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Introducing following HRA topics to visitors from Naval Nuclear Labs. - Dynamic HRA Method and Software (LWRS) - HRA Data Collection (LWRS) - HRA Consultation (KINS) - HRA for Advanced Nuclear Reactors (Hobby) - HRA for Non-Nuclear Industries (BEES)
Human factors in clean room manufacturing reliability
Human reliability analysis (HRA) evaluates human errors and provides human error probabilities (HEPs) for application in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), which is a comprehensive safety assessment method for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Generally, HRA methods estimate HEPs based on human reliability data collected from actual historical measurement, simulator experiments, or expert judgement. Most recent HRA data collection studies focus on collecting data via full-scope main control room (MCR) simulators with actual licensed reactor operators. Contrary to this, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has adopted a different approach, which attempts to collect HRA data based on experiment using simplified simulators and student participants by following the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP). This approach has a couple of advantages compared to full-scope data collection. Representatively, it has relatively low entry point for collecting HRA data, and secures large sample sizes with reasonable cost and labor. In the previous studies, we developed the SHEEP framework, then verified whether the data collected through the framework could support a representative full-scope data collection study, i.e., the Human Reliability Data Extraction (HuREX) study. Also, we analyzed human performance measurements depending on participant type (i.e., student vs. operator). In this paper, we analyze human performance data collected from an experiment comparing operator expertise and simulator complexity when using the more simplified simulator developed by INL, i.e., Rancor Microworld and the less simplified simulator, i.e., Compact Nuclear Simulator (CNS) developed by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests and correlation analysis are used for analyzing the experimental data.
In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.
There is a growing call among researchers for tighter coupling between human factors and human reliability assessments. In this research, we explore if early design stage resilience assessments can help bridge some of the gaps between human factors and human reliability assessments. Resilience in systems is their ability to recover reasonably and operate within acceptable bounds during failures and unexpected events. The fmdtools toolkit allows designers to assess the resilience of a system by modeling the human error and machine-related failure propagation in both nominal and faulty scenarios during the early design stages. As a result, the fmdtools toolkit has a low-fidelity dynamic human reliability assessment component built into it. In this paper, we study if the results from the fmdtools simulations can help inform and prioritize human factors design decision-making, resulting in tighter coupling between human factors and human reliability assessments during the design process. Specifically, we explore the results from a rover design example to understand the types of information that can help guide human factor-related decision-making.
Most studies collecting reliability data in human reliability analysis (HRA) have concentrated on research using full-scope simulators and actual operators. However, several researchers have found that there are challenges to collecting the variety of items as well as the amount of data needed to support HRA. As an opposite and complementing approach to the full-scope study, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed a simplified simulator, i.e., Rancor Microworld, for generating HRA data based on student subjects. This paper aims to identify collectible items in Rancor Microworld versus full-scope simulators. In this paper, collectible items and their different analysis levels in Rancor Microworld are identified in comparison with full-scope simulators. Then, how to treat the items is suggested with experiment directions that will be treated in the future.
Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflights, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The purpose of this paper focuses on how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lower the risk.
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) continues to suffer from a myriad of technical gaps in its foundations. Core issues have been widely discussed but remain largely unaddressed, although the path taken to this point was paved with good intentions. Now, while this characterization may seem dramatic it is not intended to throw doubt onto HRA as a discipline or to diminish the value it has on increasing safety and resilience in nuclear power. Rather, it is intended to communicate that HRA has some serious challenges and is desperately in need of a critical evaluation. To quote Dougherty [1], “the misrepresentations that will undoubtedly arise may serve to provoke the necessary creativity.” What bears noting is that in the last thirty years since Alan Swain declared that “no adequate HRA had ever been done,” there has been little effort to correct the issues he highlighted. Human factors practice is still poorly implemented, many complex systems are fundamentally incompatible with reliable human performance, and there remains poor foundational support for many of the assumptions within HRA. We propose three categories of issues in HRA, philosophical, theoretical, and empirical and potential solutions to these issues.
center dot In order to reduce commanding errors that are caused by humans, we create an approach and corresponding artifacts for standardizing the command generation process and conducting risk management during the design and assurance of such processes. center dot The literature review conducted during the standardization process revealed that very few atomic level human activities are associated with even a broad set of missions. center dot Applicable human reliability metrics for performing these atomic level tasks are available. center dot The process for building a "Periodic Table" of Command and Control Functions as well as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models is demonstrated. center dot The PRA models are executed using data from human reliability data banks. center dot The Periodic Table is related to the PRA models via Fault Links.
