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This is an overview of some of the successes of the Formal Methods team at NASA Langley. It includes discussion of the development of the Well-Clear definition for uncrewed aircraft and the subsequent creation of the DAIDALUS Detect and Avoid library, followed by discussion of the team's verification of the Compact Position Reporting algorithm, which led to the development of tools for floating-point analysis.
Formal specification and verification of security has proven a challenging task. There is no single method that has proven feasible. Instead, an integrated approach which combines several formal techniques can increase the confidence in the verification of software security properties. Such an approach which species security properties in a library that can be reused by 2 instruments and their methodologies developed for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) are described herein The Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) is a model based verijkation instrument that uses Promela and the SPIN model checker. The Property Based Tester (PBT) uses TASPEC and a Text Execution Monitor (TEM). They are used to reduce vulnerabilities and unwanted exposures in software during the development and maintenance life cycles.
The motivation for using formal methods to specify and reason about real time properties is outlined and approaches that were proposed and used are sketched. The formal verifications of clock synchronization algorithms are concluded as showing that mechanically supported reasoning about complex real time behavior is feasible. However, there was significant increase in the effectiveness of verification systems since those verifications were performed, at it is to be expected that verifications of comparable difficulty will become fairly routine. The current challenge lies in developing perspicuous and economical approaches to the formalization and specification of real time properties.
As the technological and operational capabilities of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have grown, so too have international efforts to integrate UAS into civil airspace. However, one of the major concerns that must be addressed in realizing this integration is that of safety. For example, UAS lack an on-board pilot to comply with the legal requirement that pilots see and avoid other aircraft. This requirement has motivated the development of a detect and avoid (DAA) capability for UAS that provides situational awareness and maneuver guidance to UAS operators to aid them in avoiding and remaining well clear of other aircraft in the airspace. The NASA Langley Research Center Formal Methods group has played a fundamental role in the development of this capability. This article gives a selected survey of the formal methods work conducted in support of the development of a DAA concept for UAS. This work includes specification of low-level and high-level functional requirements, formal verification of algorithms, and rigorous validation of software implementations.
This paper describes the results of a cooperative study conducted by a team of researchers in formal methods at three NASA Centers to demonstrate FM techniques and to tailor them to critical NASA software systems. This pilot project applied FM to an existing critical software subsystem, the Shuttle's Jet Select subsystem (Phase I of an ongoing study). The present study shows that FM can be used successfully to uncover hidden issues in a highly critical and mature Functional Subsystem Software Requirements (FSSR) specification which are very difficult to discover by traditional means.
This is the proceedings of Lfm2000: Fifth NASA Langley Formal Methods Workshop. The workshop was held June 13-15, 2000, in Williamsburg, Virginia. See the web site for complete information about the event.
This paper describes the application of formal methods and object-oriented modeling to reverse engineering, in which formal specifications are developed for existing, or legacy, code.
This report treats several topics in applications of formal methods to avionics software development. Most of these topics concern decision tables, an orderly, easy-to-understand format for formally specifying complex choices among alternative courses of action. The topics relating to decision tables include: generalizations fo decision tables that are more concise and support the use of decision tables in a refinement-based formal software development process; a formalism for systems of decision tables with behaviors; an exposition of Parnas tables for users of decision tables; and test coverage criteria and decision tables. We outline features of a revised version of ORA's decision table tool, Tablewise, which will support many of the new ideas described in this report. We also survey formal safety analysis of specifications and software.
This paper presents a logical analysis of a typical argument favoring the use of formal methods for software development, and suggests an alternative argument that is simpler and stronger than the typical one.
This paper describes three case studies in the lightweight application of formal methods to requirements modeling for spacecraft fault protection systems.
In the context of EDEMOI - a French national project that proposed the use of semiformal and formal methods to infer the consistency and robustness of aeronautical regulations through the analysis of faithfully representative models- a methodology had been suggested (and applied) to different (safety and security-related) aeronautical regulations. This paper summarizes the preliminary results of this experience by stating which were the methodology s expected benefits, from a scientific point of view, and which are its useful benefits, from a regulatory body s point of view.
