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Technical Basis For Radiological Acceptance Criteria For Uranium At The Y-12 National Security Complex

The purpose of this report is to establish radiological acceptance criteria for uranium. Other factors for acceptance not considered include criticality safety concerns, contaminants to the process stream, and impacts to the Safety Basis for the affected facilities. Three types of criteria were developed in this report. They include limits on external penetrating and non-penetrating radiation and on the internal hazard associated with inhalation of the material. These criteria are intended to alleviate the need for any special controls beyond what are normally utilized for worker protection from uranium hazards. Any proposed exceptions would require case-by-case evaluations to determine cost impacts and feasibility. Since Y-12 has set rigorous ALARA goals for worker doses, the external limits are based on assumptions of work time involved in the movement of accepted material plus the desire that external doses normally received are not exceeded, and set so that no special personnel monitoring would be required. Internal hazard controls were established so that dose contributions from non-uranium nuclides would not exceed 10% of that expected from the uranium component. This was performed using a Hazard Index (HI) previously established for work in areas contaminated with non-uranium nuclides. The radiological acceptance criteria for uranium are summarized in Table 1. Note that these limits are based on the assumption that radioactive daughter products have reached equilibrium.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Conceptual Model Update of Mercury Sources and Flux at Y-12 and Upper East Fork Poplar Creek, Oak Ridge,Tennessee

The interactions between the key processes that control the fate and transport of mercury (Hg) in the sediments, groundwater, and stream water within the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee are complex, and many aspects are not well understood. In contaminated environments such as Y-12, conceptual models are frequently developed to aid in visualizing and understanding the dynamic nature of the hydrologic, geochemical, and physical environment. These conceptual models integrate data in an internally consistent manner to understand processes that control the fate and transport of contaminants. Over the past few decades of environmental investigation at Y-12, a number of conceptual models have been developed to identify and define various technical processes at various scales. The main purpose of the activities described in this report is to update the 2011 conceptual model for Upper East Fork Poplar Creek using the most recent Hg concentration and flux data and informed scientific interpretation. Emphasis was placed on improving the previous model by implementing a more detailed spatial and temporal approach to visualize transport pathways in the watershed and trends in flux and concentration over time, and to compare baseflow and stormflow system dynamics. Detailed descriptions of historical and current Hg sources and transport pathways are also provided for the east and west ends of the facility. This conceptual model will allow the US Department of Energy to evaluate past and present remedial activities and provide a strong technical basis for prioritizing and optimizing remedial responses in a cost-effective and efficient manner. Twenty years ago, Hg flux from Outfall (OF) 200 at the headwaters of East Fork Poplar Creek represented approximately 20% of the overall flux leaving Y-12. By the time of the 2011 conceptual model report, that percentage had increased to 70%–80%. Flux estimates compiled for this report using data from 2009 to 2018 show that OF200 accounted for roughly 60% of the flux leaving Y-12. The relative role of the four storm drain conduits to OF200 appeared similar to 2011, with OF163 being the greatest contributor to downstream flux. An increase in Hg concentrations and flux occurred throughout and downstream of west end storm drains in 2011 in response to a storm drain cleanout. Leading up to the 2011 storm drain cleanout, annual baseflow flux was higher at OF200A6 than at Station 17. From 2011 to 2018, the trend reversed with concentrations and flux being higher at Station 17 than at OF200A6. A spike in concentrations occurred in July 2018, potentially due to a one-time influx of Hg that occurred during COLEX decontamination and decommissioning activities at Y-12. This report includes recommendations for improving our conceptual understanding of Hg sources, transport pathways, and flux at Y-12. Important recommendations include further evaluation of transport pathways, concurrent measurement of Hg concentration and flux under baseflow and stormflow conditions at multiple sites, and research to understand the connections among periphyton and methylmercury concentration, bioavailability, and bioaccumulation. Ongoing facility decontamination and decommissioning efforts, site characterization, remedial actions, and research are facilitating the collection of new Hg data at Y-12. The conceptual model update provided herein takes advantage of the extensive recent Hg sampling to provide an updated assessment of Hg mass balance and support a refined understanding of Hg behavior at or near Y-12. This assessment should assist in future environmental management decisions and in mitigating the impacts of Hg on the surrounding environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park Year One - Execution with Certainty SM - 13120

