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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance: Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS), Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Modeling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system performance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example usecases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Mathematical approaches to secure in-vehicle networks

Modern vehicles rely on numerous small computers called electronic control units (ECUs) that continually communicate life-critical messages, e.g., wheel speeds and steering angle, through a few controller area networks (CANs). Originally designed as a closed network for the life of the vehicle, CAN protocol developed bereft of security features (e.g., authentication or encryption). For emission testing, updates, and other diagnostics, vehicle CANs are now physically accessible, but this comes with vulnerability to cyber attack. Mandatory on-board diagnostic ports (OBD-II) provide adversaries with direct access to the vehicle. Remote attacks, e.g., via Bluetooth or cellular connections, are possible but require deep expertise. In short, the critical networks for vehicle functionality are exposed to remote and local cyber attacks with little to no built-in defenses. Most notably, the infamous 2015 research of Miller and Valasek exhibited a remote takeover of a Jeep’s brakes resulting in a massive recall and ample media coverage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The use of seismic spatial gradients in a single layer neural network for seismic source discrimination: proof of concept

This report describes a proof-of-concept method of seismic source discrimination using seismic gradiometry and a common machine learning technique. The tests described here are purely numerical, using synthetic seismic data and well understood mathematical techniques. The primary innovation described here is the application of a richer seismic data set derived from seismic gradiometry. Seismic gradiometry is a method to estimate the time variable spatial gradient of the wavefield to compute various wavefield attributes such as slowness, dynamic strain, and rotational motions. With the addition of these wavefield attributes, we are afforded up to twenty "compo- nents" of time series data measured at a single point on, or in, the Earth. This is in direct contrast to conventional three-component seismic data collected at several locations using a seismic network. Using the gradiometrically-derived wavefield components directly in a single-layer neural network, I show that it is possible to discriminate between three common seismic source types (earthquakes, explosions, and opening fractures) for various noise conditions and gradiometry configurations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Game Theory for Proactive Dynamic Defense and Attack Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems

While there has been a great deal of security research focused on preventing attacks, there has been less work on how one should balance security and resilience investments. In this work we developed and evaluated models that captured both explicit defenses and other mitigations that reduce the impact of attacks. We examined these issues both in more broadly applicable general Stackelberg models and in more specific network and power grid settings. Finally, we compared these solutions to existing work in terms of both solution quality and computational overhead.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance, Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis (Version 3, July 2023)

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Mod eling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system per formance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example use cases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

OASIS: Offsetting Active Reconstruction Attacks in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) has garnered significant attention for its potential to protect user privacy while enhancing model training efficiency. For that reason, FL has found its use in various domains, from health care to industrial engineering, especially where data cannot be easily exchanged due to sensitive information or privacy laws. However, recent research has demonstrated that FL protocols can be easily compromised by active reconstruction attacks executed by dishonest servers. These attacks involve the malicious modification of global model parameters, allowing the server to obtain a verbatim copy of users' private data by inverting their gradient updates. Tackling this class of attack remains a crucial challenge due to the strong threat model. In this paper, we propose a defense mechanism, namely OASIS, based on image augmentation that effectively counteracts active reconstruction attacks while preserving model performance. We first uncover the core principle of gradient inversion that enables these attacks and theoretically identify the main conditions by which the defense can be robust regardless of the attack strategies. We then construct our defense with image augmentation showing that it can undermine the attack principle. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate the efficacy of the defense mechanism highlighting its feasibility as a solution.

deep neural networks↗

Modeling most likely pathways for smuggling radioactive and special nuclear materials on a worldwide multimodal transportation network

Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, and focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Offensive Cybersecurity in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Government and corporate computer systems are attacked, networks are penetrated by hackers, and enterprises are protected by demilitarized zones. Language that until recently was used to describe security and warfare in military settings has now become common-place in cybersecurity discussions. The concepts of pre-emptive attack, counterattack and offensive defense fit the linguistic cultural thread of security in cyberspace, at least in part due to the taxonomy adopted by cybersecurity as a discipline.

