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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Identification and evaluation for the mercury solar photovoltaic array and battery energy storage system, area 23, nevada national security site, nye county, nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to construct a solar photovoltaic (PV) energy generation array and an associated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in the town of Mercury at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The purposes of the development of this facility are to support long-term efforts to modernize Mercury and to provide energy-resilient infrastructure and climate adaptation needs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Big Hole Drilling Support for Nuclear Testing, 1985-1992: An Architectural Survey of the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) planned to demolish two buildings at the Area 1 Subdock at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet environmental management mission requirements. A review was conducted under Title 54 United States Code (USC) § 306101 (commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. As a result, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was developed to mitigate the effects of the building demolitions. Stipulation III.B of the MOA requires an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock. Prior to this survey, the Subdock had not been systematically recorded. Therefore, an area of approximately 33 hectares (81 acres) was surveyed for historic properties by Desert Research Institute personnel. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the potential Area 1 Subdock Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D377), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended as eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C. It contains 14 primary resources which include individual buildings, structures, storage yards, and infrastructure. Of these resources, all except one are recommended as elements that contribute to the district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1985 through 1992. Four of the resources (B18847, B18848, S2772, S2773) are recommended as individually eligible for the NRHP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Architecture of Area 12 Camp - Nevada's Atomic Ghost Town. An Architectural Survey of Area 12 Camp, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish 10 buildings and one structure in Area 12 Camp at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Program, and Environmental Management mission requirements and to reduce dangers to site workers from some of these resources. These demolitions constitute an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. These resources were recorded and evaluated as individually ineligible for the National Register of Historic Places (National Register or NRHP) by Menocal and Shaw (2019). Upon review by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and internal review by Desert Research Institute (DRI) and NNSA/NFO staff, it was determined that these resources needed to be rerecorded and evaluated in relation to what appeared to be a National Register-eligible Historic District made up of the entirety of Area 12 Camp. Based on preliminary information, it appeared that all 11 resources would likely be contributing elements of that historic district. With that assumption in mind, recording of the entire proposed Area 12 Camp Historic District was done for three purposes. First, it would result in a definitive significance evaluation of the 11 resources in question. Second, recording of the entire camp would be offered as an appropriate mitigation measure for the demolition of these resources. Third, it would present an essential background for future management of resources within the district boundaries. Prior to the present survey, Area 12 Camp had not yet been systematically recorded; therefore, DRI surveyed an area of approximately 229 acres for architectural resources. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended eligible for the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A and C. It is unevaluated under Criteria B and D. The Area 12 Historic District contains 71 Principal Resources, which include landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, 69 (including 10 of the 11 resources to be removed) are recommended as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1960 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the government reservation now called the NNSS was named the Nevada Test Site (NTS).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Submission of Mitigation Documentation Related to the Demolition of Building 12-7, Area 12 Camp, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the demolition of Building 12-7 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B18287) in the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Building 12-7 is a contributing element to the historic district. This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25555 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding the Removal of Buildings 12-7 and 12-30 in the Area 12 Camp of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the MOA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Submission of Mitigation Documentation Related to the Demolition of Building 12-30, Area 12 Camp, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the demolition of Building 12-30 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B18289) in the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Building 12-30 is a contributing element to the historic district. This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25555 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding the Removal of Buildings 12-7 and 12-30 in the Area 12 Camp of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the MOA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Time-frequency based cyber security defense of wide-area control system for fast frequency reserve

Global power systems are transiting from conventional fossil fuel energy to renewable energies due to their environmental benefits. The increasing penetration of renewable energies presents challenges for power system operation. The efficiency and sufficiency of responsive reserves have become increasingly important for power systems with a high proportion of renewable energies. The Fast Frequency Reserve (FFR), especially the Wide-area Monitoring System (WAMS)-based FFR, is a promising and effective solution to secure and enhance the stability of power systems. However, cyber security has become a new challenge for the WAMS-based FFR system. Cyber attacks on the FFR control system may threaten the safety of power system operation due to the rapid power controllability requirement of FFR. Therefore, to address this problem, a time-frequency based cyber security defense framework is proposed to detect the cyber spoofing of synchrophasor data in WAMS-based FFR control systems. This paper first introduces the Continuous Wavelet Transforms (CWTs) to decompose spoofing signals. Then, the Dual-frequency Scale Convolutional Neural Networks (DSCNN) is proposed to identify the time-frequency domains matrix from two frequency scales. Integrating CWTs and DSCNN, an identification framework called CWTs-DSCNN is further proposed to detect the spoofing attacks in the WAMS-based FFR system. Multiple experiments using the actual data from FNET/GridEye are performed to verify the effectiveness of the framework in securing WAMS-based FFR systems.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of ROI for Workforce Development Efforts National & Homeland Security

