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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2025

Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance: DistribuTECH Workshop

Idaho National Laboratory, the Department of Energy’s Grid Deployment Office, and other national laboratories are collaborating to ensure the U.S. energy infrastructure is reliable, resilient, and secure. This involves strategically leveraging digital technologies to modernize the grid, enhance its resilience against all hazards and disruptions, and fortify national energy security across a diverse energy portfolio. In this workshop you will learn about Idaho National Lab’s Technical Assistance programs, where organizations will be matched with a national laboratory subject matter expert to focus on their key topical area. The technical assistance offered through this track is designed to be responsive to a rapidly changing regulatory landscape and cutting-edge technologies that enhance grid reliability and efficiency. Users will be guided through a tailored analysis and mitigation program to determine their current security posture and given assistance in evaluating supply chain and protection choices against potential consequences.

Digital assurance↗
DOE OSTI2021

Roadmap for Advanced Power System Measurements

Conditions in the electric power grid are changing rapidly. Changes are driven, in particular, by the increased penetration of renewable resources in the generation mix. Part of the solution to dealing with the changing conditions is the better use of measurement systems, taking advantage of the better understanding of measurements that was heralded by digital technology. Another part of the solution is the communication of samples of the directly observable voltages and currents by means of continuous point-on-wave values. The increased bandwidth capability of such a system allows more complicated measurement models to be built at the point of use. Additional measurements and analyses can then be performed. This Roadmap hinges on these two aspects of measuring: improved measurements supported by high-bandwidth (raw data) communications. Following an introduction to the overall subject, the report explores the impact of what can be thought of as the digital revolution in measurement. In essence, that revolution has served to clarify ideas about measurement and is continuing to lead to improved processes. An extensive survey of the relevant literature was performed . Webinars were held to learn from the wider community of practitioners. Based on this information, a number of gaps were identified whose continued existence would hamper the solution of the challenges now facing measurement and communication in the power grid. The underlying value propositions are interoperability (presently not very satisfactory in many measurements); greater (and less challenging) adoption of distributed energy resources; and improved international competitiveness. Underlying all that, of course, is progress toward a more reliable and resilient power system. The identified gaps were addressed in four major thrusts: technology deployment and demonstration, education, instrumentation testing and standards, and analytical methods. For each of the thrusts, multiple goals are defined to guide the implementation. The thrusts were designed to close gaps and unlock high-value use cases. After discussing the literature review, gap analysis, high-value use cases, and research thrusts in chapters 2-5, the report culminates in chapter 6 with a roadmap that links each aspect together to form a unified plan. Developing a research portfolio aligned with this plan will ensure that advanced measurement systems are in place to support reliable operation of the power system as it modernizes.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Support for Reactor Operators in Case of Cyber-Security Threats (NEUP Final Report)

Increasing use of digital technology in nuclear power plants (NPPs) poses cyber-security as a crucial threat to public safety and to continuous energy production. Cyber-security risks are comprised of complex known and unknown interactions between various entities, system vulnerabilities, network protocols, human users and malicious attacks. There is little understanding or research geared towards plant operators’ response under cyber-security threats and operational procedures to cope with such threats. This is particularly critical when a cyber-security event masquerades as a safety incident or an evolving accident. Instead of leading operators to the remediation of the accident, the masked cyber event may lead them to circumvent the safety mechanisms of the plant. Given these challenges, the objective of this project is to develop a tool to characterize abnormal NPP events as “cyber” or “safety” incidents, and to further develop this tool as a real-time operator aid to assist in response to the incident. This NEUP Final Report summarizes the research efforts towards the above goals and the results in the following three aspects. First, a methodology for classifying abnormal NPP events as cyber-attacks or safety incidents was developed. This provides the basis for responding to potential cyber-attacks. In this methodology, the causal relationships between various variables (i.e., physical variables, network variables, and control variables) for a nuclear system under consideration are modeled using dynamic Bayesian networks. Based on observations of certain variables (i.e., the evidence), inference is performed to identify the state of hidden variables, which helps indicate the occurrence of cyber-attacks or safety incidents. The proposed methodology was applied to the full scope NPP simulator system at The Ohio State University as a case study. The result shows that the proposed methodology is capable of distinguishing between cyber-attacks and safety incidents. Second, a game-theoretic approach for responding to cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants was developed. This is the second major goal of the project, and the method is used to recommend optimal responses to reactor operators in the case of cyber-attacks. We consider two cases in this research. In the first case, the interaction between the defender (i.e., the reactor operator) and the attacker is modeled as a two-player, nonzero-sum, Markov game with an infinite time horizon. In the second case, we consider a semi-Markov game between the defender and the attacker within a finite time horizon. The model in the second case enables us to consider the time sensitive response of the defender. In each case, the method for deriving the Nash equilibrium is developed. The Nash Equilibrium of the game provides the valid prediction of both players’ actions because no single player can benefit from unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium policy if the other player adheres to his/hers, hence it provides the best response of the defender to cyber-attacks. The proposed method in each case is demonstrated through a simplified benchmark digital feedwater control system. Third, a prototype display is developed to integrate the above information. The prototype display depicts the communication information to the operator and incorporates the cyber-security tool developed by the team into the interface. It consists of the regular display in current control rooms, as well as a panel used to indicate the occurrence of cyber-attacks or safety events and a panel used to guide the operator’s response to detected cyber-attacks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide: Version 1.0 [Slides]

