Knock-limited performance of several internal coolants
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The OES CO₂ Pipeline project will move captured carbon dioxide from two ethanol facilities near Gibson City, Illinois, roughly 7.8 miles southeast to three injection wells outside Anchor, where it will be permanently stored underground. The system is designed to handle up to 4.5 million metric tonnes per year of dense-phase CO₂ at pressures up to 2,500 psig, using 16-inch mainline pipe and 10.750-inch laterals made from API 5L X-60 and X-65 steel. Wall thicknesses vary depending on location, with thinner pipe in open country, heavier wall at road crossings, and the heaviest where the pipe passes under highways or railroads via horizontal directional drill. The pipe gets a fusion-bonded epoxy coating, with an added abrasion-resistant layer wherever it's bored or drilled. Major water crossings will use HDD rather than open trenching. The pipeline will be cathodically protected, equipped with SCADA-compatible pressure and temperature instrumentation, and monitored for leaks using a computational pipeline monitoring system per API RP 1130. Hydrostatic testing will be performed at 1.25 times design pressure, and an ILI caliper run will follow to catch any construction defects. Several items, including fracture toughness requirements, specific NDE methods, and ILI tool selection, are left for the detailed design phase. The whole system falls under 49 CFR Part 195 and ASME B31.4, and Gulf Interstate Engineering prepared this document as the FEED-level design basis under the CarbonSAFE Phase III program.
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This paper compares the Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) historical testing to Department of Transportation (DOT) Special Form criteria per 49 CFR Part 173, Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packages, Section 469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials as specified in DOE-STD-1027, Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities. Compliance with the aforementioned criteria allows for the exclusion of radioactive sources from the facility’s nuclear material inventory. As part of a new program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), LWRHUs are planned to be moved into TA-55, PF-5 Power Source Assembly Area (PSAA) for assembly and testing activities. The PSAA Facility is categorized as a low hazard, non-nuclear facility per DOE STD-1027 and is described in TA55-PF-5-FHC-11-001, Facility Hazard Categorization of the PSAA at PF-5, TA-55. The Facility Hazard Categorization document states, there must be documentation that radioactive sources are engineered to pass the special form testing specified by DOT in 49 CFR 173.469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials or ANSI N43.6, Sealed Radioactive Sources - Classification. This paper documents the extensive historical environmental safety testing of the LWRHU and demonstrates its ability to survive potential launch safety accident scenarios. The testing results are used herein to demonstrate through a comparative analysis that the robust design of the LWRHU meets or exceeds the special form testing specifications in 49 CFR 173.469, enabling the LWRHU to be transported and handled in PF-5 in support of testing and assembly program.
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In the 1970s, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.87 (Rev 1, June 1975) to provide interim licensing guidelines to aid applicants in implementing the 10 CFR Part 50 requirements with respect to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code (BPVC) Class 1 components operating at elevated temperatures for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, liquid-metal fast-breeder reactors, and gas-cooled fast-breeder reactors. RG 1.87 referenced ASME Code Case 1592 for materials and design and Code Cases 1593, 1594, 1595, and 1596 for fabrication and installation, examination, testing, and overpressure protection, respectively.
AI-assisted processes are expected to enhance operational efficiency and improve decision-making, supporting the long-term economic viability of nuclear power plants. However, detailed business analyses of AI-generated cost savings are rarely performed. Given the recent industry interest in Large Language Model (LLM), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program has conducted a comprehensive business case analysis of LLM Artificial Intelligence (AI) implementation in nuclear plant engineering workflows. The research employed three complementary business case approaches to evaluate impact of an LLM, using three representative engineering processes as use-cases: Boric Acid Corrosion (BAC) Evaluations, Maintenance Rule Evaluations, and 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings. Through detailed workload analyses and structured interviews, the study quantified significant efficiency improvements ranging from 11% to 59% across these processes. The research further considers how these efficiency gains could translate into tangible reliability improvements through enhanced engineering capacity. Analysis of historical plant trip data indicates that enabling engineers to focus on proactive reliability activities could provide substantial financial benefits through avoided outages, potentially generating greater value than the direct efficiency improvements alone. By documenting successful applications, implementation challenges, and strategic opportunities, this research provides nuclear utilities with a practical framework for evaluating the value of AI technology to support long-term operations through advanced digital technologies.
