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DOE OSTI2025

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS): 3S Risk Analysis for Portable Nuclear Reactors (Volume II) -- Conclusions and Implications

Growing interest in compact, easily transportable sources of baseload electricity has manifested in the proposal and early deployment of portable nuclear reactors (PNRs). PNRs are sought because they are scalable, efficient, and cost-effective for meeting energy demands in unique, remote, or contested areas. For example, Russia's KLT-40S Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) that successfully reached the Arctic coastal city of Pevek. It began providing power to the local grid in December 2019. While providing such key advantages as having a highly flexible power generation mechanism, FNPPs appear to directly challenge international norms and conventions for nuclear safety, safeguards, and security. FNPPs are neither a purely fixed nuclear fuel cycle activity nor a purely transportation-based nuclear fuel cycle activity. In response, Sandia's Mitigating International Nuclear Enogy Risks (MINER) research perspective frames this discussion in terms of risk complexity and the interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security in FNPPs, and PNRs more generally. This systems study is a technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of FNPP technologies. This research's aims are three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to PNRs and FNPPs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems- theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to show Sandia's ability for prompt, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex MINER mission objectives.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Multilevel Approach To Addressing Emerging Technologies In Nuclear Security

Emerging technologies present a unique set of challenges to operators and regulators. Although emerging technologies can be used to strengthen nuclear security systems, they also can increase risks to nuclear facilities. The disruptive nature of emerging technologies could also leave operators unprepared for threats to nuclear materials or facilities. To address the potentially dangerous consequences associated with these innovations, strong adaptive mechanisms and international cooperation on threat mitigation and technological integration are vital. This paper examines the nuclear security implications of emerging technologies from an institutional (as opposed to technology-specific) perspective. Drawing on insights from a recent workshop series hosted by the Stimson Center and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Global Material Security, as well as research funded by Global Material Security and separate research conducted by Stimson, the paper begins with a definition of emerging technology that bounds the scope of the problem while leaving some margin for expert interpretation. The subsequent sections highlight the challenges as well as potential benefits that these technologies pose at each level of the nuclear security establishment, from the operators of sites hosting radiological or nuclear material, to regulators and national policy makers, to international institutions. Each section also includes specific recommendations for incorporating emerging technologies into radiological and nuclear security planning.

Andrews, Ian↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Forensics

Nuclear forensics is a key part of the nuclear security strategy for the United States and the international community. The NACS Division is central to the leadership role that LLNL has had in nuclear forensics over the past 25 years. Our current nuclear forensic program includes conducting R&D on provenance and attribution signatures, collaborating with international partners, training the next generation of nuclear forensic experts, developing test materials for verification and validation exercises, and providing expert advice to national and international policy makers. Key to our success in these areas has been the strong and continuing involvement in nuclear forensic casework obtained through law enforcement and intelligence channels as well as our outstanding analytical capabilities. NACS must continue to conduct forward-thinking R&D in nuclear forensics that supports operational programs and addresses intelligence gaps. To maintain leadership in nuclear forensics, we must attract, develop, and retain the best talent. The NNSA has a central leadership role in developing educational initiatives for nuclear forensics. In concert with the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute, the NACS Division will continue to participate in all nuclear forensic educational initiatives (undergraduate, graduate, postdoctoral) and incorporate LLNL’s D&I vision into its student and postdoc recruitment efforts. We will continue to build formal relationships with key academic partners and institutions with active and emerging nuclear forensic research interests. We will also strengthen relationships with NNSA DNN and SSAA funded university consortia (e.g. NSSC, ACE, CNEC, CVT, ETI, MTV), helping them conduct research of interest and relevance to nuclear forensics, while at the same time evaluating and recruiting promising talent from these programs.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Security Governance in India: Institutions, Instruments, and Culture (2019)

There is an emerging consciousness in India of the importance of nuclear security and safety. Motivated by a combination of rapid growth in its civil nuclear sector, heightened scrutiny of recent nuclear accidents around the world, and the deteriorating regional security environment, India has pushed to adopt measures to strengthen and enhance its nuclear security and safety governance structures. India recognizes that the various recent global nuclear security initiatives are in its own best interest and has been an enthusiastic participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process. Today, India demonstrates a greater willingness to showcase its nuclear security arrangements before the public and has undertaken many institutional, legal, and operational reforms to maintain international regime compliance. This study takes a comprehensive look at India's approach to nuclear security and critically examines the physical security measures the country has put in place. Particular focus is placed on the evolution and strengths, as well as weaknesses, of the country's nuclear security institutions, instruments, practices, and culture. Given that the strengthening of India's nuclear security governance is an ongoing endeavor, the paper also puts forward a number of policy recommendations.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Forensics National Frameworks [Slides]

Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or national law related to nuclear security. The goal of forensic science is to discover linkages among people, places, materials, and events. Nuclear forensics is an essential component of national response plans to events involving nuclear or other radioactive materials out of regulatory control and informs prevention, detection, and response.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Investigation Support Scenario-based Policy Discussion Development [Slides]

Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or national law related to nuclear security. The goal of forensic science is to discover linkages among people, places, materials and events. Nuclear forensics is an essential component of national response plans to events involving nuclear or other radioactive materials out of regulatory control and informs prevention, detection and response.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Report of the Sixth Regional Review Meeting of the Radiological Security Partnership.

The Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulatory Commission (AERC) and the United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) co-hosted the 6th Regional Review Meeting on Radiological Security involving representatives from over 20 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the World Institute for Nuclear Security. The purpose of the event was to discuss the implementation of, and plans for, high-activity radioactive source security (RSS). The U.S. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security (ORS) fully sponsored this review meeting. Participants were welcomed to Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the meeting was formally opened by Nirmali Karunarathna of the Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulator Council who emphasized the strong partnerships among the participants. The opening Ceremony and Lamp Lighting included dignitaries from the sponsoring countries. Robert Hilton, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, and Kristin Hirsch of the ORS gave other opening remarks that highlighted the social benefit from radiological sources in medicine, industry, and agriculture, while stressing the importance of addressing the risks associated with the malicious use of radiological sources. Emphasis was placed on the importance of partnerships among all the participants to help ensure the success of securing radiological materials throughout the world and the opportunity to share information and experiences. AERC was acknowledged with special thanks for hosting this event. A participant list is included as Attachment A, and the meeting agenda is provided as Attachment B. All presentations were made available to participants. The following sections summarize the meeting’s presentations, discussions, issues, suggestions, and recommendations.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

The TRANSCEND University Consortium: Theme 4: Nuclear Materials - 20431

The safe and secure management of Pu is a matter of international concern, with ∼250 t of separated Pu currently stockpiled worldwide. The UK's civil inventory of nuclear materials contains significant stocks of separated Pu from the reprocessing of Magnox and AGR spent fuels. The preferred option for the 138.5 tonnes of Pu is re-use as mixed oxide (MOx) fuel, although 5% is not suitable for re-use and is recommended for direct disposal. However, it will take more than 15 years to implement re-use, requiring that the Pu be kept in interim storage in its current state for that period, i.e. as PuO{sub 2} powder within inert steel storage cans at Sellafield. The focus of the work presented here is thus plutonium storage and the direct disposal of plutonium. The Research and Development needs of both are now pressing: in the case of storage due to it being the current default; in the case of immobilization and disposal because of a comparative lack of Research and Development on Pu conditioning and packaging due to policy uncertainty as to whether it would be disposed of in a Geologic Disposal Facility (GDF). Addressing these needs is complicated by Pu's high radioactivity, decay heat and radiotoxicity, criticality, nuclear safeguard requirements and, for some UK Pu contaminated materials targeted for disposal, poor inventory. Thus, there is also a critical requirement for underpinning research on Pu bearing materials in these two contexts. In response to these needs, the TRANSCEND Consortium (Transformative Science and Engineering for Nuclear Decommissioning, a multi-disciplinary collaboration of 11 universities and 8 key industry partners from across the UK's civil nuclear sector) is seeking to provide technical underpinning to ongoing option development for the UK's civil Pu stockpile. Whilst understanding the behaviour of plutonium during its re-use as MOx is beyond the scope of the TRANSCEND Consortium work plan, the main objectives of the work are: (1) For interim storage: to understand how the surface structure and properties of pristine and radiation damaged PuO{sub 2} change with time in the absence and presence of water; and (2) For immobilization and disposal: to understand the mechanisms of incorporation of Pu into ceramic and glass-ceramic waste-forms, as well as the effect on these of self-induced radiation damage. Each objective is being addressed through separate work packages, the details of which are discussed in this paper. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

