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The Photon Haystack and Emerging Radiation Detection Technology

The resources devoted to interdicting special nuclear materials have increased considerably over the last several years in step with growing efforts to counter nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This changing landscape has led to a great deal of current research and development that aims to improve the effectiveness of technology now deployed worldwide. The interdiction of special nuclear materials is most commonly addressed by detecting and characterizing emitted gamma rays, but modest signature emissions can be obscured by attenuating material and must be differentiated from large and highly variable environmental background. While this makes gamma-ray detection of special nuclear materials a daunting technical challenge, a host of new detection technologies are now emerging. We thus review special nuclear material signatures, the physics of detection approaches, and detection performance metrics. The use of benchmark materials aids our discussion and comparison of detection methods.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Radiochemical Needs

The United States Government (USG) first developed nuclear forensics-related capabilities to analyze radiological and nuclear materials, including underground nuclear test debris and interdicted materials. Nuclear forensics is not a new mission for Department of Defense (DoD). The department's existing nuclear forensics capability is the result of programs that span six (6) decades and includes activities to assess foreign nuclear weapons testing activities, monitor and verify nuclear arms control treaties, and to support intelligence and law enforcement activities. Today, nuclear forensics must support not only weapons programs and nuclear smuggling incidents, but also the scientific analysis and subsequent attribution of terrorists' use of radiological or nuclear materials/devices. Nuclear forensics can help divulge the source of origin of nuclear materials, the type of design for an interdicted or detonated device, as well as the pathway of the materials or device to the incident. To accomplish this mission, the USG will need trained radiochemists and nuclear scientists to fill new positions and replace the retiring staff.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Detection of special nuclear material from delayed neutron emission induced by a dual-particle monoenergetic source

Detection of unique signatures of special nuclear materials is critical for their interdiction in a variety of nuclear security and nonproliferation scenarios. We report on the observation of delayed neutrons from fission of uranium induced in dual-particle active interrogation based on the {sup 11}B(d,n γ){sup 12}C nuclear reaction. Majority of the fissions are attributed to fast fission induced by the incident quasi-monoenergetic neutrons. A Li-doped glass–polymer composite scintillation neutron detector, which displays excellent neutron/γ discrimination at low energies, was used in the measurements, along with a recoil-based liquid scintillation detector. Time-dependent buildup and decay of delayed neutron emission from {sup 238}U were measured between the interrogating beam pulses and after the interrogating beam was turned off, respectively. Characteristic buildup and decay time profiles were compared to the common parametrization into six delayed neutron groups, finding a good agreement between the measurement and nuclear data. This method is promising for detecting fissile and fissionable materials in cargo scanning applications and can be readily integrated with transmission radiography using low-energy nuclear reaction sources.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear forensics: How science helps stop the trafficking of nuclear materials

Nuclear forensics is an essential activity in support of national counter-nuclear smuggling operations, as it can be used to provide unique and useful data to law enforcement for the prosecution of criminal nuclear smugglers and traffickers. Nuclear forensics can also be used to determine the origin of nuclear materials that have fallen out of regulatory control, allowing for the identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the safeguarding of nuclear materials, while also generating a deterrent effect through attribution to the legal and responsible owners of nuclear materials out of regulatory control. This article describes the benefits of a nuclear forensics capability to any country in possession of nuclear materials, and describes how nuclear forensics can support an investigation into the origin of interdicted nuclear materials, using a case study of a nuclear materials interdiction in Australia to describe how nuclear forensics works in practice.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Modeling most likely pathways for smuggling radioactive and special nuclear materials on a worldwide multimodal transportation network

Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, and focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DNDO Analysis Cell Concept

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has a mission of implementing rad/nuc interdiction capabilities for a managed and coordinated response to threats, integration of federal nuclear forensics programs, and coordinating the development of the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture. In the process of executing this mission, DNDO has generated substantial information, data, technical results, operational workflows and analytical tools. The effective utilization of these resources is an overarching goal of the organization. After nearly a decade of performing work, DNDO faces a challenge in capitalizing on the large amount of data, reports, processes, tools, and people. As new work is being planned, managers and researchers need to have an understating of what information has been collected, what tools are available, the collaborations which can be utilized to propel the work forward, processes to plan and execute, and how to present conclusions and results that can assist the government in making decisions. This type of challenge can be met through the use of a series of organized and connected elements which form a broader structure (cell) that promotes cross utilization of elements such that they can be tailored (analyzed) to fit the context of the problem to be solved. The development of an analysis cell for DNDO will address the challenges of utilizing existing elements, identifying gaps, annually reporting the performance of rad/nuc interdiction instrumentation, and planning the execution of future work.

