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At least 73 records · Page 4

Shock-Wave/Boundary-Layer Interaction (SWBLI) Experiments in the Presence of Transition-to-Turbulence on a Flat Plate Model in the NASA LaRC 31-Inch Mach 10 Air Tunnel

Historically, there have been a limited number of studies involving Transitional Shock-Wave/Boundary-Layer Interactions (XSWBLI) in hypersonic flows, the majority of which have been performed at Mach Numbers of 7.5 and below. Additionally, there have been even fewer such experiments which incorporate non-intrusive and optical diagnostics. NASA Langley Research Center (NASA LaRC), in collaboration with The University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) and The University of Tennessee Space Institute (UTSI), is currently planning and preparing for a series of experimental aerodynamic tests using the NASA LaRC 31-inch Mach 10 Air Tunnel. The experiments will primarily focus on studying the dynamics of Shock-Wave/Boundary-Layer Interactions (SWBLI) in the presence of transition (XSWBLI) and turbulence (SWTBLI) on a large, flat plate model at a freestream Mach number of 10. Besides continued interest in understanding the flow at high Mach numbers, executing such tests at Mach 10 avoids some known concerns and will aid in solving new problems. XSWBLI are a highly unsteady phenomena and the generation of XSWBLI at lower Mach numbers can prove to be a significant challenge. This concern will be somewhat mitigated in the Mach 10 flow, as boundary layers become increasingly stabilized, but some difficulty in achieving transition is still expected. Modelling SWBLI in the presence of transitional and turbulent boundary layers has also proven to be difficult, so a high-Mach number experiment which applies non-intrusive and optical diagnostics will aid in solving a unique problem as well as advancing the understanding and characterization of an aerodynamic surface at Mach 10.The NASA LaRC 31-inch Wind Tunnel incorporates a test section having a cross-section of 31-inches × 31-inches and provides optical access to the test section via three (3) ultra-violet (UV) transmitting windows on the top, side, and bottom. The Mach 10 operating conditions will consist of pressures (P0) ranging from 2.4 to 10MPa (348 to 1,450 psi) at a temperature (T0) of 1,000 K (1,800 °R). The NASA LaRC 31-inch wind tunnel will deliver 1-minute blow-down runs, of which 30-45 seconds will be consumed to reach the aforementioned test conditions. The pump down time between runs will be approximately 45-60 minutes, which will provide for 6-10 test runs per day over the course of a weeklong entry. The proposed flat plate model will be constructed of stainless steel with geometry consisting of a10-inch × 30-inch upper surface and a 2-inch thickness. The model will be designed to support multiple leading-edge inserts in order to examine blunt, round, and sharp leading edges at Mach 10. Adjustments will be made to manage boundary layer thickness as well as the strength and size of the shock interaction region for each test. Measurements and diagnostics will be performed though high-speed Schlieren, on-body high-speed pressure transducers, IR thermography, and oil flow visualization. Hypersonic vehicle applications have and will continue to emerge at the forefront of aerospace. The NASA-UTSA-UTSI team realizes the value of characterizing SWBLI, XSWBLI, and SWTBLI behaviors well beyond single-digit hypersonic Mach numbers. As hypersonic vehicle speed capabilities continue to increase, measurement and diagnostic methods for Mach numbers of 10 and beyond will provide the foundation for a firm understanding of flow field behavior which will directly influence the advancement of technologies towards the design and manufacturing of high-speed aerodynamic surfaces, controls, thermal protection systems, acoustic treatments, and structural components. The use of non-intrusive and optical diagnostic methods in such experimentation is pivotal in developing the visualization and empirical data necessary to advance the aforementioned technology areas.

Shockwave/Boundary-Layer Interactions↗

Deliberate Motion Analytics Fused Radar and Video Test Results Deployed Beyond the Perimeter Fence in a High Noise Environment

Security systems that protect the nation’s critical facilities must be capable of detecting physical intrusions in all weather conditions. Intrusion detection sensors in a perimeter with a high nuisance alarm rate (NAR) significantly undermine detection performance and degrade security system effectiveness. This research demonstrated a fused sensor system that can differentiate foliage and weather-induced nuisance alarms from those caused by intruders, providing reliable detection within a two-fence perimeter or beyond the fence. A key element of this work is the creation and application of a “deliberate motion algorithm” that fuses alarm data from radar and video analytics to create video motion detection fused radar system. The two-layer architecture of the algorithm uses machine learning, multi-hypothesis tracking, and Dynamic Bayes Nets to differentiate intruder alarms from weather induced alarms.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Method for Assessment of Security-Relevant Settings in Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems

Ensuring the integrity of Ethernet-based networks is a challenging and constantly evolving domain. This problem is exacerbated for those operational technology (OT) networks supporting industrial control systems (ICS) since much of that equipment was originally designed to be on a network that was isolated and generally considered free of malefactors. Increasing pressure to bridge these systems with traditional information technology (IT) networks has introduced a bevy of new threats. In response, both academia and industry have responded with security solutions tailored to ICS environments. Deploying these protection systems often involves several configuration choices. While some of these choices are clear (e.g., block/enable protocol X) others are far more subjective (e.g. alert threshold == 3.43). Further complicating the situation, while often similar to IT networks, OT networks have unique challenges and characteristics that make the task of protecting them simultaneously more difficult and straight forward.Extant solutions for quantifying the relative security of intrusion detection systems fail to effectively support the operators of said systems with understanding the impact of various configuration changes. Further, they assume that the attacks are static and not subject to manipulation or alteration in the face of defenses. In this paper, we present a threat-based method for quantifying the relative impact of various security settings for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) within ICS environments. This method provides operational staff with a clear understanding of the relative impact of their settings and assumes that the attacks levied against them are dynamic. The model is described in detail, we apply the model to a synthetic data set, and discuss the inferences that can be made and what types of decisions they could be used to support.

Gillen, Rob↗

Role of Human Intrusion in Decision-Making for Radioactive Waste Disposal - Results of the IAEA HIDRA Project - 16287

Disposal of radioactive waste aims to protect people and the environment from the potential hazards of the materials by removing the wastes from the human environment. This approach is considered desirable to dispersal of the waste in the environment. However, the waste becomes concentrated in one location, which poses potential hazards should the waste become disturbed at a future date. For radioactive waste, it is generally expected that in preparing safety cases for such disposal facilities, the possibility of the wastes being inadvertently disturbed at some point in the future and the potential consequences of such an intrusion need to be considered. Potential inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) has a role in the decision-making and the safety case throughout the lifecycle of a disposal facility. In 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally initiated a project entitled 'Human Intrusion in the Context of Disposal of Radioactive Waste' (HIDRA) to provide insights regarding the role of IHI for these decisions and to provide a common framework for consideration of IHI as part of development of a safety case for a disposal facility. HIDRA was implemented with a series of annual plenary meetings involving participants from more than 20 countries organised into three working groups. The working groups addressed: societal factors, stylised scenarios, and protective measures. The project resulted in a general approach with specific suggestions for consideration of IHI during the lifecycle of a disposal facility. From a general perspective, it was emphasized that IHI is a contributing factor to the safety case, but does not outweigh considerations related to safety of operations and long-term performance for the normal evolution of the facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SUBSLAB SOIL GAS SAMPLING PLAN FOR COMMUNICATION, MAINTENANCE, AND STORAGE, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT UNIT (SWMU) 082

HydroGeoLogic, Inc. (HGL) prepared this Subslab Soil Gas (SSSG) Sampling Plan for Communications, Maintenance, and Storage (CM&S), Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 082 for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, under Contract Number 80KSC019D0012, Task Order 80KSC021F0097 technical directive #1, awarded on September 26, 2022. As described herein, all SSSG sampling and evaluations will be completed in accordance with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA), OSWER Technical Guide for Assessing and Mitigating the Vapor Intrusion Pathway from Subsurface Vapor Sources to Indoor Air (EPA, 2015).