This report is a Final Airworthiness Validation Plan (AVP) and describes how an aircraft like X-57 does (and does not) meet current airworthiness standards. The objective of this report is to create an example certification basis, associated means of compliance (MoC), and method of compliance for a distributed electric propulsion airplane under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 21, “Certification Procedures for Products and Articles,” and its associated relevant sections of 14 CFR for “Airworthiness Standards” of Part 23, “Normal Category Airplanes,” Part 33 “Aircraft Engines,” and Part 35 “Propellers.” The approach to meet the objective is to use NASA’s X-57 Modification (Mod) IV flight demonstrator as an example and categorize its applicability to the regulations and standards according to the following three conditions: 1. Identify, where applicable, that the MoC and methods of compliance can be associated with existing Standard Specifications and Standard Practices of (ASTM) Committee F39 on Aircraft Systems and ASTM Committee F44 on General Aviation Aircraft; 2. If relevant ASTM standards do not exist, identify means and-or methods of compliance from appropriate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circulars and other sources to use for the X-57 Mod IV vehicle; or 3. If no relevant certification rule, MoC, or method of compliance exists, highlight this omission and provide recommendations.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to install a 26.45-mile-long 138-kilovolt (kV) transmission line on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. This new transmission line will upgrade the electrical transmission system and provide reliable power between Mercury Switching Station in Area 23 and the U1a Facility in Area 1. The proposed upgrade to the power transmission system constitutes an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. A portion of this new transmission line will cross the western perimeter of the Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (REECo) Maintenance Compound located in Area 6 of the NNSS. This compound with its trade shops, storage sheds, and yards served as a general construction facility that supported nuclear testing activities on the NNSS from 1967 to 1992. Although three architectural resources in the compound have previously been recorded and evaluated for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), other resources within it have not, nor has the compound been recorded and evaluated as a potential district. The State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) concurred with NNSA/NFO’s determination that the unevaluated REECo Maintenance Compound will be adversely affected by the proposed undertaking (Reed 2021). The NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, then developed the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25553 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Installation of a 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility and the Removal of the Historic 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility in Areas 1, 3, 5, 6, and 23 of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, hereafter referred to as the MOA. This architectural survey report was prepared in accordance with MOA Stipulation III.B. It describes the origins, history, layout, and functions of the REECo Maintenance Compound during the Cold War and identifies contributing and noncontributing resources. The report defines a district boundary based on archival research and the field survey and concludes with an appendix that presents digital color images of the compound with descriptions and a map key showing image viewpoints and directions. Although none of the architectural resources are recommended individually eligible, the district evaluation concludes the REECo Maintenance Compound is eligible as a historic district for listing in the NRHP under the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criteria A and C at the local level. The historic district retains all seven aspects of integrity and conveys its significance under the abovementioned criteria.
