Large-Scale Intelligent Intrusion Detection System
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The electric grid has undergone rapid, revolutionary changes in recent years; from the addition of advanced smart technologies to the growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) to increased interconnectivity and communications. However, these added communications, access interfaces, and third-party software to enable autonomous control schemes and interconnectivity also expand the attack surface of the grid. To address the gap of DER cybersecurity and secure the grid-edge to motivate a holistic, defense-in-depth approach, a proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) device was developed to secure PV smart inverter communications. The PIDMS was developed as a distributed, flexible bump-in-the-wire (BITW) solution for protecting PV smart inverter communications. Both cyber (network traffic) and physical (power system measurements) are processed using network intrusion monitoring tools and custom machinelearning algorithms for deep packet analysis and cyber-physical event correlation. The PIDMS not only detects abnormal events but also deploys mitigations to limit or eliminate system impact; the PIDMS communicates with peer PIDMSs at different locations using the MQTT protocol for increased situational awareness and alerting. The details of the PIDMS methodology and prototype development are detailed in this report as well as the evaluation results within a cyber-physical emulation environment and subsequent industry feedback.
To reduce cost and ease maintenance, industrial control systems (ICS) have adopted Ethernetbased interconnections that integrate operational technology (OT) systems with information technology (IT) networks. This integration has made these critical systems vulnerable to attack. Security solutions tailored to ICS environments are an active area of research. Anomalybased network intrusion detection systems are well-suited for these environments. Often these systems must be optimized for their specific environment. In prior work, we introduced a method for assessing the impact of various anomaly-based network IDS settings on security. This paper reviews the experimental outcomes when we applied our method to a full-scale ICS test bed using actual attacks. Our method provides new and valuable data to operators enabling more informed decisions about IDS configurations.
Nowadays, data generated by large-scale scientific experiments are on the scale of petabytes per month. These data are transferred through dedicated high-bandwidth networks across distributed collaboration sites for processing, storage, and analysis. Like general purpose networks, research networks experience attacks. However, monitoring traffic in such high-bandwidth network environments is challenging with conventional deep packet inspection (DPI)- based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). Recently, machine learning (ML) algorithms have shown potential in detecting anomalous patterns with better generalizability and faster speed. Compared to the general purpose networks, traffic movement in research network is less volatile and more likely to benefit from the ML-based anomaly analysis. We present ThunderSecure, an efficient AI-powered system for detecting anomalies in 100G research networks. ThunderSecure implements a high-throughput packet processing infrastructure using multi-cores and GPUs. It takes time-series statistics from a variety of network measurements and uses 2D Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) to explore both spatial and temporal dependencies in network data stream. Patterns of science data traffic are learned with a one-class neural network, which blends an Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE) with Gaussian mixture density estimation. Testing traffic flows exhibiting significant deviations from the learned baseline of normality are marked as anomalies. We trained ThunderSecure on hundreds of billions of science data packets recorded from a 100G research network at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. The detection performance was evaluated on traffic captured from the same research network days and weeks after the training with different types of attack flows injected. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ML work in the area of network anomaly detection that has been validated on such extreme scale datasets. Results show that ThunderSecure can recognize science data traffic that are captured long after the training and make nearly certain detection on those with anomalous flows injected, even in the case when the anomaly-to-normal mixing ratio is 0.1%.
Would you like to know when someone has dropped an undesirable executable binary on our system? What about something less malicious such as a software installation by a user? What about the user who decides to install a newer version of mod_perl or PHP on your web server without letting you know beforehand? Or even something as simple as when an undocumented config file change is made by another member of the admin group? Do you even want to know about all the changes that happen on a daily basis on your server? The purpose of an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to detect unauthorized, possibly malicious activity. The purpose of a host-based IDS, or file integrity checker, is check for unauthorized changes to key system files, binaries, libraries, and directories on the system. AIDE is an Open Source file and directory integrity checker. AIDE will let you know when a file or directory has been added, deleted, modified. It is included with the Red Hat Enterprise 6. It is available for other Linux distros. This is a case study describing the process of configuring AIDE on an out of the box RHEL6 installation. Its goal is to illustrate the thinking and the process by which a useful AIDE configuration is built.