Jason J Bublitz↗

Sensing intruders using entanglement: a photonic quantum fence

We describe the use of quantum-mechanically entangled photons for sensing intrusions across a physical perimeter. Our approach to intrusion detection uses the no-cloning principle of quantum information science as protection against an intruder s ability to spoof a sensor receiver using a classical intercept-resend attack. Moreover, we employ the correlated measurement outcomes from polarization-entangled photons to protect against quantum intercept-resend attacks, i.e., attacks using quantum teleportation. We explore the bounds on detection using quantum detection and estimation theory, and we experimentally demonstrate the underlying principle of entanglement-based detection using the visibility derived from polarization-correlation measurements.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Oppenheimer's Box of Chocolates: Remediation of the Manhattan Project Landfill at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 12283

Material Disposal Area B (MDA B) is the oldest radioactive waste disposal facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Operated from 1944-48, MDA B was the disposal facility for the Manhattan Project. Recognized as one of the most challenging environmental remediation projects at Los Alamos, the excavation of MDA B received $110 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to accelerate this complex remediation work. Several factors combined to create significant challenges to remediating the landfill known in the 1940's as the 'contaminated dump'. The secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project meant that no records were kept of radiological materials and chemicals disposed or of the landfill design. An extensive review of historical documents and interviews with early laboratory personnel resulted in a list of hundreds of hazardous chemicals that could have been buried in MDA B. Also, historical reports of MDA B spontaneously combusting on three occasions -with 50-foot flames and pink smoke spewing across the mesa during the last incident in 1948-indicated that hazardous materials were likely present in MDA B. To complicate matters further, though MDA B was located on an isolated mesa in the 1940's, the landfill has since been surrounded by a Los Alamos commercial district. The local newspaper, hardware store and a number of other businesses are located directly across the street from MDA B. This close proximity to the public and the potential for hazardous materials in MDA B necessitated conducting remediation work within protective enclosures. Potential chemical hazards and radiological inventory were better defined using a minimally intrusive sampling method called direct push technology (DPT) prior to excavation. Even with extensive sampling and planning the project team encountered many surprises and challenges during the project. The one area where planning did not fail to meet reality was safety. There were no serious worker injuries and the minor injuries recorded were those common to construction type activities. Extensive monitoring along the site boundary demonstrated that no hazardous chemicals were released and radiological dose to the public was within administrative limits. More than three years of effort by the LANL project team went into the planning for remediation of Material Disposal Area B. Hundreds of historical documents were reviewed; retired personnel were extensively interviewed and noninvasive techniques were used to characterize the site. The information collected was incorporated into the safety requirements, cost estimate, schedule and primary execution plan for the project. Ultimately the waste volume managed by the project approached 40000 m{sup 3}, more than double the original project estimate. This increase had a major impact on both project cost and schedule. Nuclear safety requirements for the project were based on an estimated MDA B radionuclide inventory of 12 PE-Ci. When excavation was complete over 123 PE-Ci had been removed from the trenches. The radionuclide inventory at MDA B was an order of magnitude higher than estimated. Work at MDA B could not have proceeded without the safety basis exemption from DOE-HQ. The one area where planning did not fail to meet reality was safety. There were no serious worker injuries and the minor injuries recorded were those common to construction type activities. Extensive monitoring along the site boundary demonstrated that no hazardous chemicals were released and radiological dose to the public was within administrative limits. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A High-Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed-Based Benchmarking Dataset For Testing Operational Technology Specific Intrusion Detection Systems

Quality datasets serve a critical purpose in cyber security research. Data is needed to understand system behavior and develop security controls to protect critical systems. However, for critical infrastructure operational environments there is a lack of available datasets to study because of the high cost and specialized capabilities necessary to generate them. This paper documents the development of a dataset of high fidelity hardware in the loop laboratory simulated models of electric and natural gas distribution systems with real cyber attack test cases. A deep dive discussion for the experimental setup and controls for generating the data is provided along with observations from using the data in evaluating intrusion detection approaches.

Ashok, Aditya↗

Considerations of human intrusion in U.S. programs for deep geologic disposal of radioactive waste

Regulations in the United States that govern the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in deep geologic repositories require the explicit consideration of hypothetical future human intrusions that disrupt the waste. Specific regulatory requirements regarding the consideration of human intrusion differ in the two sets of regulations currently in effect in the United States; one defined by the Environmental Protection Agency's 40 Code of Federal Regulations part 197, applied only to the formerly proposed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and the other defined by the Environmental Protection Agency s 40 Code of Federal Regulations part 191, applied to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico and potentially applicable to any repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States other than the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain. This report reviews the regulatory requirements relevant to human intrusion and the approaches taken by the Department of Energy to demonstrating compliance with those requirements.