On August 1, 2011, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) began its five-year, $1.4 billion cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), located on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee. UCOR will close out cleanup operations that began in 1998 under a previous contract. When the Contract Base scope of work [1] is completed in 2016, the K-25 gaseous diffusion building will have been demolished and all waste dispositioned, demolition will have started on the K-27 gaseous diffusion building, all contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic waste in inventory (approximately 500 cubic meters) will have been transferred to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, previously designated 'No-Path-To-Disposition Waste' will have been dispositioned to the extent possible, and UCOR will have managed DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM)- owned facilities at ETTP, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the Y-12 National Security Complex in a safe and cost-effective manner. Since assuming its responsibilities as the ETTP cleanup contractor, UCOR has completed its life-cycle Performance Measurement Baseline; received its Earned Value Management System (EVMS) certification; advanced the deactivation and demolition (D and D) of the K-25 gaseous diffusion building; recovered and completed the Tank W-1A and K-1070-B Burial Ground remediation projects; characterized, packaged, and shipped contact-handled transuranic waste to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center; disposed of more than 90,000 cubic yards of cleanup waste while managing the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF); and provided operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities at DOE EM facilities at ETTP, ORNL, and the Y-12 National Security Complex. Project performance as of December 31, 2012 has been excellent: - Cost Performance Index - 1.06; - Schedule Performance Index - 1.02. At the same time, since safety is the foundation of all cleanup work, UCOR's safety record goes hand in hand with its excellent project performance. Through calendar year 2012, UCOR's recordable injury rate was 0.33, and the company has worked close to 4 million hours without a lost work day injury. UCOR's safety record is one of the best in the DOE EM Complex. This performance was due, in large part, to the people and processes URS and CH2M HILL, the parent companies of UCOR, brought to the project. Key approaches included: - Selected and deployed experienced staff in key leadership positions throughout the organization; - Approached 'Transition' as the 'true' beginning of the cleanup project - kicking off a number of project initiatives such as Partnering, PMB development, D and D Plan execution, etc. - Established a project baseline for performance measurement and obtained EVMS certification in record time; - Determined material differences and changed conditions that warranted contract change - then quickly addressed these changes with the DOE client; - Aligned the project and the contract within one year - also done in record time; - Implemented Safety Trained Supervisor and Safety Conscious Work Environment Programs, and kicked off the pursuit of certification under DOE's Voluntary Protection Program. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Automated Cyber Security Testing Platform for Industrial Control Systems

Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are a complex system of coupled physics controlled by a network of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). These PLCs communicate process data across the network to coordinate control actions with each other and inform the operators of process variables and control decisions. Networking the PLCs allows more effective process control and provides the operator more information which results in more efficient plant operation. This interconnectivity creates new security issues, as operators have more access to the plant controls, so will bad actors. As plant networks become more digitized and encompass more sophisticated controllers, the network surface exposed to cyber interference grows. Understanding the dynamics of these coupled systems of physics, control logic, and network communications is critical to their protection. The research into the cybersecurity of the Operational Technologies of NPPs is developing and requires a platform that can allow high fidelity physics simulations to interact with digital networks of controllers. This will require three main components: a network simulation environment, a physics simulator, and virtual PLCs (vPLC) that represent typical industry hardware. A platform that incorporates these three components to provide the most accurate representation of actual NPP networks and controllers is developed in this paper.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Simulation of flow and mercury transport in Upper East Fork Poplar Creek, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

