Advanced Air Vehicles Program: Opening New Aviation Markets for U.S. Leadership
Overview of the projects in the Advanced Air Vehicle Program, Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate.
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Overview of the projects in the Advanced Air Vehicle Program, Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate.
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Foundations to Advance Long Duration Mission Health
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In recent years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.
The book entitled "Fusion Leadership: Unlocking the Subtle Forces that Change People and Organizations Richard L. Daft and Robert H. Lengel (1998) Berett-Koehler Publishers, Inc." was Reviewed by Dr. Michelle Collins, NASA Headquarters. If you've already read books on leadership and organizational change by authors such as Moshe Rubinstein and Iris Firstenberg, Peter Senge, Tom Peters, and Steven Covey, and you were thinking of rereading them, you don't have to do that now. Just read this book instead. It's a fusion of many of their same concepts presented from a different view. The book does not explore any particular subject in depth. Rather the authors "skim" many subjects and concepts, interlacing them to develop the concept of "Fusion Leadership". The fundamental concept of treating people as people rather than machines is the main theme. "Fusion Leadership" is the process of fusing people together by nurturing six "subtle" forces: mindfulness, courage, vision, heart, communication, and integrity. To do so, hierarchy is diminished and responsibility both for oneself as well as for the team is emphasized. There are a number of organizations and managers that will find such a change threatening. The concepts behind such a management style are straightforward and the benefits are intuitive once you've reflected on them; however, the obvious benefits of the behavioral change proposed in Fusion Leadership can be completely lost in a fear-based system. The concept of caring about people in one's organization was the common thread in Chris Turner's book All Hat, No Cattle (see book review, ASK 5). Much is being written about the re-humanizing of the workplace, but the basis of it is so common sense that one wonders what's taking so long for the workplace to change? Whether you're in a position to change your organization or simply your project team, you'll find the concepts in fusion leadership equally applicable.
Projected demand for transportation services in the urban environment has led to the development of several Concepts of Operation for Urban Air Mobility, or UAM. UAM is a concept for the transportation of people and goods in the metropolitan environment using small, efficient aircraft over short distances as part of an expanding multimodal transportation network. UAM will leverage emerging technologies including electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft, increasing levels of automation and a new operational paradigm in dense airspace where a set of agreed-upon rules govern the procedures and interactions defining a cooperative environment in which operators are entrusted with a range of functions typically conducted by Air Traffic Control (ATC). These rules, proposed in the FAA NextGen Office’s UAM Concept of Operations [1], were originally termed Community Based Rules or Community Business Rules (CBRs), and will in the future termed Cooperative Operating Practices (COPs); this document uses the original term, CBR. CBRs are a set of rules, developed by the UAM community and (where necessary) approved by the FAA that govern the interactions between UAM entities and limit the need for ATC services including, but not limited to, separation control by ATC, addressing a fundamental challenge to scaling UAM operations. UAM community development of CBRs is anticipated to accelerate the adoption of new practices while retaining the regulatory authority of the FAA within required domains (e.g., NAS safety, security and equal access). However, there currently exists no agreed industry forum or defined procedures for CBR development. Investigation of best practices for the development of UAM CBRs was identified by NASA and the FAA NextGen Office as a research need. In collaboration with seven industry partners, NASA participated in a series of simulations that investigated elements of the envisioned UAM operations, with a primary focus on Strategic Conflict Management (SCM). The development and conduct of cooperative UAM simulations with seven industry partners provided a unique opportunity to investigate CBR development practices. Development of CBRs for the UAM SCM simulations was conducted in parallel with simulation capability development and was closely related to requirements definition for the simulations. As such, the CBR development effort presented herein had two objectives: explore CBR development practices in collaboration with the industry partners and develop an initial set of UAM CBRs to support simulation requirements definition and development. Consensus was achieved among NASA and the industry partners on 24 CBRs that were developed to support the cooperative simulation operations across five topic areas: General (related to test requirements), Operational Intent, Conformance Monitoring, Demand Capacity Balancing, and Airspace Constraint Management. Additional topic areas and CBRs were discussed but were deemed outside the scope of the simulation; these are included in the appendices. A collaborative, iterative process was employed for developing the CBRs engaging both NASA and Industry; because CBR development is envisioned to be community-driven, opportunities were sought that provided industry partners leadership roles in developing CBRs. The following key observations and recommendations may aid the UAM industry in future CBR development efforts: - The lack of a defined process proved challenging initially. Stakeholder engagement in the early stages of CBR development was intermittent and may have been due to the lack of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities of those involved in the effort. - Industry leadership of CBR topic areas proved successful. Discussions in these topic areas were engaging, with alternate viewpoints freely discussed and detailed CBRs resulting. This points to the importance of identifying the best-suited leadership in technical areas for CBR development. - Discussions within a CBR topic area were typically dominated by only a few participants. Whereas all industry partners contributed to CBR development, within each topic area, technical leadership was evident even when not formally established. This observation may indicate that smaller, focused groups may be more effective in initial CBR development than an open forum or large standards development effort (although both maybe required prior to FAA review and approval for some CBRs). - Identifying suitable forums for initial UAM CBR development and identifying the most effective industry participants and leadership will be crucial for successful CBR development. Although the operational need for UAM CBRs may not be immediate, establishing the forums and leadership to define the processes for CBR development is a prudent early step to UAM realization.