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system's lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements - but does not replace - the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system's engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Skewering the silos: using Brick to enable portable analytics, modeling and controls in buildings

Nearly all large commercial buildings have heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, lighting systems, safety and other systems controlled by a computer—a dedicated server with a building energy management system (BMS). However, these BMSs are proprietary with each building’s assets (that is, fans, valves, pumps, and their setpoints) named and coded uniquely by the BMS vendor or engineer; building analytics and control algorithms are written specific to the assets and the building. Thus, any control updates or analytics to improve building performance—especially critical to reduce greenhouse emissions or improve load flexibility—are labor intensive and costly. The Brick schema was developed so the same analysis or control algorithms can work on a variety of buildings if each is digitally represented in a Brick data model. The goal of this project was to further the development of Brick to extend it beyond an academic project with demonstrated success in a small field study, to a practical choice for industrial and commercial stakeholders seeking to realize value from building data. To do this, we executed four objectives: (1) expand the Brick schema including its modeling capabilities and vocabulary, (2) develop tools for integrating Brick with existing digital technologies and representations in buildings, (3) develop an open-source analytics platform to facilitate use of Brick in delivering data value, and (4) demonstrate Brick-driven analytics and controls in real settings.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2023

Discovery of False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid Frequency Controllers with Reinforcement Learning [Poster]

While inverter-based DER (distributed energy resources) are instrumental to integrating renewable energy into the power grid, they reduce the grid's mechanical inertia, thereby increasing the risk of frequency instabilities. To compensate for frequency instability risks, the grid must also undergo a transformation to include digital technologies that allow for two-way communication between the utility and customers. The current and future state of the power grid allows for building a cleaner energy landscape. However, the grid may also become vulnerable to novel cyber threats. To preemptively protect the power grid against elaborate cyber-attacks, we propose to discover potential threats via reinforcement learning. In this work, the focus is on studying false data injection attacks that target the control logic of frequency controllers. We show that a reinforcement learning agent can successfully discover how to best inject false data into linear droop controllers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Review of internal cyber attacks in nuclear facilities and an artificial neural network model for implementing internal cyberforensics

Deployment of digital technologies within a modern shift in cyber defense systems is essential for protecting the energy production units. One of the important components of defense is cyberforensics: once an attack has been detected to locate its origin. In this paper, a review of well-known cyberattacks in nuclear facilities is provided, with the lessons learned leading to the development of a machine learning approach implementing identification of internal at- tacks in the facility's data networks. Our approach may be seen as one of the layers in a defense-in-depth strategy that identifies if the attack comes from inside, which may result in identifying faster the attacker's origin. The presented model exploits network packet examination to cast accurate predictions on detailing the origin of malicious network connections. The approach fuses multiple mathematical functions within an artificial neural network to provide a response in the form of 0/1, i. e., whether the attack is identified as internal or not. The utilization of a variety of test cases is developed to explore the relevance and validity of the predictive approach. The proposed implementation is examined with network data packet variance, and the results obtained exhibit a highly accurate detection rate.