As a result of nuclear processing activities started back in the 1950s, the environment in the vicinity of the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 NSC) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and surrounding watersheds has been contaminated by nearly 1,000 tons of elementary mercury. To comply with the state and federal surface water quality standards, a significant reduction in mercury concentration to parts-per-trillion levels has been proposed. In order to analyze the mercury cycle in the environment and provide forecasting capabilities for the flow and transport of mercury within the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek (UEFPC) watershed, an integrated surface and subsurface flow and transport model has been developed using the hydrodynamic and transport numerical package, MIKE, developed by the Danish Hydraulic Institute. The model has been constructed and calibrated using an extensive collection of historical records (i.e., hydrological data, and mercury concentration measurements in groundwater, soil, and sediment) obtained from the Oak Ridge Environmental Information System database. Daily fluctuations in stream flow, as a result of scattered rainfall, flooding, and flow augmentation, resuspend the contaminated streambed sediments and/or erode the polluted streambank soil and provide a secondary source of mercury to the creek. In order to investigate the significance of sediment-mercury interactions on the fate and transport of mercury within the UEFPC study domain, simulations were performed for two different cases (i.e., with and without consideration of sediment-mercury interactions). Computed total suspended solids and mercury concentrations at the integration point of the creek are compared with the corresponding historical records in both cases. As confirmed by the numerical simulations, a substantial portion of the mercury detected in the river is likely in the form of sediment particle–bound mercury (i.e., mercury particulates).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Mercury Source Zone Identification using Soil Vapor Sampling and Analysis

Development and demonstration of reliable measurement techniqes that can detect and help quantify the nature and extent of elemental mercury (Hg(0)) in the subsurface are needed to reduce certainties in the decision making process and increase the effectiveness of remedial actions. We conducted field tests at the Y-12 National Security Complex (NSC) in Oak Ridge, TN, to determine if sampling and analysis of Hg(0) vapors in the shallow subsurface (<0.3 m depth) can be used to as an indicator of the location and extent of Hg(0) releases in the subsurface. We constructed a rigid PVC pushprobe assembly, which was driven into the ground. Soil gas samples were collected through a sealed inner tube of the assembly and analyzed immediately in the field with a Lumex and/or Jerome Hg(0) analyzer. Time-series sampling showed that Hg vapor concentrations were fairly stable over time suggesting that the vapor phase Hg(0) was not being depleted and that sampling results were not dependent on the soil gas purge volume. Hg(0) vapor data collected at over 200 pushprobe locations at 3 different release sites correlated well to areas of known Hg(0) contamination. Vertical profiling of Hg(0) vapor concentrations conducted at 2 locations provided information on the vertical distribution of Hg(0) contamination in the subsurface. We concluded from our studies that soil gas sampling and analysis can be conducted rapidly and inexpensively at a large scale to help identify areas contaminated with Hg(0).

Watson, David B↗

Status of Additive Manufacturing Capabilities for Processing Refractory Alloys Under the Mo-99 Program

The enriched 100 Mo target, denoted as aMo, that Northstar Medical Radioisotopes is developing to produce 99 Mo from an accelerator-based method is a disk-type geometry with a 0.5–0.715 mm thickness and a 29 mm outer diameter. A press and sinter method was adopted to fabricate these samples from aMo powder feedstock. Inherent porosity from the press and sinter method makes the disks more easily dissolvable during 99 Mo postprocessing. However, the disk-type geometry will be subject to thermal stresses due to temperature variations once the geometry is in line with the accelerated electron beam, causing warping and possible failure. Additive manufacturing (AM) processes such as laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) enable the manufacturing of custom, complex geometries that may otherwise be difficult to produce with more conventional methods (e.g., press and sinter approach). Therefore, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Molybdenum-99 Program invested in developing an AM facility dedicated to processing and printing refractory powders. This report details the LPBF process, how irregular refractory powder can be prepared for LPBF, and the equipment that is available to support the program.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Sodium and Lithium Hydride Shields At the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation - 18412

