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NASA NTRS2010

Results from the NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop: Cost Drivers for Deep Space Missions

Fault Management, the detection of and response to in-flight anomalies, is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. Fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for five missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that four out of the five missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, and academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, particularly as fault management development issues affect operations and the development of operations capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗

NASA NTRS1972

Cost reduction by integration of the assurance technologies.

It is shown how the cost of applying assurance disciplines to the development of complex systems can be reduced by integrating the mechanics of system engineering and system management into a 'Development Risk Control System'. The essential features of the integration process are examined. A 'Development Risk Management Model' is described, and the use of the model to integrate and thereby reduce the cost of other assurance disciplines is discussed and illustrated.

Ball, L. W.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Mission Assurance Modeling and Simulation: A Cyber Security Roadmap

This paper proposes a cyber security modeling and simulation roadmap to enhance mission assurance governance and establish risk reduction processes within constrained budgets. The term mission assurance stems from risk management work by Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute in the late 19905. By 2010, the Defense Information Systems Agency revised its cyber strategy and established the Program Executive Officer-Mission Assurance. This highlights a shift from simply protecting data to balancing risk and begins a necessary dialogue to establish a cyber security roadmap. The Military Operations Research Society has recommended a cyber community of practice, recognizing there are too few professionals having both cyber and analytic experience. The authors characterize the limited body of knowledge in this symbiotic relationship. This paper identifies operational and research requirements for mission assurance M&S supporting defense and homeland security. M&S techniques are needed for enterprise oversight of cyber investments, test and evaluation, policy, training, and analysis.

Gendron, Gerald↗

NASA NTRS1975

Apollo experience report: Safety activities

A description is given of the flight safety experiences gained during the Apollo Program and safety, from the viewpoint of program management, engineering, mission planning, and ground test operations was discussed. Emphasis is placed on the methods used to identify the risks involved in flight and in certain ground test operations. In addition, there are discussions on the management and engineering activities used to eliminate or reduce these risks.

Rice, C. N.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Ares Knowledge Capture: Summary and Key Themes Presentation

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the MSFC Chief Engineers Office. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Ares Knowledge↗

NASA NTRS2002

Managing Risk for Cassini During Mission Operations and Data Analysis (MOandDA)

A Risk Management Process has been tailored for Cassini that not only satisfies the requirements of NASA and JPL, but also allows the Program to proactively identify and assess risks that threaten mission objectives. Cassini Risk Management is a team effort that involves both management and engineering staff. The process is managed and facilitated by the Mission Assurance Manager (MAM), but requires regular interactions with Program Staff and team members to instill the risk management philosophy into the day to day mission operations. While Risk Management is well defined for projects in the development phase, it is a relatively new concept for Mission Operations. The Cassini team has embraced this process and has begun using it in an effective, proactive manner, to ensure mission success. It is hoped that the Cassini Risk Management Process will form the basis by which risk management is conducted during MO&DA on future projects. proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working put into place will become visible and will be illusmted in future papers.

risk management↗

NASA NTRS2018

Bridging the Engineering and Medicine Gap

A primary challenge NASA faces is communication between the disparate entities of engineers and human system experts in life sciences. Clear communication is critical for exploration mission success from the perspective of both risk analysis and data handling. The engineering community uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models to inform their own risk analysis and has extensive experience managing mission data, but does not always fully consider human systems integration (HSI). The medical community, as a part of HSI, has been working 1) to develop a suite of tools to express medical risk in quantitative terms that are relatable to the engineering approaches commonly in use, and 2) to manage and integrate HSI data with engineering data. This talk will review the development of the Integrated Medical Model as an early attempt to bridge the communication gap between the medical and engineering communities in the language of PRA. This will also address data communication between the two entities in the context of data management considerations of the Medical Data Architecture. Lessons learned from these processes will help identify important elements to consider in future communication and integration of these two groups.

Walton, M.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Integrating Human Factors into Space Vehicle Processing for Risk Management

This presentation will discuss the multiple projects performed in United Space Alliance's Human Engineering Modeling and Performance (HEMAP) Lab, improvements that resulted from analysis, and the future applications of the HEMAP Lab for risk assessment by evaluating human/machine interaction and ergonomic designs.

