Cyber Deterrence and Resilience (CyDaR) Strategic Initative.
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As the wind energy industry grows, so too does our need for effective and low-cost bat mortality minimization solutions. Despite knowledge gaps in our understanding of what drives bats to collide with spinning turbines, minimization solutions have shown success during validation studies. Curtailment has been consistently effective, reducing bat mortality from 33%-79%, depending on the curtailment scenario and species present. Several validation studies have demonstrated deterrent solutions, specifically ultrasonic deterrents, to be effective, but overall, more variable compared to curtailment solutions. Further, a study combining curtailment with ultrasonic deterrents produced encouraging results, finding that adding ultrasonic deterrents to turbines that were designated to curtail, significantly reduced mortality rates compared to curtailment only turbines. Despite positive results, the strength of inference achieved with validation studies is limited by methodological constraints associated with appropriately assigning fatalities to treatments. Because of the temporal separation between when a bat collides with a turbine and when it is discovered during a ground-based carcass survey, we must assign carcasses to a treatment that ran during the prior night(s). This process may introduce errors at multiple stages. First, for studies that rotate treatments among turbines, mortality surveyors must be confident that carcasses are 'fresh' such that mortalities are correctly assigned to the treatment from the previous night(s). Second, we must reconcile any misalignments between how we assign treatments and how we implement treatments (e.g., turbines assigned with a deterrent treatment may be implemented as another treatment when deterrent devices are not operating as designed). Finally, for curtailment solutions, it is critical to recognize that measured effects are a function of not just the treatment as implemented but the proportion of the night the treatment is realized (e.g., if wind speeds are greater than the curtailment treatment cut-in speed for the entire night, we cannot expect there to me any differences in mortality reduction relative to control turbines). Using a dataset collected between June and October 2017, that rotated 3 treatments (Deterrent Only, 5 m/s Curtail only, and 5 m/s Curtail & Deterrent) and 1 control condition across 16 turbines each night, we explored the importance and implications of accounting for potential errors in assigning fatalities to treatments. We present preliminary results comparing the mortality associated with error-corrected treatments and control conditions highlighting how the measured effect of a treatment (mortality) greatly depends on site specific implementation.
The U.S. Department of Energy Wind Energy Technologies Office (DOE WETO), and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory convened a workshop entitled the State of the Science and Technology for Minimizing Impacts to Bats from Wind Energy on 13–14 November 2019. The objectives of the workshop were to (1) Identify the current impact minimization measures that are, or can be, used to reduce bat fatalities at wind energy facilities, (2) Assess the current effectiveness of those minimization measures, (3) Identify and assess the research and development (R&D) opportunities needed to optimize and improve the effectiveness of current minimization and deterrent technologies and inform the development of future solutions; and (4) Identify potential emerging or novel methods for informing impact minimization measures at or around wind energy facilities. Specifically, the workshop focused on deterrent and curtailment strategies. For deterrents, the discussion centered on the existing technology (i.e., ultrasonic deterrents, dim-UV light, and texture coating), integration with wind turbines (either retrofitting or out of the box installation), effectiveness, validation studies, and cost (e.g., technology, installation, validation, and maintenance). For curtailment, the conversation was divided into blanket curtailment (i.e., based on time and wind speed) and smart curtailment (i.e., blanket curtailment plus additional variables such as temperature or bat activity). The workshop included plenary presentations, panels, and breakout sessions to share data and stakeholder perspectives, and engage participants. Although there are several priority topics related to bat and wind energy, this workshop focused the discussion on the current technologies and strategies that are, or can be, used to reduce bat fatalities at wind energy facilities, status of research and development (R&D) of minimization measures, opportunities to optimize costs and improve effectiveness, and potential emerging or novel approaches to explore. This workshop took a holistic approach and discussed all aspects associated with advancing deterrent technologies and curtailment strategies, including the technological, biological, economic, and regulatory barriers faced by the wind energy and wildlife community.