Bulyk, Mykhaylo↗

Inferring adversarial behaviour in cyber‐physical power systems using a Bayesian attack graph approach

Abstract Highly connected smart power systems are subject to increasing vulnerabilities and adversarial threats. Defenders need to proactively identify and defend new high‐risk access paths of cyber intruders that target grid resilience. However, cyber‐physical risk analysis and defense in power systems often requires making assumptions on adversary behaviour, and these assumptions can be wrong. Thus, this work examines the problem of inferring adversary behaviour in power systems to improve risk‐based defense and detection. To achieve this, a Bayesian approach for inference of the Cyber‐Adversarial Power System (Bayes‐CAPS) is proposed that uses Bayesian networks (BNs) to define and solve the inference problem of adversarial movement in the grid infrastructure towards targets of physical impact. Specifically, BNs are used to compute conditional probabilities to queries, such as the probability of observing an event given a set of alerts. Bayes‐CAPS builds initial Bayesian attack graphs for realistic power system cyber‐physical models. These models are adaptable using collected data from the system under study. Then, Bayes‐CAPS computes the posterior probabilities of the occurrence of a security breach event in power systems. Experiments are conducted that evaluate algorithms based on time complexity, accuracy and impact of evidence for different scales and densities of network. The performance is evaluated and compared for five realistic cyber‐physical power system models of increasing size and complexities ranging from 8 to 300 substations based on computation and accuracy impacts.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗

Distribution Storage Networks (Draft Version 0.3)

Distribution storage networks are interconnected distribution-level bulk energy storage devices that function as core infrastructure elements to provide both grid resilience and defense against IoT-based cyber grid security threats. The recognition that these are core grid functions changes how storage of this type valued, financed, and operated as compared to storage for ancillary grid services. Distribution storage networks make use of fast bilateral storage to buffer the grid from edge device-based volatilities; this is the essence of both its resilience capability and its cyber defense capability. These storage networks must be core grid components because resilience is an intrinsic grid characteristic and both it and cyber defense of the distribution grid are the responsibility of the distribution utility.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Network inference reveals novel connections in pathways regulating growth and defense in the yeast salt response

Cells respond to stressful conditions by coordinating a complex, multi-faceted response that spans many levels of physiology. Much of the response is coordinated by changes in protein phosphorylation. Although the regulators of transcriptome changes during stress are well characterized in Saccharomyces cerevisiae , the upstream regulatory network controlling protein phosphorylation is less well dissected. Here, we developed a computational approach to infer the signaling network that regulates phosphorylation changes in response to salt stress. We developed an approach to link predicted regulators to groups of likely co-regulated phospho-peptides responding to stress, thereby creating new edges in a background protein interaction network. We then use integer linear programming (ILP) to integrate wild type and mutant phospho-proteomic data and predict the network controlling stress-activated phospho-proteomic changes. The network we inferred predicted new regulatory connections between stress-activated and growth-regulating pathways and suggested mechanisms coordinating metabolism, cell-cycle progression, and growth during stress. We confirmed several network predictions with co-immunoprecipitations coupled with mass-spectrometry protein identification and mutant phospho-proteomic analysis. Results show that the cAMP-phosphodiesterase Pde2 physically interacts with many stress-regulated transcription factors targeted by PKA, and that reduced phosphorylation of those factors during stress requires the Rck2 kinase that we show physically interacts with Pde2. Conclusively, our work shows how a high-quality computational network model can facilitate discovery of new pathway interactions during osmotic stress.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Moving Target Defense for Space Systems [Slides]

The purpose of this work is to determine MTD effectiveness and cost for protecting non-IP C2 networks, experiment on networks used in satellite systems, and randomize features (e.g. device address) to prevent adversary from conducting reconnaissance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Final Report for Industrial Base Cybersecurity Initiative (IBCI) Project (FY2019)

