Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Crewed”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1994

Vulnerability of manned spacecraft to crew loss from orbital debris penetration

Orbital debris growth threatens the survival of spacecraft systems from impact-induced failures. Whereas the probability of debris impact and spacecraft penetration may currently be calculated, another parameter of great interest to safety engineers is the probability that debris penetration will cause actual spacecraft or crew loss. Quantifying the likelihood of crew loss following a penetration allows spacecraft designers to identify those design features and crew operational protocols that offer the highest improvement in crew safety for available resources. Within this study, a manned spacecraft crew survivability (MSCSurv) computer model is developed that quantifies the conditional probability of losing one or more crew members, P(sub loss/pen), following the remote likelihood of an orbital debris penetration into an eight module space station. Contributions to P(sub loss/pen) are quantified from three significant penetration-induced hazards: pressure wall rupture (explosive decompression), fragment-induced injury, and 'slow' depressurization. Sensitivity analyses are performed using alternate assumptions for hazard-generating functions, crew vulnerability thresholds, and selected spacecraft design and crew operations parameters. These results are then used to recommend modifications to the spacecraft design and expected crew operations that quantitatively increase crew safety from orbital debris impacts.

Williamsen, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Shared Problem Models and Crew Decision Making

The importance of crew decision making to aviation safety has been well established through NTSB accident analyses: Crew judgment and decision making have been cited as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents in commercial air transport, general aviation, and military aviation. Yet the bulk of research on decision making has not proven helpful in improving the quality of decisions in the cockpit. One reason is that traditional analytic decision models are inappropriate to the dynamic complex nature of cockpit decision making and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions. A new model of dynamic naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove more useful for training or aiding cockpit decision making. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulation and National Transportation Safety Board accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation and reflect the crew's metacognitive skill. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relation between communication that serves to build performance. Implications of these findings for crew training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS2000

Scheduling and Estimating the Cost of Crew Time

In a previous paper, Theory and Application of the Equivalent System Mass Metric, Julie Levri, David Vaccari, and Alan Drysdale developed a method for computing the Equivalent System Mass (ESM) of crew time. ESM is an analog of cost. The suggested approach has been applied but seems to impose too high a cost for small additional requirements for crew time. The proposed method is based on the minimum average cost of crew time. In this work, the scheduling of crew time is examined in more detail, using suggested crew time allocations and daily work schedules. Crew tasks are typically assigned using priorities, which can also be used to construct a crew time demand curve mapping the value or cost per hour versus the total number of hours worked. The cost of additional crew time can be estimated by considering the intersection and shapes of the demand and supply curves. If e assume a mathematical form for the demand curve, a revised method can be developed for computing the cost or ESM of crew time. This method indicates a low cost per hour for small additional requirements for crew time and an increasing cost per hour for larger requirements.

Jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS1994

Communication Research in Aviation and Space Operations: Symptoms and Strategies of Crew Coordination

The day-to-day operators of today's aerospace systems work under increasing pressures to accomplish more with less. They work in operational systems which are complex, technology-based, and high-risk; in which incidents and accidents have far-reaching and costly consequences. For these and other reasons, there is concern that the safety net formerly built upon redundant systems and abundant resources may become overburdened. Although we know that human ingenuity can overcome incredible odds, human nature can also fail in unpredictable ways. Over the last 20 years, a large percentage of aviation accidents and incidents have been attributed to human errors rather than hardware or environmental factors alone. A class of errors have been identified which are not due to a lack of individual, technical competencies. Rather, they are due to the failure of teams to utilize readily available resources or information in a timely fashion. These insights began a training revolution in the aviation industry called Cockpit Resource Management, which later became known as Crew Resource Management (CRM) as its concepts and applications extended to teams beyond the flightdeck. Then, as now, communication has been a cornerstone in CRM training since crew coordination and resource management largely resides within information transfer processes--both within flightcrews, and between flightcrews and the ground operations teams that support them. The research I will describe takes its roots in CRM history as we began to study communication processes in order to discover symptoms of crew coordination problems, as well as strategies of effective crew management. On the one hand, communication is often the means or the tool by which team members manage their resources, solve problems, maintain situational awareness and procedural discipline. Conversely, it is the lack of planning and resource management, loss of vigilance and situational awareness, and non-standard communications that are implicated in accidents and incidents. NASA/Ames Crew Factors researchers have been developing a model of effective crew coordination in order to understand the sources of performance breakdowns, and to develop effective solutions and interventions. Because communication is a primary mechanism by which information is received and transmitted, and because it is observable behavior, we focus on these group processes in order to identify patterns of communication that distinguish effective from less effective crew performance. Since a prime objective is to develop training recommendations for enhancing communication skills, we interpret our findings in the context of relevant task and environmental conditions, role and procedural constraints, and the normal real-time parameters of flight operations. Another research objective is to consider how communication and coordination can be enhanced through design. For example, flight deck and hardware design as well as procedural and software design may greatly influence the efficiency with which crews communicate and coordinate their work. In addition, teams and tasks may be designed, organized, and trained so that team interactions with each other are based upon appropriately shared knowledge, procedures and situation awareness. In short, we are interested in enhancing communication practices through (1) the training of specific communication skills, and (2) the design of equipment, tasks, procedures, and teams that optimize smooth, unambiguous communication processes. Two examples of communication research will be described; one in aviation and one in space operations. The first example is a high-fidelity full mission simulation study which investigates the affect of flightdeck automation on crew coordination and communication (contrasting crew performance in the DC-9 vs. MD88). Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Return to Flight: Crew Activities Resource Reel 1 of 2

