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Evaluating Performance of UAS Detect-And-Avoid System Using a Fast-Time Simulation Tool

Most unmanned aircraft systems will be required to be equipped with a Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) system. The surveillance performance of the DAA system to detect and track intruder aircraft will depend on the encounter geometries that unmanned aircraft are expected to have with other aircraft in the airspace. The performance of DAA alerting and avoidance system is also dependent on the timeliness of alerting for UAS pilots to give a sufficient time to determine and command a resolution maneuver to avoid well clear separation violations. This presentation introduces general background of UAS DAA systems and concept of well clear separation standard to satisfy see and avoid regulations. The presentation shows the several UAS mission profiles and analysis of the encounter geometries that were simulated using historical VFR traffic data and some proposed UAS missions. This presentation introduces several potential metrics for evaluating the performance of a DAA system and shows the results that measured through fast-time simulation with traffic scenarios that include NAS-wide VFR manned aircraft and IFR UAS flights. At the end, some research areas will be briefly discussed.

UAS

An Alternative Time Metric to Modified Tau for Unmanned Aircraft System Detect And Avoid

A new horizontal time metric, Time to Protected Zone, is proposed for use in the Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems equipped by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This time metric has three advantages over the currently adopted time metric, modified tau: it corresponds to a physical event, it is linear with time, and it can be directly used to prioritize intruding aircraft. The protected zone defines an area around the UAS that can be a function of each intruding aircraft's surveillance measurement errors. Even with its advantages, the Time to Protected Zone depends explicitly on encounter geometry and may be more sensitive to surveillance sensor errors than modified tau. To quantify its sensitivity, simulation of 972 encounters using realistic sensor models and a proprietary fusion tracker is performed. Two sensitivity metrics, the probability of time reversal and the average absolute time error, are computed for both the Time to Protected Zone and modified tau. Results show that the sensitivity of the Time to Protected Zone is comparable to that of modified tau if the dimensions of the protected zone are adequately defined.

alert

An Alternative Time Metric to Modified Tau for Unmanned Aircraft System Detect And Avoid

A new horizontal time metric, Time to Protected Zone, is proposed for use in the Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems equipped by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This time metric has three advantages over the currently adopted time metric, modified tau: it corresponds to a physical event, it is linear with time, and it can be directly used to prioritize intruding aircraft. The protected zone defines an area around the UAS that can be a function of each intruding aircraft's surveillance measurement errors. Even with its advantages, the Time to Protected Zone depends explicitly on encounter geometry and may be more sensitive to surveillance sensor errors than modified tau. To quantify its sensitivity, simulation of 972 encounters using realistic sensor models and a proprietary fusion tracker is performed. Two sensitivity metrics, the probability of time reversal and the average absolute time error, are computed for both the Time to Protected Zone and modified tau. Results show that the sensitivity of the Time to Protected Zone is comparable to that of modified tau if the dimensions of the protected zone are adequately defined.

UAS

En Route Detect and Avoid Well Clear in Terminal Area Landing Pattern

A fast time simulation was conducted to test the detect and avoid Well Clear definition designed for en route use when an unmanned aircraft (UA) is approaching the landing pattern of the terminal area. Measures focused on were loss of well clear and alerts intended to help the pilot avoid loss of well clear. Data indicated warning-level alerts will occur outside the typical Class D airspace which may prevent the UA from normal operations in the terminal airspace. Other aircraft on 45o entry could result in “nuisance” alerts which may also prevent the UA from normal operations in the terminal airspace. However, eliminating horizontal proximity (τmod) has the potential to increase “nuisance” alerts on the 45o entry and downwind legs. Overall, this suggests that a more stringent definition of Well Clear may be advisable in the landing pattern of the terminal area.

Trujillo, Anna C.