Information security issues impact all manufacturing sectors and are particularly troublesome when designs for advanced weapons systems are lost via attacks that propagate through the relatively unprotected lower tiers of the nation's supply chains. The US Manufacturing Industrial Base (MIB) consists of suppliers and distributors that range in size from large prime contractors with extensive cybersecurity resources to small shops with little or no in-house information technology capabilities. The acquisition and maintenance of the technologies, systems, and financial resources needed to assure secure collaborations can be an overwhelming challenge for many manufacturers yet the cost of poor cybersecurity practices can lead to the compromise of national security information worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The Department of Defense Manufacturing Industrial Base Policy organization and the Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Advanced Manufacturing Office have chartered the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) to design, develop, and demonstrate a Manufacturing Threat Evaluation Wargaming System (MTEWS). The MTEWS concept is based on the use of a virtual model of the computer networks and cybersecurity protocols used across the MIB that will be continuously updated to reflect the dynamic threat environment. The MTEWS cyber-physical test range will demonstrate a prototype wargaming system that analyzes the impact of new and existing cybersecurity threats while also providing the information needed to sustain the integrity of the MIB supply chains. A long-term goal is the establishment of an enduring national manufacturing operations center that proactively responds to the continuously changing attacks that threaten the MIB and US national security. LANL and Y-12 have formed an Industrial Base Cybersecurity Initiative Team (IBCI), consisting of partners from the public, private and academic sectors, that is developing the MTEWS. To date, most of the project tasks have been centered on the technologies required to create a representative model of the MIB because this is a foundational element for the entire project. Modeling activities at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNC Charlotte) have demonstrated a VMware-based prototype system that can accommodate a network model with up to 350 nodes and includes features such as the option to incorporate network scanning information when building the model and the ability to down select the elements of duplicative networks to a statistically significant subset that avoids redundantly duplicating network configurations. Broad Ordering Agreements have been established with UNC Charlotte and the University of West Florida (UWF) that support a variety of cybersecurity for manufacturing tasks and wide-spread endorsement has been received from government, industry and academia sectors concerning the IBCI goals and technical direction.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Multi-comparative systems biology analysis reveals time-course biosignatures of in vivo bovine pathway responses to B. melitensis, S. enterica Typhimurium and M. avium paratuberculosis

Background: To decipher the complexity and improve the understanding of host-pathogen interactions, biologists must adopt new system level approaches in which the hierarchy of biological interactions and dynamics can be studied. This paper presents the application of systems biology for the cross-comparative analysis and interactome modeling of three different infectious agents, leading to the identification of novel, unique and common molecular host responses (biosignatures). Methods: A computational systems biology method was utilized to create interactome models of the host responses to Brucella melitensis (BMEL), Salmonella enterica Typhimurium (STM) and Mycobacterium avium paratuberculosis (MAP). A bovine ligated ileal loop biological model was employed to capture the host gene expression response at four time points post infection. New methods based on Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) machine learning were employed to conduct a systematic comparative analysis of pathway and Gene Ontology category perturbations. Results: A cross-comparative assessment of 219 pathways and 1620 gene ontology (GO) categories was performed on each pathogen-host condition. Both unique and common pathway and GO perturbations indicated remarkable temporal differences in pathogen-host response profiles. Highly discriminatory pathways were selected from each pathogen condition to create a common system level interactome model comprised of 622 genes. This model was trained with data from each pathogen condition to capture unique and common gene expression features and relationships leading to the identification of candidate host-pathogen points of interactions and discriminatory biosignatures. Conclusions: Our results provide deeper understanding of the overall complexity of host defensive and pathogen invasion processes as well as the identification of novel host-pathogen interactions. The application of advanced computational methods for developing interactome models based on DBN has proven to be instrumental in conducting multi-conditional cross-comparative analyses. Further, this approach generates a fully simulateable model with capabilities for predictive analysis as well as for diagnostic pattern recognition. The resulting biosignatures may represent future targets for identification of emerging pathogens as well as for development of antimicrobial drugs, immunotherapeutics, or vaccines for prevention and treatment of diseases caused by known, emerging/re-emerging infectious agents.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

PV Cyber Security Research (Final Report)