URS-CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) is responsible for cleanup of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Formerly known as the K-25 site, the facility enriched uranium for major defense and energy programs for more than 40 years. DOE is seeking the safest, most environmentally protective and fiscally responsible treatment for its large inventory of radioactive-contaminated metals known as 'shields'. The 66 sodium and lithium shields were constructed for use in experiments at the Tower Shielding Facility (TSF), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The TSF operated from 1954 to 1992 and was designed and built for radiation-shielding studies. The shield containers are constructed of aluminum or stainless steel of varying sizes and shapes that were then filled with either sodium metal or lithium hydride material. The historical records indicate the sodium shields were constructed at the Molten Salt Reactor for use in experiments in the 1971 time frame, while the lithium shields were constructed at the Y-12 site and were used in experiments as early as 1961. A subset of the sodium and lithium shields contain depleted uranium. The sodium and lithium shields were initially used at the TSF to perform in-depth measurements of the neutron transport through the shield materials. Based on process knowledge, the shields are managed as radiologically contaminated containers. Efforts have been made over the last fifteen years to find recycle markets for both the sodium and lithium hydride shields. This includes an onsite operation that was initiated at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in 2004. After an operational exothermic reaction incident occurred soon after startup, the onsite ETTP recycling action was discontinued and a search for offsite recycling facilities was initiated. In 2016, the Y-12 National Security Complex was contacted regarding recycle/repurpose of the lithium shields; however, the lithium was determined to not be acceptable for their current repurpose process. To date, no offsite recycling outlets have been identified. Recent progress on the waste disposal actions, a shipment of 22 small sodium shields have been shipped and treated offsite. Therefore, the current shield inventory consists of 29 sodium shields located at ETTP and 15 sodium and lithium hydride shields staged at ORNL. The time period needed to reasonably identify safe disposition or recycling outlets for the shields was expected to exceed the one-year Land Disposal Restrictions storage time limit; therefore, approval was received to add the shields to the Site Treatment Plan (STP) in March, 2017. Until a disposition path is found, the shields will continue to be stored in a safe configuration that is protective of human health and the environment. This engineering evaluation identifies and screens the alternatives for dispositioning the shields at the Oak Ridge(ORR). Four alternatives were evaluated including; (1) macro-encapsulation, (2) deactivation, (3) recycle and (4) leave-in-place. An initial screening was performed, and the alternative passing the initial screening are then evaluated in more detail. The evaluation criteria used included environmental risk, technical feasibility, administrative feasibility, worker safety, nuclear safety, transportation safety, and cost. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of a Mobile Hot Cell Technology for Processing Idaho National Laboratory Remote-Handled Wastes

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) currently does not have the necessary capabilities to process all remote-handled wastes resulting from the Laboratory’s nuclear-related missions. Over the years, various U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-sponsored programs undertaken at the INL have produced radioactive wastes and other materials that are categorized as remote-handled (contact radiological dose rate > 200 mR/hr). These materials include Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), transuranic (TRU) waste, waste requiring geological disposal, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste (both radioactive and hazardous per the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA]), and activated and/or radioactively-contaminated reactor components. The waste consists primarily of uranium, plutonium, other TRU isotopes, and shorter-lived isotopes such as cesium and cobalt with radiological dose rates up to 20,000 R/hr. The hazardous constituents in the waste consist primarily of reactive metals (i.e., sodium and sodium-potassium alloy [NaK]), which are reactive and ignitable per RCRA, making the waste difficult to handle and treat. A smaller portion of the waste is contaminated with other hazardous components (i.e., RCRA toxicity characteristic metals). Several analyses of alternatives to provide the required remote-handling and treatment capability to manage INL’s remote-handled waste have been conducted over the years and have included various options ranging from modification of existing hot cells to construction of new hot cells. Previous analyses have identified a mobile processing unit as an alternative for providing the required remote-handled waste processing capability; however, it was summarily dismissed as being a potentially viable alternative based on limitations of a specific design considered. In 2008 INL solicited expressions of interest from Vendors who could provide existing, demonstrated technology that could be applied to the retrieval, sorting, treatment (as required), and repackaging of INL remote-handled wastes. Based on review of the responses and the potential viability of a mobile hot cell technology, INL subsequently conducted a technology evaluation, including proof-of-process validation, to assess the feasibility of utilizing such a technology for processing INL’s remote-handled wastes to meet established regulatory milestones. The technology evaluation focused on specific application of a mobile hot cell technology to the conditions to be encountered at the INL and addressed details of previous technology deployment, required modifications to accommodate INL’s remote-handled waste, ability to meet DOE safety requirements, requirements for fabrication/construction/decontamination and dismantling, and risks and uncertainties associated with application of the technology to INL’s remote-handled waste. The large capital costs associated with establishing a fixed asset to process INL’s remote-handled waste, the relatively small total volume of waste to be processed when compared to other waste streams through the complex, and competing mission-related needs has made it extremely difficult to secure the necessary support to advance the project. Because of this constraint, alternative contract structures were also explored as part of the technology evaluation wherein the impact of a large capital investment could be lessened.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Responsible Artificial Intelligence for Insider Threat Mitigation