This publication consists of papers presented at NASA Langley Research Center's fourth workshop on the application of formal methods to the design and verification of life-critical systems. Topic considered include: Proving properties of accident; modeling and validating SAFER in VDM-SL; requirement analysis of real-time control systems using PVS; a tabular language for system design; automated deductive verification of parallel systems. Also included is a fundamental hardware design in PVS.
This paper describes our work exploring the suitability of formal specification methods for independent verification and validation (IV&V) of software specifications for large, safety critical systems. An IV&V contractor often has to perform rapid analysis on incomplete specifications, with no control over how those specifications are represented. Lightweight formal methods show significant promise in this context, as they offer a way of uncovering major errors, without the burden of full proofs of correctness. We describe an experiment in the application of the method SCR. to testing for consistency properties of a partial model of requirements for Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery on the space station. We conclude that the insights gained from formalizing a specification is valuable, and it is the process of formalization, rather than the end product that is important. It was only necessary to build enough of the formal model to test the properties in which we were interested. Maintenance of fidelity between multiple representations of the same requirements (as they evolve) is still a problem, and deserves further study.
The proper role and scope for the use of discrete mathematics and formal methods in support of engineering the security and integrity of components within deployed computer systems are discussed. It is proposed that the Z schema can be used as the specification language to capture the precise definition of system and component interfaces. This can be accomplished with an object oriented development paradigm.
This paper describes our work exploring the suitability of formal specification methods for independent verification and validation (IV&V) of software specifications for large, safety critical systems. An IV&V contractor often has to perform rapid analysis on incomplete specifications, with no control over how those specifications are represented. Lightweight formal methods show significant promise in this context, as they offer a way of uncovering major errors, without the burden of full proofs of correctness. We describe a case study of the use of partial formal models for V&V of the requirements for Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery on the space station. We conclude that the insights gained from formalizing a specification are valuable, and it is the process of formalization, rather than the end product that is important. It was only necessary to build enough of the formal model to test the properties in which we were interested. Maintenance of fidelity between multiple representations of the same requirements (as they evolve) is still a problem, and deserves further study.
This report documents the Phase 1 results of an effort aimed at formally verifying a key hardware component, called Scoreboard, of a Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP) being built at Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (CSDL). The Scoreboard is part of the FTPP virtual bus that guarantees reliable communication between processors in the presence of Byzantine faults in the system. The Scoreboard implements a piece of control logic that approves and validates a message before it can be transmitted. The goal of Phase 1 was to lay the foundation of the Scoreboard verification. A formal specification of the functional requirements and a high-level hardware design for the Scoreboard were developed. The hardware design was based on a preliminary Scoreboard design developed at CSDL. A main correctness theorem, from which the functional requirements can be established as corollaries, was proved for the Scoreboard design. The goal of Phase 2 is to verify the final detailed design of Scoreboard. This task is being conducted as part of a NASA-sponsored effort to explore integration of formal methods in the development cycle of current fault-tolerant architectures being built in the aerospace industry.
This volume presents technical issues involved in applying mathematical techniques known as Formal Methods to specify and analytically verify aerospace and avionics software systems.
To help in formally verifying the correctness of various systems, NASA constructs mathematical proofs using the proof assistant PVS (Prototype Verification System). Throughout this effort, NASA has amassed a library of tens of thousands of proven lemmas. While these lemmas can often be applied to new problems, their abundance can make lemma selection a non-trivial task. This project focuses on creating a lemma selector for use in PVS based on existing systems MePo, MaSh, and MeSh, which were written for other proof assistants. An initial benchmark system makes selections based on symbol-level similarity while the final lemma selector is a hybrid system, combining the classical approach used in the benchmark with a machine learning approach which leverages the lemmas' past usage.