Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Alarm Systems”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Personal Alarm System

Trouble in the classroom is an unpleasant fact of modern life. Space technology can't stop the trouble from occurring, but it can prevent it from spreading. In recognition of this, NASA and the Sacramento, Cal. Unified School District developed a personal security system based on space telemetry technology. The first application was for schools, but the simplicity and reliability of the system has made it more widely applicable. The heart of the system is an ultrasonic pen-size transmitter. It can be used by prison guards, teachers, or others such as the handicapped and the elderly.

Source record↗

Evaluation of Oak Ridge National Laboratory Health Physics Research Reactor Operation Data for Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Creation

Over the last few decades, the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Working Group has focused on gathering critical and subcritical benchmark experiment data from different facilities around the world for inclusion in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook). The compiled data can be used by criticality safety analysts to help validate their calculation tools and cross-section libraries for a variety of applications.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).

42 ENGINEERING↗

A new APDS approach - alarm processing based on alarm prioritization - 201

We take for granted that the advances in technology bring improvements to the conditions in which humans perform activities associated to them. Is that the case for digital alarm systems in nuclear power plants? The answer is not that simple. A review of the related literature, shows that still, the single most significant problem with alarm systems, is the large number of alarm messages presented to the operator at once. This is an issue that affects analog I and C control rooms with conventional annunciators and gets aggravated in digital I and C based control rooms. Digital alarm systems present the alarms in the form of lists in computer screens. This kind of presentation forces the operator to scroll or navigate pages to review the active alarms. Also, the alarm lists do not allow the operator to apply the pattern recognition practices acquired during training when using with fixed position alarm systems. An Alarm Processing and Diagnostic System (APDS) facilitates the alarm monitoring task by applying alarm reduction techniques based on alarm priorities. It allows the operators to focus on the most important alarms during plant upsets. A new generation of APDS should be based in an improved alarm analysis methodology. To develop such methodology, Tecnatom reviewed applicable standards and our own alarm analysis experiences. This paper documents the process and conclusions of the methodology development. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Alarm rationalization: practical experience rationalizing alarm configuration for an accelerator subsystem

A new alarm system toolkit has been implemented at SNS. The toolkit handles the Central Control Room (CCR) 'annunciator', or audio alarms. For the new alarm system to be effective, the alarms must be meaningful and properly configured. Along with the implementation of the new alarm toolkit, a thorough documentation and rationalization of the alarm configuration is taking place. Requirements and maintenance of a robust alarm configuration have been gathered from system and operations experts. In this paper we present our practical experience with the vacuum system alarm handling configuration of the alarm toolkit.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Incorporating realistic conservatism into criticality alarm placement and emergency response: a regulatory perspective - 14425

Review of historical process plant criticality accidents shows that their consequences vary widely and are extremely difficult to predict accurately. Because of the wide variability and inherent uncertainty in estimating consequences, criticality detector placement analysis and consequence estimation for emergency response typically utilize very conservative assumptions with regard to the total fissions, time-dependent fission rate, and intervening shielding. For detector placement, a 'minimum accident of concern' is typically defined, whereas emergency consequence evaluations typically define a maximum fission source term. These require different mindsets because what is conservative for one type of analysis may be non-conservative for the other. While some conservatism is commonly practiced in both cases, excessive conservatism can result in a net increase in risk, such as resulting from inadvertent alarm activations, that can be costly to operations and counterproductive to safety. Conversely, reliance on very detailed calculational models to reduce conservatism could increase the number and complexity of controls, such as shielding for dose mitigation. Deterministic regulatory criteria have also been applied for determining where criticality detectors are to be deployed and what areas must be evacuated in the event of an accident. This paper explores several issues associated with criticality alarm placement and emergency response from a regulatory perspective. This paper will discuss insights gained from historical fuel facility accidents and significant events regarding the inherent risk of criticality, the most likely locations for criticality to occur, and the most probable characteristics of a critical excursion. This will include discussion of the previously disputed relevance of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (USNRC's) longstanding model for a critical excursion. While USNRC regulations deterministically require dual alarm coverage in all areas having greater than a 'critical mass' of fissionable material, a process is provided to grant exemptions when a risk-informed argument is technically justified. Similar risk-informed considerations have been used to justify compensatory measures allowing limited operation during periods of alarm system outage due to component failure or maintenance. This paper will explore the application of risk information and performance history to address requirements for criticality alarm system coverage, granting exemptions from deterministic criteria, allowing compensatory measures during system outages, determining evacuation areas and routes, and assessing the significance associated with alarm system issues. Finally, the impact of shielding on the USNRC's regulatory risk basis and approved subcritical margin will be reviewed. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Alarms Philosophy

An effective alarm system consists of a mechanism to monitor control points and generate alarm notifications, tools for operators to view, hear, acknowledge and handle alarms and a good configuration. Despite the availability of numerous fully featured tools, accelerator alarm systems continue to be disappointing to operations, frequently to the point of alarms being permanently silenced or totally ignored. This is often due to configurations that produce an excessive number of alarms or fail to communicate the required operator response. Most accelerator controls systems do a good job of monitoring specified points and generating notifications when parameters exceed predefined limits. In some cases, improved tools can help, but more often, poor configuration is the root cause of ineffective alarm systems. A SNS, we have invested considerable effort in generating appropriate configurations using a rigorous set of rules based on best practices in the industrial process controls community. This paper will discuss our alarm configuration philosophy and operator response to our new system.

alarms↗

Spillage detector for liquid chromatography systems

A spillage detector device for use in conjunction with fractionation of liquid chromatography systems which includes a spillage recieving enclosure beneath the fractionation area is described. A sensing device having a plurality of electrodes of alternating polarity is mounted within the spillage recieving enclosure. Detection circuitry, responsive to conductivity between electrodes, is operatively connected to the sensing device. The detection circuitry feeds into the output circuitry. The output circuit has relaying and switching circuitry directed to a solenoid, an alarm system and a pump. The solenoid is connected to the pliable conduit of the chromatography system. The alarm system comprises an audio alarm and a visual signal. A 115-volt power system interconnected with the pump, the solenoid, the sensing device, and the detection and output circuitry.

