NICSIM: NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL SIMULATION FOR EVALUATING RESPONSE TO CYBER-ATTACKS.
Abstract not provided.
El Genk, Mohamed↗
SEARCH · Search NASA
Results for “Cyber attacks”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Autonomous reconfigurable virtual sensing system for cyber-attack neutralization
An industrial asset may be associated with a plurality of monitoring nodes, each monitoring node generating a series of monitoring node values over time representing current operation of the industrial asset. An abnormality detection computer may determine that at least one abnormal monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault. A virtual sensing estimator may continuously execute an adaptive learning process to create or update virtual sensor models for the monitoring nodes. Responsive to an indication that a monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault, the virtual sensing estimator may be dynamically reconfigured to estimate a series of virtual node values for the abnormal monitoring node or nodes based on information from normal monitoring nodes and appropriate virtual sensor models. The series of monitoring node values from the abnormal monitoring node or nodes may then be replaced with the virtual node values.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Using virtual sensors to accommodate industrial asset control systems during cyber attacks
In some embodiments, an industrial asset may be associated with a plurality of monitoring nodes, each monitoring node generating a series of monitoring node values over time that represent operation of the industrial asset. A threat detection computer may determine that an attacked monitoring node is currently being attacked. Responsive to this determination, a virtual sensor coupled to the plurality of monitoring nodes may estimate a series of virtual node values for the attacked monitoring node(s) based on information received from monitoring nodes that are not currently being attacked. The virtual sensor may then replace the series of monitoring node values from the attacked monitoring node(s) with the virtual node values. Note that in some embodiments, virtual node values may be estimated for a particular node even before it is determined that the node is currently being attacked.
Mestha, Lalit Keshav↗
Cyber-attack detection, localization, and neutralization for unmanned aerial vehicles
In some embodiments, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (“UAV”) system may be associated with a plurality of monitoring nodes, each monitoring node generating a series of monitoring node values over time that represent operation of the UAV system. An attack detection computer platform may receive the series of current monitoring node values and generate a set of current feature vectors. The attack detection computer platform may access an attack detection model having at least one decision boundary (e.g., created using a set of normal feature vectors a set of attacked feature vectors). The attack detection model may then be executed and the platform may transmit an attack alert signal based on the set of current feature vectors and the at least one decision boundary. According to some embodiments, attack localization and/or neutralization functions may also be provided.
Mestha, Lalit Keshav↗
Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating cyber attacks on power systems comprising distributed energy resources
Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cybersecurity attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and the generation-load balance. Investigations of the impact to the power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The invention provides methods for minimizing the risks to distribution and transmission systems using an engineered control system which detects and mitigates unsafe control commands.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Dynamic, resilient sensing system for automatic cyber-attack neutralization
An industrial asset may have monitoring nodes that generate current monitoring node values. An abnormality detection computer may determine that an abnormal monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing fault. A dynamic, resilient estimator constructs, using normal monitoring node values, a latent feature space (of lower dimensionality as compared to a temporal space) associated with latent features. The system also constructs, using normal monitoring node values, functions to project values into the latent feature space. Responsive to an indication that a node is currently being attacked or experiencing fault, the system may compute optimal values of the latent features to minimize a reconstruction error of the nodes not currently being attacked or experiencing a fault. The optimal values may then be projected back into the temporal space to provide estimated values and the current monitoring node values from the abnormal monitoring node are replaced with the estimated values.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Dynamic, resilient virtual sensing system and shadow controller for cyber-attack neutralization
An industrial asset may have monitoring nodes (e.g., sensor or actuator nodes) that generate current monitoring node values. An abnormality detection and localization computer may receive the series of current monitoring node values and output an indication of at least one abnormal monitoring node that is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault. An actor-critic platform may tune a dynamic, resilient state estimator for a sensor node and output tuning parameters for a controller that improve operation of the industrial asset during the current attack or fault. The actor-critic platform may include, for example, a dynamic, resilient state estimator, an actor model, and a critic model. According to some embodiments, a value function of the critic model is updated for each action of the actor model and each action of the actor model is evaluated by the critic model to update a policy of the actor-critic platform.
Roychowdhury, Subhrajit↗
Adaptive, self-tuning virtual sensing system for cyber-attack neutralization
An industrial asset may have a plurality of monitoring nodes, each monitoring node generating a series of monitoring node values over time representing current operation of the industrial asset. An abnormality detection computer may determine that an abnormal monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault. An autonomous, resilient estimator may continuously execute an adaptive learning process to create or update virtual sensor models for that monitoring node. Responsive to an indication that a monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault, a level of neutralization may be automatically determined. The autonomous, resilient estimator may then be dynamically reconfigured to estimate a series of virtual node values based on information from normal monitoring nodes, appropriate virtual sensor models, and the determined level of neutralization. The series of monitoring node values from the abnormal monitoring node or nodes may then be replaced with the virtual node values.