Swift, Peter N.↗

An Assessment of the Penetrations in the First Wall Required for Plasma Measurments for Control of an Advanced Tokamak Plasma Demo

A Demonstration tokamak (Demo) is an essential next step toward a magnetic-fusion based reactor. One based on advanced-tokamak (AT) plasmas is especially appealing because of its relative compactness. However, it will require many plasma measurements to provide the necessary signals to feed to ancillary systems to protect the device and control the plasma. This note addresses the question of how much intrusion into the blanket system will be required to allow the measurements needed to provide the information required for plasma control. All diagnostics will require, at least, the same shielding designs as planned for ITER, while having the capability to maintain their calibration through very long pulses. Much work is required to define better the measurement needs and the quantity and quality of the measurements that will have to be made, and how they can be integrated into the other tokamak structures.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Experimental Design for the Evaluation of Detection Techniques of Hidden Corrosion Beneath the Thermal Protective System of the Space Shuttle Orbiter

The detection of corrosion beneath Space Shuttle Orbiter thermal protective system is traditionally accomplished by removing the Reusable Surface Insulation tiles and performing a visual inspection of the aluminum substrate and corrosion protection system. This process is time consuming and has the potential to damage high cost tiles. To evaluate non-intrusive NDE methods, a Proof of Concept (PoC) experiment was designed and test panels were manufactured. The objective of the test plan was three-fold: establish the ability to detect corrosion hidden from view by tiles; determine the key factor affecting detectability; roughly quantify the detection threshold. The plan consisted of artificially inducing dimensionally controlled corrosion spots in two panels and rebonding tile over the spots to model the thermal protective system of the orbiter. The corrosion spot diameter ranged from 0.100" to 0.600" inches and the depth ranged from 0.003" to 0.020". One panel consisted of a complete factorial array of corrosion spots with and without tile coverage. The second panel consisted of randomized factorial points replicated and hidden by tile. Conventional methods such as ultrasonics, infrared, eddy current and microwave methods have shortcomings. Ultrasonics and IR cannot sufficiently penetrate the tiles, while eddy current and microwaves have inadequate resolution. As such, the panels were interrogated using Backscatter Radiography and Terahertz Imaging. The terahertz system successfully detected artificially induced corrosion spots under orbiter tile and functional testing is in-work in preparation for implementation.

Kemmerer, Catherine C.↗

DEPO-related to Radioactive Sources.

Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) is discussed as it pertains to protection of radioactive sources. The bulk of the report describes features of various kinds of detection systems, and follows this with systems for entry control and personnel identification.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Multi-Target Camera Tracking, Hand-off and Display LDRD 158819 Final Report

Modern security control rooms gather video and sensor feeds from tens to hundreds of cameras. Advanced camera analytics can detect motion from individual video streams and convert unexpected motion into alarms, but the interpretation of these alarms depends heavily upon human operators. Unfortunately, these operators can be overwhelmed when a large number of events happen simultaneously, or lulled into complacency due to frequent false alarms. This LDRD project has focused on improving video surveillance-based security systems by changing the fundamental focus from the cameras to the targets being tracked. If properly integrated, more cameras shouldn’t lead to more alarms, more monitors, more operators, and increased response latency but instead should lead to better information and more rapid response times. For the course of the LDRD we have been developing algorithms that take live video imagery from multiple video cameras, identify individual moving targets from the background imagery, and then display the results in a single 3D interactive video. In this document we summarize the work in developing this multi-camera, multi-target system, including lessons learned, tools developed, technologies explored, and a description of current capability.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Spawning Habitat Studies of Hanford Reach Fall Chinook Salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha), Final Report.

