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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS1997

Feasibility Investigation for Performing Fireball Temperature Tests

NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was requested by the Launch Abort Subpanel and the Power Systems Subpanel of the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel to investigate the feasibility of using spectroscopic techniques to measure propellant fireball gas temperatures. This report outlines the modeling and experimental approaches and results of this investigation. Descriptions of the theoretical particle temperature and mass effusion models are presented along with the results of the survivability of small plutonium dioxide (less than or equal to 1000 microns diameter) particles entrained in various propellant fireball scenarios. The experimental test systems used to measure the hydroxide radical, water, and particle graybody spectral emissions and absorptions are discussed. Spectral results along with temperatures extracted by analyzing the spectral features are presented for the flames investigated in the laboratory environment. Methods of implementing spectroscopic measurements for future testing using the WSTF Large-scale Hydrogen/Oxygen Explosion Facility are discussed, and the accuracy expected for these measurements is estimated from laboratory measurements.

Tapphorn, Ralph M.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Crew Exploration Vehicle Ascent Abort Overview

One of the primary design drivers for NASA's Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is to ensure crew safety. Aborts during the critical ascent flight phase require the design and operation of CEV systems to escape from the Crew Launch Vehicle and return the crew safely to the Earth. To accomplish this requirement of continuous abort coverage, CEV ascent abort modes are being designed and analyzed to accommodate the velocity, altitude, atmospheric, and vehicle configuration changes that occur during ascent. The analysis involves an evaluation of the feasibility and survivability of each abort mode and an assessment of the abort mode coverage. These studies and design trades are being conducted so that more informed decisions can be made regarding the vehicle abort requirements, design, and operation. This paper presents an overview of the CEV, driving requirements for abort scenarios, and an overview of current ascent abort modes. Example analysis results are then discussed. Finally, future areas for abort analysis are addressed.

Davidson, John B., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2004

CFD Approaches for Simulation of Wing-Body Stage Separation

A collection of computational fluid dynamics tools and techniques are being developed and tested for application to stage separation and abort simulation for next-generation launch vehicles. In this work, an overset grid Navier-Stokes flow solver has been enhanced and demonstrated on a matrix of proximity cases and on a dynamic separation simulation of a belly-to-belly wing-body configuration. Steady cases show excellent agreement between Navier-Stokes results, Cartesian grid Euler solutions, and wind tunnel data at Mach 3. Good agreement has been obtained between Navier-Stokes, Euler, and wind tunnel results at Mach 6. An analysis of a dynamic separation at Mach 3 demonstrates that unsteady aerodynamic effects are not important for this scenario. Results provide an illustration of the relative applicability of Euler and Navier-Stokes methods to these types of problems.

Buning, Pieter G.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Multimodal Perception and Multicriterion Control of Nested Systems: Constraints on Crew Members During Space Vehicle Abort, Entry, and Landing - 2

This report reviews the operational demands made of a Shuttle pilot or commander within the context of a proven empirical methodology for describing human sensorimotor performance and whole-body coordination in mechanically and perceptually complex environments. The conclusions of this review pertain to a) methods for improving our understanding of the psychophysics and biomechanics of visual/manual control and whole-body coordination in space vehicle cockpits; b) the application of scientific knowledge about human perception and performance in dynamic inertial conditions to the development of technology, procedures, and training for personnel in space vehicle cockpits; c) recommendations for mitigation of safety and reliability concerns about human performance in space vehicle cockpits; and d) in-flight evaluation of flight crew performance during nominal and off-nominal launch and reentry scenarios.

Riccio, Gary E.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Abort performance for a winged-body single-stage to orbit vehicle

Optimal control theory is employed to determine the performance of abort to orbit (ATO) and return to launch site (RTLS) maneuvers for a single-stage to orbit vehicle. The vehicle configuration examined is a seven engine, winged-body vehicle, that lifts-off vertically and lands horizontally. The abort maneuvers occur as the vehicle ascends to orbit and are initiated when the vehicle suffers an engine failure. The optimal control problems are numerically solved in discretized form via a nonlinear programming (NLP) algorithm. A description highlighting the attributes of this NLP method is provided. ATO maneuver results show that the vehicle is capable of ascending to orbit with a single engine failure at lift-off. Two engine out ATO maneuvers are not possible from the launch pad, but are possible after launch when the thrust to weight ratio becomes sufficiently large. Results show that single engine out RTLS maneuvers can be made for up to 180 seconds after lift-off and that there are scenarios for which RTLS maneuvers should be performed instead of ATP maneuvers.