Abbaszadeh, Masoud↗
Virtual sensor supervised learning for cyber-attack neutralization
An industrial asset may have monitoring nodes that generate current monitoring node values. A dynamic, resilient estimator may split a temporal monitoring node space into normal and one or more abnormal subspaces associated with different kinds of attack vectors. According to some embodiments, a neutralization model is constructed and trained for each attack vector using supervised learning and the associated abnormal subspace. In other embodiments, a single model is created using out-of-range values for abnormal monitoring nodes. Responsive to an indication of a particular abnormal monitoring node or nodes, the system may automatically invoke the appropriate neutralization model to determine estimated values of the particular abnormal monitoring node or nodes (e.g., by selecting the correct model or using out-of-range values). The series of current monitoring node values from the abnormal monitoring node or nodes may then be replaced with the estimated values.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Systems and methods for global cyber-attack or fault detection model
An industrial asset may have monitoring nodes that generate current monitoring node values representing a current operation of the industrial asset. An abnormality detection computer may detect when a monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault based on a current feature vector, calculated in accordance with current monitoring node values, and a detection model that includes a decision boundary. A model updater (e.g., a continuous learning model updater) may determine an update time-frame (e.g., short-term, mid-term, long-term, etc.) associated with the system based on trigger occurrence detection (e.g., associated with a time-based trigger, a performance-based trigger, an event-based trigger, etc.). The model updater may then update the detection model in accordance with the determined update time-frame (and, in some embodiments, continuous learning).
Xu, Rui↗
Diagnostics Algorithms in Nuclear Plant Cyber Attack Analysis Toolkit
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating cyber attacks on power systems comprising distributed energy resources
Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cybersecurity attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and the generation-load balance. Investigations of the impact to the power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The invention provides methods for minimizing the risks to distribution and transmission systems using an engineered control system which detects and mitigates unsafe control commands.
Johnson, Jay Tillay↗
Detection of Cyber Attacks on Cloud Based Microservices with Distributed Features
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Choe, Yung Ryn↗
Analyzing the Effects of Cyberattacks on Distribution System State Estimation: Preprint
Key components of power systems—such as energy management systems, automatic generation control, and state estimation—are under serious vulnerability from cyber attacks. Cyber threats in electric grids have increased significantly because of the increased interconnectivity of supervisory control and data acquisition systems and public network infrastructure. As the penetration level of distributed energy resources increases, it is imperative to employ system-monitoring techniques such as state estimation for the reliable operation of distribution systems. Recently, multiple methods have been developed that exploit the low rank property of distribution system state matrix and are robust to bad data, such as matrix completion. This paper analyzes the impact of various realistic cyber attack scenarios on matrix completion. Realistic cyber attack scenarios are converted into data corruption models that are used in an extensive simulation of a custom IEEE 123-bus system.