Nuclear Science & Technology↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Overview: Joint NERC/INL/E-ISAC Webinar

In July, NERC, the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) will host a joint informational webinar to highlight areas focused on integrating cyber and physical security with conventional engineering practices (security integration). NERC's work on these topics represents one of the first focused applications of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). INL is leading the development of philosophy and practices to identify and mitigate the inherent risks of digital technology by including cybersecurity as a core element of engineering risk management. This presentation will provide an overview of CIE, a discussion of how NERC's work represents one of the first new discipline-specific applications of CIE, and an update on significant milestones and resources from the CIE program.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Design and Operations

Pursuant to the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy published in 2022, INL is leading the development of philosophy and practices to identify and mitigate the inherent risks of digital technology by including cybersecurity as a core element of engineering risk management. This presentation will provide an overview of why we need CIE and what it is, a discussion of the major implications of CIE for electric power systems design and operations, and an update on significant milestones and resources from the CIE program.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Towards Provable Security in Industrial Control Systems Via Dynamic Protocol Attestation

Industrial control systems (ICSs) increasingly rely on digital technologies vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attackers can infiltrate ICSs and execute malicious actions. Individually, each action seems innocuous. But taken together, they cause the system to enter an unsafe state. These attacks have resulted in dramatic consequences such as physical damage, economic loss, and environmental catastrophes. This paper introduces a methodology that restricts actions using protocols. These protocols only allow safe actions to execute. Protocols are written in a domain specific language we have embedded in an interactive theorem prover (ITP). The ITP enables formal, machine-checked proofs to ensure protocols maintain safety properties. We use dynamic attestation to ensure ICSs conform to their protocol even if an adversary compromises a component. Since protocol conformance prevents unsafe actions, the previously mentioned cyber attacks become impossible. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology using an example from the Fischertechnik Industry 4.0 platform. We measure dynamic attestation's impact on latency and throughput. Our approach is a starting point for studying how to combine formal methods and protocol design to thwart attacks intended to cripple ICSs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems Cyber Range

As digital technologies expand to meet the needs of a more autonomous, interconnected, and advanced power system, new cybersecurity complexities and vulnerabilities arise. The ARIES Cyber Range enables the energy sector to evaluate these evolutions and validate cybersecurity solutions without impacting live systems. Combining power grid-scale hardware with emulation and simulation approaches, the ARIES Cyber Range can faithfully replicate modern energy systems - from grid physics to communication networks, and everything in between - with real-world fidelity. At NLR, researchers and partners are answering complex power system cybersecurity questions, examining emerging threats to the electric sector, and de risking new security technologies, all at a mission-relevant speed that keeps pace with rapidly evolving systems and hazards.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Digital-Twin-Enabling Technologies for Online Condition Monitoring of Nuclear Power Plant Components

Online condition monitoring is an area of active research that may enable optimized scheduling, maintenance, and safety of nuclear power plant components, reducing unnecessary derates while simultaneously improving operational capacity. Digital twins (DTs) are one avenue to conduct online condition monitoring and are currently being explored by national laboratories and universities alike. DTs for online condition monitoring are, in essence, state concurrent models that emulate a physical process which predicts a parameter and compares it against a measured value. A DT’s goal is to provide additional insights by combining and interpreting various sources of information for preventative maintenance scheduling optimization or early fault detection. DTs for condition monitoring are projected to be valuable for meeting requirements under 10 CFR 50.55a, “Codes and Standards,” and 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants”. However, DT technologies are still under significant development, and the process for developing a DT for condition monitoring has not been formalized. Therefore, in this work, we present an initial framework for developing a DT, discuss and review the various challenges and considerations for DT deployment, and identify the opportunities that a DT can improve. The presented framework is intended to help developers formulate a strategy when approaching DT development for condition monitoring. In conclusion, a DT use case for a reactor coolant pump is presented to demonstrate the proposed framework.