Quality datasets serve a critical purpose in cyber security research. Data is needed to understand system behavior and develop security controls to protect critical systems. However, for critical infrastructure operational environments there is a lack of available datasets to study because of the high cost and specialized capabilities necessary to generate them. This paper documents the development of a dataset of high fidelity hardware in the loop laboratory simulated models of electric and natural gas distribution systems with real cyber attack test cases. A deep dive discussion for the experimental setup and controls for generating the data is provided along with observations from using the data in evaluating intrusion detection approaches.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are vulnerable to cyberattacks targeting both internal communication networks and external perception sensors. While edge-based intrusion de- tection for Controller Area Network (CAN) buses offers real-time protection, it cannot detect cross-modal threats. Conversely, multi-modal fusion approaches improve coverage but often lack efficiency for in-vehicle deployment. This thesis integrates two complemen- tary solutions: (1) a lightweight, edge-deployable machine learning framework for CAN bus intrusion detection, and (2) a late-fusion system combining CAN FD and LiDAR data. Together, they form a hierarchical defense capable of handling single-modality and coordi- nated attacks. Simulations show that CAN-only models reach 93% accuracy on simulated DoS, spoofing, replay, and fuzzy attacks, while the fusion system achieves 0.87 AUC and 0.82 F1-score at 2 ms latency. This unified framework establishes a scalable, explainable, and field-ready strategy for AV cybersecurity.
The challenge of achieving situational understanding is a limiting factor in effective, timely, and adaptive cyber-security analysis. Anomaly detection fills a critical role in network assessment and trend analysis, both of which underlie the establishment of comprehensive situational understanding. To that end, we propose a cyber security data warehouse implemented as a hierarchical graph of aggregations that captures anomalies at multiple scales. Each node of our pro-posed graph is a summarization table of cyber event aggregations, and the edges are aggregation operators. The cyber security data warehouse enables domain experts to quickly traverse a multi-scale aggregation space systematically. We describe the architecture of a test bed system and a summary of results on the IEEE VAST 2012 Cyber Forensics data.
This report describes the results of research into the effects of environment-induced noise on the evaluation process for anomaly detectors in the cyber security domain. This research was conducted during a 10-week summer internship program from the 19th of August, 2012 to the 23rd of August, 2012 at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. The research performed lies within the larger context of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) Smart Grid cyber security project, a Department of Energy (DoE) funded effort involving the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology and the University of Southern California/ Information Sciences Institute. The results of the present effort constitute an important contribution towards building more rigorous evaluation paradigms for anomaly-based intrusion detectors in complex cyber physical systems such as the Smart Grid. Anomaly detection is a key strategy for cyber intrusion detection and operates by identifying deviations from profiles of nominal behavior and are thus conceptually appealing for detecting "novel" attacks. Evaluating the performance of such a detector requires assessing: (a) how well it captures the model of nominal behavior, and (b) how well it detects attacks (deviations from normality). Current evaluation methods produce results that give insufficient insight into the operation of a detector, inevitably resulting in a significantly poor characterization of a detectors performance. In this work, we first describe a preliminary taxonomy of key evaluation constructs that are necessary for establishing rigor in the evaluation regime of an anomaly detector. We then focus on clarifying the impact of the operational environment on the manifestation of attacks in monitored data. We show how dynamic and evolving environments can introduce high variability into the data stream perturbing detector performance. Prior research has focused on understanding the impact of this variability in training data for anomaly detectors, but has ignored variability in the attack signal that will necessarily affect the evaluation results for such detectors. We posit that current evaluation strategies implicitly assume that attacks always manifest in a stable manner; we show that this assumption is wrong. We describe a simple experiment to demonstrate the effects of environmental noise on the manifestation of attacks in data and introduce the notion of attack manifestation stability. Finally, we argue that conclusions about detector performance will be unreliable and incomplete if the stability of attack manifestation is not accounted for in the evaluation strategy.