The crew of the STS-114 Discovery Mission is seen in various aspects of training for space flight. The crew activities include: 1) STS-114 Return to Flight Crew Photo Session; 2) Tile Repair Training on Precision Air Bearing Floor; 3) SAFER Tile Inspection Training in Virtual Reality Laboratory; 4) Guidance and Navigation Simulator Tile Survey Training; 5) Crew Inspects Orbital Boom and Sensor System (OBSS); 6) Bailout Training-Crew Compartment; 7) Emergency Egress Training-Crew Compartment Trainer (CCT); 8) Water Survival Training-Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL); 9) Ascent Training-Shuttle Motion Simulator; 10) External Tank Photo Training-Full Fuselage Trainer; 11) Rendezvous and Docking Training-Shuttle Engineering Simulator (SES) Dome; 12) Shuttle Robot Arm Training-SES Dome; 13) EVA Training Virtual Reality Lab; 14) EVA Training Neutral Buoyancy Lab; 15) EVA-2 Training-NBL; 16) EVA Tool Training-Partial Gravity Simulator; 17) Cure in Place Ablator Applicator (CIPAA) Training Glove Vacuum Chamber; 16) Crew Visit to Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA); 17) Crew Inspection-Space Shuttle Discovery; and 18) Crew Inspection-External Tank and Orbital Boom and Sensor System (OBSS). The crew are then seen answering questions from the media at the Space Shuttle Landing Facility.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2008

Crew Activity Analyzer

The crew activity analyzer (CAA) is a system of electronic hardware and software for automatically identifying patterns of group activity among crew members working together in an office, cockpit, workshop, laboratory, or other enclosed space. The CAA synchronously records multiple streams of data from digital video cameras, wireless microphones, and position sensors, then plays back and processes the data to identify activity patterns specified by human analysts. The processing greatly reduces the amount of time that the analysts must spend in examining large amounts of data, enabling the analysts to concentrate on subsets of data that represent activities of interest. The CAA has potential for use in a variety of governmental and commercial applications, including planning for crews for future long space flights, designing facilities wherein humans must work in proximity for long times, improving crew training and measuring crew performance in military settings, human-factors and safety assessment, development of team procedures, and behavioral and ethnographic research. The data-acquisition hardware of the CAA (see figure) includes two video cameras: an overhead one aimed upward at a paraboloidal mirror on the ceiling and one mounted on a wall aimed in a downward slant toward the crew area. As many as four wireless microphones can be worn by crew members. The audio signals received from the microphones are digitized, then compressed in preparation for storage. Approximate locations of as many as four crew members are measured by use of a Cricket indoor location system. [The Cricket indoor location system includes ultrasonic/radio beacon and listener units. A Cricket beacon (in this case, worn by a crew member) simultaneously transmits a pulse of ultrasound and a radio signal that contains identifying information. Each Cricket listener unit measures the difference between the times of reception of the ultrasound and radio signals from an identified beacon. Assuming essentially instantaneous propagation of the radio signal, the distance between that beacon and the listener unit is estimated from this time difference and the speed of sound in air.] In this system, six Cricket listener units are mounted in various positions on the ceiling, and as many as four Cricket beacons are attached to crew members. The three-dimensional position of each Cricket beacon can be estimated from the time-difference readings of that beacon from at least three Cricket listener units

Murray, James↗
NASA NTRS2014

Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission Nominal Design and Performance