The IDEAL Professional Engagement project at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) aims to enhance the laboratory's workforce diversity and inclusivity efforts, focusing on the U.S. National and Homeland Security mission areas. This project involves researching and evaluating opportunities for INL to engage in various professional events, particularly cyber conferences, to support recruitment and professional development. The project involved several key tasks: compiling comprehensive information on national laboratories and their mission statements, developing a deep understanding of INL’s role and efforts in national and homeland security, and identifying and engaging key stakeholders. Interviews were conducted with a set of targeted questions, and the findings were analyzed to identify common themes, insights, and actionable recommendations. Additionally, relevant upcoming cyber conferences were identified, various sponsorship levels and their associated benefits were evaluated, and the recruitment potential of these conferences was assessed. A detailed cost analysis was performed, including registration fees and travel expenses, and a cost-benefit analysis was conducted to evaluate the financial viability and potential return on investment (ROI) of conference participation and sponsorship. Based on the research and analysis, actionable recommendations for conference participation and sponsorship were formulated, ensuring alignment with INL’s mission and diversity goals. Preliminary results include a comprehensive list of relevant cyber conferences, a detailed cost analysis, and a set of actionable recommendations for future conference participation and sponsorship. The analysis highlights the financial requirements and geographical distribution of these conferences, providing valuable insights for INL's engagement strategies. This project underscores the importance of strategic engagement in professional events to attract and develop a diverse and skilled workforce, ultimately supporting INL’s mission areas in U.S. National and Homeland Security.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Calendar Year 2024 Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Letter Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Rev. 1

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada (referred to herein as “the Plan”) (DOE/EMNV, 2025) describes the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s UGTA Activity. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (DOE/EMNV, 2024), and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Mitigation for Removal of Building 01-202681 in the Main Storage Yard of the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The Main Storage Yard was originally recorded as SHPO Resource No. S2772 in 2020 during an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock (Collins et al. 2022). It was recommended individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria A and C and as contributing to the significance of the potential Area 1 Subdock Historic District. The SHPO concurred with these determinations in a letter dated April 29, 2022 (Reed). The Main Storage Yard retains all seven aspects of integrity. The location, design, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association have not changed since the original construction. Since the purpose of the yard is to maintain storage equipment that is actively being used, the design and feeling will change each time equipment is moved. Such actions reinforce the integrity of design and feeling. Buildings 01-101 and 01-102 were removed (Collins and Menocal 2020), but the other buildings and storage yard remain. Therefore, the setting has been changed, but not to the degree that the Main Storage Yard no longer conveys its significance (see Figures 4 and 5 for comparison). The Main Storage Yard was designed to facilitate the relocation of the Area 3 Subdock to Area 1 in 1985. The design for the overall Subdock provided a centralized cluster of buildings surrounded by two large storage yards. While the North Storage Yard largely serves as overflow storage, the Main Storage Yard holds the majority of drill rigs and drilling equipment needed to support big hole drilling. The Main Storage Yard and its contents were essential elements of the nuclear testing drilling program on the NNSS thus making it eligible for the NRHP under Criterion A for its contribution to broad patterns of history by storing specially designed equipment for underground nuclear testing at the NNSS. It is also eligible under Criterion C as it is an engineered landscape that now serves as an open-air repository of drilling technology and nuclear testing. In addition to its individual significance, the Main Storage Yard also contributes to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District as it showcases a variety of big-hole drilling equipment, support facilities, and warehouses that were specially designed for nuclear testing at the NNSS. Despite the demolition of two contributing elements to date, the district still contains numerous examples of other facilities with the purpose of supporting big-hole drilling; therefore, the district still remains eligible under Criteria A and C.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Mitigation for Removal of Building 01-103 in the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

