Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “CERTIFICATION”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1994

Role of Wind Tunnels and Computer Codes in the Certification and Qualification of Rotorcraft for Flight in Forecast Icing

The cost and time to certify or qualify a rotorcraft for flight in forecast icing has been a major impediment to the development of ice protection systems for helicopter rotors. Development and flight test programs for those aircraft that have achieved certification or qualification for flight in icing conditions have taken many years, and the costs have been very high. NASA, Sikorsky, and others have been conducting research into alternative means for providing information for the development of ice protection systems, and subsequent flight testing to substantiate the air-worthiness of a rotor ice protection system. Model rotor icing tests conducted in 1989 and 1993 have provided a data base for correlation of codes, and for the validation of wind tunnel icing test techniques. This paper summarizes this research, showing test and correlation trends as functions of cloud liquid water content, rotor lift, flight speed, and ambient temperature. Molds were made of several of the ice formations on the rotor blades. These molds were used to form simulated ice on the rotor blades, and the blades were then tested in a wind tunnel to determine flight performance characteristics. These simulated-ice rotor performance tests are discussed in the paper. The levels of correlation achieved and the role of these tools (codes and wind tunnel tests) in flight test planning, testing, and extension of flight data to the limits of the icing envelope are discussed. The potential application of simulated ice, the NASA LEWICE computer, the Sikorsky Generalized Rotor Performance aerodynamic computer code, and NASA Icing Research Tunnel rotor tests in a rotorcraft certification or qualification program are also discussed. The correlation of these computer codes with tunnel test data is presented, and a procedure or process to use these methods as part of a certification or qualification program is introduced.

Flemming, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Certification methodology applied to the NASA experimental radar system

The objective of the research is to apply selected FAA certification techniques to the NASA experimental wind shear radar system. Although there is no intent to certify the NASA system, the procedures developed may prove useful to manufacturers that plan to undergo the certification process. The certification methodology for forward-looking wind shear detection radars will require estimation of system performance in several FAA-specified microburst/clutter scenarios as well as the estimation of probabilities of missed and false hazard alerts under general operational conditions. Because of the near-impossibility of obtaining these results experimentally, analytical and simulation approaches must be used. Hazard detection algorithms were developed that derived predictive estimates of aircraft hazard from basic radar measurements of weather reflectivity and radial wind velocity. These algorithms were designed to prevent false alarms due to ground clutter while providing accurate predictions of hazard to the aircraft due to weather. A method of calculation of the probability of missed and false hazard alerts has been developed that takes into account the effect of the various algorithms used in the system and provides estimates of the probability of missed and false alerts per microburst encounter under weather conditions found at Denver, Kansas City, and Orlando. Simulation techniques have been developed that permit the proper merging of radar ground clutter data (obtained from flight tests) with simulated microburst data (obtained from microburst models) to estimate system performance using the microburst/clutter scenarios defined by the FAA.

Britt, Charles L.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Integrating human factors knowledge into certification: The point of view of the Internatioanal Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

It is appropriate here to repeat the analogy described in the introduction to this paper which is that: The consideration of human factors requirements during the design stage of advanced, new technology systems may be seen as resting over a three-legged stool. The first leg, the equipment that a system will utilize to achieve its goals, has traditionally attracted ergonomic considerations associated with equipment design, usually centered around 'knobs and dials.' Lately, this view has expanded to include the so-called other important aspect of Human Factor's study which deals with the cognitive, behaviorial and social processes of the human operators. Study in this area must be furthered. The second leg of the stool, the procedures to operate the equipment, however, has been largely unaddressed. Procedures are not inherent to equipment, but must be developed. The importance of proper human factors consideration in the design of procedures can not be overstated. Lastly, the third leg of the stool, the certification of personnel who will operate the equipment, is very much underway, but far from being complete. The real quest now, however, is to integrate these three legs into an indivisible one. Finally, and most importantly, this workshop and its topic are extremely timely in that we are at the dawn of the most ambitious development ever undertaken in international civil aviation. This would allow us the rather unique opportunity to put theory into practice in the near future by ensuring that the concepts developed and furthered by this workshop and the follow-up are implemented in the design and certification of the ICAO future CNS/ATM systems described earlier in this paper. Now is the time to incorporate human factors requirements during the certification processes of these systems. This might act as a test to the feasibility of these ideas. Such endeavors represent a challenge for the research, engineering, training, operational and regulatory communities. But there is certainly more to be gained by attempting to meet the challenge rather than refraining from progress by decrying the difficulties involved.