In 2010, the President announced that, in 2025, the U.S. intended to launch a human mission to an asteroid [1]. This announcement was followed by the idea of a Capability Driven Framework (CDF) [2], which is based on the idea of evolving capabilities from less demanding to more demanding missions to multiple possible destinations and with increased flexibility, cost effectiveness and sustainability. Focused missions, such as a NASA inter-Center study that examined the viability and implications of sending a crew to a Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) [3], provided a way to better understand and evaluate the utility of these CDF capabilities when applied to an actual mission. The long duration of the NEA missions were contrasted with a concept described in a study prepared for the Keck Institute of Space Studies (KISS) [4] where a robotic spacecraft would redirect an asteroid to the Earth-Moon vicinity, where a relatively short duration crewed mission could be conducted to the captured asteroid. This mission concept was included in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) fiscal year 2014 budget request, as submitted by the NASA Administrator [5]. NASA studies continued to examine the idea of a crewed mission to a captured asteroid in the Earth-Moon vicinity. During this time was an announcement of NASA's Asteroid Grand Challenge [6]. Key goals for the Asteroid Grand Challenge are to locate, redirect, and explore an asteroid, as well as find and plan for asteroid threats. An Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM) study was being conducted, which supports this Grand Challenge by providing understanding in how to execute an asteroid rendezvous, capture it, and redirect it to Earth-Moon space, and, in particular, to a distant retrograde orbit (DRO). Subsequent to the returning of the asteroid to a DRO, would be the launch of a crewed mission to rendezvous with the redirected asteroid. This report examines that crewed mission by assessing the Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission (ARCM) nominal design and performance costs associated with an Orion based crewed rendezvous mission to a captured asteroid in an Earth-Moon DRO. The ARM study includes two fundamental mission phases: 1) The Asteroid Redirect Robotic Mission (ARRM) and 2) the ARCM. The ARRM includes a solar electric propulsion based robotic asteroid return vehicle (ARV) sent to rendezvous with a selected near Earth asteroid, capture it, and return it to a DRO in the Earth-Moon vicinity. The DRO is selected over other possible asteroid parking orbits due to its achievability (by both the robotic and crewed vehicles) and by its stability (e.g., no orbit maintenance is required). After the return of the asteroid to the Earth-Moon vicinity, the ARCM is executed and carries a crew of two astronauts to a DRO to rendezvous with the awaiting ARV with the asteroid. The outbound and inbound transfers employ lunar gravity assist (LGA) flybys to reduce the Orion propellant requirement for the overall nominal mission, which provides a nominal mission with some reserve propellant for possible abort situations. The nominal mission described in this report provides a better understanding of the mission considerations as well as the feasibility of such a crewed mission, particularly with regard to spacecraft currently undergoing development, such as the Orion vehicle and the Space Launch System (SLS).

Condon, Gerald↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Humans to Mars, but How Many? Using Training Requirements Modeling to Inform Crew Size

Missions to Mars will differ from previous human spaceflight missions in that the onboard crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner due to the long communication delays. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, that crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise of the Mission Control Central (MCC) team NASA currently relies upon. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing a methodology for assessing the trade space of factors that affect the number of crew for future missions. This methodology includes the consideration of results from three human performance models developed using the Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling platform as well as a custom-built model on expertise trained within the crew. The IMPRINT results will be presented in the modeling and simulation sub-tag. Here we present results of a model based on NASA’s crew qualification and responsibility matrix (CQRM), a tool used to identify the crew qualifications for each area of responsibility (operation, system, and payload) for a mission. The model outputs an optimized allocation of training assignments along with a flight-assigned CQRM that can be used to consider the expertise that can be trained within a crew of a given size. We discuss the CQRM model result implications on the trade space for Mars mission crew size.

Mars↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Humans to Mars, but How Many? Using Training Requirements Modeling to Inform Crew Size

Missions to Mars will differ from previous human spaceflight missions in that the onboard crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner due to the long communication delays. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, that crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise of the Mission Control Central (MCC) team NASA currently relies upon. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing a methodology for assessing the trade space of factors that affect the number of crew for future missions. This methodology includes the consideration of results from three human performance models developed using the Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling platform as well as a custom-built model on expertise trained within the crew. The IMPRINT results will be presented in the modeling and simulation sub-tag. Here we present results of a model based on NASA’s crew qualification and responsibility matrix (CQRM), a tool used to identify the crew qualifications for each area of responsibility (operation, system, and payload) for a mission. The model outputs an optimized allocation of training assignments along with a flight-assigned CQRM that can be used to consider the expertise that can be trained within a crew of a given size. We discuss the CQRM model result implications on the trade space for Mars mission crew size.