As part of this nation-wide study, in September 2006, historical survey and evaluation of NASA-owned and managed facilities that was conducted by NASA s Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. The results of this study are presented in a report entitled, "Survey and Evaluation of NASA-owned Historic Facilities and Properties in the Context of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas," prepared in November 2007 by NASA JSC s contractor, Archaeological Consultants, Inc. As a result of this survey, the Avionics Systems Laboratory (Building 16) was determined eligible for listing in the NRHP, with concurrence by the Texas State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The survey concluded that Building 5 is eligible for the NRHP under Criteria A and C in the context of the U.S. Space Shuttle program (1969-2010). Because it has achieved significance within the past 50 years, Criteria Consideration G applies. At the time of this documentation, Building 16 was still used to support the SSP as an engineering research facility, which is also sometimes used for astronaut training. This documentation package precedes any undertaking as defined by Section 106 of the NHPA, as amended, and implemented in 36 CFR Part 800, as NASA JSC has decided to proactively pursue efforts to mitigate the potential adverse affects of any future modifications to the facility. It includes a historical summary of the Space Shuttle program; the history of JSC in relation to the SSP; a narrative of the history of Building 16 and how it supported the SSP; and a physical description of the structure. In addition, photographs documenting the construction and historical use of Building 16 in support of the SSP, as well as photographs of the facility documenting the existing conditions, special technological features, and engineering details, are included. A contact sheet printed on archival paper, and an electronic copy of the work product on CD, are also provided
As part of this nation-wide study, in September 2006, historical survey and evaluation of NASA-owned and managed facilities was conducted by NASA's Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. The results of this study are presented in a report entitled, Survey and Evaluation of NASA-owned Historic Facilities and Properties in the Context of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, prepared in November 2007 by NASA JSC s contractor, Archaeological Consultants, Inc. As a result of this survey, the Communications and Tracking Development Laboratory (Building 44) was determined eligible for listing in the NRHP, with concurrence by the Texas State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The survey concluded that Building 44 is eligible for the NRHP under Criteria A and C in the context of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program (1969-2010). Because it has achieved significance within the past 50 years, Criteria Consideration G applies. At the time of this documentation, Building 44 was still used to support the SSP as an engineering research facility, which is also sometimes used for astronaut training. This documentation package precedes any undertaking as defined by Section 106 of the NHPA, as amended, and implemented by 36 CFR Part 800, as NASA JSC has decided to proactively pursue efforts to mitigate the potential adverse affects of any future modifications to the facility. It includes a historical summary of the Space Shuttle Program; the history of JSC in relation to the SSP; a narrative of the history of Building 44 and how it supported the SSP; and a physical description of the building. In addition, photographs documenting the construction and historical use of Building 44 in support of the SSP, as well as photographs of the facility documenting the existing conditions, special technological features, and engineering details, are included. A contact sheet printed on archival paper, and an electronic copy of the work product on CD, are also provided.
As part of this nation-wide study, in September 2006, historical survey and evaluation of NASA-owned and managed facilities was conducted by NASA's Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. The results of this study are presented in a report entitled, Survey and Evaluation of NASA-owned Historic Facilities and Properties in the Context of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, prepared in November 2007 by NASA JSC s contractor, Archaeological Consultants, Inc. As a result of this survey, the Mission Control Center (Building 30) was determined eligible for listing in the NRHP, with concurrence by the Texas State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The survey concluded that Building 30 is eligible for the NRHP under Criteria A and C in the context of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program (1969-2010). Because it has achieved significance within the past 50 years, Criteria Consideration G applies. It should be noted that the Mission Control Center was designated a National Historic Landmark in 1985 for its role in the Apollo 11 Lunar Landing. At the time of this documentation, Building 30 was still used to support the SSP as an engineering research facility, which is also sometimes used for astronaut training. This documentation package precedes any undertaking as defined by Section 106 of the NHPA, as amended, and implemented in 36 CFR Part 800, as NASA JSC has decided to proactively pursue efforts to mitigate the potential adverse affects of any future modifications to the facility. It includes a historical summary of the Space Shuttle program; the history of JSC in relation to the SSP; a narrative of the history of Building 30 and how it supported the SSP; and a physical description of the structure. In addition, photographs documenting the construction and historical use of Building 30 in support of the SSP, as well as photographs of the facility documenting the existing conditions, special technological features, and engineering details, are included. A contact sheet printed on archival paper, and an electronic copy of the work product on CD, are also provided.
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Demonstration seeks to develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE SNF for road-ready dry storage (RRDS); and establish the processes that will be used in a future production facility. The Packaging Demonstration will utilize the DOE Standard Canister (DOESC) for packaging select DOE-managed SNF types for interim storage, transportation and disposal as part of RRDS. Placing DOE-managed SNF into RRDS is part of the strategic framework for SNF on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. To comply with DOE, INL and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, this Code of Record establishes the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section III, Division 3 as the Code that will govern DOESC and internal support structure constructioni, with certain clarifications. This Code of Record establishes a rationale for proceeding without construction certification of the DOESC (i.e., “N-stamping) and the extent to which a Registered Professional Engineer is required for the DOE Spent Fuel Packaging Demonstration. Given the (i) standard industry practice to pursue independent licensure of commercial storage casks and transportation packages by the NRC in lieu of ASME certification and (ii) guidance provided by 10 CFR 830, DOESC construction activities need not be certified (i.e., “stamped”) to the ASME BPVC. However, additional quality assurance requirements will apply as outlined in this Code of Record.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), and the U.S. Department of Energy Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) plan to implement corrective action activities (under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, agreed to by the State of Nevada) and demolition of the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) facility and the Test Cell C Historic District. These are major components of the unrecorded Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District, which is eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register). The NRDS is in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, in Nye County, Nevada. Demolition and removal of the buildings and accessories constitutes an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800.
