Average Alert Times Supported by ATAR Classes A1, A2, and A3
This presentation shows the average warning and corrective alert times supported by the ATAR classes A1, A2, and A3
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This presentation shows the average warning and corrective alert times supported by the ATAR classes A1, A2, and A3
This report documents a closed-loop analysis of an DAA system using a Electro/Optical sensor model. Safety and operational suitability metrics are computed. Results show that the safety metrics are most sensitive to the angular rate accuracy of the intruder aircraft. Trade-off between safety and operationl suitability metrics is discussed. Results from this work directly inform the requirements of an electro/optical sensors for detect-and-avoid.
This thesis researches potential failure conditions within supersonic and potential hypersonic aircraft. The most critical off-nominal situations have been identified to be Engine Failures, Rapid Decompression and High Altitude Radiation. Having in mind, current regulatory requirements as well as past operations of Concorde, potential locations for different speeds have been modeled to identify safe operational volumes. With an emphasis on the engine failure case as part of the thesis requirement, a potential first order approach to future DAA systems is described in order to add these models on top of current conflict resolution models.
Regulations to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions. Those requirements will apply to the new detect and avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the National Airspace System (NAS) and are determined according to their contribution to the overall safety case for such an integration. This briefing focuses on providing an overview of the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES) platform, review of detect-and-avoid models incorprated in ACES, sumamry of two planned ACES studies, and a way forward to impact the SC-228 VV plan.
Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. A recent study conducted using NASA's ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability begins to address questions surrounding the development of draft MOPS for DAA systems by assessing DAA performance in a NAS-wide context. ACES analyses were conducted to determine the impact of varying elements of UAS pilot performance and uncertainty mitigations on DAA system performance. Simulations were conducted with recorded cooperative and non-cooperative VFR (Visual Flight Rules) traffic to accurately model UAS encounters with other NAS traffic (ATC (Air Traffic Control) being responsible for separation with other IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) aircraft) and with roughly 25, 000 simulated UAS operations The number of Loss of Well Clear (LoWC) events were recorded across the range of independent variables: pilot response time, horizontal LoWC prediction buffer and horizontal LoWC resolution buffer. The number of LoWC events was compared to the unmitigated case (without the benefit of a DAA system) to determine the resultant risk-ratio for each of 8 simulation conditions. The parameter trades presented by the resultant DAA system performance (risk ratio) will be used by SC 228 to inform decisions about future requirements development and validation efforts.
The Detect and Avoid (DAA) capability of a recent version (Run 3) of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System-Xu (ACAS-Xu) is measured against that of the Detect and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS), a reference algorithm for the Phase 1 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA. This comparative analysis of the two systems' alerting and horizontal guidance outcomes is conducted through the lens of the Detect and Avoid mission using flight data of scripted encounters from a recent flight test. Results indicate comparable timelines and outcomes between ACAS-Xu's Remain Well Clear alert and guidance and DAIDALUS's corrective alert and guidance, although ACAS-Xu's guidance appears to be more conservative. ACAS-Xu's Collision Avoidance alert and guidance occurs later than DAIDALUS's warning alert and guidance, and overlaps with DAIDALUS's timeline of maneuver to remain Well Clear. Interesting discrepancies between ACAS-Xu's directive guidance and DAIDALUS's "Regain Well Clear" guidance occur in some scenarios.
This paper presents an encounter-based simulation architecture developed at NASA to facilitate flexible and efficient Detect and Avoid modeling in parametric or tradespace studies on large data sets. The basic premise of this tool is that large-scale input data can be reduced to a set of `canonical encounters' and that using the reduced data in simulations does not lead to loss of fidelity. A canonical encounter is specified as ownship and intruder flight portions potentially resulting in a loss of well clear along with a set of properties that characterize the encounter. The advantages of using canonical encounters include faster simulations, reduced memory footprint, ability to select encounters based on user-specified criteria, shared encounters across multiple teams, peer-reviewed encounters, and a better understanding of the input data set, to name a few.
This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.
This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.
The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) project conducted Flight Test 6 (FT6) in 2019. The ultimate goal of this flight test was to produce data to inform RTCA SC-228's Phase II Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Low Size, Weight, and Power Sensors. This report documents the analysis of scripted encounters' data. Scripted encounters own were analyzed and categorized based on the outcome of alert, maneuver guidance, and effectiveness of pilots' maneuver in resolving conflicts. Results indicate that UAS pilots' decisions as well as intruder maneuvers are leading factors that contribute to ineffective DAA maneuvers. Results also show that adding buffers to the DAA's suggested minimum turn angle improves effectiveness of the DAA maneuvers.