41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗
Towards Provable Security in Industrial Control Systems Via Dynamic Protocol Attestation
Industrial control systems (ICSs) increasingly rely on digital technologies vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attackers can infiltrate ICSs and execute malicious actions. Individually, each action seems innocuous. But taken together, they cause the system to enter an unsafe state. These attacks have resulted in dramatic consequences such as physical damage, economic loss, and environmental catastrophes. This paper introduces a methodology that restricts actions using protocols. These protocols only allow safe actions to execute. Protocols are written in a domain specific language we have embedded in an interactive theorem prover (ITP). The ITP enables formal, machine-checked proofs to ensure protocols maintain safety properties. We use dynamic attestation to ensure ICSs conform to their protocol even if an adversary compromises a component. Since protocol conformance prevents unsafe actions, the previously mentioned cyber attacks become impossible. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology using an example from the Fischertechnik Industry 4.0 platform. We measure dynamic attestation's impact on latency and throughput. Our approach is a starting point for studying how to combine formal methods and protocol design to thwart attacks intended to cripple ICSs.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
A Real-Time ANPC Inverter Digital Twin with Integrated Design-For-Trust
The demand for renewable energy has increased over the last few years, and so has the demand for greater expectations within the energy market. This increasing trend has been accompanied by more significant usage of internet-connected devices (IoT), leading to critical electrical infrastructure being connected to the internet. Implementing internet connectivity with such devices and systems provides benefits such as improving the system's performance, facilitating irregularity and anomaly mitigation, and providing additional situational awareness for enhanced decision-making. However, enhancing the connected system with IoT introduces a drawback – a greater vulnerability to cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the electrical sector have occurred in the United States and Ukraine. These cyber-attacks highlight and expose vulnerabilities that a system inherits when connecting to the internet. These attacks left thousands of customers without electricity for hours until operators could regain control of the electric utility grid. Therefore, to address the vulnerabilities of an internet-connected power electronic device, this work focused on the hardware layer of the system. Implementing a cyber-control system inside the hardware layer can significantly reduce the possibility of an attacker patching malicious controller firmware into a photovoltaic grid-connected inverter, thus mitigating the likelihood that the inverter becomes inactive a cyber-attack scenario. With this mitigation technique, if a cyberattack is successful and an attacker gains control of the network, a cyber-defense technique is in place to mitigate the impact of the cyber-attack. This additional protection layer was developed based on an innovative concept known as Digital Twin (DT). A DT, in this case, replicates an Active-Neutral Point Clamped (ANPC) inverter and was designed using a hardware language known as VHDL (Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language) and applied to Field-Programmable-GateArray (FPGA). The DT is embedded within the FPGA and contained in a controller board, the UCB (Unified Controller Board), developed by the University of Arkansas electrical engineering team. This UCB also contains two Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) responsible for generating associated signals to control an authentic physical inverter. These DSP signals are received and processed by the FPGA that implements the DT of an ANPC; in other words, it simulates in realtime the expected output of an actual ANPC inverter using the signals from the DSP. When a new firmware is ready to be patched, the DT provides output signals simulating behavior that a real ANPC inverter would generate with the new firmware. The new firmware is tested to check if it meets all the operational requirements established using a Design-For-Trust technique (DFTr). If the new firmware fails in at least one of the DFT tests, it is considered malicious and must be rejected. This work is divided into sections, such as Background, which explains the pieces that were used and the strategy behind this work; Process and Procedure, which explains the methodology that was adopted to prove the reliability and effectiveness of this work; Results and Discussion, where the simulations and results are described and explained; followed by Conclusion and Future work section, which concludes this work and adds possible future projects to continue this work further.
do Amaral Custodio, Paulo Vitor↗
Evaluating Resilience of Water Distribution Networks to Operational Failures from Cyber-Physical Attacks
Water cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have gained increasing interest to improve operational efficiency and reliability. However, due to growing exposure to cyber-physical attacks, cybersecurity and resilience against the attacks have become significant concerns. There have been efforts to improve cybersecurity in water CPSs, yet few attempts to investigate resilience against cyber-physical attacks. This study contributes to characterizing resilience of a water CPS and investigating potential resilience strategies. An advanced resilience measure integrating withstanding, absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capability of a system is proposed and applied to the C-town water distribution network (WDN) for 15 failure set scenarios with a pressure-driven hydraulic simulation. The results provide identification of failure sets and unfavorable operational conditions that make the system more vulnerable to the cyber-physical attacks and in turn produce low resilience and capabilities. It is also found that, after recovery of a disrupted component, adjustment of overall operational interactions across system components is needed for complete restoration of disrupted functionality. The findings provide insights on infrastructure investment with resilience strategies in cyber and physical water system domains.
Shin, Sangmin↗
Load Margin Constrained Moving Target Defense against False Data Injection Attacks
Cyber physical security of power systems with high penetration of renewable generation has attracted attention from researchers. One critical issue is that cyber-physical attacks, disguised as uncertain renewable generation, can target conventional power system state estimation (SE). Moving target defense (MTD) is a promising defense strategy to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against SE. However, all existing studies myopically perturb the reactance of transmission lines equipped with distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices without adequately considering the system voltage stability. Exacerbated by the renewable generation uncertainty, existing MTD may cause voltage instability when the power grid is under stress. To address this issue, we propose a novel MTD framework that explicitly considers system voltage stability by using continuation power flow. We utilize the sensitivity matrix of power injection to line impedance, on which an optimization problem for maximizing load margin is formulated. This framework is validated on the IEEE 14-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system, in which net load redistribution attacks are launched by sophisticated attackers. Steady-state simulations and dynamic simulations on PSS/E show the effectiveness of the proposed framework in circumventing the voltage instability while maintaining the detection effectiveness of MTD. The impact of the proposed method on attack detection effectiveness is also revealed.
Zhang, Hang↗