This report examines the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for insider threat mitigation (ITM) programs in nuclear security facilities. Insider threat detection presents unique challenges due to the subtle and adaptive nature of these threats, the complex signatures involved, and the scarcity of available data for analysis. Traditional human-centered approaches, while essential, face limitations in processing large amounts of data continuously and detecting subtle patterns across multiple systems. AI technologies can potentially address these limitations by providing 24/7 monitoring capabilities, identifying complex patterns that might escape human observation, and offering consistent application of security criteria. However, the deployment of AI in nuclear security contexts introduces significant new risks, including workflow disruption, expanded attack surfaces, potential for misuse, and ethical concerns regarding privacy, fairness, transparency, safety, and security. The high-consequence nature of nuclear security decisions demands careful consideration of these risks and systematic approaches to their mitigation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Embedded Sensor Development in Metallic Structures for the Transformational Challenge Reactor

The ability to make minimally intrusive measurements of process conditions has tremendous potential for improving system performance and control in applications such as nuclear power generation. Towards this end, emerging and evolving advanced manufacturing methods, such as additive manufacturing, present new opportunities for more seamlessly integrating sensing with structure. This technical report summarizes the progress of work performed to assess the feasibility of embedding commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) sensors in a metallic reactor core using advanced manufacturing methods. The progress of four research and development tasks are documented: 1) A survey of COTS sensors for nuclear applications that are candidates for embedded fabrication, 2) Development of a conceptual framework for investigating the feasibility of sensor embedment, 3) Definition of structural geometries and other characteristics that will represent compelling proof-of-concept, and 4) Preliminary prototyping of embedded sensors. For the purposes of this initial study, nuclear grade K-type thermocouples were selected for investigation of embedment methodologies. This sensor was selected as an initial candidate because it represents one of the simplest sensor configurations that can provide useful process information. A selective laser melting (SLM) additive manufacturing process was used to fabricate structures with complexity representative of the core design of the transformational challenge reactor (TCR) and methods were developed to embed a thermocouple with a complex two-dimensional routing path. There are many challenges associated with embedding sensors during the additive manufacturing process including securing the sensor in the structure, relocating the part in the additive machine if using a “pick and place” sensor placement method, mitigating the potential for powder contamination, optimizing energy deposition parameters to build as closely as possible around the sensor path and improve structural integrity of the part, and tuning energy deposition to mitigate thermally induced warpage of the sensor and part as well as potential for damaging the sensing device. Preliminary results indicate that it is feasible to integrate the sensor while minimally compromising the structural integrity of the part and preserving sensor performance. This first phase of this work focused on developing a workflow for embedding sensors and controlling energy deposition during the additive manufacturing process to better understand the build characteristics around the sensor. Future work will perform more in-depth characterization of prototype parts using X-ray computed tomography and scanning electron microscopy to better understand fabricated structures, performance testing of embedded sensors in high temperature environments, adding new embedded measurement modalities, embedding devices with dissimilar materials in contact with additive powders, and the development of methods for embedding sensors with three-dimensional routing paths.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Approach to Shared Research Systems