Mars↗
NASA NTRS2024

Crew Health and Performance Integrated Data Architecture (CHP-IDA) Project

BACKGROUND: Future Human Exploration missions introduce a new paradigm as crews move further from the resupply and near real-time ground support typical of Low Earth Orbit missions today. Without immediate support from ground-based personnel, exploration crews will be more reliant on inflight data and technology to respond to emergencies and anomalies. A data architecture to support a new generation of technologies, employing advanced analytical and predictive modeling techniques, is needed to enable crew autonomy. OVERVIEW: The Crew Health and Performance Integrated Data Architecture (CHP-IDA) project funded by NASA’s Exploration Medical Integrated Product Team (XMIPT) is laying a foundation for future in-flight informatics by providing a back-end architecture for collecting, storing, and integrating multiple sources of data generated by and around the crew. CHP-IDA provides a platform for common data models and Application Programming Interfaces to access, integrate, process, and display CHP data (e.g., environmental, exercise, medical, sleep, performance, etc.). This will facilitate the increased situation awareness and decision support required by the crew and remote support of exploration missions. This presentation will describe the currently ongoing effort to develop and evaluate a path-to-flight concept of the CHP-IDA software and its core capabilities. Current integrations will be discussed, including analytics for Extravehicular Activity metabolic rate and data ingestion from a multi-functional integrated medical device. The presentation will also provide examples of scenarios used to demonstrate the CHP-IDA through human-in-the-loop test bed activities as well as examples of appropriate system performance metrics. DISCUSSION: Today, in-flight data is often siloed, unsynchronized, and largely inaccessible in real time. Many data sets require manual entry and/or data transfer between vehicles and the ground. These issues contribute to risks in supporting exploration medical capabilities. The CHP-IDA is a back-end data system providing core capabilities needed for timely and meaningful data insights across CHP domains to crew and remote personnel to enable increased crew autonomy. Future work includes collaboration with additional CHP domains, new technology integrations, and further demonstrations of the IDA within different vehicle and communication latency contexts. LEARNING OBJECTIVES 1. The audience will understand that the CHP-IDA is a back-end system, providing a platform to facilitate access, promote decision tools, and provide meaningful insights to crew and to remote stakeholders during exploration missions. 2. The audience will gain insight into human-centered research and activities used to discover CHP domain data needs and pain points and how this information is used to guide development of the IDA.

Exploration↗
NASA NTRS1990

Personality factors in flight operations. Volume 1: Leader characteristics and crew performance in a full-mission air transport simulation

Crew effectiveness is a joint product of the piloting skills, attitudes, and personality characteristics of team members. As obvious as this point might seem, both traditional approaches to optimizing crew performance and more recent training development highlighting crew coordination have emphasized only the skill and attitudinal dimensions. This volume is the first in a series of papers on this simulation. A subsequent volume will focus on patterns of communication within crews. The results of a full-mission simulation research study assessing the impact of individual personality on crew performance is reported. Using a selection algorithm described in previous research, captains were classified as fitting one of three profiles along a battery of personality assessment scales. The performances of 23 crews led by captains fitting each profile were contrasted over a one-and-one-half-day simulated trip. Crews led by captains fitting a positive Instrumental-Expressive profile (high achievement motivation and interpersonal skill) were consistently effective and made fewer errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Expressive profile (below average achievement motivation, negative expressive style, such as complaining) were consistently less effective and made more errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Instrumental profile (high levels of competitiveness, verbal aggressiveness, and impatience and irritability) were less effective on the first day but equal to the best on the second day. These results underscore the importance of stable personality variables as predictors of team coordination and performance.

Chidester, Thomas R.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Lunar-Mars Life Support Test Project: Human Factors and Crew Interactions - Phase 2

Phase 2 of the Lunar-Mars Life Support Test Project was conducted in June and July of 1996 at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The primary objective of Phase 2 was to demonstrate and evaluate an integrated physicochemical air revitalization and regenerative water recovery system capable of sustaining a human crew of four for 30 days inside a closed chamber. The crew (3 males and 1 female) was continuously present inside a chamber throughout the 30-day test. The objective of this paper was to describe crew interactions and human factors for the test. Crew preparations for the test included training and familiarization of chamber systems and accommodations, and medical and psychological evaluations. During the test, crew members provided metabolic loads for the life support systems, performed maintenance on chamber systems, and evaluated human factors inside the chamber. Overall, the four crew members found the chamber to be comfortable for the 30-day test. The crew performed well together and this was attributed in part to team dynamics, skill mix (one commander, two system experts, and one logistics lead), and a complementary mix of personalities. Communication with and support by family, friends, and colleagues were identified as important contributors to the high morale of the crew during the test. Lessons learned and recommendations for future testing are presented by the crew in this paper.

