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NASA NTRS2017

Verification Testing: Meet User Needs Figure of Merit

Verification is the process through which Modeling and Simulation(M&S) software goes to ensure that it has been rigorously tested and debugged for its intended use. Validation confirms that said software accurately models and represents the real world system. Credibility gives an assessment of the development and testing effort that the software has gone through as well as how accurate and reliable test results are. Together, these three components form Verification, Validation, and Credibility(VV&C), the process by which all NASA modeling software is to be tested to ensure that it is ready for implementation. NASA created this process following the CAIB (Columbia Accident Investigation Board) report seeking to understand the reasons the Columbia space shuttle failed during reentry. The reports conclusion was that the accident was fully avoidable, however, among other issues, the necessary data to make an informed decision was not there and the result was complete loss of the shuttle and crew. In an effort to mitigate this problem, NASA put out their Standard for Models and Simulations, currently in version NASA-STD-7009A, in which they detailed their recommendations, requirements and rationale for the different components of VV&C. They did this with the intention that it would allow for people receiving MS software to clearly understand and have data from the past development effort. This in turn would allow the people who had not worked with the MS software before to move forward with greater confidence and efficiency in their work. This particular project looks to perform Verification on several MATLAB (Registered Trademark)(The MathWorks, Inc.) scripts that will be later implemented in a website interface. It seeks to take note and define the limits of operation, the units and significance, and the expected datatype and format of the inputs and outputs of each of the scripts. This is intended to prevent the code from attempting to make incorrect or impossible calculations. Additionally, this project will look at the coding generally and note inconsistencies, redundancies, and other aspects that may become problematic or slow down the codes run time. Certain scripts lacking in documentation also will be commented and cataloged.

validation↗
NASA NTRS2004

Test and Analysis Correlation of Form Impact onto Space Shuttle Wing Leading Edge RCC Panel 8

Soon after the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) began their study of the space shuttle Columbia accident, "physics-based" analyses using LS-DYNA were applied to characterize the expected damage to the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) leading edge from high-speed foam impacts. Forensic evidence quickly led CAIB investigators to concentrate on the left wing leading edge RCC panels. This paper will concentrate on the test of the left-wing RCC panel 8 conducted at Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) and the correlation with an LS-DYNA analysis. The successful correlation of the LS-DYNA model has resulted in the use of LS-DYNA as a predictive tool for characterizing the threshold of damage for impacts of various debris such as foam, ice, and ablators onto the RCC leading edge for shuttle return-to-flight.

Fasanella, Edwin L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Shuttle Columbia Post-Accident Analysis and Investigation

Although the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew was tragic, the circumstances offered a unique opportunity to examine a multitude of components which had experienced one of the harshest environments ever encountered by engineered materials: a break up at a velocity in excess of Mach 18 and an altitude exceeding 200,000 feet (63 KM), resulting in a debris field 645 miles/l,038 KM long and 10 miles/16 KM wide. Various analytical tools were employed to ascertain the sequence of events leading to the disintegration of the Orbiter and to characterize the features of the debris. The testing and analyses all indicated that a breach in a left wing reinforced carbon/carbon composite leading edge panel was the access point for hot gasses generated during re-entry to penetrate the structure of the vehicle and compromise the integrity of the materials and components in that area of the Shuttle. The analytical and elemental testing utilized such techniques as X-Ray Diffraction (XRD), Energy Dispersive X-Ray (EDX) dot mapping, Electron Micro Probe Analysis (EMPA), and X-Ray Photoelectron Spectroscopy (XPS) to characterize the deposition of intermetallics adjacent to the suspected location of the plasma breach in the leading edge of the left wing, Fig. 1.

McDanels, Steven J.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle

This viewgraph presentation summarizes changes to the Space Shuttle Propulsions Systems made for the Return to Flight in response to the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The presentation also includes an overivew of the Columbia debris recovery effort.