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory conducted this study for the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) with funding provided through the Northwest Power and Conservation Council(a) and the BPA Fish and Wildlife Program. The study was conducted in the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. The goal of study was to determine the physical habitat factors necessary to define the redd capacity of fall Chinook salmon that spawn in large mainstem rivers like the Hanford Reach and Snake River. The study was originally commissioned in FY 1994 and then recommissioned in FY 2000 through the Fish and Wildlife Program rolling review of the Columbia River Basin projects. The work described in this report covers the period from 1994 through 2004; however, the majority of the information comes from the last four years of the study (2000 through 2004). Results from the work conducted from 1994 to 2000 were covered in an earlier report. More than any other stock of Pacific salmon, fall Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) have suffered severe impacts from the hydroelectric development in the Columbia River Basin. Fall Chinook salmon rely heavily on mainstem habitats for all phases of their life cycle, and mainstem hydroelectric dams have inundated or blocked areas that were historically used for spawning and rearing. The natural flow pattern that existed in the historic period has been altered by the dams, which in turn have affected the physical and biological template upon which fall Chinook salmon depend upon for successful reproduction. Operation of the dams to produce power to meet short-term needs in electricity (termed power peaking) produces unnatural fluctuations in flow over a 24-hour cycle. These flow fluctuations alter the physical habitat and disrupt the cues that salmon use to select spawning sites, as well as strand fish in near-shore habitat that becomes dewatered. The quality of spawning gravels has been affected by dam construction, flood protection, and agricultural and industrial development. In some cases, the riverbed is armored such that it is more difficult for spawners to move, while in other cases the intrusion of fine sediment into spawning gravels has reduced water flow to sensitive eggs and young fry. Recovery of fall Chinook salmon populations may involve habitat restoration through such actions as dam removal and reservoir drawdown. In addition, habitat protection will be accomplished through set-asides of existing high-quality habitat. A key component to evaluating these actions is quantifying the salmon spawning habitat potential of a given river reach so that realistic recovery goals for salmon abundance can be developed. Quantifying salmon spawning habitat potential requires an understanding of the spawning behavior of Chinook salmon, as well as an understanding of the physical habitat where these fish spawn. Increasingly, fish biologists are recognizing that assessing the physical habitat of riverine systems where salmon spawn goes beyond measuring microhabitat like water depth, velocity, and substrate size. Geomorphic features of the river measured over a range of spatial scales set up the physical template upon which the microhabitat develops, and successful assessments of spawning habitat potential incorporate these geomorphic features. We had three primary objectives for this study. The first objective was to determine the relationship between physical habitats at different spatial scales and fall Chinook salmon spawning locations. The second objective was to estimate the fall Chinook salmon redd capacity for the Reach. The third objective was to suggest a protocol for determining preferable spawning reaches of fall Chinook salmon. To ensure that we collected physical data within habitat that was representative of the full range of potential spawning habitat, the study area was stratified based on geomorphic features of the river using a two-dimensional river channel index that classified the river cross section into one of four shapes based on channel symmetry, depth, and width. We found that this river channel classification system was a good predictor at the scale of a river reach ({approx}1 km) of where fall Chinook salmon would spawn. Using this two-dimensional river channel index, we selected study areas that were representative of the geomorphic classes. A total of nine study sites distributed throughout the middle 27 km of the Reach (study area) were investigated. Four of the study sites were located between river kilometer 575 and 580 in a section of the river where fall Chinook salmon have not spawned since aerial surveys were initiated in the 1940s; four sites were located in the spawning reach (river kilometer [rkm] 590 to 603); and one site was located upstream of the spawning reach (rkm 605).

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Considerations Related To Human Intrusion In The Context Of Disposal Of Radioactive Waste-The IAEA HIDRA Project

The principal approaches for management of radioactive waste are commonly termed ‘delay and decay’, ‘concentrate and contain’ and ‘dilute and disperse’. Containing the waste and isolating it from the human environment, by burying it, is considered to increase safety and is generally accepted as the preferred approach for managing radioactive waste. However, this approach results in concentrated sources of radioactive waste contained in one location, which can pose hazards should the facility be disrupted by human action in the future. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) agree that some form of inadvertent human intrusion (HI) needs to be considered to address the potential consequences in the case of loss of institutional control and loss of memory of the disposal facility. Requirements are reflected in national regulations governing radioactive waste disposal. However, in practice, these requirements are often different from country to country, which is then reflected in the actual implementation of HI as part of a safety case. The IAEA project on HI in the context of Disposal of RadioActive waste (HIDRA) has been started to identify potential areas for improved consistency in consideration of HI. The expected outcome is to provide recommendations on how to address human actions in the safety case in the future, and how the safety case may be used to demonstrate robustness and optimize siting, design and waste acceptance criteria within the context of a safety case.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

International Implementation of IAEA's Borehole Disposal Concept for Sealed Radioactive Sources - 18545