Building 01-103, the Drill Bit Repair Building was originally recorded as SHPO Resource No. B18848 in 2020 during an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock (Collins et al. 2022). It was recommended individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria A and C and contributing to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District. The SHPO concurred with these determinations in a letter dated April 29, 2022 (Reed 2022). The Drill Bit Repair Building retains all seven aspects of integrity. The location, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association have not changed since its original construction. The design was modified slightly in 1996 with the addition of a removable and non-destructive chain-link fence. Nearby buildings 01-101 and 01-102 were removed (Collins and Menocal 2020) but the other buildings and storage yards remain. Therefore, the integrity of setting has been changed, but not to the degree that the building no longer conveys its significance (see Figures 4 and 5 for comparison). Building 01-103 was constructed in 1985 to coincide with the relocation of the Area 3 Subdock to Area 1. The design for the new Subdock provided a centralized cluster of buildings surrounded by two large storage yards. The buildings included administrative and engineering office space, warehouses, a radiograph building, and Building 01-103 as the drill bit maintenance and repair building, among others. The Drill Bit Repair Building was critical to the success of underground nuclear testing and is eligible under Criterion A for its contribution to broad patterns of history by maintaining specially designed equipment for underground nuclear testing at the NNSS. It is also eligible under Criterion C as it is the only recorded example of a facility built specifically for the maintenance of big-hole drill bits on the NNSS. As it retains both significance and integrity, it remains individually eligible under Criteria A and C. In addition to its individual significance, the Drill Bit Repair Building also contributes to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District as a representative of a big-hole drilling support facility necessary for underground nuclear testing. The building and the equipment therein were designed specifically for testing at the NNSS, where much of the early technology and methods for big-hole drilling were developed. Its removal will result in not only the demolition of a contributing element but also a change in the physical features of the district’s setting that contribute to its historic significance. The change in setting will diminish the district’s integrity. However, the district still contains numerous examples of other buildings constructed for the purpose of supporting big-hole drilling and remains eligible under Criteria A and C.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Area 6 Control Point: An Architectural Survey of the Area 6 Control Point, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) proposes to demolish five buildings and five accessory resources in the Area 6 Control Point at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The demolition and removal of the buildings and accessories constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. The buildings and accessories were recorded in Identification and Evaluation of 14 Architectural Resources Scheduled for Demolition, Area 6 Control Point and Vicinity, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2020). The report found that the five buildings were not individually eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) but were potentially eligible as contributing elements to an unrecorded Area 6 Control Point district. The report also found that the five accessory resources were not individually eligible for the NRHP but they contributed to other historic properties, including the contributing elements to the unrecorded district. Finally, the report found that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect to historic properties. The State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings regarding the eligibility of the buildings and structures in the Area of Potential Effect (APE) and that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect (Reed 2020). The NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, then developed the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-21NA25543 Between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Demolition of Fourteen Buildings and Structures in Area 6 of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, hereafter referred to as the MOA. The MOA stipulates that a district boundary be delineated with an accompanying boundary report and supporting photographs (Stipulation III.A) followed by an architectural survey of the potential historic district (Stipulation III.B). The SHPO reviewed and concurred with the proposed district boundary and accompanying boundary report and photographs (O’Neill et al. 2021) on August 23, 2021, in fulfillment of Stipulation III.A (Reed 2021). This architectural survey report has been prepared in accordance with Stipulation III.B. It includes an NRHP evaluation of the district, identifies contributing and non-contributing elements, and is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms. The NRHP evaluation concludes that the Area 6 Control Point is recommended eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criterion A at the national level as the location of the command center and various support facilities directly related to timing and firing operations for nuclear testing on the NNSS from 1951 to 1992. It is also recommended eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characteristics of a nuclear command center in the context of the Cold War and as a significant and distinguishable entity. There are a total of 29 primary resources within the district boundary. Of these, 28 are recommended as contributing elements to the Area 6 Control Point Historic District and one is recommended as non-contributing.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 114: Area 25 EMAD Facility Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 114, Area 25 EMAD Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 114 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: • 25-41-03, EMAD Facility (Building 3900) • 25-99-23, Manned Control Car (MCC) and Engine Installation Vehicle (EIV) • 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building (Train Shed) This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAU 114. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 114 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective actions for CAU 114. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of corrective actions will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. The purpose of the corrective action investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. If specific conditions or findings fall outside the bounds of the conceptual site model, such as an unanticipated release, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine the path forward before proceeding. Upon completion of SAFER activities, a closure report (CR) will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The schedule for completion of the CR will be established in consultation with NDEP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

How Low Can You Go? Using Synthetic 3D Imagery to Drastically Reduce Real-World Training Data for Object Detection

Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) currently provide state-of-the-art performance on image classification and object detection tasks, and there are many global security mission areas where such models could be extremely useful. Crucially, the success of these models is driven in large part by the widespread availability of high-quality open source data sets such as Image Net, Common Objects in Context (COCO), and KITTI, which contain millions of images with thousands of unique labels. However, global security relevant objects-of-interest can be difficult to obtain: relevant events are low frequency and high consequence; the content of relevant images is sensitive; and adversaries and proliferators seek to obscure their activities. For these cases where exemplar data is hard to come-by, even fine-tuning an existing model with available data can be effectively impossible. Recent work demonstrated that models can be trained using a combination of real-world and synthetic images generated from 3D representations; that such models can exceed the performance of models trained using real-world data alone; and that the generated images need not be perfectly realistic (Tremblay, et al., 2018). However, this approach still required hundreds to thousands of real-world images for training and fine tuning, which for sparse, global security-relevant datasets can be an unrealistic hurdle. In this research, we validate the performance and behavior of DCNN models as we drive the number of real-world images used for training object detection tasks down to a minimal set. We perform multiple experiments to identify the best approach to train DCNNs from an extremely small set of real-world images. In doing so, we: Develop state-of-the-art, parameterized 3D models based on real-world images and sample from their parameters to increase the variance in synthetic image training data; Use machine learning explainability techniques to highlight and correct through targeted training the biases that result from training using completely synthetic images; and Validate our results by comparing the performance of the models trained on synthetic data to one another, and to a control model created by fine-tuning an existing ImageNet-trained model with a limited number (hundreds) of real-world images.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 114: Area 25 EMAD Facility Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, (Rev.0, with ROTC 1)

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 114, Area 25 EMAD Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 114 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (formerly, the Nevada Test Site): 25-41-03, EMAD Facility; 25-99-23, Manned Control Car (MCC) and Engine Installation Vehicle (EIV); and 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building. This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAU 114. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 114 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective actions for CAU 114. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of corrective actions will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. The purpose of the corrective action investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. If specific conditions or findings fall outside the bounds of the SAFER Plan, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine the path forward before proceeding. Upon completion of SAFER activities, a closure report will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The schedule for completion of the closure report will be established at the FFACO annual meeting.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