Roberts, Lisa↗
NASA NTRS2006

Orbiter Return-To-Flight Entry Aeroheating

The Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 began an unprecedented level of effort within the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community to support the Space Shuttle Program. During the approximately six month time frame of the primary Columbia Accident Investigation Board activity, many technical disciplines were involved in a concerted effort to reconstruct the last moments of the Columbia and her crew, and understand the critical events that led to that loss. Significant contributions to the CAIB activity were made by the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community(REF CAIB) in understanding the re-entry environments that led to the propagation of an ascent foam induced wing leading edge damage to a subsequent breech of the wing spar of Columbia, and the subsequent breakup of the vehicle. A core of the NASA hypersonic aerothermodynamics team that was involved in the CAIB investigation has been combined with the United Space Alliance and Boeing Orbiter engineering team in order to position the Space Shuttle Program with a process to perform in-flight Thermal Protection System damage assessments. This damage assessment process is now part of the baselined plan for Shuttle support, and is a direct out-growth of the Columbia accident and NASAs response. Multiple re-entry aeroheating tools are involved in this damage assessment process, many of which have been developed during the Return To Flight activity. In addition, because these aeroheating tools are part of an overall damage assessment process that also involves the thermal and stress analyses community, in addition to a much broader mission support team, an integrated process for performing the damage assessment activities has been developed by the Space Shuttle Program and the Orbiter engineering community. Several subsets of activity in the Orbiter aeroheating communities support to the Return To Flight effort have been described in previous publications (CFD?, Cavity Heating? Any BLT? Grid Generation?). This work will provide a description of the integrated process utilized to perform Orbiter tile damage assessment, and in particular will seek to provide a description of the integrated aeroheating tools utilized to perform these assessments. Individual aeroheating tools will be described which provide the nominal re-entry heating environment characterization for the Orbiter, the heating environments for tile damage, heating effects due to exposed Thermal Protection System substrates, the application of Computational Fluid Dynamics for the description of tile cavity heating, and boundary layer transition prediction. This paper is meant to provide an overall view of the integrated aeroheating assessment process for tile damage assessment as one of a sequence of papers on the development of the boundary layer transition prediction capability in support of Space Shuttle Return To Flight efforts.

Campbell, Charles H.↗
NASA NTRS2006

An Overview of Spray-On Foam Insulation Applications on the Space Shuttle's External Tank: Foam Applications and Foam Shedding Mechanisms

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that the cause of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew was a breach in the thermal protection system on the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel No. 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch. The CAIB conclusion has spawned numerous studies to identify the cause of and factors influencing foam shedding and foam debris liberation from the External Tank during ascent. The symposium on the Thermo-mechanics and Fracture of Space Shuttle External Tank Spray-On Foam Insulation is a collection of presentations that discuss the physics and mechanics of the ET SOFI with the objective of improving analytical and numerical methods for predicting foam thermo-mechanical and fracture behavior. This keynote presentation sets the stage for the presentations contained in this symposium by introducing the audience to the various types of SOFI applications on the Shuttle s External Tank and by discussing the various mechanisms that are believed to be the cause of foam shedding during the Shuttle s ascent to space

Sullivan, Roy M.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Comprehensive Shuttle Foam Debris Reduction Strategies

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3, 2003. Foam liberated from the External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery s recent return to flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of erosion of foam and the risk of future undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as some sort of sizehime limited ablator. This step is paramount to accepting the CAB recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant effort has been expended to identify root cause of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly (FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, only a most probable cause can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities. Also, foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a negative margin range is not consistently achieved. Looking at the ET S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., glass half full mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle s case, reasonableness is established by exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and programmatic constraints. A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an approach no matter what becomes of the next flight s actual debris field lest we fall back into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy offramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission.

Semmes, Edmund B.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Software Programs Derive Measurements from Photographs

Even under the most unfortunate circumstances, NASA continues on a path of innovation. After the Space Shuttle Columbia reentered the atmosphere on February 1, 2003, it experienced a catastrophic failure, and the entire crew and vehicle were lost. For the two weeks prior to the accident, Columbia STS-107 was on a mission to perform physical, life, and space sciences research in the unique environment of microgravity. Following the accident, the remaining shuttles - Endeavor, Atlantis, and Discovery - were grounded, and an intense investigation ensued. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board spent nearly 7 months examining the cause of the accident and determining what would ensure a safe return to flight. To this end, investigators performed an extensive review down five analytic paths: aerodynamic, thermodynamic, sensor data timeline, debris reconstruction, and imaging. As part of the evaluation of all the available imagery from Columbia's ascent, orbit, and entry, investigators needed a new method for analyzing still video images to determine the size of the material that fell from Columbia, as well as the distance that the material traveled. John Lane, a scientist at Kennedy Space Center, devised a software program to calculate the unknown dimension of the material in the images, and soon after the investigation was complete, continued to enhance the technology. Eventually, the program that assisted in the Columbia investigation became available for licensing.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

Improving Performance of the System Safety Function at Marshall Space Flight Center

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that organizational and management issues were significant contributors to the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition, the CAIB observed similarities between the organizational and management climate that preceded the Challenger accident and the climate that preceded the Columbia accident. To prevent recurrence of adverse organizational and management climates, effective implementation of the system safety function is suggested. Attributes of an effective system safety program are presented. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) system safety program is analyzed using the attributes. Conclusions and recommendations for improving the MSFC system safety program are offered in this case study.