A commonly stated goal of many US Military activities, especially in the strategic realm of nuclear weapons, is to “deter potential adversaries and assure allies.” However, sometimes the phrase “assure allies” seems to be an appendage to a larger deterrence objective. Yet, assurance is fundamentally different than deterrence, even extended deterrence, which aims to shape the decisions of potential adversaries. Assurance, on the other hand, seeks to influence the decisions of allies. As such, assurance must not be treated as an appendage to deterrence, but rather as the strategic imperative that it is. A proper understanding of assurance is critical in an age of renewed great power competition where alliances provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential adversaries. This paper provides a primer on assurance theory, to include its definition, variables, challenges, and measures of success.
Los Alamos is responsible for the NATO deterrent, is critical to the UK at-sea deterrent, and has designed over 90% of the current US stockpile. Los Alamos MUST lead the stockpile into the next phase of nuclear deterrence. To succeed, we need to leverage across several funding sources and sites to both answer the tactical needs of the current stockpile and to develop capabilities and personnel to meet future challenges.
Few concepts are more important to our nation than the principle of deterrence. It is at the very core of our national security strategy. Despite its lasting import to our nation, and the rest of the world, we still lack a complete and explicit formulation of the calculus of deterrence. This has, at times, resulted in failed policies costing the Nation lives and wealth. With the ultimate objective of making the Nation more secure, we establish a complete and explicit formulation of deterrence calculus, which consists of eight levers. As it turns out this formulation also applies to the calculus of compellence, and is thus a unifying model of coercive conflict.
The erosion of the global security environment over the last two decades has been rapid and dramatic. It appears also to be accelerating. There are deep and widening concerns in the United States and among its allies and partners that deterrence too has eroded at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The Strategic Posture Commission captured the essence of the problem in its October 2023 report—the United States seeks to meet the challenges of complex multipolar nuclear rivalry in the 21 st century with a slimmed down version of a nuclear deterrent designed in the middle of the 20 th century. With great urgency, the Commission recommended that something more and/or different is needed than simply the replacement of legacy systems with modern variants. But the U.S. nuclear security enterprise was reshaped after the Cold War to support the stockpile stewardship mission—not renewed designed, engineering, and production at scale. It has long fallen short of the agility, flexibility, and adaptiveness periodically asked of it by national leaders. In recent years, however, the message of urgency has been clearly received in the enterprise. Its culture has begun to shift. It has also been received by those in Washington D.C. responsible for funding and guiding the enterprise. The result is an enterprise in transition. Stockpile stewardship has given way to stockpile transformation. Risk aversion is giving way to risk management. Innovation and adaptation have been embraced. Experience to date has yielded some important lessons about what works and what doesn’t in terms of accelerating and delivering the needed innovation and adaptation. It has revealed the enduring character of some challenges. But it has also revealed that a much more agile and effective enterprise is within the national reach—something that will pay important dividends for deterrence, assurance, strategic stability, and peace.
Intravenous administration of abuse-deterrent opioid products poses high safety risks, in part due to the presence of high molecular weight polymeric excipients. Previous in vivo studies in animal models have shown that the higher molecular weight (Mw) polymeric excipients like polyethylene oxide (PEO) were directly linked to such adverse responses as intravenous hemolysis and kidney damage. PEO polymers have been widely used in abuse-deterrent formulations (ADF) of opioid products, adding to concerns over the general safety of the opioid category due to the unknown safety risk from abuse via unintended routes. Here, the current study focused on the determination of the critical overlap concentration (c*) at various PEO molecular weights to aid in explaining differences in observed adverse responses from previous animal studies on the intravenous administration of PEO solutions. Adverse in vivo responses may be related to the viscoelastic regime of the polymer solution, which depends not only on Mw but also on concentration. Having a localized polymer concentration in the blood above the c*, i.e., the transition from the dilute to semi-dilute entangled viscoelastic regime, may influence the flow behavior and interactions of cells in the blood. The relationship of c* to this combination of physical, chemical, and rheological effects is a possible driving force behind adverse in vivo responses.
