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Robotic and Human-Tended Collaborative Drilling Automation for Subsurface Exploration

Future in-situ lunar/martian resource utilization and characterization, as well as the scientific search for life on Mars, will require access to the subsurface and hence drilling. Drilling on Earth is hard - an art form more than an engineering discipline. Human operators listen and feel drill string vibrations coming from kilometers underground. Abundant mass and energy make it possible for terrestrial drilling to employ brute-force approaches to failure recovery and system performance issues. Space drilling will require intelligent and autonomous systems for robotic exploration and to support human exploration. Eventual in-situ resource utilization will require deep drilling with probable human-tended operation of large-bore drills, but initial lunar subsurface exploration and near-term ISRU will be accomplished with lightweight, rover-deployable or standalone drills capable of penetrating a few tens of meters in depth. These lightweight exploration drills have a direct counterpart in terrestrial prospecting and ore-body location, and will be designed to operate either human-tended or automated. NASA and industry now are acquiring experience in developing and building low-mass automated planetary prototype drills to design and build a pre-flight lunar prototype targeted for 2011-12 flight opportunities. A successful system will include development of drilling hardware, and automated control software to operate it safely and effectively. This includes control of the drilling hardware, state estimation of both the hardware and the lithography being drilled and state of the hole, and potentially planning and scheduling software suitable for uncertain situations such as drilling. Given that Humans on the Moon or Mars are unlikely to be able to spend protracted EVA periods at a drill site, both human-tended and robotic access to planetary subsurfaces will require some degree of standalone, autonomous drilling capability. Human-robotic coordination will be important, either between a robotic drill and humans on Earth, or a human-tended drill and its visiting crew. The Mars Analog Rio Tinto Experiment (MARTE) is a current project that studies and simulates the remote science operations between an automated drill in Spain and a distant, distributed human science team. The Drilling Automation for Mars Exploration (DAME) project, by contrast: is developing and testing standalone automation at a lunar/martian impact crater analog site in Arctic Canada. The drill hardware in both projects is a hardened, evolved version of the Advanced Deep Drill (ADD) developed by Honeybee Robotics for the Mars Subsurface Program. The current ADD is capable of 20m, and the DAME project is developing diagnostic and executive software for hands-off surface operations of the evolved version of this drill. The current drill automation architecture being developed by NASA and tested in 2004-06 at analog sites in the Arctic and Spain will add downhole diagnosis of different strata, bit wear detection, and dynamic replanning capabilities when unexpected failures or drilling conditions are discovered in conjunction with simulated mission operations and remote science planning. The most important determinant of future 1unar and martian drilling automation and staffing requirements will be the actual performance of automated prototype drilling hardware systems in field trials in simulated mission operations. It is difficult to accurately predict the level of automation and human interaction that will be needed for a lunar-deployed drill without first having extensive experience with the robotic control of prototype drill systems under realistic analog field conditions. Drill-specific failure modes and software design flaws will become most apparent at this stage. DAME will develop and test drill automation software and hardware under stressful operating conditions during several planned field campaigns. Initial results from summer 2004 tests show seven identifi distinct failure modes of the drill: cuttings-removal issues with low-power drilling into permafrost, and successful steps at executive control and initial automation.

Glass, Brian

Bayesian Safety Risk Modeling of Human-Flightdeck Automation Interaction

Usage of automatic systems in airliners has increased fuel efficiency, added extra capabilities, enhanced safety and reliability, as well as provide improved passenger comfort since its introduction in the late 80's. However, original automation benefits, including reduced flight crew workload, human errors or training requirements, were not achieved as originally expected. Instead, automation introduced new failure modes, redistributed, and sometimes increased workload, brought in new cognitive and attention demands, and increased training requirements. Modern airliners have numerous flight modes, providing more flexibility (and inherently more complexity) to the flight crew. However, the price to pay for the increased flexibility is the need for increased mode awareness, as well as the need to supervise, understand, and predict automated system behavior. Also, over-reliance on automation is linked to manual flight skill degradation and complacency in commercial pilots. As a result, recent accidents involving human errors are often caused by the interactions between humans and the automated systems (e.g., the breakdown in man-machine coordination), deteriorated manual flying skills, and/or loss of situational awareness due to heavy dependence on automated systems. This paper describes the development of the increased complexity and reliance on automation baseline model, named FLAP for FLightdeck Automation Problems. The model development process starts with a comprehensive literature review followed by the construction of a framework comprised of high-level causal factors leading to an automation-related flight anomaly. The framework was then converted into a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) using the Hugin Software v7.8. The effects of automation on flight crew are incorporated into the model, including flight skill degradation, increased cognitive demand and training requirements along with their interactions. Besides flight crew deficiencies, automation system failures and anomalies of avionic systems are also incorporated. The resultant model helps simulate the emergence of automation-related issues in today's modern airliners from a top-down, generalized approach, which serves as a platform to evaluate NASA developed technologies

