SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The Aviation Security Screening Optimizer for Risk and Throughput (ASSORT) is designed to assess risk-based approaches for passenger screening and checkpoint operations. Additionally, ASSORT is exploring various traveler categories — general, trusted, and trusted-plus — along with different checkpoint screening Concept of Operations tailored to each traveler type
The Sandia Utilities form an RF toolkit extending the GNU Radio framework for straightforward interaction with bursty RF systems which can be cumbersome using built in capabilities of the framework or other open source extensions. Motivated by the abstract exercise of responding to a modulated burst of information with a unique modulated burst of information, the Sandia Utilities provide several dozen additional debug and signal processing blocks through four software modules. These blocks manifest their utility through a new general concept of operation for GNU Radio applications and extend many existing streaming capabilities to the PDU-based message passing API. Using these concepts and tools, it is straightforward to develop software capabilities to interact with existing and new bursty RF devices.
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
The Advanced Reactor Control and Operations (ARCO) facility was constructed in January 2018 to serve as a test bed for advanced reactor control rooms and operator support systems. Since then, it has supported human-machine interface user experience research, fault detection and mitigation technology development, control room concept of operations development, and remote operations research. ARCO serves as the control room for the Compact Integral Effects Test (CIET) facility, which replicates the primary-side flow paths and thermal-hydraulic behavior of a fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR) using simulant fluids and scaling principles. New reactor designs feature different operating conditions and scenarios than those in existing reactors. ARCO supports the research and development of digital tools for operator communications, intuitive real-time data analysis, online health monitoring and prognostics, and control room cybersecurity. By integrating these different technologies, ARCO acts as a prototypical control system to iteratively develop methods and tools of operation in advanced small modular nuclear reactors. This paper describes the features of and challenges to operating advanced small modular reactors underlying the design basis for ARCO and its operator support systems.
Today’s transmission networks extend for hundreds of kilometers, transferring significant amounts of electrical energy. For every country, there are sort of “back- bone” lines, where a massive failure of transformers would create serious challenges to sustain a reliable energy supply. Natural phenomena and human driven actions could be triggers of such catastrophic events. For large utilities, or groups of utilities, it would be highly convenient to count with “flexible transformers”, which could be used as replacements for different voltage levels and with impedance adjustable to match optimum local requirements of impacted substations. Currently applied “emergency transformers” are fixed-impedance devices. In this contribution, a new concept of flexible, “future-grid ready” type of power transformers, specially devised for transmission networks is explained. This transformer has adjustable impedance features, which could be on-line operated. The concept has been proven to be functional and stable in the factory lab and in the field, by means of a prototype autotransformer of of 100 MVA, 165/69 Kv.
This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.
The "density limit'' is one of the fundamental bounds on tokamak operating space, and is commonly estimated via the empirical Greenwald scaling. This limit has garnered renewed interest in recent years as it has become clear that ITER and many tokamak pilot plant concepts must operate near or above the widely-used Greenwald limit to achieve their objectives. Evidence has also grown that the Greenwald scaling - in its remarkable simplicity - may not capture the full complexity of the disruptive density limit. In this study, we assemble a multi-machine database to quantify the effectiveness of the Greenwald limit as a predictor of the L-mode density limit and identify alternative stability metrics. We find that a two-parameter dimensionless boundary in the plasma edge, $\nu_{*\rm, edge}^{\rm limit} = 3.0 \beta_{T,{\rm edge}}^{-0.4}$, achieves significantly higher accuracy (true negative rate of 97.7\% at a true positive rate of 95\%) than the Greenwald limit (true negative rate 86.1\% at a true positive rate of 95\%) across a multi-machine dataset including metal- and carbon-wall tokamaks (AUG, C-Mod, DIII-D, and TCV). The collisionality boundary presented here can be applied for density limit avoidance in current devices and in ITER, where it can be measured and responded to in real time.
Electric grid operators are adept at handling complexity and uncertainty. However, with increasing introduction of renewable generation, distributed energy resources, and more frequent severe weather events, operators will experience new workload and challenging decision scenarios. Here, this paper quantifies risks and benefits from an operator's perspective of introducing weather based forecast Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR) using variable wind conditions in addition to ambient temperature to relieve transmission congestion and facilitating more offshore wind (OSW). A concept of operations (CONOPS) applied to a forecast DLR implementation and its integration with OSW is defined. A method for evaluating tradeoffs of derating to make the rating more conservative but decreasing the benefit was developed and applied to a case study for two existing overhead transmission lines on Long Island, New York. The CONOPS uses historical day-ahead and hour-ahead High Resolution Rapid Refresh weather forecasts and weather station data to support planning and real-time operations. The analysis determines the risk of downgrades in real-time operational rating compared to the forecast and quantifies the frequency and severity of last-minute downgrades. The risk is compared against the benefits in increased capacity to provide insights on the additional amount of uncertainty DLR and OSW will add to the operator's workload.