World-leading research requires state-of-the-art systems for research and innovation. Operational excellence is the key component of scientific excellence by implementing ubiquitous security, repeatable processes, streamlined policies, and reliable and robust infrastructure. Building a research environment to meet these needs is a complex and expensive task. In many cases, it can be financially advantageous for one or more programs, projects, and/or stakeholder(s) to pool resources to build a shared research system to meet common goals. However, such a system brings some unique challenges that need to be addressed. This document describes the process to mitigate these challenges by documenting how the interested parties contribute to the overall success of the system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Update on Full-Scale Retrieval and Transfer System Testing for Pneumatic Conveyance of High-Level Calcine Waste - 20241

The Idaho National Laboratory processed spent nuclear fuel from 1953 to 1994. The process used solvent extraction to separate uranium, resulting in a liquid waste. A calcination process was used to convert the liquid waste to a high-level radioactive solid powder, referred to as calcine. The calcine is stored in stainless steel bins contained within concrete vaults called the Calcined Solids Storage Facilities. There are a total of seven CSSFs. The Calcine Retrieval Project is tasked with retrieving the calcine from the bins of CSSF 1 and pneumatically transferring it to the bins of CSSF 6. CSSF 1 was constructed to be a final calcine repository with no forethought of retrieval. It represents the greatest technical hurdle to calcine extraction of all the CSSFs. The challenges inherent with accessing the calcine, safely extracting it, and securely transporting it are copious and complex. Once the calcine is removed from CSSF1, that facility may be closed, reducing the footprint of waste storage at the INL. The same process for removing Calcine from CSSF1 may then be utilized to remove the calcine from the remaining CSSFs for final treatment and transport to a long-term storage facility. To overcome these inherent challenges with accessing CSSF 1 and extracting the calcine in a timely manner, a full-scale integrated mockup has been constructed. The mockup includes a full-size model of a concentric group of bins from CSSF 1 and a storage vessel representing CSSF 6. All essential elements of the transport design are represented in the Mockup, including motive and makeup air supply (air compressor), a replica of the CSSF6 cyclone, pre-filter, HEPA filter, vacuum pump, and retrieval control devices. Construction on the Mockup was completed in 2018 and testing began in February 2019. It has already proven very beneficial to the CRP. Experience in running the Mockup have aided in the development of retrieval and transport methodologies and the selection of process parameter values. It has also uncovered some unforeseen technological challenges and will continue to be valuable to the testing team as these hurdles are overcome and the process is proven effective. Operations personnel have also benefitted from its use as a training tool and will continue to use the Mockup as a simulator to reproduce problems encountered during extraction and transfer of Calcine from CSSF 1. The knowledge gained during this process will also be of continued benefit as future work is done to remove various types of calcine from the remaining CSSFs. The methodology of safe and secure transfer of radioactive material may be of benefit to others throughout the U.S. Department of Energy complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Monitoring system for the quality assessment in additive manufacturing