UAS Integration into the NAS: Detect and Avoid Display Evaluations in Support of SC-228 MOPS Development

This presentation provides an overview of the work the Human Systems Integration (HSI) sub-project has done on detect and avoid (DAA) displays while working on the UAS Integration into the NAS project. Much of the work has been used to support the ongoing development of minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for UAS by RTCA Special Committee 228. The design and results of three different human-in-the-loop simulations are discussed, with particular emphasis on the role of the UAS pilot in the Self Separation Timeline.

unmanned aircraft systems

Hazard detection and avoidance sensor for NASA's planetary landers

An optical terrain analysis based sensor system specifically designed for landing hazard detection as required for NASA's autonomous planetary landers is introduced. This optical hazard detection and avoidance (HDA) sensor utilizes an optoelectronic wedge-and-ting (WRD) filter for Fourier transformed feature extraction and an electronic neural network processor for pattern classification. A fully implemented optical HDA sensor would assure safe landing of the planetary landers. Computer simulation results of a successful feasibility study is reported. Future research for hardware system implementation is also provided.

Lau, Brian

Encounter-Based Simulation Architecture for Detect-And-Avoid Modeling

This paper presents an encounter-based simulation architecture developed at NASA to facilitate flexible and efficient Detect and Avoid modeling in parametric or tradespace studies on large data sets. The basic premise of this tool is that large-scale input data can be reduced to a set of `canonical encounters' and that using the reduced data in simulations does not lead to loss of fidelity. A canonical encounter is specified as ownship and intruder flight portions potentially resulting in a loss of well clear along with a set of properties that characterize the encounter. The advantages of using canonical encounters include faster simulations, reduced memory footprint, ability to select encounters based on user-specified criteria, shared encounters across multiple teams, peer-reviewed encounters, and a better understanding of the input data set, to name a few.

MOPS

Encounter-Based Simulation Architecture for Detect and Avoid Modeling

This paper presents an encounter-based simulation architecture developed at NASA to facilitate flexible and efficient Detect and Avoid modeling in parametric or tradespace studies on large data sets. The basic premise of this tool is that large-scale input data can be reduced to a set of `canonical encounters' and that using the reduced data in simulations does not lead to loss of fidelity. A canonical encounter is specified as ownship and intruder flight portions potentially resulting in a loss of well clear along with a set of properties that characterize the encounter. The advantages of using canonical encounters include faster simulations, reduced memory footprint, ability to select encounters based on user-specified criteria, shared encounters across multiple teams, peer-reviewed encounters, and a better understanding of the input data set, to name a few.

MOPS

An Evaluation of Detect and Avoid (DAA) Displays for Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Effect of Information Level and Display Location on Pilot Performance

A consortium of government, industry and academia is currently working to establish minimum operational performance standards for Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Control and Communications (C2) systems in order to enable broader integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). One subset of these performance standards will need to address the DAA display requirements that support an acceptable level of pilot performance. From a pilot's perspective, the DAA task is the maintenance of self separation and collision avoidance from other aircraft, utilizing the available information and controls within the Ground Control Station (GCS), including the DAA display. The pilot-in-the-loop DAA task requires the pilot to carry out three major functions: 1) detect a potential threat, 2) determine an appropriate resolution maneuver, and 3) execute that resolution maneuver via the GCS control and navigation interface(s). The purpose of the present study was to examine two main questions with respect to DAA display considerations that could impact pilots' ability to maintain well clear from other aircraft. First, what is the effect of a minimum (or basic) information display compared to an advanced information display on pilot performance? Second, what is the effect of display location on UAS pilot performance? Two levels of information level (basic, advanced) were compared across two levels of display location (standalone, integrated), for a total of four displays. The authors propose an eight-stage pilot-DAA interaction timeline from which several pilot response time metrics can be extracted. These metrics were compared across the four display conditions. The results indicate that the advanced displays had faster overall response times compared to the basic displays, however, there were no significant differences between the standalone and integrated displays. Implications of the findings on understanding pilot performance on the DAA task, the development of DAA display performance standards, as well as the need for future research are discussed.

detect and avoid

NAS-Wide Fast-Time Simulation Study for Evaluating Performance of UAS Detect-and-Avoid Alerting and Guidance Systems

This presentation contains the analysis results of NAS-wide fast-time simulations with UAS and VFR traffic for a single day for evaluating the performance of Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) alerting and guidance systems. This purpose of this study was to help refine and validate MOPS alerting and guidance requirements. In this study, we generated plots of all performance metrics that are specified by RTCA SC-228 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS): 1) to evaluate the sensitivity of alerting parameters on the performance metrics of each DAA alert type: Preventive, Corrective, and Warning alerts and 2) to evaluate the effect of sensor uncertainty on DAA alerting and guidance performance.