We use a couple of cavemen to explain the concept of deterrence, which has been with humans from the beginning. The interaction between the two cavemen will demonstrate how deterrence can discourage violence by instilling doubt and fear of the consequences escalating such violence further.
Ridesharing has become an increasingly prevalent form of transportation. Although transportation network companies such as Uber and Lyft initially started as a personal rideshare service where individuals ride alone or with people they know, rideshare services have been expanded to pooled rideshare—a dynamic rideshare system where an individual rides with passengers they do not know. Despite the growth in rideshare services worldwide, the use of pooled rideshare in the U.S.A. is relatively low compared to other forms of transportation. A national U.S. survey (N = 5385) was conducted to investigate reasons why individuals are willing or unwilling to consider pooled rideshare. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were performed, where the exploratory factor analysis suggests five factors, specifically,service experience,time/cost,traffic/environment,privacy, andsafety. Model fit indices of the confirmatory factor analysis verified that these five factors can represent the factors behind riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare. Furthermore, a binomial logistic regression was conducted to explore how the five factors influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare. The three factors that influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare wereservice experience(B = 1.05),traffic/environment(B = .38), andtime/cost(B = .26), while a lack ofprivacy(B = −1.46) can be a deterrent for pooled rideshare.Safetyis important for those who are both willing and unwilling to consider the use of pooled rideshare. Understanding these factors is important for the future of pooled rideshare services in the U.S.A.
This co-op was performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) within the Weapon Surety Engineering 11 Department (9435), which is a customer-focused organization that provides engineering and system analysis expertise to ensure a safe deterrent throughout the entire weapon lifecycle. Engineers in 9435 develop a deep knowledge in both component and system function to support rigorous evaluation and mitigation of potential failure modes. They operate across multiple engineering disciplines (mechanical, electrical, computer, materials and systems engineering) with opportunities to develop crossdisciplinary capability. The team supports a variety of stockpile systems and is part of the product teams during development, design and production, as well as advanced concept and exploratory efforts. 9435 engineers use their extensive component and system knowledge, as well as experimental data and modeling, to ensure products function as intended with assured safety. Members of the department learn the function of multiple components, how those components integrate within the system and apply surety principles and processes to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent.
In a geopolitical environment once again dominated by Great Power competition, the stakes of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent also returned to the forefront of national security. Yet, as nearly thirty years have passed without the United States conducting a nuclear test, there exists considerable uncertainty on how quickly, or even if, the United States could resume nuclear testing—a key component of a credible deterrent. However, there remains a legal requirement, with origins in hard-earned Cold War lessons, for the nation to return to underground nuclear testing if called upon to do so. This paper provides an overview of nuclear testing, the nation’s current state of preparedness, and offers recommendations on how to improve its test readiness posture.
On 11 August 1995, President Clinton announced that the United States intended to enter negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To address concerns that the cessation of nuclear testing would introduce uncertainty about the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, he also announced the concurrent establishment of six Safeguards as conditions of entry. Safeguard A prescribed “. . . a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile.” Safeguard B required “The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure . . . human scientific resources.” These two Safeguards led to the establishment of the physical and intellectual capabilities to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, or the Lab) is one of the United States’ (U.S.) weapons complex nuclear security laboratories; it is owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by Triad National Security, LLC. LANL’s mission is to solve national security challenges through scientific excellence, which includes nuclear deterrence and stockpile stewardship. Such activities generate a variety of radioactive waste types, including transuranic (TRU) waste. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is under a congressional mandate to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 to meet Department of Defense requirements and support the nuclear deterrent. LANL is responsible for producing at least 30 pits per year by 2026, while the Savannah River Site will produce 50 pits per year by 2030. As of August 2018, the NNSA TRU waste inventory at LANL was at 53% capacity. In order to ensure the nuclear material missions are able to continue uninterrupted, the storage of TRU waste needs to remain below 60% of total capacity. As LANL increases production and prepares to meet the 30 pits per year goal, waste generation will increase substantially. Thus, there is a need to rejuvenate current infrastructure and implement TRU waste reduction methods in the coming years.