Maurino, Daniel↗
NASA NTRS1994

Certification for civil flight decks and the human-computer interface

This paper will address the issue of human factor aspects of civil flight deck certification, with emphasis on the pilot's interface with automation. In particular, three questions will be asked that relate to this certification process: (1) are the methods, data, and guidelines available from human factors to adequately address the problems of certifying as safe and error tolerant the complex automated systems of modern civil transport aircraft; (2) do aircraft manufacturers effectively apply human factors information during the aircraft flight deck design process; and (3) do regulatory authorities effectively apply human factors information during the aircraft certification process?

Mcclumpha, Andrew J.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Beware of agents when flying aircraft: Basic principles behind a generic methodology for the evaluation and certification of advanced aviation systems

There is currently a growing interest in the aeronautical community to assess the effects of the increasing levels of automation on pilots' performance and overall safety. The first effect of automation is the change in the nature of the pilot's role on the flight deck. Pilots have become supervisors who monitor aircraft systems in usual situations and intervene only when unanticipated events occur. Instead of 'hand flying' the airplane, pilots contribute to the control of aircraft by acting as mediators, instructions given to the automation. By eliminating the need for manually controlling normal situations, such a role division has reduced the opportunities for the pilot to acquire experience and skills necessary to safely cope with abnormal events. Difficulties in assessing the state and behavior of automation arise mainly from four factors: (1) the complexity of current systems and consequence mode-related problems; (2) the intrinsic autonomy of automation which is able to fire mode transitions without explicit commands from the pilots; (3) the bad quality of feed-back from the control systems displays and interfaces to the pilots; and (4) the fact that the automation currently has no explicit representation of the current pilots' intentions and strategy. Assuming certification has among its major goals to guarantee the passengers' and pilots' safety and the airplane integrity under normal and abnormal operational conditions, the authors suggest it would be particularly fruitful to come up with a conceptual reference system providing the certification authorities both with a theoretical framework and a list of principles usable for assessing the quality of the equipment and designs under examination. This is precisely the scope of this paper. However, the authors recognize that the conceptual presented is still under development and would thus be best considered as a source of reflection for the design, evaluation and certification processes of advanced aviation technologies.

Javaux, Denis↗
NASA NTRS1997

Midcourse Space Experiment Data Certification and Technology Transfer

The University of Alabama in Huntsville contributes to the Technical Management of the Midcourse Space Experiment Program, to the Certification of the Level 2 data produced by the Midcourse Space Experiment's suite of in-orbit imaging radiometers, imaging spectra-radiometers and an interferometer and to the Transfer of the Midcourse Space Experiment Technology to other Government Programs. The Technical Management of the Midcourse Space Experiment Program is expected to continue through out the spacecraft's useful life time, 5 years after its 1996 launch. The Transfer of Midcourse Space Experiment Technology to other government elements is expected to be on a demand basis by the United States Government and other organizations. The University of Alabama Huntsville' contribution specifically supports the nine Ultraviolet Visible Imagers and Spectrographic Imagers (UVISI) and the Pointing and Alignment of all eleven of the science instruments. The science instruments effectively cover the 0.1 to 28 micron spectral region. The Midcourse Space Experiment spacecraft, launched April 24, 1996, is expected to have a 5 year useful lifetime with a 12 month lifetime for the cryogenically cooled IR sensor. A pre-launch, ground based calibration of the instruments provided a basis for the pre-launch certification of the Level 2 data base these instruments produce. With the spacecraft in-orbit the certification of the instruments' Level 2 data base is being extended to the in-orbit environment.

Pollock, David B.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Streamlining Software Aspects of Certification: Technical Team Report on the First Industry Workshop

To address concerns about time and expense associated with software aspects of certification, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began the Streamlining Software Aspects of Certification (SSAC) program. As part of this program, a Technical Team was established to determine whether the cost and time associated with certifying aircraft can be reduced while maintaining or improving safety, with the intent of impacting the FAA's Flight 2000 program. The Technical Team conducted a workshop to gain a better understanding of the major concerns in industry about software cost and schedule. Over 120 people attended the workshop, including representatives from the FAA,commercial transport and general aviation aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, and procurers and developers of non-airborne systems; and, more than 200 issues about software aspects of certification were recorded. This paper provides an overview of the SSAC program, motivation for the workshop, details of the workshop activities and outcomes, and recommendations for follow-on work.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Noise Certification Predictions for FJX-2-Powered Aircraft Using Analytic Methods

Williams International Co. is currently developing the 700-pound thrust class FJX-2 turbofan engine for the general Aviation Propulsion Program's Turbine Engine Element. As part of the 1996 NASA-Williams cooperative working agreement, NASA agreed to analytically calculate the noise certification levels of the FJX-2-powered V-Jet II test bed aircraft. Although the V-Jet II is a demonstration aircraft that is unlikely to be produced and certified, the noise results presented here may be considered to be representative of the noise levels of small, general aviation jet aircraft that the FJX-2 would power. A single engine variant of the V-Jet II, the V-Jet I concept airplane, is also considered. Reported in this paper are the analytically predicted FJX-2/V-Jet noise levels appropriate for Federal Aviation Regulation certification. Also reported are FJX-2/V-Jet noise levels using noise metrics appropriate for the propeller-driven aircraft that will be its major market competition, as well as a sensitivity analysis of the certification noise levels to major system uncertainties.