Ming, D. W.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Medical Operations Console Procedure Evaluation: BME Response to Crew Call Down for an Emergency

International Space Station (ISS) Mission Operations are managed by multiple flight control disciplines located at the lead Mission Control Center (MCC) at NASA-Johnson Space Center (JSC). ISS Medical Operations are supported by the complementary roles of Flight Surgeons (Surgeon) and Biomedical Engineer (BME) flight controllers. The Surgeon, a board certified physician, oversees all medical concerns of the crew and the BME provides operational and engineering support for Medical Operations Crew Health Care System. ISS Medical Operations is currently addressing the coordinated response to a crew call down for an emergent medical event, in particular when the BME is the only Medical Operations representative in MCC. In this case, the console procedure BME Response to Crew Call Down for an Emergency will be used. The procedure instructs the BME to contact a Surgeon as soon as possible, coordinate with other flight disciplines to establish a Private Medical Conference (PMC) for the crew and Surgeon, gather information from the crew if time permits, and provide Surgeon with pertinent console resources. It is paramount that this procedure is clearly written and easily navigated to assist the BME to respond consistently and efficiently. A total of five BME flight controllers participated in the study. Each BME participant sat in a simulated MCC environment at a console configured with resources specific to the BME MCC console and was presented with two scripted emergency call downs from an ISS crew member. Each participant used the procedure while interacting with analog MCC disciplines to respond to the crew call down. Audio and video recordings of the simulations were analyzed and each BME participant's actions were compared to the procedure. Structured debriefs were conducted at the conclusion of both simulations. The procedure was evaluated for its ability to elicit consistent responses from each BME participant. Trials were examined for deviations in procedure task completion and/or navigation, in particular the execution of the Surgeon call sequence. Debrief comments were used to analyze unclear procedural steps and to discern any discrepancies between the procedure and generally accepted BME actions. The sequence followed by BME participants differed considerably from the sequence intended by the procedure. Common deviations included the call sequence used to contact Surgeon, the content of BME and crew interaction and the gathering of pertinent console resources. Differing perceptions of task priority and imprecise language seem to have caused multiple deviations from the procedure s intended sequence. The study generated 40 recommendations for the procedure, of which 34 are being implemented. These recommendations address improving the clarity of the instructions, identifying training considerations, expediting Surgeon contact, improving cues for anticipated flight control team communication and identifying missing console tools.

Johnson-Troop↗
NASA NTRS2015

Design Considerations for a Crewed Mars Ascent Vehicle

Exploration architecture studies identified the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) as one of the largest "gear ratio" items in a crewed Mars mission. Because every kilogram of mass ascended from the Martian surface requires seven kilograms or more of ascent propellant, it is desirable for the MAV to be as small and lightweight as possible. Analysis identified four key factors that drive MAV sizing: 1) Number of crew: more crew members require more equipment-and a larger cabin diameter to hold that equipment-with direct implications to structural, thermal, propulsion, and power subsystem mass. 2) Which suit is worn during ascent: Extravehicular Activity (EVA) type suits are physically larger and heavier than Intravehicular Activity (IVA) type suits and because they are less flexible, EVA suits require more elbow-room to maneuver in and out of. An empty EVA suit takes up about as much cabin volume as a crew member. 3) How much time crew spends in the MAV: less than about 12 hours and the MAV can be considered a "taxi" with few provisions for crew comfort. However, if the crew spends more than 12 consecutive hours in the MAV, it begins to look like a Habitat requiring more crew comfort items. 4) How crew get into/out of the MAV: ingress/egress method drives structural mass (for example, EVA hatch vs. pressurized tunnel vs. suit port) as well as consumables mass for lost cabin atmosphere, and has profound impacts on surface element architecture. To minimize MAV cabin mass, the following is recommended: Limit MAV usage to 24 consecutive hours or less; discard EVA suits on the surface and ascend wearing IVA suits; Limit MAV functionality to ascent only, rather than dual-use ascent/habitat functions; and ingress/egress the MAV via a detachable tunnel to another pressurized surface asset.