Lyon, Jeffery A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission Probability of Success

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. The SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the Inertial Navigation System to detect a second fault. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error due to sensor faults in a purely inertial system can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environmental and performance envelope. As this performance outside of first fault detections is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design. A top-down approach is utilized to assess vehicle sensitivity to second sensor faults. A wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both fault magnitude and time is used for assessment. The approach also utilizes a schedule to change fault detection thresholds autonomously. These individual values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success in terms of system-level insertion requirements while minimizing the probability of false positives. This paper will describe an approach integrating Genetic Algorithms and Monte Carlo analysis to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach and performance assessment and verification will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this approach to second fault detection optimization to maximize mission probability of success through taking advantage of existing margin.

Anzalone, Evan J.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission POS

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. To accommodate this with regards to Navigation, the SLS utilizes an internally redundant Inertial Navigation System (INS) with built-in capability to detect, isolate, and recover from first failure conditions and still maintain adherence to performance requirements. The unit utilizes multiple hardware- and software-level techniques to enable detection, isolation, and recovery from these events in terms of its built-in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) algorithms. Successful operation is defined in terms of sufficient navigation accuracy at insertion while operating under worst case single sensor outages (gyroscope and accelerometer faults at launch). In addition to first fault detection and recovery, the SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the INS to detect a second fault, tracking any unacceptable uncertainty in knowledge of the vehicle's state. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error and sensor faults can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environments and outside of its performance envelope causing loss of mission, or worse, loss of crew. The criteria for operation under second faults allows for a larger set of achievable missions in terms of potential fault conditions, due to the INS operating at the edge of its capability. As this performance is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design space. Due to the implications of the vehicle response to abort conditions (such as a potentially failed INS), it is important to consider a wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both magnitude and time. As such, the Navigation team is taking advantage of the INS's capability to schedule and change fault detection thresholds in flight. These values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success, and reducing the probability of false positives (defined as when the INS would report a second fault condition resulting in loss of mission, but the vehicle would still meet insertion requirements within system-level margins). This paper will describe an optimization approach using Genetic Algorithms to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events as a function of potential fault magnitude and time of fault over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach, and performance assessment of the results will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this process to second fault detection to maximize mission probability of success.

Anzalone, Evan↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space transfer vehicle concepts and requirements. Volume 1: Executive summary

The objectives of the Space Transfer Vehicle (STV) Concepts and Requirements studies were to provide sensitivity data on usage, economics, and technology associated with new space transportation systems. The study was structured to utilize data on the emerging launch vehicles, the latest mission scenarios, and Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) payload manifesting and schedules, to define a flexible, high performance, cost effective, evolutionary space transportation system for NASA. Initial activities were to support the MSFC effort in the preparation of inputs to the 90 Day Report to the National Space Council (NSC). With the results of this study establishing a point-of-departure for continuing the STV studies in 1990, additional options and mission architectures were defined. The continuing studies will update and expand the parametrics, assess new cargo and manned ETO vehicles, determine impacts on the redefined Phase 0 Space Station Freedom, and to develop a design that encompasses adequate configuration flexibility to ensure compliance with on-going NASA study recommendations with major system disconnects. In terms of general requirements, the objectives of the STV system and its mission profiles will address crew safety and mission success through a failure-tolerant and forgiving design approach. These objectives were addressed through the following: engine-out capability for all mission phases; built-in-test for vehicle health monitoring to allow testing of all critical functions such as, verification of lunar landing and ascent engines before initiating the landing sequence; critical subsystems will have multiple strings for redundancy plus adequate supplies of onboard spares for removal and replacement of failed items; crew radiation protection; and trajectories that optimize lunar and Mars performance and flyby abort capabilities.

Source record↗