Recovery human action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part in human reliability analysis (HRA). However, there are a couple of limitations to treating recovery actions using only the current HRA methods available. Representatively, the existing recovery analysis does not specifically consider recovery actions as they have occurred in actual nuclear power plants (NPPs). To handle the challenges in the existing recovery analyses, this study suggests a way to analyze recovery actions under a dynamic HRA method, the Procedure-based Risk Investigation MEthod-Human Reliability Analysis (PRIME-HRA) method. The PRIME-HRA method suggests a way on how to develop dynamic simulation models using dynamic risk assessment tools such as the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) [1] and the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) [2]. EMRALD and HUNTER are the dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and HRA tools developed at Idaho National Laboratory. In this paper, differences on analyzing recovery actions in the Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP), the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) and the Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and challenges of these approaches are introduced. How we have developed the PRIME-HRA is also introduced in this paper. Then, the proposed approach to analyzing recovery human actions in dynamic context is partially discussed with an example.
Most current efforts have modified and applied existing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods to treat human actions related to beyond-design-basis external events in which diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) equipment would be deployed. However, many questions remain regarding the suitability of legacy HRA methods to address FLEX human actions, sparking the need for a new method of reasonably evaluating them. In this context, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) researched a relatively new approach to treating FLEX human actions via Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) software. EMRALD was developed to support the increasing need for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models that can respond to evolving plant conditions during simulations. A couple benefits were identified when analyzing FLEX human actions through this software. In general, it is especially useful for evaluating a strategy’s feasibility, including FLEX human actions that require a relatively long time to perform. In this paper, we suggest how FLEX human actions can be modeled using the EMRALD software. Two different HRA modeling approaches using EMRALD are introduced: (1) procedure-based modeling and (2) PRA/HRA-based modeling. The former approach was introduced in the authors’ previous paper, whereas this paper mainly discusses how the latter approach works for an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) scenario with relevant procedures and PRA models. A hybrid method combining the two modeling approaches is introduced at the paper’s conclusion.
Green (1990) believes that the two main factors safeguarding flying from human error are both related to certification and regulation. First is the increasingly proceduralized nature of flying whereby as much as possible is reduced to a rule-based activity. Second is the emphasis placed upon training and competency checking of aircrew in simulators and in the air, both generally and for all particular types of aircraft flown. This leaves, believes Green, other human factors that are relatively unaddressed as yet and which can give rise to human reliability problems. These include: hardware factors and especially pilot/co-pilot relationships; and system factors including fatigue and cost/safety trade-offs. He also, importantly, identifies problems with the integration of the 'electronic crew member' following increased automation. Human reliability failures with artificial intelligence and automation, due to over-reliance on the system fail-safe mechanisms, or to operator under- confidence in the integrity or self-regulating capacity of the system, or to out-of-loop effects, are widely accepted as being due to deficiencies in plant design, planning, management and maintenance more than to 'operator error' - Reason's (1990) latent error or organization pathogens argument. Reliability failures in complex systems are well enough documented to give cause for concern and at least promote a debate on the merits of a full certification program. The purpose of this short paper is to seek out and explore what is valuable in certification, at the least to show that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages and at best to identify positive outcomes perhaps not obtainable in other ways. On both sides of the debate on certification there is general agreement on the need for a better human factors perspective and effort in complex aviation systems design. What is at issue is how this is to be promoted. It is incumbent upon opponents of certification to say how else such promotion be enabled. This is an exploratory and philosophical review, not a focused and specific one, and it will draw upon much that is not firmly in the domain of complex aviation systems.
The building of a spacecraft is complex and often involves multiple suppliers and companies that have their own designs and processes. Standards have been developed across the industries to reduce the chances for critical flight errors at the system level, but the spacecraft is still vulnerable to the introduction of critical errors during integration of these systems. Critical errors can occur at any time during the process and in many cases, human reliability analysis (HRA) identifies human error as a risk driver. Most programs have a test plan in place that is intended to catch these errors, but it is not uncommon for schedule and cost stress to result in less testing than initially planned. Therefore, integrated testing, or "testing as you fly," is essential as a final check on the design and assembly to catch any errors prior to the mission. This presentation will outline the unique benefits of integrated testing by catching critical flight errors that can otherwise go undetected, discuss HRA methods that are used to identify opportunities for human error, lessons learned and challenges over ownership of testing will be discussed.
This paper describes an experiment using the Rancor Microworld simulator to probe into differences in human performance between students and actual operators. Six human performance measures – 1) time, 2) error, 3) workload, 4) situational awareness, 5) attention patterns, and 6) number of manipulations – are measured from experiments. The experiment has been conducted for 11 operators and 20 students so far. More experiments and analyses will be continued. Further experimental studies using Rancor Microworld are expected to be able to collect additional data that may be missing from full-scope studies and contribute to items that can support human reliability data.
The Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team at NASA Glenn Research Center is planning a customized approach to quantify human spaceflight performance changes with respect to changes to the CHP system functions and capabilities. Using the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) initiated by NASA’s Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) [1], the team is surveying potential candidate models and novel strategies that generate metrics suitable for supporting decision making related to how the CHP system may influence human system performance risk. One such investigation includes classic Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) models. Traditionally, HRA methods estimate the occurrence of human errors and their impact on the success of an activity when designing and operating a system. While humans perceive, interpret, decide on, and carry out a course of action, the factors affecting performance and error likelihood are commonly referred to as performance shaping factors (PSFs). Originally developed to alleviate safety concerns related to nuclear power plant operations, HRA methods such as THERP [2] and CREAM [3] dismantle an activity into tasks, requiring elemental steps to be executed, and assess their failure due to predefined PSFs. In this study, we compare generic HRA methods and those that incorporate some human spaceflight aspects, such as sleep conditions (SCREAM [4]), with respect to how they may be adopted to capture performance with an intention to mitigate detrimental outcomes elucidated by the HSRB DAGs. We suggest strategies to quantify astronaut performance specific to spaceflight activities and illustrate how such concepts may help in optimizing the CHP system capabilities with respect to Artemis missions.
Recovery human action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part in human reliability analysis (HRA). However, there are a couple of limitations to treat recovery actions only depending on the current HRA methods. Representatively, the existing recovery analysis does not specifically consider recovery actions as are occurred in actual nuclear power plants (NPPs). The overall goal of this study aims to develop a novel recovery analysis method to account for human action recoveries in context of scenarios as well as complement the limitations of existing recovery analysis. In this paper, the recovery analysis in current HRA methods and their challenges are introduced. A strategy to achieve the goal is introduced with a modified recovery definition. Then, how we have researched the approach will be introduced in the paper.
A lack of data has been identified as a major challenge in human reliability analysis (HRA). Accordingly, several institutes and researchers have tried to collect HRA data from different data sources such as actual historical measurements, expert judgements, or simulator studies. While the most recent studies predominantly focus on collecting data using full-scope simulators with actual operators, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has begun to collect HRA data using a simplified simulator, i.e., the Rancor Microworld simulator, with student participants. Full-scope studies have been known to have several intrinsic challenges to securing enough quantity of the data due to many reasons like the high cost for performing experiments or requiring actual operators’ cooperation. The ultimate goal of INL’s effort aims to infer actual operators’ data collected from a full-scope simulator on the basis of microworld data with student subjects as well as collect additional data that could be missed in the full-scope research. As a first step to achieve this goal, this paper projects an experimental plan for investigating the differences in human performance between individuals in two groups: 1) an actual operator and 2) a student when using the Rancor Microworld simulator. A randomized factorial experiment design has been developed with two independent variables, i.e., type of scenario and type of subject. Six human performance measures, i.e., 1) time, 2) error, 3) workload, 4) situation awareness, 5) patterns of attention and 6) the number of manipulations were selected. A couple of scenarios and their procedures available to the Rancor Microworld simulator have been developed.
As part of their duties, Human Reliability Analysis must often evaluate if crews in nuclear power plants (NPPs) can complete tasks associated with a human-failure event within time limits. For example, the time required in NPP scenarios is determined by systematic and structured walkthroughs, feasibility studies, recorded times from training exercises, and interviews with experienced operators and experts. Typically, a point estimate is derived for the estimate (mean, maximum, or 95th percentile of time required). Using point-estimate values can mask the risk associated with variability among crews, plant conditions and set-up, environmental conditions, and other impact factors under which these actions are executed. While point estimates for time required and time available have served the industry well, without considering the uncertainty they could lead to biased understanding about the risk. The Integrated Human Event Analysis System - General Methodology (IDHEAS-G) model (developed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC) for human error probability calculates human error probability by summing two probabilities: insufficient time and cognitive error. As such, the model takes a more holistic approach by considering the full distributions for time required and time available to calculate the human error probability because the time available to complete the task is insufficient. In this study, we expand on the work of the NRC and discuss methods for estimating these time considerations. For example, for the time required, the impact of Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) on the distribution was divided into impacts that are aleatory in nature, such as crew-to-crew variability, and those that are epistemic (i.e., the PIFs). Starting with the factors that introduce aleatory uncertainty, a first-order distribution was developed from a large set of time required (i.e., NPP task completion times) data for the range of operator actions that occur in the NPP control room under simulated accident conditions. The first-order distribution can then be adjusted to account for epistemic uncertainty using research associated with the impact of applicable PIFs on the time required. We also develop guidance for analysts to address the probability distributions for the time available. The guidance we developed on how to estimate time required and time available distributions is based on the identification of pertinent research and data, data analyses, and expert knowledge elicitation.