Pagh, Richard T.↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY 2016 Data Analysis Annual Report

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,500 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 606 sites in 56 countries worldwide. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element in the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings. NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 56 countries around the world. Thirty-seven of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year 2016. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in fiscal year 2016. The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of approximately six from site to site. Some lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have approximately 8,000 occupancies per day and the different types of cargo that travel through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was above 96% for fiscal year 2016. NSDD takes all of these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (FY 2018 Data Analysis Annual Report)

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,728 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 660 sites in 63 countries. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element of the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings.NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries (summarized in the banner to the right) highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 63 countries around the world. Thirty-two of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year (FY) 2018. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in FY 2018.The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of up to nine from site to site. Some RPM lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have up to approximately 8,000 occupancies per day, and the different types of cargo traveling through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was 97% for FY 2018. NSDD takes all these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by ORNL Radiation Inspection Systems Team (RIST) data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Mission Analysis for using Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Equipment for Consequence Management

The overall objective of this project is to research, evaluate, and test first responder preventive radiological/nuclear detection equipment (PRND) to provide state and local agencies with guidance on how to best use radiological search and interdiction systems and equipment for consequence management and response after a radiological/nuclear release or detonation. While the equipment being tested in this effort has been specifically designed by technology manufacturers and purchased by responders for preventive detection and source interdiction operations, the fleet of PRND equipment will help fill the needs for radiological instrumentation should a consequence management response take place, as it is currently the most widely available and fielded radiological instrumentation by state and local agencies. This effort will provide scientific guidance on the best way to deploy and operate this class of equipment for consequence management missions. Gaining a better understanding of how PRND equipment can operate and perform for these missions will allow for recommendations on the tactical approach responders can use for consequence management operations. With the support of the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), PRND equipment has been placed into service at federal, state, and local agencies throughout the nation. If the equipment capability and limitations are taken into account, this large inventory and capability can be repurposed to support the emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological of nuclear event.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Development of Spectroscopic Tools for Nuclear Forensics Signatures Development

Diversion of nuclear materialsfrom legitimate commercial processes for use by nefarious actors is a frightening and surreptitious problem. Smuggled nuclear material can be used to manufacture a simple radiological dispersion device (RDD) and potentially incorporated into the development of a nuclear weapon. With some frequency, smuggled nuclear material is interdicted in foreign countries as actors cross border checkpoints. Nuclear material interdicted in this way can be analyzed using a variety of tools. Plutonium-239 is commonly used as the fissile material in nuclear weapon production as an alternative to uranium-235. Plutonium in a production, refining, or finishing facility will exist in many forms including oxide precursors (PuF4, PuF3, Pu oxalate, etc.), oxide, and metal. The ability to identify plutonium in each of these forms and determine properties, characteristics, or history of these materials is crucial for determining if the processes occurring in a nuclear facility are legitimate or not. This presentation will focus on the development and application ofspectroscopic tools developed at SRNL using doubled-walled cells (DWC) to characterize Pu-bearing compounds. Advances in the use of vibrational spectroscopy techniques (Raman and IR), UV-VIS-SWIR diffuse reflectance spectroscopy, gamma emission spectroscopy, luminescence spectroscopy, laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in conjunction with XRD and SEM in the characterization of Pu-bearing compounds will be presented with emphasis in material processing history.

Villa-Aleman, Eliel↗

Evaluating Short-warning Mitigation via Intentional Robust Disruption of a Hypothetical Impact of Asteroid 2023 NT1