Kiessling, Ed↗
NASA NTRS2005

Investigations of Shuttle Main Landing Gear Door Environmental Seals

The environmental seals for the main landing gear doors of the Shuttle Orbiters were raised by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board as a potential safety concern. Inspections of seals installed on the Shuttle Discovery revealed that they were permanently deformed and no longer met certified seal compression requirements. Replacement of the seals led to the inability to fully close the main landing gear doors. Johnson Space Center requested that Glenn Research Center conduct tests on the main landing gear door environmental seals to assist in installing the seals in a manner to allow the main landing gear doors to fully close. Further testing was conducted to fill out the seal performance database. Results from the testing indicated that the method of bonding the seals was important in reducing seal loads on the main landing gear doors. Also, the replacement seals installed in Shuttle Discovery were found to have leakage performance sufficient to meet the certification requirements.

Finkbeiner, Joshua↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development of Columbia Leading Edge Reconstruction System

After the loss of Columbia in 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA KSC directed personnel at the Launch Equipment Test Facility (LETF) to design and build high fidelity mock-ups of Columbia's left wing leading edges. These leading edge segments, constructed of reinforced carbon-carbon, were a major point of inquiry by the investigation team. The LETF engineers developed a concept of building a clear Lexan panel with an aluminum support structure ten percent larger than the original panel. The leading edge debris are attached to the Lexan panels and both the front and back side of each panel are visible for inspection. The entire assembly can be rotated, to provide visual access to the entire panel. Six carts were fabricated to support the thirteen panels. These carts could be set up in order, next to each other, to provide the desired inspection access. The carts and attached debris are currently located in the Vehicle Assembly Building at KSC.

Trautwein, John↗
NASA NTRS2005

Analysis of Carbon/Carbon Fragments From the Columbia Tragedy

The extensive investigation following the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia accident of February 1, 2003 determined that hot gases entered the wing through a breach in the protective reinforced carbon/carbon (RCC) leading edge. In the current study, the exposed edges of the recovered RCC from the vicinity of the breach are examined with scanning electron microscopy and Raman spectroscopy. Electron microscopy of the exposed edges revealed regions of pointed carbon fibers, characteristic of exposure to high temperature oxidizing gases. The Raman technique relates the observed 1350 and 1580 to 1600 cm(-1) bands to graphitic dom ains and their corresponding temperatures of formation. Some of the regions showed evidence of exposure temperatures beyond 2700 ?C during the accident.

Tallant, David R.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Probe Widens

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board has identified about a dozen shuttle program safety concerns it will address in its final report, in addition to foam shedding from the Lockheed Martin external tank-believed by many board members to be the direct cause for the loss of Columbia and her crew. As new evidence narrows the location of Columbia's left-wing breach to a lower corner of reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) Panel 8 and its adjoining T-seal, the board is broadening its penetration of other shuttle safety issues. As the board works in Houston, United Space Alliance technicians here at Kennedy last week sent the first six of 22 RCC panels from the orbiter Atlantis left wing to Vought Aircraft Industries Inc. in Dallas for extensive testing to assess their integrity. The move is a key step toward both returning the shuttle to flight with Atlantis and obtaining more data on RCC panels subjected to fewer flights, and less exposure to the weather, than the older panels used on Columbia.

Covault, Craig↗
NASA NTRS2008

Test-Analysis Correlation for Space Shuttle External Tank Foam Impacting RCC Wing Leading Edge Component Panels

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA develop, validate, and maintain a modeling tool capable of predicting the damage threshold for debris impacts on the Space Shuttle Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) wing leading edge and nosecap assembly. The results presented in this paper are one part of a multi-level approach that supported the development of the predictive tool used to recertify the shuttle for flight following the Columbia Accident. The assessment of predictive capability was largely based on test analysis comparisons for simpler component structures. This paper provides comparisons of finite element simulations with test data for external tank foam debris impacts onto 6-in. square RCC flat panels. Both quantitative displacement and qualitative damage assessment correlations are provided. The comparisons show good agreement and provided the Space Shuttle Program with confidence in the predictive tool.