Ancel, Ersin

Pilot opinions on high level flight deck automation issues: Toward the development of a design philosophy

There has been much concern in recent years about the rapid increase in automation on commercial flight decks. The survey was composed of three major sections. The first section asked pilots to rate different automation components that exist on the latest commercial aircraft regarding their obtrusiveness and the attention and effort required in using them. The second section addressed general 'automation philosophy' issues. The third section focused on issues related to levels and amount of automation. The results indicate that pilots of advanced aircraft like their automation, use it, and would welcome more automation. However, they also believe that automation has many disadvantages, especially fully autonomous automation. They want their automation to be simple and reliable and to produce predictable results. The biggest needs for higher levels of automation were in pre-flight, communication, systems management, and task management functions, planning as well as response tasks, and high workload situations. There is an irony and a challenge in the implications of these findings. On the one hand pilots would like new automation to be simple and reliable, but they need it to support the most complex part of the job--managing and planning tasks in high workload situations.

Tenney, Yvette J.

Effects of Automation Types on Air Traffic Controller Situation Awareness and Performance

The Joint Planning and Development Office has proposed the introduction of automated systems to help air traffic controllers handle the increasing volume of air traffic in the next two decades (JPDO, 2007). Because fully automated systems leave operators out of the decision-making loop (e.g., Billings, 1991), it is important to determine the right level and type of automation that will keep air traffic controllers in the loop. This study examined the differences in the situation awareness (SA) and collision detection performance of individuals when they worked with information acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection and action implementation automation to control air traffic (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). When the automation was unreliable, the time taken to detect an upcoming collision was significantly longer for all the automation types compared with the information acquisition automation. This poor performance following automation failure was mediated by SA, with lower SA yielding poor performance. Thus, the costs associated with automation failure are greater when automation is applied to higher order stages of information processing. Results have practical implications for automation design and development of SA training programs.

Sethumadhavan, A.

Cost-Effective Telemetry and Command Ground Systems Automation Strategy for the Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) Mission

Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) is an Earth-orbiting, remote-sensing NASA mission slated for launch in 2014. The ground data system (GDS) being developed for SMAP is composed of many heterogeneous subsystems, ranging from those that support planning and sequencing to those used for real-time operations, and even further to those that enable science data exchange. A full end-to-end automation of the GDS may result in cost savings during mission operations, but it would require a significant upfront investment to develop such a comprehensive automation. As demonstrated by the Jason-1 and Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) missions, a measure of "lights-out" automation for routine, orbital pass, ground operations can still reduce mission costs through smaller staffing of operators and limiting their working hours. The challenge, then, for the SMAP GDS engineering team, is to formulate an automated operations strategy--and corresponding system architecture -- to minimize operator intervention during routine operations, while balancing the development costs associated with the scope and complexity of automation. This paper discusses the automated operations approach being developed for the SMAP GDS. The focus is on automating the activities involved in routine passes, which limits the scope to real-time operations. A key subsystem of the SMAP GDS -- NASA's AMMOS Mission Data Processing and Control System (AMPCS) -- provides a set of capabilities that enable such automation. Also discussed are the lights-out pass automations of the Jason-1 and WISE missions and how they informed the automation strategy for SMAP. The paper aims to provide insights into what is necessary in automating the GDS operations for Earth satellite missions.

soil moisture

Cost-Effective Telemetry and Command Ground Systems Automation Strategy for the Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) Mission

Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) is an Earth-orbiting, remote-sensing NASA mission slated for launch in 2014.[double dagger] The ground data system (GDS) being developed for SMAP is composed of many heterogeneous subsystems, ranging from those that support planning and sequencing to those used for real-time operations, and even further to those that enable science data exchange. A full end-to-end automation of the GDS may result in cost savings during mission operations, but it would require a significant upfront investment to develop such comprehensive automation. As demonstrated by the Jason-1 and Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) missions, a measure of "lights-out" automation for routine, orbital pass ground operations can still reduce mission cost through smaller staffing of operators and limited work hours. The challenge, then, for the SMAP GDS engineering team is to formulate an automated operations strategy--and corresponding system architecture--to minimize operator intervention during operations, while balancing the development cost associated with the scope and complexity of automation. This paper discusses the automated operations approach being developed for the SMAP GDS. The focus is on automating the activities involved in routine passes, which limits the scope to real-time operations. A key subsystem of the SMAP GDS--NASA's AMMOS Mission Data Processing and Control System (AMPCS)--provides a set of capabilities that enable such automation. Also discussed are the lights-out pass automations of the Jason-1 and WISE missions and how they informed the automation strategy for SMAP. The paper aims to provide insights into what is necessary in automating the GDS operations for Earth satellite missions.

remote-sensing

Human Automation Teaming: Lessons Learned and Future Directions

Full autonomy seems to be the goal for system developers in almost every area of the economy. However, as we move from automated systems to autonomous systems, designers have needed to insert humans to oversee automation that has traditionally been brittle or incomplete. This creates its own problems as the operator is usually out of the loop when the automation hands over problems that it cannot handle. To better handle these situations, it has been proposed that we develop human automation teams that have shared goals and objectives to support task performance. This paper will describe an initial model of Human Automation Teaming (HAT) which has three elements: transparency, bi-directional communications, and human-directed execution. Transparency in our model is a method for giving insight into the reasoning behind automated recommendations and actions, bi-directional communication allows the operator to communicate directly with the automation, and finally the automation defers execution to the human. The model was implemented through a number of features on an electronic flight bag (EFB) which are described in the paper. The EFB was installed in a mid-fidelity flight simulator and used by 12 airline pilots to support diversion decisions during off-nominal flight scenarios. Pilots reported that working with the HAT automation made diversion decisions easier and reduced their workload. They also reported that the information provided about diversion airports was similar to what they would receive from ground dispatch, thus making coordination with dispatch easier and less time consuming. These HAT features engender more trust in the automation when appropriate, and less when not, allowing improved supervision of automated functions by flight crews.

Human-Autonomy Teaming

Automated fault-management in a simulated spaceflight micro-world

BACKGROUND: As human spaceflight missions extend in duration and distance from Earth, a self-sufficient crew will bear far greater onboard responsibility and authority for mission success. This will increase the need for automated fault management (FM). Human factors issues in the use of such systems include maintenance of cognitive skill, situational awareness (SA), trust in automation, and workload. This study examine the human performance consequences of operator use of intelligent FM support in interaction with an autonomous, space-related, atmospheric control system. METHODS: An expert system representing a model-base reasoning agent supported operators at a low level of automation (LOA) by a computerized fault finding guide, at a medium LOA by an automated diagnosis and recovery advisory, and at a high LOA by automate diagnosis and recovery implementation, subject to operator approval or veto. Ten percent of the experimental trials involved complete failure of FM support. RESULTS: Benefits of automation were reflected in more accurate diagnoses, shorter fault identification time, and reduced subjective operator workload. Unexpectedly, fault identification times deteriorated more at the medium than at the high LOA during automation failure. Analyses of information sampling behavior showed that offloading operators from recovery implementation during reliable automation enabled operators at high LOA to engage in fault assessment activities CONCLUSIONS: The potential threat to SA imposed by high-level automation, in which decision advisories are automatically generated, need not inevitably be counteracted by choosing a lower LOA. Instead, freeing operator cognitive resources by automatic implementation of recover plans at a higher LOA can promote better fault comprehension, so long as the automation interface is designed to support efficient information sampling.