One overarching objective of this program of study was the accumulation of objective, scientifically valid information relating to auditory performance of bald and golden eagles that may be used to guide the development of acoustic alerting/deterrence technologies intended to discourage encroachment into wind energy air spaces. To that end, analyses aimed at the characterization of sensitivity to sound in bald and golden eagles, along with findings in the supra-threshold, dynamic frequency spaces related to response latencies and amplitudes, leads us to conclude that bald, and golden eagles navigate the same basic working auditory space, as in other known and thus far characterized members of the diurnal raptor family. Specifically, bald and golden eagles, along with other raptor species within the group, operate in an auditory space characterized by a frequency band at least four octaves wide and centered on 2 kHz, with an upper frequency limit between 6 and 10 kHz at 80 dB SPL and a lower frequency limit that almost certainly extends below 0.2 kHz. Consequently, we recommend that signal designers use these data as a guideline in efforts to design effective and efficient acoustic alerting/deterrent systems. It is important to note that signal energy broadcast outside of this frequency band at moderate levels will not contribute to the efficacy of a deterrent but will add an unnecessary fraction to the overall acoustic pollution budget. The importance of this consideration is heightened by contemporaneous concerns related to the transmission of noise broadcast by wind energy farms. In addition, based on analyses of data acquired from red-tailed hawks using the same experimental paradigm and data acquisition system, we conclude that auditory function in the red-tailed hawk is sufficiently like that observed in bald and golden eagles to permit its use as a surrogate species. Response waveforms, threshold-frequency curves, and input-output characteristics match those of eagles closely. It should be noted however, that differences in sensitivity and slightly extended high-frequency limits of hearing should be taken into account when extrapolating findings from one species to the others. Although the inclusion of behavioral tests of red-tailed hawks to acoustic stimuli was beyond the scope of this investigation, future efforts to assess response parameters like signal-type preference and habituation rate will further elucidate their suitability to serve as eagle surrogates in behavioral studies; nonetheless, the species in question are well matched with respect to basic auditory performance. A second essential objective of this program of study was the acoustic characterization of a subset of calls comprising the vocal repertoires of bald and golden eagles that may be used to supplement auditory performance findings in the effort to guide the development of acoustic alerting signals. With regard to that objective, the vocal repertoires of both bald and golden eagle species are rich and varied. While similar in spectrographic structure, distinctive differences are also clear. Generally, golden eagles produce some calls with shorter durations, and similar “sounding” calls exhibit distinctively different spectrographic patterns than those of bald eagles. Both species produce calls that contain a wide variety of nonlinear elements that operate to enhance the rich and varied nature of commonly observed vocal products. Comparison of the average power spectra of commonly observed bald and golden eagle calls with threshold-frequency curves leads to the conclusion that call energies fall within the frequency bounds of hearing. Further, the acoustic energy of calls considered in this report tend to fall into overlapping, but different frequency ranges of the acoustic sensitivity curve. This condition may encourage signal designers to vary the frequency content of acoustic deterrence signals in the field. Finally, preliminary observations relating to the tendencies and proclivities of bald eagles to attend to the acoustic landscape lead to the conclusion that eagles monitor their immediate sound environment assiduously. Individuals respond to a variety of natural and synthetic sound signals reliably and, perhaps most relevant in the context of the engineering of acoustic alerting/deterrence technologies, habituation to most sounds considered in this effort was minimal. These preliminary results, while calling for extended behavioral testing, are promising and set the stage for the exportation of behavioral studies into real world scenarios.
Mission drivers at the national level are evolving to accommodate a broadening landscape. The U.S. faces a rapidly evolving, threat-based environment with an associated expansion of national-level priorities. Priorities continue to include all aspects of sustaining the existing, aging stockpile. Now, however, we must also include consideration of options for a future deterrent, including efficacy of the deterrent against new threats (threat assessment and response), capability needs associated with new materials and modern manufacturing and production processes, and efficiency requirements for a modern workflow for weapons design. Executing this complex strategy will come with challenges. We must execute our current mission, while we prepare for future missions and an increasingly uncertain future.