Additive Manufacturing (AM) refers to a process by which a set of digital data -representing a certain complex 3dim design - is used to grow the respective 3dim real structure equal to the corresponding design. For the powder-based EOS manufacturing process a variety of plastic and metal materials can be used. Thereby, AM is in many aspects a very powerful tool as it can help to overcome particular limitations in conventional manufacturing. AM enables more freedom of design, complex, hollow and/or lightweight structures as well as product individualisation and functional integration. As such it is a promising approach with respect to the future design and manufacturing of complex 3dim structures. On the other hand, it certainly calls for new methods and standards in view of quality assessment. In particular, when utilizing AM for the design of complex parts used in aviation and aerospace technologies, appropriate monitoring systems are mandatory. In this respect, recently, sustainable progress has been accomplished by joining the common efforts and concerns of a manufacturer Additive Manufacturing systems and respective materials (EOS), along with those of an operator of such systems (MTU Aero Engines) and experienced application engineers (Carl Metrology), using decent know how in the field of optical and infrared methods regarding non-destructive-examination (NDE). The newly developed technology is best described by a high-resolution layer by layer inspection technique, which allows for a 3D tomography-analysis of the complex part at any time during the manufacturing process. Thereby, inspection costs are kept rather low by using smart image-processing methods as well as CMOS sensors instead of infrared detectors. Moreover, results from conventional physical metallurgy may easily be correlated with the predictive results of the monitoring system which not only allows for improvements of the AM monitoring system, but finally leads to an optimisation of the quality and insurance of material security of the complex structure being manufactured. Both, our poster and our oral presentation will explain the data flow between the above mentioned parties involved. A suitable monitoring system for Additive Manufacturing will be introduced, along with a presentation of the respective high resolution data acquisition, as well as the image processing and the data analysis allowing for a precise control of the 3dim growth-process.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Concept Feasibility Report for Using Co-Extrusion to Bond Metals to Complex Shapes of U-10Mo

In support of the Convert Program of the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been investigating manufacturing processes for the uranium-10% molybdenum (U-10Mo) alloy plate fuel for the U.S. high-performance research reactors (USHPRR). This report documents the results of PNNL’s efforts to develop the extrusion process for this concept. The approach to the development of a co-extruded complex-shaped fuel has been described and an extrusion of DU-10Mo was made. The initial findings suggest that given the extrusion forces required for processing U-10Mo, the co-extrusion process can meet the production demands of the USHPRR fuel and may be a viable production method. The development activity is in the early stages and has just begun to identify technical challenges to address details such as dimensional tolerances and shape control. New extrusion dies and roll groove profiles have been developed and will be assessed by extrusion and rolling of U-10Mo during the next fiscal year. Progress on the development and demonstration of the co-extrusion process for flat and shaped fuel is reported in this document

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Remediation of Mercury-Contaminated Storm Sewer Sediments from the West End Mercury Area at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee - 12061

The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN has faced an ongoing challenge from mercury entrapped in soils beneath and adjacent to buildings, storm sewers, and process pipelines. Previous actions to reduce the quantity and/or mobilization of mercury-contaminated media have included plugging of building floor drains, cleaning of sediment and sludge from sumps, manholes, drain lines, and storm sewers, lining/relining of storm sewers and replacement of a portion of the storm sewer trunk line, re-routing and removal of process piping, and installation of the Central Mercury Treatment System to capture and treat contaminated sump water. Despite the success of these actions, mercury flux in the storm sewer out-falls that discharge to Upper East Fork Poplar Creek (UEFPC) continues to pose a threat to long-term water quality. A video camera survey of the storm sewer network revealed several sections of storm sewer that had large cracks, separations, swells, and accumulations of sediment/sludge and debris. The selected remedy was to clean and line the sections of storm sewer pipe that were determined to be primary contributors to the mercury flux in the storm sewer out-falls. The project, referred to as the West End Mercury Area (WEMA) Storm Sewer Remediation Project, included cleaning sediment and debris from over 2,460 meters of storm sewer pipe followed by the installation of nearly 366 meters of cure-in-place pipe (CIPP) liner. One of the greatest challenges to the success of this project was the high cost of disposal associated with the mercury-contaminated sludge and wastewater generated from the storm sewer cleaning process. A contractor designed and operated an on-site wastewater pre-treatment system that successfully reduced mercury levels in 191 cubic meters of sludge to levels that allowed it to be disposed at Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) disposal cell as a non-hazardous, low-level waste. The system was also effective at pre-treating over 1,514,000 liters of wastewater to levels that met the waste acceptance criteria for the on-site West End [wastewater] Treatment Facility (WETF). This paper describes the storm sewer cleaning and lining process and the methods used to process the mercury-contaminated sludge and wastewater, as well as several 'lessons learned' that would be relevant to any future projects involving storm sewer cleaning and debris remediation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