We investigate various short-warning mitigation scenarios via fragmentation for a hypothetical impact of asteroid 2023 NT1, a near-Earth object (NEO) that was discovered on 2023 July 15, two days after its closest approach to Earth on July 13. The asteroid passed by Earth within ∼0.25 lunar distances, with a closest approach of ∼1 × 10 5 km and a velocity of 11.27 km s −1 . Its size remains largely uncertain, with an estimated diameter range of 26–58 m and a most probable estimate of 34 m (JPL Sentry, 2023 September 15; weighted by the NEO size frequency distribution). If 2023 NT1 had collided with Earth, it could have caused significant local damage. Assuming a spherical asteroid with a diameter of 34 m, uniform density of 2.6 g cm −3 , and impact velocity of 15.59 km s −1 , a collision would have yielded an estimated impact energy of ∼1.5 Mt, approximately 3 times the energy of the Chelyabinsk airburst in 2013. We analyze the effectiveness of mitigation via intentional robust disruption for objects similar to 2023 NT1. We utilize Pulverize It (PI), a NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts study of planetary defense via fragmentation, to model potential mitigation scenarios through simulations of hypervelocity asteroid disruption and atmospheric ground effects in the case of a terminal defense mode. Simulations suggest that PI is an effective multimodal approach for planetary defense that can operate in extremely short interdiction modes, in addition to long interdiction timescales with extended warning. Our simulations support the proposition that threats like 2023 NT1 can be effectively mitigated with intercepts of 1 day (or less) prior to impact, yielding minimal to no ground damage.

Asteroids↗

Modeling most likely pathways for smuggling radioactive and special nuclear materials on a worldwide multi-modal transportation network

Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, all focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

National and International Assistance in the Technical Assessment of Nuclear and other Radiological Materials out of Regulatory Control

Considerable resources are dedicated worldwide to detect illicit materials of all types amid the concern of their potential use in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Of particular concern are illicit nuclear and radiological materials as they have potential to cause serious harm to the general public if not maintained under regulatory control. As such, the international community has developed recommendations and guidance for States and their Competent Authorities to establish, implement, maintain, and strengthen their nuclear security regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control through the publication Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Nuclear Security Series No.15. Based on this guidance and national/international practical experience and best practices, the international community has made considerable advances in the detection, interdiction, and adjudication of nuclear and other radiological materials out of regulatory control. The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation has national/international experience to share on providing emergency responders and front line officers assistance in the technical assessment of interdicted nuclear and other radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

The MARSAME Methodology: Fundamentals, Benefits and Applications - 12135

MARSAME is an acronym for the 'Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment'. Published in January 2009, MARSAME was a joint effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to aid sites in the clearance of materials and equipment (M and E). The MARSAME manual supplements the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM), published in 1997. As cited in the MARSAME, applicable M and E includes metals, concrete, tools, equipment, piping, conduit, and furniture. Also included are dispersible bulk materials such as trash, rubble, roofing materials, and sludge. Solids stored in containers, as well as liquids and gases, represent additional M and E. The MARSAME methodology covers multiple technical areas, including the initial assessment (IA), Measurement Quality Objectives (MQOs), survey approaches and considerations, survey plans, survey implementation, and Data Quality Assessment (DQA). These topics are generally captured under four phases of the data life cycle, which are Planning, Implementation, Assessment, and Decision-Making. Flexibility and a graded approach are inherent components of the MARSAME methodology pertaining to M and E property clearance programs. Because large quantities of M and E potentially affected by radioactivity are present in the United States, owners of the M and E need to identify acceptable disposition options. Thirteen disposition options, broadly defined under both release and interdiction scenarios, are described in MARSAME. Nine disposition options are listed for release; these options are categorized into two for reuse, two for recycle, four for disposal, and one that is essentially 'status quo' (i.e., maintain current radiological controls). Four interdiction options are also cited. To date, applications of the MARSAME approach for M and E property clearance under reuse scenarios have been limited. However, this should change as familiarity increases. Known examples are provided from DOE-contractor and NRC-licensee facilities. If the methodology is appropriately planned and implemented, the benefits of the MARSAME approach include worker and public protection, reduction in the amount of disposed radioactive waste, reuse of materials (resulting in environmental and material sustainability advantages), and cost savings. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National technical nuclear forensics: U.S. approach to capability sustainment