This report covers the inspection findings for the Routine Inspection of the Omega Bridge conducted on September 23-25, 2022 and the Fracture Critical Member (FCM) Inspection conducted on June 26-27, 2021. Note that due to complications with the under-bridge access unit, portions of the Routine Inspection and the entire FCM Inspection could not be completed in 2022. As a result, the superstructure condition reported herein is based on the 2021 inspection whereas the deck and substructure conditions are based on the 2022 inspection. The superstructure condition will be updated when the inspection is completed in 2023. The inspections were completed according to the standards referenced in EXHIBIT “D” SCOPE OF WORK AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS including the National Bridge Inspection Standards (23 CFR Part 650, dated 12/14/2004) and other FHWA, NMDOT, and AASHTO codes and standards.
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) requests variance from 10 CFR 851 (the Rule) for construction work at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The request is based upon successful application of similar variances granted to LLNS in continued support of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiative to streamline the delivery of line-item construction projects under $50 million. This request is aligned with the approved NA 50 safety approach. Experience gained in the construction of the new LLNL Emergency Operations Center (EOC) under the variance granted in June 2020 and construction preparations to date on the Digital Infrastructure Capabilities Expansion (DICE) under the variance granted April 2022 is very encouraging. There are strong indicators that a benefit has been realized by both the subcontractors executing the work and the Laboratory. The variance has permitted local/regional construction businesses contracted to Management & Operation Contractor operated facilities and lower tier subcontractors to bid, operate, execute, and comply with safety and health standards they utilize in their business outside of the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. While compliance to standards that are as safe and healthful as those in 10 CFR 851: confusion, additional cost, and inefficiencies associated with the burden of compliance to an unfamiliar regulatory spectrum has been avoided. Safety and health performance on the construction project including the number of inspection and surveillance issues is comparable to other subcontractors and projects at LLNL executed under 10 CFR 851. This variance application was prepared according to the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Subpart D – Variances, § 851.31 Variance Process. This request is limited to subcontractor executed construction at LLNL.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is responsible for providing solutions to challenging issues through multidisciplinary science, engineering, and technology that impact national security. As part of the Radioactive Air Emissions Management (RAEM) Team, it is our responsibility to ensure LANL operates within the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (Rad-NESHAP). The standard states, “Emissions of radionuclides to the ambient air from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem/yr” (EPA, 2002) During a routine assessment of LANL’s Rad-NESHAP compliance program, an opportunity for improvement was identified that addresses the evaluation of routine stack samples which potentially have naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) on the filter media. In the past and based on professional judgment, detections of NORM such as K-40 and Be-7 typically were rejected from the analytical results. The assessment finding suggested developing a technical criterion to ensure that such rejections were justified, comparing actual measured values with anticipated NORM concentrations for various stacks located at LANL. The significance of accepting or rejecting samples as “true” or “NORM” and its impact on the RAEM’s mission and compliance to the regulations is explained later in the document. Additionally, this document will describe the process and calculations for how such results are to be accepted as actual samples “true positive” or rejected as NORM.
Big Sky Laser Technologies of Bozeman, MT is a developer of compact, ruggedized commercial and developmental laser systems, including small medical lasers and Lidars used in NASA tracking applications. Company engineers developing new laser products determined that NASA technology for detection and control of prelasing in a Q-switched laser would be of value to them in at least two of their product lines. Big Sky Laser's CFR-800 unit is based on NASA technology to which they obtained a non-exclusive patent.