CENC PSN VOID FY20 Report

Maritime trade accounts for approximately 80 percent of international commerce. The high volume of vessels traversing domestic and international ports makes port areas prime targets for terrorism as well as illegal trafficking of drugs and arms (conventional or nuclear). Port security is therefore a worldwide concern affecting global economies, freedom of movement, and national security. However, extensive port monitoring is inherently complex and time consuming — making it truly viable only via an automated framework that can detect potential illicit activity and alert authorities in a timely manner. The development of image processing algorithms for this purpose requires access to large, labeled datasets that cover the breadth of targets of interest as well as the environments that they are observed within. Curated and labeled datasets of this nature are of enormous value to Sandia's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and National Security Program portfolios, as well as to Sandia's machine learning/automatic target recognition (ML/ATR) algorithm development and R&D communities. The goal of this project is to create a commercial satellite imagery dataset of labeled maritime vessels in port areas to support the development of ML/ATR algorithms for port security nonproliferation purposes. This dataset — Port Security Nonproliferation Vessel Overhead Imagery Dataset (PSN VOID) — has the potential to support a variety of other ancillary missions, such as maritime domain awareness, domestic and international security, drug interdiction, and weapons trafficking.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Outreach to Industry on Safeguards by Design Concept for Small Modular Reactors

"Safeguards by Design" (SBD) is the process of incorporating safeguards features into the design of a nuclear facility during the design stage. The goal of SBD is to increase the safeguardability of a facility, which is a qualitative measure of the degree of ease with which a nuclear energy system can be effectively and efficiently placed under international safeguards. During the past decade, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Brookhaven National Laboratory, and several consultants to develop the Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) process. FSA is a screening process used by a facility designer to focus attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process identifies the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. During FY 2014, NNSA sponsored BNL and LANL to introduce the FSA to Westinghouse designers of their small modular nuclear power plant design. This report documents the interactions with Westinghouse Electric Company LLC ("Westinghouse") staff. The report describes the Westinghouse safeguards design concept with a view towards eventual application of the FSA to their design.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Exploring Multilayer Network Models to Build a Scientific Basis for Integrated Deterrence: Final Report

The emerging multipolar international security environment represents a fundamental restructuring of global nuclear balance of power to include two nuclear peer competitors, growing non-peer nuclear threats, and concerns of nuclear latency from both allies and adversaries. Conflicts in the grey zone, cyber operations, mis- and disinformation campaigns, and emerging disruptive technologies like drones, and hypersonic missiles are becoming more prevalent. These present a risk of cross-domain and multi-domain conflicts that may not follow known escalatory patterns. In order to prepare for the new deterrence environment, it is critical to have quantitative and qualitative understandings of these cross-domain conflicts, their potential for escalation, and which systems they may impact. To that end, our team created a Multi-Layer Network (MLN) model of ‘integrated deterrence’ where instruments of national power are modeled as individual network graph layers that include efforts from all domains. We then evaluate the potential for escalation against escalation scenarios. Analysis of the escalation scenarios is then used to identify insights of potential risk and escalation within integrated deterrence.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Vedizar Fingerprinter

SAND2025-03289O Vedizar Fingerprinter simplifies the process of identifying devices on a network by analyzing traffic data. It uses a unique library to recognize different devices, making it easier for users to understand what is happening on their networks. This software is ideal for IT and operational technology environments, helping organizations monitor their networks effectively. By saving results in a database, it allows for easy access and review of device information. Users can enhance their network security and optimize performance without needing specialized hardware or technical expertise. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Jacobellis, John [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), L↗
DOE OSTI2024

Conditional multi-step attribution for climate forcings

SAND2025-11608O Conditional multi-step attribution for climate forcings and its associated dataset present a framework for attributing a climate impacts, such as stratospheric warming or surface cooling, to a specific magnitude of climate forcing, such as stratospheric aerosol injection. The objective is to improve on existing methods that struggle to attribute highly noisy climate signals. This has potential broader use in climate security applications to identify and understand geoengineering and climate tipping point effects. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Swiler, Laura↗
DOE OSTI2021

Risk Informed Timelines (RIT) v.1.0

Risk Informed Timelines (RIT) is a more modern and holistic method for understanding how access delay timelines are developed and utilized in physical security system evaluations. The software utilizes Bayesian methods to combine subject matter expert judgement and small performance test datasets in a consistent and defensible way. It allows a more holistic view of delay performance that provides distributions of task times and task success probabilities to account for tasks that, if failed, would result in failure of the attack. The RIT methodology is meant to enable security risk managers to begin the transition into more comprehensive delay timeline analysis. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-8294 O

Noel, ToddG.↗