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. This project was split into two phases. The first provided a survey and roadmap of the cybersecurity for the solar industry. The second investigated multiple PV cybersecurity research and development (R&D) concepts identified in the first phase. In the first year, the team created a roadmap for improving cybersecurity for distributed solar energy resources. This roadmap was intended to provide direction for the nation over the next five years and focused on the intersection of industry and government and recommends activities in four related areas: stakeholder engagement, cyber security research and development, standards development, and industry best practices. At the same time, the team produced a primer for DER vendors, aggregators, and grid operators to establish a common taxonomy and describe basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This material was motivated by the need to assist the broader PV industry with cybersecurity resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. Lastly, an adversary-based assessment of multiple PV devices was completed at the Distributed Energy Technologies Laboratory at Sandia National Laboratories to determine the status of industry cybersecurity practices. The team found multiple deficiencies in the security features of the assessed devices. In the second year, a set of recommendations was created for DER communication protocols— especially with respect to the state-of-the-art requirements in IEEE 2030.5. Additionally, several cybersecurity R&D technologies related to communications-enabled photovoltaic systems were studied to harden DER communication networks. Specifically, the team investigated (a) using software defined networking to create a moving target defense system for DER communications, and (b) engineering controls that prevent misprogramming or adversary action on DER devices/networks by disallowing setpoints that will generate unstable power system operations.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components

We consider infrastructures consisting of a network of systems, each composed of discrete components. The network provides the vital connectivity between the systems and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. The individual components of the systems can be attacked by cyber and physical means and can be appropriately reinforced to withstand these attacks. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure performance as a game between an attacker and a provider, who choose the numbers of the components of the systems and network to attack and reinforce, respectively. The costs and benefits of attacks and reinforcements are characterized using the sum-form, product-form and composite utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a component cost term. We present a two-level characterization of the correlations within the infrastructure: (i) the aggregate failure correlation function specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network, and (ii) the survival probabilities of the systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations using multiplier functions. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions that provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities and also the expected infrastructure capacity specified by the total number of operational components. We apply these results to derive and analyze defense strategies for distributed cloud computing infrastructures using cyber-physical models.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Computational analysis of deployable wind turbine systems in defense operational energy applications.

The U.S. military has been exploring pathways to reduce the logistical burden of fuel on virtually all their missions globally. Energy harvesting of local resources such as wind and solar can help increase the resilience and operational effectiveness of military units, especially at the most forward operating bases where the fuel logistics are most challenging. This report considers the potential benefits of wind energy provided by deployable wind turbines as measured by a reduction in fuel consumption and supply convoys to a hypothetical network of Army Infantry Brigade Combat Team bases. Two modeling and simulation tools are used to represent the bases and their operations and quantify the impacts of system design variables that include wind turbine technologies, battery storage, number of turbines, and wind resource quality. The System of Systems Analysis Toolkit Joint Operational Energy Model serves as a baseline scenario for comparison. The Hybrid Optimization of Multiple Energy Resources simulation tool is used to optimize a single base within the larger Joint Operational Energy Model. The results of both tools show that wind turbines can provide significant benefits to contingency bases in terms of reduced fuel use and number of convoy trips to resupply the base. The match between the turbine design and wind resource, which is statistically low across most of the global land area, is a critical design consideration. The addition of battery storage can enhance the benefits of wind turbines, especially in systems with more wind turbines and higher wind resources. Wind turbines may also provide additional benefits to other metrics such as resilience that may be important but not fully considered in the current analysis. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful support, feedback and review to improve this report: U.S. Department of Energy Wind Energy Technologies Office, Patrick Gilman and Bret Barker; Idaho National Laboratory, Jake Gentle and Bradley Whipple; The National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Robert Preus and Tony Jimenez; Sandia National Laboratories, Alan Nanco, Dennis Anderson, and Hai Le. In addition, numerous discussions with military and industry stakeholders over the year were invaluable in focusing the efforts represented in this report.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

An Example of Counter-Adversarial Community Detection Analysis

Community detection is often used to understand the nature of a network. However, there may exist an adversarial member of the network who wishes to evade that understanding. We analyze one such specific situation, quantifying the efficacy of certain attacks against a particular analytic use of community detection and providing a preliminary assessment of a possible defense.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