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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
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NASA NTRS2009

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

Development of Detectability Limits for On-Orbit Inspection of Space Shuttle Wing Leading Edge

At the conclusion of the Columbia Accident Investigation, one of the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was that NASA develop and implement an inspection plan for the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system components of the Space Shuttle. To address these issues, a group of scientists and engineers at NASA Langley Research Center proposed the use of an IR camera to inspect the RCC. Any crack in an RCC panel changes the thermal resistance of the material in the direction perpendicular to the crack. The change in thermal resistance can be made visible by introducing a heat flow across the crack and using an IR camera to image the resulting surface temperature distribution. The temperature difference across the crack depends on the change in the thermal resistance, the length of the crack, the local thermal gradient, and the rate of radiation exchange with the environment. This paper describes how the authors derived the minimum thermal gradient detectability limits for a through crack in an RCC panel. This paper will also show, through the use of a transient, 3-dimensional, finite element model, that these minimum gradients naturally exist on-orbit. The results from the finite element model confirm that there are sufficient thermal gradient to detect a crack on 96% of the RCC leading edge.

Stephan, Ryan A.↗
NASA NTRS2004

InvestigationOrganizer: The Development and Testing of a Web-based Tool to Support Mishap Investigations

InvestigationOrganizer (IO) is a collaborative web-based system designed to support the conduct of mishap investigations. IO provides a common repository for a wide range of mishap related information, and allows investigators to make explicit, shared, and meaningful links between evidence, causal models, findings and recommendations. It integrates the functionality of a database, a common document repository, a semantic knowledge network, a rule-based inference engine, and causal modeling and visualization. Thus far, IO has been used to support four mishap investigations within NASA, ranging from a small property damage case to the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. This paper describes how the functionality of IO supports mishap investigations and the lessons learned from the experience of supporting two of the NASA mishap investigations: the Columbia Accident Investigation and the CONTOUR Loss Investigation.

Carvalho, Robert F.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Shuttle Propulsion Overview to NATO

In the early morning on Saturday, February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up during entry. After extensive investigation of the accident and recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, President Bush gave the vision for space exploration for NASA, which include return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practical, complete assembly of the ISS by the end of the decade, initiate robotic missions to the moon no later than 2008, develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle, conduct first robotic, then human missions to Mars and extend human exploration across the solar system.

Lightfoot, Robert↗
NASA NTRS1979

Proceedings: Third Annual Workshop on Meteorological and Environmental Inputs to Aviation Systems

The proceedings of a workshop on meteorological and environmental inputs to aviation systems are reported. The major objectives of the workshop are to satisfy such needs of the sponsoring agencies as the expansion of our understanding and knowledge of the interaction of the atmosphere with aviation systems, the better definition and implementation of services to operators, and the collection and interpretation of data for establishing operational criteria, relating the total meteorological inputs from the atmospheric sciences to the needs of aviation communities. The unique aspect of the workshop was the achievement of communication across the interface of the boundaries between pilots, meteorologists, training personnel, accident investigators, traffic controllers, flight operation personnel from military, civil, general aviation, and commercial interests alike. Representatives were in attendance from government, airlines, private agencies, aircraft manufacturers, Department of Defense, industries, research institutes, and universities. Full-length papers addressed the topics of training, flight operations, accident investigation, air traffic control, and airports. Winds and wind shear; icing and frost; atmospheric electricity and lightning; fog, visibility and ceilings; and turbulence were discussed.

Camp, D. W.↗
NASA NTRS2009

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations (M and S): Development Process and Rationale

After the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report. the NASA Administrator at that time chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify the CAIB report elements with Agency-wide applicability, and to develop corrective measures to address each element. This report documents the chronological development and release of an Agency-wide Standard for Models and Simulations (M&S) (NASA Standard 7009) in response to Action #4 from the report, "A Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, January 30, 2004".

Zang, Thomas A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Orbital Debris Shape and Orientation Effects on Impact Damage to Shuttle Tiles

Taking the damage results from a previous paper as a guide, and using a tile model created for the STS-107 accident investigation, we used the SPHC hydrodynamic code to evaluate the probable worst-case impact effects of flat, rectangular, "flake-shaped," orbital debris particles on Space Shuttle thermal tiles. We compared the damage from flakes with that produced by spheres. The flakes and spheres were sized according to a "characteristic length" (Lc) derived from radar cross-section measurements, and embodied in the NASA Standard Breakup Model (SBM). Impacts were simulated at near-normal obliquity, at 12 km/sec. We modeled the worst-case flake orientation: a corner-on impact, an orientation we term a "Face A-B" impact. Results of our simulations indicate that flake impactors are less damaging than spheres of the same Lc. Since spherical impactors have been assumed in analyses of shuttle orbital debris impact risk, we find that these risks may have been overestimated. This work represents a preliminary second step, i.e., a follow-on to [1], in developing a sensitivity analysis for the expected range of effects on damage considering spherical vs. non-spherical impactors, as recommended by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Evans, Steven W.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Another Approach to Enhance Airline Safety: Using Management Safety Tools