Authorized by the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA), the National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) provides private sector technology developers access to strategic infrastructures and assets for commercial nuclear energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment activities. The mission is to support a timely and cost-effective path to the licensing and commercialization of new nuclear energy systems. To meet these needs, NRIC is developing two reactor demonstration test beds at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the ZPPR Test bed (ZTB) and the EBR-II Test bed (ETB). ZTB will support the demonstration of systems that operate at less than 500 kWt. The baseline objective is for the ZPPR Cell to act as a confinement structure capable of siting reactors that utilize Safeguards Category 1 material for operations. The major areas addressed in the pre-conceptual design include: • Installation of an access door • Electrical Power • Heat Removal • Ventilation in the Cell • Reactor Installation Along with the design for ZTB, a concept of operations (COP) has also been developed. The COP is intended to facilitate a common understanding of ideas, challenges, and issues. As systems continue to evolve in complexity System Engineers and Project Directors will utilize and update the COP to develop and sustain a common vision of the system for stakeholders.
The nuclear industry is developing new advanced reactor technologies, and many companies are conceptualizing designs for microreactors, a class of nuclear reactor with a sub-20 MWth power output designed to be factory fabricated, easily transportable, and simple to control. Microreactors offer promising solutions to several use cases for which large-scale plants would not be suitable, and conventional power generation means, notably diesel electric generators, are expensive and logistically difficult. Many of the potential use cases are in isolated locations such as arctic communities, remote mines, and military installations. Therefore, the cost of microreactor deployment and traditional onsite operations pose a challenge that requires new technical solutions to address. One solution that has the potential to greatly improve economics is to operate and monitor microreactors remotely from a centralized location. Remote monitoring and operation are novel concepts to the nuclear industry and will greatly alter the tasks and responsibilities associated with current commercial nuclear power plant operators. As such, it is important to perform research on potential technological solutions and the impacts those solutions have on operations with end-goal of defining a safe and effective remote concept of operations. This paper proposes a framework for resilient remote operation of microreactors enabled by a novel digital twin implementation.
Authorized by the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA), the National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) provides private sector technology developers access to strategic infrastructures and assets for commercial nuclear energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment activities. The mission is to support a timely and cost-effective path to the licensing and commercialization of new nuclear energy systems. To meet these needs, NRIC is developing two test beds at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The ZPPR Test bed (ZTB) and the EBR-II Test bed (ETB). The EBR-II test bed will support the demonstration of systems that operate at less than 10 MWt. The baseline objective is for the EBR-II Dome to act as a safety significant containment structure capable of siting reactors that utilize Safeguards Category 4 material for operations. The major areas addressed in the pre-conceptual design include: • Installation of an access door • Electrical Power • Heat Removal • Ventilation in the Dome • Module handling system Along with the design for ETB a concept of operations (COP) has also been developed. The COP is intended to facilitate a common understanding of ideas, challenges, and issues. As systems continue to evolve in complexity System Engineers and Project Directors will utilize the COP to develop and sustain a common vision of the system for stakeholders.
Utility owners and operators of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) are and will be modernizing their nuclear power plants by performing a digital transformation involving design of an integrated set of systems that together enable a technology centric operating plant. The Plant Modernization Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program has a strategic action plan that lays the groundwork for a digital transformation of the nuclear industry. The model for this transformation is an advanced concept of operations, with an end point vision, “To achieve the maximum aggregate benefit enabled by this digital transformation.” To achieve this, the digital infrastructure for a nuclear plant must be designed as an integrated set of systems that together enable a technology centric operating model. The digital transformation process obviously needs to involve technology considerations and systems engineering, but it also needs to include human and organizational expertise. Thus, human and organizational factors, including sociotechnical systems methods and techniques (e.g., Cognitive Systems Engineering, Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes, human systems integration, and Macroergonomics) need to be considered for digital transformation projects in order to effectively integrate human and organizational expertise efforts into the new work system that results from nuclear power plant digital modernization. That is, the work system is the basic unit of sociotechnical systems analysis and contains three components: personnel, technical, and organization and management. These components should be jointly optimized with respect to the interdependence of systems performance criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and safety. Joint optimization can be achieved through the application of three human and organization functions: knowledge representation, knowledge elicitation, and cross-functional integration. This report provides a strategic framework for effective integration of human and organizational expertise within nuclear power plant digital modernization efforts.