NASA Discipline Space Human Factors

Controller Inhibition of Automated Conflict Resolutions in a Maximum NextGen Condition

With the continued projection of increases in air traffic density, operations in the National Airspace System are expected to exceed human capabilities in the near future. In order to address the bottleneck of human workload capacity, highly automated safety-critical systems are under development to support air traffic controllers. A human-in-the-loop experiment examined controllers transition through four NextGen automation stages: Current-Day, Minimum, Moderate, and Maximum. Maximum NextGen simulated a fully automated environment where the automation was responsible for detecting and resolving conflicts within simulation parameters in high-density airspace. By allocating these tasks to the automation, the controllers task changed. The human moved to primarily a supervisory position- typically only regaining control over separation assurance tasks during conflict situations deferred by the automation. While tasks were allocated a-priori between the controller and automated agent, controllers maintained authority to inhibit the automation from interacting with particular aircraft. Preliminary work is complete, where significant differences were found in inhibition frequency between simulation participants. However, the contexts in which the controllers inhibited the automation, and their reasons for doing so, remain unclear. This analysis attempts to identity factors contributing to human controllers inhibition of the automation in the Maximum NextGen condition.

adaptable automation

Space biology initiative program definition review. Trade study 1: Automation costs versus crew utilization

A significant emphasis upon automation within the Space Biology Initiative hardware appears justified in order to conserve crew labor and crew training effort. Two generic forms of automation were identified: automation of data and information handling and decision making, and the automation of material handling, transfer, and processing. The use of automatic data acquisition, expert systems, robots, and machine vision will increase the volume of experiments and quality of results. The automation described may also influence efforts to miniaturize and modularize the large array of SBI hardware identified to date. The cost and benefit model developed appears to be a useful guideline for SBI equipment specifiers and designers. Additional refinements would enhance the validity of the model. Two NASA automation pilot programs, 'The Principal Investigator in a Box' and 'Rack Mounted Robots' were investigated and found to be quite appropriate for adaptation to the SBI program. There are other in-house NASA efforts that provide technology that may be appropriate for the SBI program. Important data is believed to exist in advanced medical labs throughout the U.S., Japan, and Europe. The information and data processing in medical analysis equipment is highly automated and future trends reveal continued progress in this area. However, automation of material handling and processing has progressed in a limited manner because the medical labs are not affected by the power and space constraints that Space Station medical equipment is faced with. Therefore, NASA's major emphasis in automation will require a lead effort in the automation of material handling to achieve optimal crew utilization.

Jackson, L. Neal

Methodology for Prototyping Increased Levels of Automation for Spacecraft Rendezvous Functions

The Crew Exploration Vehicle necessitates higher levels of automation than previous NASA vehicles, due to program requirements for automation, including Automated Rendezvous and Docking. Studies of spacecraft development often point to the locus of decision-making authority between humans and computers (i.e. automation) as a prime driver for cost, safety, and mission success. Therefore, a critical component in the Crew Exploration Vehicle development is the determination of the correct level of automation. To identify the appropriate levels of automation and autonomy to design into a human space flight vehicle, NASA has created the Function-specific Level of Autonomy and Automation Tool. This paper develops a methodology for prototyping increased levels of automation for spacecraft rendezvous functions. This methodology is used to evaluate the accuracy of the Function-specific Level of Autonomy and Automation Tool specified levels of automation, via prototyping. Spacecraft rendezvous planning tasks are selected and then prototyped in Matlab using Fuzzy Logic techniques and existing Space Shuttle rendezvous trajectory algorithms.

Hart, Jeremy J.

Configuring the Orion Guidance, Navigation, and Control Flight Software for Automated Sequencing

The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle is being designed with greater automation capabilities than any other crewed spacecraft in NASA s history. The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) flight software architecture is designed to provide a flexible and evolvable framework that accommodates increasing levels of automation over time. Within the GN&C flight software, a data-driven approach is used to configure software. This approach allows data reconfiguration and updates to automated sequences without requiring recompilation of the software. Because of the great dependency of the automation and the flight software on the configuration data, the data management is a vital component of the processes for software certification, mission design, and flight operations. To enable the automated sequencing and data configuration of the GN&C subsystem on Orion, a desktop database configuration tool has been developed. The database tool allows the specification of the GN&C activity sequences, the automated transitions in the software, and the corresponding parameter reconfigurations. These aspects of the GN&C automation on Orion are all coordinated via data management, and the database tool provides the ability to test the automation capabilities during the development of the GN&C software. In addition to providing the infrastructure to manage the GN&C automation, the database tool has been designed with capabilities to import and export artifacts for simulation analysis and documentation purposes. Furthermore, the database configuration tool, currently used to manage simulation data, is envisioned to evolve into a mission planning tool for generating and testing GN&C software sequences and configurations. A key enabler of the GN&C automation design, the database tool allows both the creation and maintenance of the data artifacts, as well as serving the critical role of helping to manage, visualize, and understand the data-driven parameters both during software development and throughout the life of the Orion project.