In the event of a nuclear detonation in the United States (U.S.), the interdiction of a nuclear device, or the seizure of nuclear materials, there will be tremendous pressure to attribute the source of the material, establish responsibility, and ensure the prevention of another incident. Along with intelligence and law enforcement investigations, nuclear forensics is one of the three pillars supporting attribution. The field of nuclear forensics includes the collection, analysis, and evaluation of radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris after an event or interdiction. The nuclear forensics scientific workforce is situated primarily in national and defense laboratories, but in recent decades has experienced a decline in numbers. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has implemented an expertise development program in order to off-set these declines and sustain a workforce of educated and trained scientists skilled in areas needed for nuclear forensics. Since its inception in 2008, the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP) addresses this challenge holistically, through support to undergraduate and graduate students, university faculty and programs, as well as post-doctoral researchers at national laboratories in fields which are directly relevant to nuclear forensics. In that time, the program has placed 44 Ph.D.'s directly into national laboratories and U.S. federal agencies, maintaining the technical expertise required to execute the Nation's nuclear forensics mission. In 2017, the NNFEDP will institute the new Nuclear Forensics Research Award that will foster collaborations between university students and faculty with national laboratory researchers to further support and reinforce the advancement of nuclear forensic science through joint efforts. This opportunity will increase participation in this exciting and critically important national security mission space and contribute to the sustained development of the nuclear forensics workforce. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Technosocial Predictive Analytics for Illicit Nuclear Trafficking

Illicit nuclear trafficking networks are a national security threat. These networks can directly lead to nuclear proliferation, as state or non-state actors attempt to identify and acquire nuclear weapons-related expertise, technologies, components, and materials. The ability to characterize and anticipate the key nodes, transit routes, and exchange mechanisms associated with these networks is essential to influence, disrupt, interdict or destroy the function of the networks and their processes. The complexities inherent to the characterization and anticipation of illicit nuclear trafficking networks requires that a variety of modeling and knowledge technologies be jointly harnessed to construct an effective analytical and decision making workflow in which specific case studies can be built in reasonable time and with realistic effort. In this paper, we explore a solution to this challenge that integrates evidentiary and dynamic modeling with knowledge management and analytical gaming, and demonstrate its application to a geopolitical region at risk.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Pond Crash Forensics: Presumptive identification of pond crash agents by next generation sequencing in replicate raceway mass cultures of Nannochloropsis salina

Productivity of algal mass culture can be severely reduced by contaminating organisms. It is, therefore, important to identify contaminants, determine their effect on productivity and, ultimately, develop countermeasures against such contamination. In this paper, we utilized microbiome analysis by second-generation sequencing of small subunit rRNA genes to characterize the predator and pathogen burden of open raceway cultures of Nannochloropsis salina. Samples were analyzed from replicate raceways before and after crashes. In one culture cycle, we identified two algivorous species, the rotifer Brachionus and gastrotrich Chaetonotus, the presence of which may have contributed to the loss of algal biomass. In the second culture cycle, the raceways were treated with hypochlorite in an unsuccessful attempt to interdict the crash. Finally, our analyses were shown to be an effective strategy for the identification of the biological contaminants and the characterization of intervention strategies.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Rare-earth element fractionation in uranium ore and its U(VI) alteration minerals

We developed a cation exchange chromatography method employing sulfonated polysterene cation resin (DOWEX AG50-X8) in order to separate rare-earth elements (REEs) from uranium-rich materials. The chemical separation scheme is designed to reduce matrix effects and consequently yield enhanced ionization efficiencies for concentration determinations of REEs without significant fractionation using solution mode-inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) analysis. This method was then applied to determine REE abundances in four uraninite (ideally UO 2 ) samples and their associated U(VI) alteration minerals. In three of the samples analyzed, the concentration of REEs for primary uraninite are higher than those for their corresponding secondary uranium alteration phases. The results for U(VI) alteration minerals of two samples indicate enrichment of the light REEs (LREEs) over the heavy REEs (HREEs). This differential mobilization is attributed to differences in the mineralogical composition of the U(VI) alteration. There is a lack of fractionation of the LREEs in the uraninite alteration rind that is composed of U(VI) minerals containing Ca 2+ as the interlayer cation (uranophane and bequerelite); contrarily, U(VI) alteration minerals containing K + and Pb 2+ as interlayer cations (fourmarierite, dumontite) indicate fractionation (enrichment) of the LREEs. Our results have implications for nuclear forensic analyses since a comparison is reported between the REE abundances for the CUP-2 (processed uranium ore) certified reference material and previously determined values for uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced from the same U deposit (Blind River/Elliott Lake, Canada). UOCs represent the most common form of interdicted nuclear material and consequently is material frequently targeted for forensic analysis. The comparison reveals similar chondrite normalized REE signatures but variable absolute abundances. Based on the results reported here, the latter may be attributed to the differing REE abundances between primary ore and associated alteration phases, and/or is related to varying fabrication processes adopted during production of UOC.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