The potential for human errors in conducting security related screening operations can lead to inadvertent and adverse decision outcomes. This paper overviews an initial mathematical framework designed to model and quantify the various human factors and decision outcomes that may occur in conducting security screening operations, such as U.S. port of entry radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) security screening. This framework is based on the Human Error Assessment and Reduction (HEART) technique. As applied here, the framework incorporates a set of rules for human engagement, including a prescribed concept of operations (CONOPS) and deviations that may occur from this established CONOPS due to inadvertent personnel decision errors. We also review some of the various factors that may adversely influence such decisions by security screening personnel. Some of these factors include current workload, environmental conditions, training, and various other intangible factors. Using the HEART methodology, we translate each of these factors into error producing conditions, their effects on error, an assessed proportion of effects, and finally the overall probability of human error at each stage of the screening process. We then include a small scale example to demonstrate the methodology and results based on an assumed set of input conditions at a notional port of entry.
This report documents the activities performed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2020 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk-Informed System Analysis (RISA) Pathway, Enhanced Resilient Plant (ERP) Systems research. The purpose of the RISA Pathway research and development is to support plant owner-operator decisions with the aim to improve the economics, reliability, and maintain the high levels of safety of current nuclear power plants over periods of extended plant operations. The concept of ERP refers to the combinations of accident-tolerant fuel (ATF), optimal use of diverse and flexible coping strategy (FLEX), enhancements to plant components and systems, and the incorporation of augmented or new passive cooling systems, as well as improved fuel cycle efficiency. The objective of the ERP research effort is to use the RISA methods and toolkit in industry applications, including methods development and early demonstration of technologies, in order to enhance existing reactors’ safety features (both active and passive) and to substantially reduce operating costs through risk-informed approaches to plant design modifications to the plant and their characterization. One main focus of the FY 2020 efforts documented in this report was to extend the analyses conducted in FYs 2018 and 2019 for a pressurized water reactor (PWR) to a boiling water reactor (BWR). The same analysis process, risk analysis approaches, and analysis tools as in the previous work for PWR were used for a generic BWR with near-term ATF cladding (i.e., Iron-Chromium-Aluminum [FeCrAl] cladding and Chromium [Cr]-coated cladding) designs under the postulated station blackout (SBO) and medium loss-of-coolant (MLOCA) accident scenarios. In addition, a FLEX model was developed and incorporated into a generic BWR probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model using the INL-developed software tool, Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE), to assess the risk impact from FLEX. The other main focus of the FY 2020 efforts was to advance analysis methods, including developing dynamic approach for FLEX human reliability analysis (HRA) using the INL-developed software tool, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD), as well as developing a multicriterion benefit evaluation (MCBE) method for evaluating costs and benefits of safety enhancements in nuclear power plants (NPPs). As a case study, the MCBE method was applied to evaluate the costs and benefits brought by FLEX implementation.
Based on the higher interest in Advanced Reactor (AR) deployment (e.g., ARDP[1]) for potential new fuel cycles, the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long-term management and final disposition of potential Advance Reactor spent nuclear fuels (SNF) that would be generated in potential advanced reactors. Safely managing and dispositioning the potential future AR SNF, and any other associated radioactive wastes, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment of those. This paper summarizes the efforts by the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) in evaluating characteristics and packaging options for advanced reactor spent nuclear fuel forms. The fuel forms were categorized into three types: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) fuel salt. This work emphasized TRISO and metallic SNF and waste streams because of the near-term anticipated operation of the Xe-100 and the Natrium reactors as advanced-reactor demonstrations. Preliminary information for the spent-fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) is also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions used publicly available information. The following characteristics are calculated or estimated for use in the preliminary assessments: SNF volume and mass, radiation/activity levels through time, thermal conditions through time, potential radionuclide source terms, chemical interactions and evolutions, disposal inventories, and waste-form lifetime. Using those characteristics, calculations to determine the applicability of existing canister designs were performed. These evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints for storage, transportation, and disposal. The paper also includes a literature review and analysis on the storage, transportation, and disposal evaluations and experiences from reactors with similar fuel forms. Advanced-reactor vendors cite past experiences with Fort St. Vrain for TRISO and the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) for metallics that have major influences on fuel design. Finally, the paper includes preliminary concepts of operation for advanced-reactor SNF. This encompasses storage, transportation, potential treatment, and disposal activities from both a per-canister and systems-integration perspective.