Jarvis, M. J.↗

Rocky Flats Neutron Detector Testing at Valduc, France

Recent program requirements of the US Department of Energy/NNSA have led to a need for a criticality accident alarm system to be installed at a newly activated facility. The Criticality Safety Group of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was able to recover and store for possible future use approximately 200 neutron criticality detectors and 20 master alarm panels from the former Rocky Flats Plant in Golden, Colorado when the plant was closed. The Criticality Safety Group participated in a facility analysis and evaluation, the engineering design and review process, as well as the refurbishment, testing, and recalibration of the Rocky Flats criticality alarm system equipment to be used in the new facility. In order to demonstrate the functionality and survivability of the neutron detectors to the effects of an actual criticality accident, neutron detector testing was performed at the French CEA Valduc SILENE reactor from October 7 to October 19, 2010. The neutron detectors were exposed to three criticality events or pulses generated by the SILENE reactor. The first excursion was performed with a bare or unshielded reactor, and the second excursion was made with a lead shielded/reflected reactor, and the third excursion with a polyethylene reflected core. These tests of the Rocky Flats neutron detectors were performed as a part of the 2010 Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Measurements at the SILENE Reactor. The principal investigators for this series of experiments were Thomas M. Miller and John C. Wagner of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with Nicolas Authier and Nathalie Baclet of CEA Valduc. Several other organizations were also represented, including the Y-12 National Security Complex, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, CEA Saclay, and Babcock International Group.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Experiment Design and Preparation for a Shielding Benchmark Utilizing Godiva-IV

An experiment is currently being designed to provide a high-quality shielding benchmark for Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) modeling. Previous benchmarks have suffered from uncertainty primarily due to two factors. The first factor is radiation that is not directly coming from the source, also known as room return. Room return is notoriously difficult to account for in experimental data and to model in benchmarks. The second factor is uncertainty associated with the source term itself. In order to reduce these two sources of uncertainty, this experiment will utilize a room return shield [1] that will reduce the effect of room return and previous work performed to ensure the reproducibility of the source term. The experiment will use the Godiva IV [2] assembly located at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) to provide a neutron source representative of a criticality accident. Previous experiments [3]-[4] have shown that Godiva IV is capable of producing both bursts and steady-state emissions of equal magnitude which will allow for reduced uncertainty in the source term. The room return shield will house and isolate the shielding samples, neutron activation foils, and other detectors. Data collected will provide a comparison of the neutron and gamma dose for shielded and unshielded configurations. This data will be used to validate shielding data used for modeling criticality accident alarm systems. Shielding samples included in this benchmark are C, Fe, NaCl, Pb, high density polyethylene, and SiO 2 . This paper details the design of the room return shield, the experimental plan, challenges, and mitigation strategies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Development of human machine interface (HMI) for digital control rooms in nuclear power plants - 119

The analog control systems of traditional Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are being replaced by digital systems due to the fact that analog Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems are becoming obsolete and such technology is no longer supported by manufacturers. The purpose of this study is to jointly evaluate the performance of an operator with a Human Machine Interface (HMI) in a NPP digital control room ensuring the efficiency and the safety of the NPP. The validity and the accuracy of the operators' actions are the primary goals that have to be preserved through the emergence of the HMI based in digital systems. The transition from analog to digital control systems leads to a more advanced support of the NPP; Video Display Units (VDUs) are used for monitoring the state of the NPP while alarm systems help for directing attention. The operators, in order to monitor information from the different VDUs, have to switch attention between different screens (alarms systems and control systems). Therefore, a well-established HMI is a significant challenge to the overall operation of the NPP, that actually helps the operators to learn from the available information in detecting possible anomalies and making the right decisions, to ensure safety, and in parallel to diminish the human error. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

FAULT DIAGNOSIS WITH MULTI-STATE ALARMS IN A NUCLEAR POWER CONTROL SIMULATOR

This research addresses how alarm systems can increase operator performance within nuclear power plant operations. The experiment examined the effect of two types of alarm systems (two-state and three-state alarms) on alarm compliance and diagnosis for two types of faults differing in complexity. We hypothesized three-state alarms would improve performance in alarm recognition and fault diagnoses over that of two-state alarms. We used sensitivity and criterion based on Signal Detection Theory to measure performance. We further hypothesized that operator trust would be highest when using three-state alarms. The findings from this research showed participants performed better and had more trust in three-state alarms compared to two-state alarms. Furthermore, these findings have significant theoretical implications and practical applications as they apply to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear power plant operations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Fault Diagnosis with Multi-State Alarms in a Nuclear Power Control Simulation

This research addresses how alarm systems can increase operator performance within nuclear power plant operations. The experiment examined the effects of two types of alarm systems (two-state and three-state alarms) on alarm compliance and diagnosis for two types of faults differing in complexity. We hypothesized the use of three-state alarms would improve performance in alarm recognition and fault diagnoses over that of two-state alarms. Sensitivity and criterion based on the Signal Detection Theory were used to measure performance. We further hypothesized that operator trust would be highest when using three-state alarms. The findings from this research showed participants performed better and had more trust in three-state alarms compared to two-state alarms. Furthermore, these findings have significant theoretical implications and practical applications as they apply to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear power plant operations.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