DAA Alerting Performance

Validation of Minimum Display Requirements for a UAS Detect and Avoid System

The full integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS), a prerequisite for enabling a broad range of public and commercial UAS operations, presents several technical challenges to UAS developers, operators and regulators. A primary barrier is the inability for UAS pilots (situated at a ground control station, or GCS) to comply with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations sections 91.111 and 91.113, which require pilots to “see and avoid” other aircraft in order to maintain well clear. UAS pilots’ removal from the flight deck of the aircraft necessitates the development of a UAS-specific system for detecting nearby traffic and displaying traffic information to the pilot to support their ability to maintain an objectively defined “DAA well clear” threshold from other aircraft. This new UAS-specific function of remaining DAA well clear is called traffic avoidance. The resulting Detect and Avoid (DAA) system, however, will be subject to a collection of requirements that manufacturers will be obligated to meet in order to certify their equipment. RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228), a consortium of representatives from government, industry and academia, is responsible for developing and documenting the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA systems. The present study is the final in a series of human-in-the-loop (HITL) experiments designed to explore and test the various display and alerting requirements being incorporated into the DAA MOPS. Whereas the prior DAA HITLs examined a wide variety of DAA display features and concepts, the current experiment aims to validate the latest minimum display requirements for Phase 1 of the DAA MOPS. Rather than test different display concepts, this study tests two configurations of a MOPS-compatible DAA display: a version that is integrated into the primary navigation and control display of the GCS and a version that is physically separated from the primary display. This manipulation tests the draft minimum requirement that allows the DAA traffic display to be a separate, or standalone, configuration. This type of configuration is a more achievable near-term technology solution since it does not stipulate additional certification or integration requirements on UAS manufacturers. However, a standalone display configuration has the potential to result in pilot performance issues resulting from the cognitive costs of switching between the primary DAA display and the primary navigation and control display. This configuration is also particularly susceptible to errors if the displays are in different orientations (e.g., north-up versus track-up). Both the integrated and standalone display configurations were presented to 16 active UAS pilots in a medium-fidelity simulation, which included confederate air traffic controllers and pseudo pilots operating simulated manned traffic. Pilots were tasked with navigating two different mission routes while maintaining DAA well clear with scripted conflicts. Pilot response times (i.e., measured response) and ability to remain DAA well clear are reported. Primary results indicate that both display configurations resulted in favorable response times and well clear rates. While there were clear trends of pilots objectively performing better in the integrated display condition, with several measured response metrics reaching statistical significance, the differences between the two displays were typically moderate. While the primary variable of DAA display location did not have an especially large impact on pilot performance on its own, when examined alongside the type of DAA threat the pilot was facing (a caution-level versus a warning-level alert), the response time benefits associated with the integrated display were amplified. The implications of these American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2 results on the Phase 1 DAA MOPS and the connection of this data to previous studies is also discussed.

detect and avoid

UAS Integration in the NAS: Detect and Avoid

This presentation will cover the structure of the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) integration into the national airspace system (NAS) project (UAS-NAS Project). The talk also details the motivation of the project to help develop standards for a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system, which is required in order to comply with requirements in manned aviation to see-and-avoid other traffic so as to maintain well clear. The presentation covers accomplishments reached by the project in Phase 1 of the research, and touches on the work to be done in Phase 2. The discussion ends with examples of the display work developed as a result of the Phase 1 research.

unmanned aircraft systems

Piloted Well Clear Performance Evaluation of Detect and Avoid Systems with Suggestive Guidance