Lyle, Karen H.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Accident Case Study of Organizational Silence Communication Breakdown: Shuttle Columbia, Mission STS-107

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ESMD Risk and Knowledge Management team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the official Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document. This report is accompanied by a video that will be sent at request

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2004

Rapid Structured Volume Grid Smoothing and Adaption Technique

A rapid, structured volume grid smoothing and adaption technique, based on signal processing methods, was developed and applied to the Shuttle Orbiter at hypervelocity flight conditions in support of the Columbia Accident Investigation. Because of the fast pace of the investigation, computational aerothermodynamicists, applying hypersonic viscous flow solving computational fluid dynamic (CFD) codes, refined and enhanced a grid for an undamaged baseline vehicle to assess a variety of damage scenarios. Of the many methods available to modify a structured grid, most are time-consuming and require significant user interaction. By casting the grid data into different coordinate systems, specifically two computational coordinates with arclength as the third coordinate, signal processing methods are used for filtering the data [Taubin, CG v/29 1995]. Using a reverse transformation, the processed data are used to smooth the Cartesian coordinates of the structured grids. By coupling the signal processing method with existing grid operations within the Volume Grid Manipulator tool, problems related to grid smoothing are solved efficiently and with minimal user interaction. Examples of these smoothing operations are illustrated for reduction in grid stretching and volume grid adaptation. In each of these examples, other techniques existed at the time of the Columbia accident, but the incorporation of signal processing techniques reduced the time to perform the corrections by nearly 60%. This reduction in time to perform the corrections therefore enabled the assessment of approximately twice the number of damage scenarios than previously possible during the allocated investigation time.

Alter, Stephen J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Rapid Structured Volume Grid Smoothing and Adaption Technique

A rapid, structured volume grid smoothing and adaption technique, based on signal processing methods, was developed and applied to the Shuttle Orbiter at hypervelocity flight conditions in support of the Columbia Accident Investigation. Because of the fast pace of the investigation, computational aerothermodynamicists, applying hypersonic viscous flow solving computational fluid dynamic (CFD) codes, refined and enhanced a grid for an undamaged baseline vehicle to assess a variety of damage scenarios. Of the many methods available to modify a structured grid, most are time-consuming and require significant user interaction. By casting the grid data into different coordinate systems, specifically two computational coordinates with arclength as the third coordinate, signal processing methods are used for filtering the data [Taubin, CG v/29 1995]. Using a reverse transformation, the processed data are used to smooth the Cartesian coordinates of the structured grids. By coupling the signal processing method with existing grid operations within the Volume Grid Manipulator tool, problems related to grid smoothing are solved efficiently and with minimal user interaction. Examples of these smoothing operations are illustrated for reductions in grid stretching and volume grid adaptation. In each of these examples, other techniques existed at the time of the Columbia accident, but the incorporation of signal processing techniques reduced the time to perform the corrections by nearly 60%. This reduction in time to perform the corrections therefore enabled the assessment of approximately twice the number of damage scenarios than previously possible during the allocated investigation time.

Alter, Stephen J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Orbital Debris Shape and Orientation Effects on Impact Damage to Shuttle Tiles

Taking the damage results from a previous paper as a guide, and using a tile model created for the STS-107 accident investigation, we used the SPHC hydrodynamic code to evaluate the probable worst-case impact effects of flat, rectangular, "flake-shaped," orbital debris particles on Space Shuttle thermal tiles. We compared the damage from flakes with that produced by spheres. The flakes and spheres were sized according to a "characteristic length" (Lc) derived from radar cross-section measurements, and embodied in the NASA Standard Breakup Model (SBM). Impacts were simulated at near-normal obliquity, at 12 km/sec. We modeled the worst-case flake orientation: a corner-on impact, an orientation we term a "Face A-B" impact. Results of our simulations indicate that flake impactors are less damaging than spheres of the same Lc. Since spherical impactors have been assumed in analyses of shuttle orbital debris impact risk, we find that these risks may have been overestimated. This work represents a preliminary second step, i.e., a follow-on to [1], in developing a sensitivity analysis for the expected range of effects on damage considering spherical vs. non-spherical impactors, as recommended by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Evans, Steven W.↗