Berton, Jeffrey J.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Certification of a Modified Research Public Aircraft

NASA Ames Research Center has several aircraft that have been modified to conduct aeronautical and scientific research. NASA's purpose is to provide research to improve safety of flight and support scientific research for Mission to Planet Earth. Our research and platform aircraft have been modified to fit the needs of the scientific and research programs. Because NASA's aircraft have been modified and operated as public aircraft, certification of airworthiness on many are not current. Some of our aircraft are military aircraft and were never certificated. This paper discusses the process of bringing a modified B200 King Air aircraft certification current to meet Federal Aviation Regulations.

Forsyth, T. J.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Modular Certification

Airplanes are certified as a whole: there is no established basis for separately certifying some components, particularly software-intensive ones, independently of their specific application in a given airplane. The absence of separate certification inhibits the development of modular components that could be largely "precertified" and used in several different contexts within a single airplane, or across many different airplanes. In this report, we examine the issues in modular certification of software components and propose an approach based on assume-guarantee reasoning. We extend the method from verification to certification by considering behavior in the presence of failures. This exposes the need for partitioning, and separation of assumptions and guarantees into normal and abnormal cases. We then identify three classes of property that must be verified within this framework: safe function, true guarantees, and controlled failure. We identify a particular assume-guarantee proof rule (due to McMillan) that is appropriate to the applications considered, and formally verify its soundness in PVS.

Rushby, John↗
NASA NTRS2006

Crash Certification by Analysis - Are We There Yet?

This paper addresses the issue of crash certification by analysis. This broad topic encompasses many ancillary issues including model validation procedures, uncertainty in test data and analysis models, probabilistic techniques for test-analysis correlation, verification of the mathematical formulation, and establishment of appropriate qualification requirements. This paper will focus on certification requirements for crashworthiness of military helicopters; capabilities of the current analysis codes used for crash modeling and simulation, including some examples of simulations from the literature to illustrate the current approach to model validation; and future directions needed to achieve "crash certification by analysis."

Jackson, Karen E.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Deriving Safety Cases for the Formal Safety Certification of Automatically Generated Code

We present an approach to systematically derive safety cases for automatically generated code from information collected during a formal, Hoare-style safety certification of the code. This safety case makes explicit the formal and informal reasoning principles, and reveals the top-level assumptions and external dependencies that must be taken into account; however, the evidence still comes from the formal safety proofs. It uses a generic goal-based argument that is instantiated with respect to the certified safety property (i.e., safety claims) and the program. This will be combined with a complementary safety case that argues the safety of the framework itself, in particular the correctness of the Hoare rules with respect to the safety property and the trustworthiness of the certification system and its individual components. Keywords: Automated code generation, Hoare logic, formal code certification, safety case, Goal Structuring Notation.

Basir, Nurlida↗
NASA NTRS2013

Certification-Based Process Analysis

Space mission architects are often challenged with knowing which investment in technology infusion will have the highest return. Certification-based analysis (CBA) gives architects and technologists a means to communicate the risks and advantages of infusing technologies at various points in a process. Various alternatives can be compared, and requirements based on supporting streamlining or automation can be derived and levied on candidate technologies. CBA is a technique for analyzing a process and identifying potential areas of improvement. The process and analysis products are used to communicate between technologists and architects. Process means any of the standard representations of a production flow; in this case, any individual steps leading to products, which feed into other steps, until the final product is produced at the end. This sort of process is common for space mission operations, where a set of goals is reduced eventually to a fully vetted command sequence to be sent to the spacecraft. Fully vetting a product is synonymous with certification. For some types of products, this is referred to as verification and validation, and for others it is referred to as checking. Fundamentally, certification is the step in the process where one insures that a product works as intended, and contains no flaws.