Woodbury, Sarah↗

NASA NTRS2012

Tailoring Systems Engineering Processes in a Conceptual Design Environment: A Case Study at NASA Marshall Spaceflight Center's ACO

This paper provides an overview of Systems Engineering as it is applied in a conceptual design space systems department at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Marshall Spaceflight Center (MSFC) Advanced Concepts Office (ACO). Engineering work performed in the NASA MFSC's ACO is targeted toward the Exploratory Research and Concepts Development life cycle stages, as defined in the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) System Engineering Handbook. This paper addresses three ACO Systems Engineering tools that correspond to three INCOSE Technical Processes: Stakeholder Requirements Definition, Requirements Analysis, and Integration, as well as one Project Process Risk Management. These processes are used to facilitate, streamline, and manage systems engineering processes tailored for the earliest two life cycle stages, which is the environment in which ACO engineers work. The role of systems engineers and systems engineering as performed in ACO is explored in this paper. The need for tailoring Systems Engineering processes, tools, and products in the ever-changing engineering services ACO provides to its customers is addressed.

Mulqueen, John↗

NASA NTRS2016

Purpose, Principles, and Challenges of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center

NASA formed the NASA Engineering and Safety Center in 2003 following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. It is an Agency level, program-independent engineering resource supporting NASA's missions, programs, and projects. It functions to identify, resolve, and communicate engineering issues, risks, and, particularly, alternative technical opinions, to NASA senior management. The goal is to help ensure fully informed, risk-based programmatic and operational decision-making processes. To date, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has conducted or is actively working over 600 technical studies and projects, spread across all NASA Mission Directorates, and for various other U.S. Government and non-governmental agencies and organizations. Since inception, NESC human spaceflight related activities, in particular, have transitioned from Shuttle Return-to-Flight and completion of the International Space Station (ISS) to ISS operations and Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), Space Launch System (SLS), and Commercial Crew Program (CCP) vehicle design, integration, test, and certification. This transition has changed the character of NESC studies. For these development programs, the NESC must operate in a broader, system-level design and certification context as compared to the reactive, time-critical, hardware specific nature of flight operations support.

Gilbert, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2001

The Role of Space Medicine in Management of Risk in Spaceflight

The purpose of Space Medicine is to ensure mission success by providing quality and comprehensive health care throughout all mission phases to optimize crew health and performance and to prevent negative long-term health consequences. Space flight presents additional hazards and associated risks to crew health, performance, and safety. With an extended human presence in space it is expected that illness and injury will occur on orbit, which may present a significant threat to crew health and performance and to mission success. Maintaining crew health, safety and performance and preventing illness and injury are high priorities necessary for mission success and agency goals. Space flight health care should meet the standards of practice of evidence based clinical medicine. The function of Space Medicine is expected to meet the agency goals as stated in the 1998 NASA Strategic Plan and the priorities established by the Critical Path Roadmap Project. The Critical Path Roadmap Project is an integrated NASA cross-disciplinary strategy to assess, understand, mitigate, and manage the risks associated with long-term exposure to the space flight environment. The evidence based approach to space medicine should be standardized, objective process yielding expected results and establishing clinical practice standards while balancing individual risk with mission (programmatic) risk. The ability to methodically apply available knowledge and expertise to individual and mission health issues will ensure appropriate priorities are assigned and resources are allocated. NASA Space Medicine risk management process is a combined clinical and engineering approach. Competition for weight, power, volume, cost, and crew time must be balanced in making decisions about the care of individual crew with competing agency resources.

Clark, Jonathan B.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modeling NASA’s Procedural Requirement Processes - Implications for Digital Future

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has an ongoing Digital Transformation effort and to leverage and showcase the power of Digital Transformation, an effort is underway to develop an integrated, datacentric, model representing NASA’s key process requirements. The task was divided into three phases: As Is modeling, Analysis, and To Be Planning. As part of this effort, a team has completed the first Phase I of the modeling task and is nearing completion of the second phase. This effort will capture the key elements as requirements, responsibilities, allocations, roles, products, and associated lifecycle elements. The scope of modeling included NASA’s NPR 7120.5 (Project and Program Management), NPR 7123.1 (Systems Engineering) and NPRs 8705.2 (Risk classification for Robotic Missions) and 8705.4 (Human-Rating Requirements for Space Missions). This paper will summarize the approach, scope, parsing patterns applied, metamodel, and associated workflows for the As-Is modeling. It will also summarize the results and insights gleaned during that phase, including the review process. These insights have informed the analysis and will be discussed. The analysis modeling phase will also be summarized including how the stakeholders were engaged, how the common elements were handled and dispositioned, and will also describe some of the plans for the future of NASA NPDs and NPRs.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modeling NASA’s Procedural Requirement Processes – Implications for a Digital Future