advanced sensor instrumentation↗
DOE OSTI2023

Sensitivity and Importance Measure Analyses for Various Design Architectures for High Safety-Significant Safety-Related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants

A transition from analog instrumentation and control (I&C) technologies to digital I&C technologies is taking place for license renewals of existing nuclear power plants and for operating licenses of new advanced reactors. This transition necessitates research on risk and economic assessments of digital I&C technologies to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of vital systems, reduce uncertainty in licensing costs in addition to timeline, support integration of digital I&C systems in the plant, and find the most efficient technology upgrades. Adding redundancy within systems or components is a common means of improving design safety; however, it can also make designs more prone to common-cause failures (CCFs). Introducing diversity into redundant systems or components is a way to mitigate and possibly eliminate CCFs, but it also increases plant complexity and may be costly. The balance between redundancy and diversity remains a challenge for digital I&C systems. This study performs sensitivity and importance analyses for four design architectures of two digital I&C systems—the reactor-trip system and the engineered safety features actuation system. For each system, two architectures are examined, including a redundant, non-diverse configuration and a redundant, diverse configuration. The sensitivity analysis will provide insights on the impact of introducing diversity to system reliability. The importance results will help identify risk-significant and risk-sensitive components and failure modes, which may be good candidates for future design improvement.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Developing Digital Twin Visualizations: A Methodology and Case Study on Chemical Separation Processing

As advances in digital engineering continue to push the technological boundaries, digital twin (DT) visualizations for diagnostics and safeguards advancement become much more feasible and practical. DTs generate large and complex data streams that require effective user interfaces to provide monitoring and diagnostic capabilities. Unfortunately, while these frameworks exist, there is not much research on the systematic documentation of human–computer interaction (HCI) for DT visualization. This work presents a dual-mode visualization methodology (two dimensional [2D] graphical user interface dashboard and 3D mixed reality) designed to support diagnostic tasks in DT systems and building on a validated framework and applying established HCI principles. The methodology is demonstrated through a case study of aqueous processing at Idaho National Laboratory, using experimental data from the chemical solvent extraction runs. Our interfaces display real-time alerts and monitoring to inform users of safeguards anomalies. The interfaces use immersive 3D mixed-reality visualization for further system and experiment investigation. This work demonstrates how the systematic application of HCI principles can inform DT visualization design for diagnostic and safeguards applications. While formal user evaluation studies remain as future work, this paper documents the systematic design methodology and demonstrates a proof-of-concept implementation.

3D visualization↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mechanical Solutions Scan Report

Power lines, poles, and towers are the backbone of the United States (U.S.) electric-power grid. These transmission and distribution networks route electricity from generator to loads. The characteristics of these routes are rapidly changing -- trending towards decentralized renewable generation, electric heating, vehicle charging, and large data-center loads. Coupled with aging infrastructure and the increased frequency of extreme weather events, there is concern about the future reliability and transmission capacity of conductors and adjacent components. This scan report seeks to provide an overview of mechanical solutions to challenges caused by extreme weather events associated with components of transmission and distribution infrastructure, including conductor heat sag, ice accumulation, wind, and wildfire. Many options could increase transmission capacity or reliability, and these are at various stages of technological readiness. Some have only been lab tested, while some have been widely deployed in the U.S. or overseas for decades. The solution categories and providers featured in this report are intended to be comprehensive at the time of publication and to serve as a reference for decision-makers concerned about transmission and distribution reliability. There are two other categories of large, complex solutions, which are not covered in this report: replacing existing conductors with advanced conductors and implementing digital grid enhancing technologies. A separate scan report titled “Advanced Conductor Scan Report,” which discusses advanced carbon-core conductors, was published by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in 2023. Information on digital technologies, such as dynamic line ratings, power-flow controllers, and other power electronics and communications-based devices, can be found on the Grid- Enhancing Technologies landing page. Mechanical grid-enhancing technologies, or solutions covered in this report, often do not require full equipment replacement and do not rely on digital components. Mechanical technologies are overlooked because they may be older, simpler, or seemingly “more obvious” than digital or carbon-core technologies. However, it is wise to consider mechanical solutions in a thorough evaluation of grid enhancing technology solutions.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