With funding from the Government of Canada, and support from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of International Program and many others, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is supporting the field deployment of the Borehole Disposal Concept (BDC) for secure disposal of radioactive sources in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia. This is a first-of-its-kind implementation. Though small in volume, disused sealed radioactive sources can be intensively radioactive and create a significant safety and security liability for the majority of the 168 Member States in the IAEA. Millions of sealed radioactive sources have been manufactured since 1901, and it is estimated that hundreds of thousands are now unwanted. The irony is that some of the countries with the smallest inventories have the greatest difficulties managing their radioactive wastes. The BDC was originally conceptualized in an IAEA-study undertaken by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) for countries with small inventories of disused sealed radioactive sources. There are multiple, passive engineered and natural barriers in the BDC design, including an inner stainless-steel capsule (which holds the wastes), an inner cement containment barrier, an outer stainless steel container and outer backfill cement, as well as the surrounding geosphere. In common subsurface geochemical environments, these barriers will isolate the wastes from the biosphere, provide effective containment and ensure long-term safety. To greatly limit the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion (safety), and deliberate human intrusion (security), these waste packages will be disposed of in a narrow diameter borehole (26 cm) at depths greater than 30 m. This type of borehole disposal creates an exceptionally small footprint, removes the wastes from normal human surficial activities, and isolates the waste packages from near-surface processes. Over the past 20 years, the IAEA, NECSA and many others have advanced the BDC on the shoulders of the IAEA's broader work supporting safe and secure disposal of radioactive wastes and management of sealed radioactive sources. With recent funding and support from many others, the IAEA has assisted Ghana, Malaysia and the Philippines in assessing their inventories and conditioning their disused sealed radioactive sources, in drilling investigation boreholes and characterizing their proposed sites, and in designing their disposal systems. These countries plan to place the uppermost waste package at depths greater than 100 m. While activities in the Philippines remain focused on-site characterization, Ghana is in the latter stages of developing their Safety Case for operational and 'post-closure' safety and Malaysia has completed their Safety Case and submitted a license application to construct and operate a BDC facility. Though this paper identifies the support provided to Member States by the IAEA, it is the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and the Malaysian Nuclear Agency that are responsible for the safety and security of the disposals and that have been responsible for carrying-out their disposal programs. Once the BDC is licensed by the relevant national regulatory bodies, these first-of-a-kind disposal approaches will provide a template for other countries to safely dispose of their disused sealed radioactive sources - permanently eliminating their safety and security liabilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cyber–Physical System Security of Distribution Systems

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Project Boeing SGS (Final Report)

Boeing and its partner, PJM Interconnection, teamed to bring advanced “defense-grade” technologies for cyber security to the US regional power grid through demonstration in PJM’s energy management environment. Under this cooperative project with the Department of Energy, Boeing and PJM have developed and demonstrated a host of technologies specifically tailored to the needs of PJM and the electric sector as a whole. The team has demonstrated to the energy industry a combination of processes, techniques and technologies that have been successfully implemented in the commercial, defense, and intelligence communities to identify, mitigate and continuously monitor the cyber security of critical systems. Guided by the results of a Cyber Security Risk-Based Assessment completed in Phase I, the Boeing-PJM team has completed multiple iterations through the Phase II Development and Phase III Deployment phases. Multiple cyber security solutions have been completed across a variety of controls including: Application Security, Enhanced Malware Detection, Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) Optimization, Continuous Vulnerability Monitoring, SCADA Monitoring/Intrusion Detection, Operational Resiliency, Cyber Range simulations and hands on cyber security personnel training. All of the developed and demonstrated solutions are suitable for replication across the electric sector and/or the energy sector as a whole. Benefits identified include; Improved malware and intrusion detection capability on critical SCADA networks including behavioral-based alerts resulting in improved zero-day threat protection; Improved Security Incident and Event Management system resulting in better threat visibility, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting a serious event; Improved malware detection and zero-day threat response capability; Improved ability to systematically evaluate and secure in house and vendor sourced software applications; Improved ability to continuously monitor and maintain secure configuration of network devices resulting in reduced vulnerabilities for potential exploitation; Improved overall cyber security situational awareness through the integration of multiple discrete security technologies into a single cyber security reporting console; Improved ability to maintain the resiliency of critical systems in the face of a targeted cyber attack of other significant event; Improved ability to model complex networks for penetration testing and advanced training of cyber security personnel

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