Odegard, Ryan G.

MOC Automation with GMSEC and the Generic Extendable Message Utility (GEMU)

Automation has become critical for ground systems, improving efficiency and reliability while reducing costs across mission operations. The Goddard Mission Services Evolution Center (GMSEC) software suite has played a significant role in enabling this automation, leveraging its publish/subscribe paradigm through a message bus architecture to facilitate seamless communication and data flow. Historically, the GMSEC suite, through components like Criteria Action Table (CAT) has been pivotal in automating ground system capabilities. However, as technology advances, limitations in automation with CAT have emerged, creating an opportunity to enhance ground system automation through the introduction of GEMU. This new GMSEC component brings new capabilities and addresses specific automation constraints that CAT could not overcome, allowing for more sophisticated, flexible, and efficient message processing. GEMU, at its core, is designed to accelerate the development of custom GMSEC-compliant applications. It enables users to construct automated message processing pipelines quickly, supporting both drag-and-drop web-based configuration and scripting through a simple domain-specific language. This advancement not only simplifies the process but also reduces the time needed for implementing automated solutions. This presentation will outline GEMU’s potential value in improving mission operations automation. It will highlight the benefits of transitioning from CAT to GEMU and offer insights into how GEMU can drive operational efficiencies. We will also provide an overview of the automation capabilities of GEMU and its potential impact on mission operations centers (MOCs).

GMSEC

A Meta-Analytic Approach to Investigating the Relationship Between Human-Automation Trust and Attention Allocation

Trust and attention allocation are pivotal determinants in human-automation interaction. However, there are scarce empirical findings regarding the relationship between trust and attention allocation. Observations from our previous work suggested there may be a negative correlation between trust in automation and eye movement towards automation, though no formal analysis of these data had been conducted to quantify this relationship. The present meta-analysis examined the relationship between three dimensions of trust in automation (performance, process, and purpose) and visual attention allocation to the automation. Specifically, we applied Cumming’s (2014) meta-analysis technique to combine evidence across three experiments. Results indicated a negative correlation between trust in automation and visual sampling of the automated system monitoring task for performance-based trust, but not for process- or purpose-based trust. These findings suggest that operators scanned the automation’s behavior less frequently when indicating higher performance-based trust towards the automation.

Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT)

Team play with a powerful and independent agent: operational experiences and automation surprises on the Airbus A-320

Research and operational experience have shown that one of the major problems with pilot-automation interaction is a lack of mode awareness (i.e., the current and future status and behavior of the automation). As a result, pilots sometimes experience so-called automation surprises when the automation takes an unexpected action or fails to behave as anticipated. A lack of mode awareness and automation surprises can he viewed as symptoms of a mismatch between human and machine properties and capabilities. Changes in automation design can therefore he expected to affect the likelihood and nature of problems encountered by pilots. Previous studies have focused exclusively on early generation "glass cockpit" aircraft that were designed based on a similar automation philosophy. To find out whether similar difficulties with maintaining mode awareness are encountered on more advanced aircraft, a corpus of automation surprises was gathered from pilots of the Airbus A-320, an aircraft characterized by high levels of autonomy, authority, and complexity. To understand the underlying reasons for reported breakdowns in human-automation coordination, we also asked pilots about their monitoring strategies and their experiences with and attitude toward the unique design of flight controls on this aircraft.