Knight, Russell L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Uncertainty Quantification and Certification Prediction of Low-Boom Supersonic Aircraft Configurations

The primary objective of this work was to develop and demonstrate a process for accurate and efficient uncertainty quantification and certification prediction of low-boom, supersonic, transport aircraft. High-fidelity computational fluid dynamics models of multiple low-boom configurations were investigated including the Lockheed Martin SEEB-ALR body of revolution, the NASA 69 Delta Wing, and the Lockheed Martin 1021-01 configuration. A nonintrusive polynomial chaos surrogate modeling approach was used for reduced computational cost of propagating mixed, inherent (aleatory) and model-form (epistemic) uncertainty from both the computation fluid dynamics model and the near-field to ground level propagation model. A methodology has also been introduced to quantify the plausibility of a design to pass a certification under uncertainty. Results of this study include the analysis of each of the three configurations of interest under inviscid and fully turbulent flow assumptions. A comparison of the uncertainty outputs and sensitivity analyses between the configurations is also given. The results of this study illustrate the flexibility and robustness of the developed framework as a tool for uncertainty quantification and certification prediction of low-boom, supersonic aircraft.

West, Thomas K., IV↗
NASA NTRS2008

Towards Certification of a Space System Application of Fault Detection and Isolation

Advanced fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR) software is being investigated at NASA as a means to the improve reliability and availability of its space systems. Certification is a critical step in the acceptance of such software. Its attainment hinges on performing the necessary verification and validation to show that the software will fulfill its requirements in the intended setting. Presented herein is our ongoing work to plan for the certification of a pilot application of advanced FDIR software in a NASA setting. We describe the application, and the key challenges and opportunities it offers for certification.

Software verification↗
NASA NTRS2016

Certification Strategies using Run-Time Safety Assurance for Part 23 Autopilot Systems

Part 23 aircraft operation, and in particular general aviation, is relatively unsafe when compared to other common forms of vehicle travel. Currently, there exists technologies that could increase safety statistics for these aircraft; however, the high burden and cost of performing the requisite safety critical certification processes for these systems limits their proliferation. For this reason, many entities, including the Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, and the US Air Force, are considering new options for certification for technologies that will improve aircraft safety. Of particular interest, are low cost autopilot systems for general aviation aircraft, as these systems have the potential to positively and significantly affect safety statistics. This paper proposes new systems and techniques, leveraging run-time verification, for the assurance of general aviation autopilot systems, which would be used to supplement the current certification process and provide a viable path for near-term low-cost implementation. In addition, discussions on preliminary experimentation and building the assurance case for a system, based on these principles, is provided.

automatic collision avoidance↗
NASA NTRS2018

Serious Gaming for Building a Basis of Certification via Trust and Trustworthiness of Autonomous Systems

Autonomous systems governed by a variety of adaptive and nondeterministic algorithms are being planned for inclusion into safety-critical environments, such as unmanned aircraft and space systems in both civilian and military applications. However, until autonomous systems are proven and perceived to be capable and resilient in the face of unanticipated conditions, humans will be reluctant or unable to delegate authority, remaining in control aided by machine-based information and decision support. Proving capability, or trustworthiness, is a necessary component of certification. Perceived capability is a component of trust. Trustworthiness is an attribute of a cyber-physical system that requires context-driven metrics to prove and certify. Trust is an attribute of the agents participating in the system and is gained over time and multiple interactions through trustworthy behavior and transparency. Historically, artificial intelligence and machine learning systems provide answers without explanation - without a rationale or insight into the machine “thinking”. In order to function as trusted teammates, machines must be able to explain their decisions and actions. This transparency is a product of both content and communication. NASA’s Autonomy Teaming & TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR) project seeks to build a basis for certification of autonomous systems via establishing metrics for trustworthiness and trust in multi-agent team interactions, using AI (Artificial Intelligence) explainability and persistent modeling and simulation, in the context of mission planning and execution, with analyzable trajectories. Inspired by Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG) and Serious Gaming, the proposed ATTRACTOR modeling and simulation environment is similar to online gaming environments in which player (aka agent) participants interact with each other, affect their environment, and expect the simulation to persist and change regardless of any individual agent’s active participation. This persistent simulation environment will accommodate individual agents, groups of self-organizing agents, and large-scale infrastructure behavior. The effects of the emerging adaptation and coevolution can be observed and measured to building a basis of measurable trustworthiness and trust, toward certification of safety-critical autonomous systems.

Allen, B. Danette↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Approach to Additive Manufacturing Certification: Methodologies for Qualification of Additively Manufactured Aerospace Hardware

NASA's Approach to Additive Manufacturing Certification: Methodologies for Qualification of Additively Manufactured Aerospace Hardware. This course is intended to provide guidance and practical methodologies on how to establish a qualified process and deliver certifiable hardware per the requirements in MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717. Course Objectives: Reinforce a basic understanding of AM processes; Become familiar with MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717 requirements for metallic spaceflight hardware; Appreciate integrated path to Qualification and Certification; Understand products necessary to get you to Qualification and Certification.

West, Brian↗