Intrusion detection is often described as having two main approaches: signature-based and anomaly-based. We argue that only unsupervised methods are suitable for detecting anomalies. However, there has been a tendency in the literature to conflate the notion of an anomaly with the notion of a malicious event. As a result, the methods used to discover anomalies have typically been ad hoc, making it nearly impossible to systematically compare between models or regulate the number of alerts. We propose a new, principled approach to anomaly detection that addresses the main shortcomings of ad hoc approaches. We provide both theoretical and cyber-specific examples to demonstrate the benefits of our more principled approach.
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The goal is to provide insight into intrusions in high performance computing, focusing on tracking intruders motions through the system. The current tools, such as pattern matching, do not provide sufficient tracking capabilities. We tested two tools: an instrumented version of SSH (iSSH) and Linux Auditing Framework (Auditd). First discussed is Instrumented Secure Shell (iSSH): a version of SSH developed at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. The goal is to audit user activity within a computer system to increase security. Capabilities are: Keystroke logging, Records user names and authentication information, and Catching suspicious remote and local commands. Strengths for iSSH are: (1) Good for keystroke logging, making it easier to track malicious users by catching suspicious commands; (2) Works with Bro to send alerts; could be configured to send pages to systems administrators; and (3) Creates visibility into SSH sessions. Weaknesses are: (1) Relatively new, so not very well documented; and (2) No capabilities to see if files have been edited, moved, or copied within the system. Second we discuss Auditd, the user component of the Linux Auditing System. It creates logs of user behavior, and monitors systems calls and file accesses. Its goal is to improve system security by keeping track of users actions within the system. Strenghts of Auditd are: (1) Very thorough logs; (2) Wider variety of tracking abilities than iSSH; and (3) Older, so better documented. Weaknesses are: (1) Logs record everything, not just malicious behavior; (2) The size of the logs can lead to overflowing directories; and (3) This level of logging leads to a lot of false alarms. Auditd is better documented than iSSH, which would help administrators during set up and troubleshooting. iSSH has a cleaner notification system, but the logs are not as detailed as Auditd. From our performance testing: (1) File transfer speed using SCP is increased when using iSSH; and (2) Network benchmarks were roughly the same regardless of which tool was running.
The Visualizer dashboard provides grid operator highly-trusted alarming environment for an ongoing or potential cyber-attack based on system anomalies and network-based verification. Once anomalies are detected by the IDS tool (HIDES, NREL SWR-19-65), this platform stores the signatures or alert logs that are generated by the intrusion detector, lays out the detailed summary of the possible alerts, and maps these attacks with high-level scenarios. These scenarios are later combined to define a final event using a decision tree approach and a final report is generated out of this tool for further forensic analysis. It also supports authentication and authorization to support roles-based access control (RBAC) for users and a group of people.
Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) are rapidly becoming an integral part of the modern society. By 2030, there is estimated to be over 40 billion active and connected IoT devices [1]. This rapid progress also comes with a significant implication on cybersecurity. Back-end infrastructure and systems have a much broader attack than they did previously due to vulnerable IoT/EC devices being connected to wireless networks. This expanding attack surface is a growing concern because IoT/EC are increasingly being used in critical systems such as power grids, health care, and smart homes. To effectively address a problem of this scale, cognitive cyber methods—which can autonomously detect and react to cyber attacks as they develop—are needed. To address this, we bring Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to IoT/EC devices, using tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data against cyber threats, and using Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. We propose a novel three-layer architecture: (1) an IoT layer for tinyML-based inference, (2) an edge layer for ML model training, and (3) a cloud layer for FL operations. Using the publicly available 11-class N-BaIoT dataset [2], we demonstrate that this architecture mitigates resource constraints at the IoT layer while improving detection accuracy over standard two-layer designs. An outlier-resistant scaler, feature reduction, and quantization enable the tinyML model to maintain detection accuracy with a reduced model size. Additionally, federated learning that only utilizes the intersection (across heterogenous devices) of the reduced feature set achieves superior detection accuracy compared to locally trained models.