Regulations to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions (RTCA, 2013). Those requirements will apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the United States (U.S) National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined according to their contribution to the overall safety case. That safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS collectively operating in the NAS meet an airspace safety threshold (AST). Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace safety case. Foremost among these is calculation of the systems risk ratio, the degree to which a particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation standard (FAA, 2013). The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not known what the effectiveness is of a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or even what parameters of the DAA system most improve the pilots ability to maintain separation. The relationship between the DAA system design and the overall effectiveness of the DAA system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, must be determined before DAA operational and performance requirements can be finalized. Much research has been devoted to integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace (Dalamagkidis, 2009, Ostwald, 2007, Gillian, 2012, Hesselink, 2011, Santiago, 2015, Rorie 2015 and 2016). Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA system have gone through human-in-the-loop simulation and flight-testing. Most of these evaluations were part of development programs to produce a deployable system, so it is unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to general requirements for future traffic displays (Calhoun, 2014). Other displays have undergone testing to collect data that may generalize to new displays, but have not been evaluated in the context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS equipped with DAA systems in the NAS (Bell, 2012). Other research efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and separation standards. Together with this work, they are expected to facilitate validation of the airspace safety case (Park, 2014 and Johnson, 2015). The contribution of the present work is to quantify the effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain well clear as a function of display features and surveillance sensor error. This quantification will help enable selection of a minimum set of DAA design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be unique for all UAS platforms. A second objective is to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the modeling of overall DAA system performance in non-human-in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in such batch experiments will allow investigation of a much larger number of encounters than is possible in human simulations. This capability is necessary to demonstrate that a particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST under all foreseeable operational conditions.

detect and avoid

Windshear detection and avoidance - Airborne systems survey

Functional requirements for airborne windshear detection and warning systems are discussed in terms of the threat posed to civil aircraft operations. A preliminary set of performance criteria for predictive windshear detection and warning systems is defined. Candidate airborne remote sensor technologies based on microwave Doppler radar, Doppler laser radar (lidar), and infrared radiometric techniques are discussed in the context of overall system requirements, and the performance of each sensor is assessed for representative microburst environments and ground clutter conditions. Preliminary simulation results demonstrate that all three sensors show potential for detecting windshear, and provide adequate warning time to allow flight crews to avoid the affected area or escape from the encounter. Radar simulation and analysis show that by using bin-to-bin automatic gain control, clutter filtering, limited detection range, and suitable antenna tilt management, windshear from wet microbursts can be accurately detected. Although a performance improvement can be obtained at higher radar frequency, the baseline X-band system also detected the presence of windshear hazard for a dry microburst. Simulation results of end-to-end performance for competing coherent lidar systems are presented.

Bowles, Roland L.

Detection And Avoidance Of Obstacles By Helicopters

Report discusses problems relevant to control subsystems enabling helicopters on nap-of-the-Earth flight paths to detect and avoid obstacles automatically. Indicates similarities between this and obstacle-avoidance problem of industrial mobile robots. Two approaches extend two-dimensional obstacle-avoidance concept to three dimensions. First involves direct search of three-dimensional range-map data for indications of openings between obstacles. Second involves compression of data into two-dimensional map for path search.

Cheng, Victor H. L.

Ground Based Detect and Avoid

This presentation documents the results of an industry survey performed to help inform future research and requirements development regarding ground-based detect and avoid (GBDAA) systems. The author evaluated and summarized the current-state of existing GBDAA systems with a focus on system capabilities, current use cases, and concepts of operations. The survey included vendors such as Echodyne, Seamatica, and Raytheon, government organizations, including the Air Force and FAA, as well as members from the FAA's UAS Test Sites in New York, Alaska, Nevada, Virginia and North Dakota. High-level findings are provided as well as quotes from individuals involved in building and testing GBDAA systems. Conclusions include a lack of coordination between test sites, manufacturers and standards organizations. There is also a wide range of performance capabilities between test sites and systems. More work is required to define minimum operational performance standards for these systems, which are in a relatively immature state at the moment.

ground-based radar