Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Failures”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Benchmarking Mixed Mode Failure in Progressive Damage and Failure Analysis Methods

The verification and validation of progressive-damage-analysis finite element methods are difficult but critical tasks to undertake during their development. Verification exercises assess whether a predictive analysis tool produces results that are consistent with the fundamental concepts and assumptions of the tool under evaluation. Ideally, closed-form analytical solutions can be derived for which method verification results can be compared. Problems selected for computational tool verification are often simple and isolate individual features of the tool. In the case of progressive damage finite element methods, verifications should be performed to evaluate the ability of the model to predict the initiation of damage and its growth through the finite element mesh under a variety of conditions. Mabson et al. proposed a test case of a unidirectional, fiber-reinforced plate with a center crack subjected to tensile loads to evaluate matrix crack propagation predictions. The problem was modeled using the Abaqus Hashin continuum damage mechanics (CDM) model for fiber-reinforced composites. Different combinations of matrix strengths and element sizes were used in the simulations, and the results were compared to a closed-form solution based on linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM). It was determined that the Abaqus CDM model could predict the LEFM solution of Mode I cracks only when the finite element mesh density met specific requirements based on the material properties. This paper presents closed-form LEFM solutions for a center notch mixed mode (CNMM) verification problem. Parametric finite element analyses were developed using progressive damage analysis methods of both the Discrete Damage Mechanics (DDM) and CDM classes. The progressive damage analysis methods applied in the analyses of the CNMM problem include CompDam and the Floating Node Method. Analyses were conducted with various mode mixities and element sizes to verify that the damage models were working as intended and to identify any limits of applicability.

Leone, Frank↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
DOE OSTI2022

Rethinking PCMI Failures Under Transient Conditions

Under PCMI conditions, the cladding strain is driven by either pellet swelling during normal operation or pellet thermal expansion in transients. The loading in PCMI is displacement controlled because friction between the pellet and the cladding results in a strain compatibility at the pellet/cladding interface. Failure is known to occur under PCMI loading conditions during operation when normal power changes result in release of iodine (and other fission products) causing stress corrosion cracking where the crack-propagation rate is dependent upon the cladding stress but slow relative to strictly mechanical failures. Failures after normal power changes are often referred to as failure by pellet-cladding interaction or PCI to distinguish it from PCMI. Such failures are considered displacement-controlled failures, as noted above, and occur with limited plastic strain. This is different to what is typically thought of as PCMI failure under transient conditions, either Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs) or Reactivity Insertion Accidents (RIAs), which is generally assumed to occur once the cladding reaches a mechanical strain limit. But there are two features in the typical PCMI failure in an RIA that are not consistent with the PCMI assumptions. The first is the ductile shear failure feature in cross section and the second is a large crack opening post failure (e.g., see OI-11 failure in NSRR program). The ductile feature is indicative of a plastic instability that requires very large local strains, and the large crack opening must be the result of a release of energy, both of which are not expected if stress in the cladding was only driven by thermal expansion in the pellet. It is concluded that there must be a mechanism (likely related to rod internal pressure) that eliminates strain compatibility between the pellet and cladding – allowing strain localization to occur in what are known as PCMI transient failures. In some sense, these PCMI failures may actually be early burst failures that occur when thermal expansion causes uniform strains greater than a defined limit and fission gas pressure eliminate the strain compatibility

Cantonwine, Paul↗
NASA NTRS2014

Level of Automation and Failure Frequency Effects on Simulated Lunar Lander Performance

A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted at the NASA Ames Research Center Vertical Motion Simulator, where instrument-rated pilots completed a simulated terminal descent phase of a lunar landing. Ten pilots participated in a 2 x 2 mixed design experiment, with level of automation as the within-subjects factor and failure frequency as the between subjects factor. The two evaluated levels of automation were high (fully automated landing) and low (manual controlled landing). During test trials, participants were exposed to either a high number of failures (75% failure frequency) or low number of failures (25% failure frequency). In order to investigate the pilots' sensitivity to changes in levels of automation and failure frequency, the dependent measure selected for this experiment was accuracy of failure diagnosis, from which D Prime and Decision Criterion were derived. For each of the dependent measures, no significant difference was found for level of automation and no significant interaction was detected between level of automation and failure frequency. A significant effect was identified for failure frequency suggesting failure frequency has a significant effect on pilots' sensitivity to failure detection and diagnosis. Participants were more likely to correctly identify and diagnose failures if they experienced the higher levels of failures, regardless of level of automation

performance↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Failure Behavior and Control-Based Mitigation for a Parallel Hybrid Propulsion System

NASA is pursuing research to advance Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP) technologies that address fuel burn and emission reduction goals. EAP brings the potential for improved performance over the state of the art. However, for these systems to be practical and certifiable, they need to possess adequate robustness to adverse conditions including a variety of system failures that are not applicable to conventional turbofans today. Numerous EAP concepts interface gas turbine engines with an electrical power system that includes electric machines and sometimes electrical energy storage. The expansion of the powertrain increases the probability of encountering a failure and introduces new failure modes. Failures within the electrical power system may also impact the gas turbine engine(s) to which the electrical powertrain is coupled. This effort investigates failures originating in the electrical power system and their impact on the parallel hybrid propulsion system. Reversionary control strategies are also demonstrated to reduce the impact of the failures. Failure mitigation strategies were devised and employed in simulation. Various failure scenarios were simulated including those occurring during steady state operation, transients, and takeoff and landing scenarios. The timing of the failure and delay in failure identification and activation of mitigation strategies are noteworthy variables in the study. While the system remained stable throughout all failure scenarios, delays in failure identification could result in undesirable conditions such as increased operating temperatures and reduced stall margin. The results demonstrate successful mitigation of failures through reversionary control modes and help to generate confidence in the robustness of the conceptual parallel hybrid propulsion system.

Failure behavior↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Failure Behavior and Control Based Mitigation for a Parallel Hybrid Propulsion System

NASA is pursuing research to advance Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP) technologies that address fuel burn and emission reduction goals. EAP brings the potential for improved performance over the state of the art. However, for these systems to be practical and certifiable, they need to possess adequate robustness to adverse conditions including a variety of system failures that are not applicable to conventional turbofans today. Numerous EAP concepts interface gas turbine engines with an electrical power system that includes electric machines and sometimes electrical energy storage. The expansion of the powertrain increases the probability of encountering a failure and introduces new failure modes. Failures within the electrical power system may also impact the gas turbine engine(s) to which the electrical powertrain is coupled. This effort investigates failures originating in the electrical power system and their impact on the parallel hybrid propulsion system. Reversionary control strategies are also demonstrated to reduce the impact of the failures. Failure mitigation strategies were devised and employed in simulation. Various failure scenarios were simulated including those occurring during steady state operation, transients, and takeoff and landing scenarios. The timing of the failure and delay in failure identification and activation of mitigation strategies are noteworthy variables in the study. While the system remained stable throughout all failure scenarios, delays in failure identification could result in undesirable conditions such as increased operating temperatures and reduced stall margin. The results demonstrate successful mitigation of failures through reversionary control modes and help to generate confidence in the robustness of the conceptual parallel hybrid propulsion system.

Failure behavior↗