This report documents the activities performed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, Enhanced Resilient Plant (ERP) Systems research. The purpose of the RISA Pathway research and development is to support plant owner-operator decisions with the aim to improve the economics, reliability, and maintain the high levels of safety of current nuclear power plants over periods of extended plant operations. The concept of ERP refers to the combinations of accident-tolerant fuel (ATF), optimal use of diverse and flexible coping strategy (FLEX), enhancements to plant components and systems, the incorporation of augmented or new passive cooling systems, the advanced battery technology with extended capacity, as well as improved fuel cycle efficiency. The objective of the ERP research effort is to use the RISA methods and toolkit in industry applications, including methods development and early demonstration of technologies, in order to enhance existing reactors? safety features and to substantially reduce operating costs through risk-informed approaches to plant design modifications to the plant and their characterization. The ERP R&D efforts in FY 2021 are focused on three industry initiatives, including accident-tolerant fuel (ATF), optimal use of diverse and flexible coping strategy (FLEX), and advanced battery technology with extended capacity.
The commercial U.S. light-water reactor fleet has been operating at historical efficiency, reliability, and safety over the last decade. Nuclear power has the highest capacity factor of any other power generation technology while also serving as the largest baseload source for carbon-free energy. Despite this remarkable achievement, continued operations for many plants are threatened due to fierce electricity market competition and rising operations and maintenance costs of which continued maintenance of obsolete analog equipment is a contributor. The digital age and associated technologies are where the future lies in process control, and nuclear has yet to take full advantage of the capabilities offered therein. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program (LWRS) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), sponsored by the Department of Energy, has a mission to help the light-water reactor fleet manage its foundational capabilities to continue providing safe and reliable carbon-free power. LWRS helps support that mission by providing scientific, technology-based solutions for advanced concepts of operations with a more viable business model that will allow the fleet to continue to operate at peak levels through extended plant operation. The LWRS Digitalization Project at INL seeks to leverage digital technologies to synthesize and transform work processes. We provide a state-of-the-art analysis of digitalized work processes in nuclear power and investigate ways in which researchers at INL and the nuclear industry can work together to identify what data to access, how to access it, what to do with the data, and most importantly, how to use the insights for decision-making across all levels within the business. Borne from these considerations, we present four guiding principles for digitalization: develop a coherent digitalization plan, apply human factors engineering, establish data governance, and anticipate unintended consequences. Together, these principles form a method that plants can use to effectively to digitalize nuclear industry work processes. Our guiding principles are informed by multiple knowledge sources. First, we document activities from the Work Digitalization Initiative, which was conceived as a means for nuclear organizations to help define and standardize the industry’s approach to digitalizing work. Second, we detail primary research conducted with industry professionals regarding drivers and barriers to digitalization adoption. We present survey results that demonstrate what the industry hopes to get out of digitalization and the ways that INL can continue to support the industry’s digital transformation. Third, we present a digitalization use case with industry partners NextAxiom Technology and Xcel Energy. The project objective was to transform the current condition report work process from paper to digital, incorporating digitalized principles. We report the development of the application and lessons learned. The accomplishments achieved by this research and development serve to identify critical needs for plant guidance in support of digitalization implementation and contribute to the knowledge and strategies available for utilities considering or undertaking digitalization.
Advances in simulation capabilities to model physical systems have outpaced the development of simulations for humans using those physical systems. There is an argument that the infinite span of potential human behaviors inherently render human modeling more challenging than physical systems. Despite this challenge, the need for modeling humans interacting with these complex systems is paramount. As technologies have improved, many of the failure modes originating from the physical systems have been solved. This means the overall proportion of human errors has increased, such that it is not uncommon to be the primary driver of system failure in modern complex systems. Moreover, technologies such as automated systems may introduce emerging contexts that can cause new, unanticipated modes of human error. Therefore, it is now more important than ever to develop models of human behavior to realize overall system error reductions and achieve established safety margins. To support new and novel concepts of operations for the anticipated wave of advanced nuclear reactor deployments, human factors and human reliability analysis researchers need to develop advanced simulation-based approaches. This talk presents a simulation environment suitable to both collect data and then perform Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate human performance and develop better models of human behavior. Specifically, the Rancor Microworld Simulator models a complex energy production system in a simplified manner. Rancor includes computer-based procedures, which serve as a framework to automatically classify human behaviors without manual, subjective experimenter coding during scenarios. This method supports a detailed level of analysis at the task level. It is feasible for collecting large sample sizes required to develop quantitative modelling elements that have historically challenged traditional full-scope simulator study approaches. Additionally, the other portion of this experimental platform, the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), is presented to show how the collected data can be used to evaluate novel scenarios based on the contextual factors, or performance shaping factors, derived from Rancor simulations. Rancor-HUNTER is being used to predict operator performance with new procedures, such as results from control room modernization or new-build situations. Rancor-HUNTER is also proving a useful surrogate platform to model human performance for other complex systems.