Rucker, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Utilization of the International Space Station for Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test (CAST)

The United States space policy is evolving toward missions beyond low Earth orbit. In an effort to meet that policy, NASA has recognized Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) as a valuable capability. Identified within AMO capabilities is the potential for autonomous planning and replanning during human spaceflight operations. That is allowing crew members to collectively or individually participate in the development of their own schedules. Currently, dedicated mission operations planners collaborate with international partners to create daily plans for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), taking into account mission requirements, ground rules, and various vehicle and payload constraints. In future deep space operations the crew will require more independence from ground support due to communication transmission delays. Furthermore, crew members who are provided with the capability to schedule their own activities are able to leverage direct experience operating in the space environment, and possibly maximize their efficiency. CAST (Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test) is an ISS investigation designed to analyze three important hypotheses about crew autonomous scheduling. First, given appropriate inputs, the crew is able to create and execute a plan in a reasonable period of time without impacts to mission success. Second, the proximity of the planner, in this case the crew, to the planned operations increases their operational efficiency. Third, crew members are more satisfied when given a role in plan development. This paper presents the results from a single astronaut test subject who participated in five CAST sessions. The details on the operational philosophy of CAST are discussed, including the approach to crew training, selection criteria for test days, and data collection methods. CAST is a technology demonstration payload sponsored by the ISS Research Science and Technology Office, and performed by experts in Mission Operations Planning from the Flight Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center, and researchers across multiple NASA centers. It is hoped the results of this investigation will guide NASA's implementation of autonomous mission operations for long duration human space missions to Mars and beyond.

Healy, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2018

Information Displays and Crew Configurations for UTM Operations

In this paper we discuss how team configuration may influence how infor-mation is shared among team members for low-altitude Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations. NASA collected and analyzed observation data gathered during a series of field tests for the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project. The field tests were part of a larger effort aimed at advancing the UTM concept, conducted at six test-sites spread across the USA. Ground control station (GCS) concepts, flight-crew composition, and crew-size var-ied within and across test-sites. Flight crews took two strategic approaches to organizing their teams. The first of the two approaches was implemented by one third of the flight crews. These crews integrated the role of UTM opera-tor into the duties of existing crew members, merging the current roles with this new one, keeping the UTM Operator collocated with the flight crew. The remaining two thirds implemented a distributed team configuration, where a single UTM operator distributed support across multiple crews. Results from our data collection efforts revealed that UTM Operator location influenced whether flight crews used verbal communication versus displays to acquire UTM information.

teams↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Medical Training to Progressively Enable EIMO

Background. Onboard medical capabilities have greatly expanded over the history of the US space program. Newly identified space-related medical conditions, technological advances, and longer mission durations have led to an increasing need for on-demand medical expertise. Lengthy communications delays, lack of resupply and evacuation opportunities on exploration-class missions place an ever-increasing burden on the crew to provide medical care. Having adequate knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) available is an essential component of successful Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO). Without appropriate crew training and KSA, cutting-edge medical equipment has little value. Presumably, the crew will include a qualified physician; however, if the physician is incapacitated, a non-physician crew medical officer (CMO) will be needed. While more crew time is needed for medical training, there will be concomitant increases in preflight training demands for vehicle system management, operations, science, and contingencies. In truly independent operations, onboard resources such as just-in-time training, mixed reality, decision support tools, and AI-enabled chatbot “consultants” will be needed to augment KSA. Overview. Because of crew time constraints, topical priorities must be determined for preflight training. Curricula should be developed that emphasize management of conditions with relatively high incidence and morbidity/mortality. Defining the required KSA levels to treat each condition is essential, but all crewmembers should have basic lifesaving skills. Procedural and diagnostic training on live patients and simulators should be prioritized over classroom lectures. Crews must be trained with onboard equipment, resources, mixed reality, and AI-based decision support tools. Mission simulations should include medical problems with/without ground support and with appropriate communication delays. Certification guidelines for each level of KSA must be established. Skills rapidly decay for non-physician CMO’s; both pre-flight and in-flight refresher training will be needed. During spaceflight just-in-time training, simulations, and onboard CME with crew physician can help retain skills. Discussion. Medical technology, simulation design, mixed reality, and AI are advancing at a dizzying rate. Recognizing the severe constraints on crew time, it is critical that astronaut training is highly efficient and adapted to keep pace with new innovations both pre-flight and during exploration missions. These challenges will be discussed during this panel session.

Jay Lemery↗