The ultimate goal of conducting an accident investigation is to prevent similar accidents from happening again and to make operations safer system-wide. Based on the findings extracted from the investigation, the "lesson learned" becomes a genuine part of the safety database making risk management available to safety analysts. The airline industry is no exception. In the US, the FAA has advocated the usage of the System Safety concept in enhancing safety since 2000. Yet, in today s usage of System Safety, the airline industry mainly focuses on risk management, which is a reactive process of the System Safety discipline. In order to extend the merit of System Safety and to prevent accidents beforehand, a specific System Safety tool needs to be applied; so a model of hazard prediction can be formed. To do so, the authors initiated this study by reviewing 189 final accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) covering FAR Part 121 scheduled operations. The discovered accident causes (direct hazards) were categorized into 10 groups Flight Operations, Ground Crew, Turbulence, Maintenance, Foreign Object Damage (FOD), Flight Attendant, Air Traffic Control, Manufacturer, Passenger, and Federal Aviation Administration. These direct hazards were associated with 36 root factors prepared for an error-elimination model using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a leading tool for System Safety experts. An FTA block-diagram model was created, followed by a probability simulation of accidents. Five case studies and reports were provided in order to fully demonstrate the usefulness of System Safety tools in promoting airline safety.

Lu, Chien-tsug↗
NASA NTRS2004

SemanticOrganizer: A Customizable Semantic Repository for Distributed NASA Project Teams

SemanticOrganizer is a collaborative knowledge management system designed to support distributed NASA projects, including diverse teams of scientists, engineers, and accident investigators. The system provides a customizable, semantically structured information repository that stores work products relevant to multiple projects of differing types. SemanticOrganizer is one of the earliest and largest semantic web applications deployed at NASA to date, and has been used in diverse contexts ranging from the investigation of Space Shuttle Columbia's accident to the search for life on other planets. Although the underlying repository employs a single unified ontology, access control and ontology customization mechanisms make the repository contents appear different for each project team. This paper describes SemanticOrganizer, its customization facilities, and a sampling of its applications. The paper also summarizes some key lessons learned from building and fielding a successful semantic web application across a wide-ranging set of domains with diverse users.

Keller, Richard M.↗
NASA NTRS2015

The Human Factors of an Early Space Accident: Flight 3-65 of the X-15

The X-15 was a critical research vehicle in the early days of space flight. On November 15, 1967, the X-15-3 suffered an in-flight breakup. This 191st flight of the X-15 and the 65th flight of this third configuration was the only fatal accident of the X-15 program. This paper presents an analysis, from a human factors perspective, of the events that led up to the accident. The analysis is based on the information contained in the report of the Air Force-NASA Accident Investigation Board (AIB) dated January, 1968. The AIBs analysis addressed, primarily, the events that occurred subsequent to the pilots taking direct control of the reaction control system. The analysis described here suggests that all of the events that caused the accident occurred well before the moment when the pilot switched to direct control. Consequently, the analyses and conclusions regarding the causal factors of, and the contributing factors to, the loss of Flight 3-65 presented here differ from those of the AIB based on the same evidence. Although the accident occurred in 1967, the results of the presented analysis are still relevant today. We present our analysis and discuss its implications for the safety of space operations.

accident investigation↗
NASA NTRS2005

Backstop: Shuttle Will Fly with Outstanding Waivers; New Oversight Eases Conflicts on Safety

he space shuttle Discovery is carrying some 300 waivers to technical specifications as it enters the home stretch of its planned return to flight next month. There were about 6,000 waivers in place when Columbia crashed. Shuttle managers say they are working to reduce the number of waivers remaining by fixing the problems they highlight, a change prompted by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. In the wake of the accident, NASA has heeded the CAWS recommendation that waivers be the responsibility of an "independent technical authority" (ITA), rather than the shuttle program itself. To carry out the recommendation of the CAIB-which found an inherent conflict of interest in having the same managers make decisions about cost, schedule and safety-then-Administrator Sean O'Keefe designated the agency's chief engineer as the formal ITA. He is responsible for setting, maintaining and granting waivers across the agency. In mid-January, Fred Gregory, then O'Keefe's deputy and now his acting replacement, launched the ITA within NASA under Chief Engineer Rex Geveden, the former program manager on the Gravity Probe B experiment.

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Characterization of Deposits on Glass Substrate as a Tool in Failure Analysis: The Orbiter Vehicle Columbia Case Study

In connection with the accident investigation of the space shuttle Columbia, an analysis methodology utilizing well established microscopic and spectroscopic techniques was implemented for evaluating the environment to which the exterior fused silica glass was exposed. Through the implementation of optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, energy dispersive spectroscopy, transmission electron microscopy, and electron diffraction, details emerged regarding the manner in which a charred metallic deposited layer formed on top of the exposed glass. Due to nature of the substrate and the materials deposited, the methodology proved to allow for a more detailed analysis of the vehicle breakup. By contrast, similar analytical methodologies on metallic substrates have proven to be challenging due to strong potential for error resulting from substrate contamination. This information proved to be valuable to not only those involved in investigating the break up of Columbia, but also provides a potential guide for investigating future high altitude and high energy accidents.

Olivas, J. D.↗