NPR↗

NASA NTRS2009

Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management Program -- IRKM-P

The NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) IRKM-P tightly couples risk management and knowledge management processes and tools to produce an effective "modern" work environment. IRKM-P objectives include: (1) to learn lessons from past and current programs (Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station); (2) to generate and share new engineering design, operations, and management best practices through preexisting Continuous Risk Management (CRM) procedures and knowledge-management practices; and (3) to infuse those lessons and best practices into current activities. The conceptual framework of the IRKM-P is based on the assumption that risks highlight potential knowledge gaps that might be mitigated through one or more knowledge management practices or artifacts. These same risks also serve as cues for collection of knowledge particularly, knowledge of technical or programmatic challenges that might recur.

Lengyel, David M.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): A Bibliography

Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a bottom-up analytical process that identifies process hazards, which helps managers understand vulnerabilities of systems, as well as assess and mitigate risk. It is one of several engineering tools and techniques available to program and project managers aimed at increasing the likelihood of safe and successful NASA programs and missions. This bibliography references 465 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, failure modes or failure analysis, in either the basic index of the major subject terms.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2003

Information technology security system engineering methodology

A methodology is described for system engineering security into large information technology systems under development. The methodology is an integration of a risk management process and a generic system development life cycle process. The methodology is to be used by Security System Engineers to effectively engineer and integrate information technology security into a target system as it progresses through the development life cycle. The methodology can also be used to re-engineer security into a legacy system.

Security risk analysis system engineering↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA Risk Management Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the Risk Management (RM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [1], with a specific focus on programs and projects, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. This handbook supports RM application within the NASA systems engineering process, and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [2]. Specifically, this handbook provides guidance that is applicable to the common technical processes of Technical Risk Management and Decision Analysis established by NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements [3]. These processes are part of the \Systems Engineering Engine. (Figure 1) that is used to drive the development of the system and associated work products to satisfy stakeholder expectations in all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. Like NPR 7123.1A, NPR 8000.4A is a discipline-oriented NPR that intersects with product-oriented NPRs such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements [4]; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements [5]; and NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements [6]. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 7123.1A, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 8000.4A. 1.2 Scope and Depth This handbook provides guidance for conducting RM in the context of NASA program and project life cycles, which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular risk management issues that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when managing programs and projects in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2018

The Second European Service Module (ESM-2) Evolutions, Production and Challenges

This paper presents an overview of the Second European Service Module (ESM-2), the second in a series of European Service Modules produced as part of the Barter agreement between NASA and ESA for the Orion Program. The European Industrial consortium is led by the ESA prime contractor Airbus Defence and Space in Bremen. ESA and Airbus signed the ESM-2 contract on 16 February 2017, for this key element of the Orion Exploration Mission 2 (EM-2). EM-2 is the first crewed mission for Orion and will take astronauts farther into the solar system than humanity has ever travelled. EM-2 will also be a historic mission for Europe, as the ESM-2 will be the first European spacecraft to be part of a human transportation system carrying humans beyond low Earth orbit. ESM-2 is mainly a recurring production following ESM-1. Nevertheless, there are a number of important changes being implemented, for example, to incorporate upgrades to further enhance safety and reliability. The challenging delivery schedule for ESM-2 has driven the need to commence manufacturing prior to completion of the qualification on ESM-1. In addition, some requirement deviations and non-compliances approved for ESM-1 have resulted in modifications for ESM-2. In order to manage the competing constraints effectively, the ESM-2 Team has put in place a number of novel approaches to manage schedule, risk, and technical changes. Airbus has set up multi-functional teams according to an approach known as "Major Spacecraft Deliveries" consisting of quality assurance, engineering and procurement. The risk of starting manufacturing prior to qualification is managed through a special risk share agreement. This agreement necessitates rigorous risk reviews across the board for all manufacturing, assembly, integration and test milestones. The ESM-2 changes are managed by Configuration Management, but Airbus has also introduced the Technical Baseline Matrix to provide a transparent top-level overview of the changes from ESM-1 to ESM-2. The tool provides the basis for ESM-2 design and development needs, decisions, as well as the input for the Orion EM-2 Critical Design Review (CDR). The main technical evolutions, status of the production and the novel management approaches for ESM-2 are presented and discussed in the paper.

Orion European Service Module Programme↗