NASA Discipline Space Human Factors

A Comparison Between Orion Automated and Space Shuttle Rendezvous Techniques

The Orion spacecraft will replace the space shuttle and will be the first human spacecraft since the Apollo program to leave low earth orbit. This vehicle will serve as the cornerstone of a complete space transportation system with a myriad of mission requirements necessitating rendezvous to multiple vehicles in earth orbit, around the moon and eventually beyond . These goals will require a complex and robust vehicle that is, significantly different from both the space shuttle and the command module of the Apollo program. Historically, orbit operations have been accomplished with heavy reliance on ground support and manual crew reconfiguration and monitoring. One major difference with Orion is that automation will be incorporated as a key element of the man-vehicle system. The automated system will consist of software devoted to transitioning between events based on a master timeline. This effectively adds a layer of high level sequencing that moves control of the vehicle from one phase to the next. This type of automated control is not entirely new to spacecraft since the shuttle uses a version of this during ascent and entry operations. During shuttle orbit operations however many of the software modes and hardware switches must be manually configured through the use of printed procedures and instructions voiced from the ground. The goal of the automation scheme on Orion is to extend high level automation to all flight phases. The move towards automation represents a large shift from current space shuttle operations, and so these new systems will be adopted gradually via various safeguards. These include features such as authority-to-proceed, manual down modes, and functional inhibits. This paper describes the contrast between the manual and ground approach of the space shuttle and the proposed automation of the Orion vehicle. I will introduce typical orbit operations that are common to all rendezvous missions and go on to describe the current Orion automation architecture and contrast it with shuttle rendezvous techniques and circumstances. The shuttle rendezvous profile is timed to take approximately 3 days from orbit insertion to docking at the International Space Station (ISS). This process can be divided into 3 phases: far-field, mid-field and proximity operations. The far-field stage is characterized as the most quiescent phase. The spacecraft is usually too far to navigate using relative sensors and uses the Inertial Measurement Units (IMU s) to numerically solve for its position. The maneuvers are infrequent, roughly twice per day, and are larger than other burns in the profile. The shuttle uses this opportunity to take extensive ground based radar updates and keep high fidelity orbit states on the ground. This state is then periodically uplinked to the shuttle computers. The targeting solutions for burn maneuvers are also computed on the ground and uplinked. During the burn the crew is responsible for setting the shuttle attitude and configuring the propulsion system for ignition. Again this entire process is manually driven by both crew and ground activity. The only automatic processes that occur are associated with the real-time execution of the burn. The Orion automated functionality will seek to relieve the workload of both the crew and ground during this phase

Ruiz, Jose O,

Integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering into Process Automation

As organizations increasingly automate their core missions and essential functions to address business risks and enhance efficiency, process automation becomes pivotal. This shift, involving minimal or no manual intervention, significantly impacts an organization's cyber-risk landscape. While automation drives efficiencies, it also introduces new cyber risks if not properly managed. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) provides a proactive framework for managing these digital risks, enhancing cyber-resilience in process automation. This document supports organizations in applying CIE principles to mitigate the cyber risks associated with automation. The outlined approach can be independently implemented to improve any organization’s cyber-resilience, ensuring that the advantages of automation do not result in unaddressed or unmanaged digital risks. It serves as a starting point, offering considerations for integrating CIE principles and practices into organizational processes. CIE is presented as an iterative process, fostering continuous improvement and reinforcing the engineering and operational cultures to manage digital risks effectively. The document is structured as follows: Section 1 provides background on CIE and process automation, and their integration. Section 2 explores the twelve CIE principles in the context of process automation, highlighting key questions, engineering considerations, and implications for digital risk management. Section 3 synthesizes the findings and offers recommendations to advance resilience by design.

42 - ENGINEERING

Transitioning Resolution Responsibility between the Controller and Automation Team in Simulated NextGen Separation Assurance

As part of an ongoing research effort on separation assurance and functional allocation in NextGen, a controller- in-the-loop study with ground-based automation was conducted at NASA Ames' Airspace Operations Laboratory in August 2012 to investigate the potential impact of introducing self-separating aircraft in progressively advanced NextGen timeframes. From this larger study, the current exploratory analysis of controller-automation interaction styles focuses on the last and most far-term time frame. Measurements were recorded that firstly verified the continued operational validity of this iteration of the ground-based functional allocation automation concept in forecast traffic densities up to 2x that of current day high altitude en-route sectors. Additionally, with greater levels of fully automated conflict detection and resolution as well as the introduction of intervention functionality, objective and subjective analyses showed a range of passive to active controller- automation interaction styles between the participants. Not only did the controllers work with the automation to meet their safety and capacity goals in the simulated future NextGen timeframe, they did so in different ways and with different attitudes of trust/use of the automation. Taken as a whole, the results showed that the prototyped controller-automation functional allocation framework was very flexible and successful overall.

NextGen