This presentation reviews the crew dynamics during two simulations of Mars Missions. Using an analog of a Mars habitat in two locations, Flashline Mars Arctic Research Station (FMARS) which is located on Devon Island at 75 deg North in the Canadian Arctic, and the Mars Desert Research Station (MDRS) which is located in the south of Utah, the presentation examines the crew dynamics in relation to the leadership style of the commander of the mission. The difference in the interaction of the two crews were shown to be related to the leadership style and the age group in the crew. As much as possible the habitats and environment was to resemble a Mars outpost. The difference between the International Space Station and a Mars missions is reviewed. The leadership styles are reviewed and the contrast between the FMARS and the MDRS leadership styles were related to crew productivity, and the personal interactions between the crew members. It became evident that leadership styles and interpersonal skill had more affect on mission success and crew dynamics than other characteristics.
In this paper we report on the results of an ethnographic study of a rapid design innovation (RDI) experiment in NASA Aeronautics. This work is based on the study of the Aeronautics Autonomy Testbed Capability (AATC) team in the Convergent Aeronautics Solutions (CAS) project. This paper focuses on and summarizes one of the key over-arching findings from the study: there is a significant mismatch in the organizational culture in the rest of the organization compared with that required for RDI. And, if this organizational cultural mismatch is not addressed, the likelihood of any organization being able to advance a new and different type of work (such as RDI) will be jeopardized. We delineate several aspects of the two different cultures identified in order to enable leaders and practitioners to better understand what contributes to the cultural dissonance and the implications of the differences in the cultures. As well, we identify ways in which those differences can be addressed. Research from organization and other social sciences are incorporated to highlight the differences. The implications of the research suggest that the significant cultural differences trigger a strong and resistive response from the dominant culture that may negate leadership’s strategy to build the new capacity for RDI. While the research results noted the pervasive nature of innovation throughout the workplace, the type of innovation envisioned in RDI is a rare type of innovation that requires significantly new methods, work processes, tools, and skills such that approaches used in the dominate culture cannot be adopted by expediting the existing approaches. Examples include: innovation teaming and leadership; the need for adaptive leadership that changes the relationship of a research leader to the other researchers; and, an interdisciplinary teaming approach which shapes team relationships and activities. Each of these aspects requires new teaming, tools, and skills in order to succeed. Thus, when introducing RDI activities where there is a different dominant culture, teams need to be: well trained; protected; recognized and rewarded. And, team leaders must also be trained in the unique types of teaming and innovation tools used in RDI. Both RDI teaming and team leadership must be sanctioned, supported, and rewarded by leadership. Because of the cultural mismatch, in some organizations looking to add RDI to their existing and established organizations, sep to avoid or mitigate the negative impact of the culture mismatch.
There have been over 60 studies of Earth-bound activities that can be viewed as simulations of manned spaceflight. These analogs have involved Antarctic and Arctic expeditions, submarines and submersible simulators, land-based simulators, and hypodynamia environments. None of these analogs has accounted for all the variables related to extended spaceflight (e.g., microgravity, long-duration, heterogeneous crews), and some of the stimulation conditions have been found to be more representative of space conditions than others. A number of psychosocial factors have emerged from the simulation literature that correspond to important issues that have been reported from space. Psychological factors include sleep disorders, alterations in time sense, transcendent experiences, demographic issues, career motivation, homesickness, and increased perceptual sensitivities. Psychiatric factors include anxiety, depression, psychosis, psychosomatic symptoms, emotional reactions related to mission stage, asthenia, and postflight personality, and marital problems. Finally, interpersonal factors include tension resulting from crew heterogeneity, decreased cohesion over time, need for privacy, and issues involving leadership roles and lines of authority. Since future space missions will usually involve heterogeneous crews working on complicated objectives over long periods of time, these features require further study. Socio-cultural factors affecting confined crews (e.g., language and dialect, cultural differences, gender biases) should be explored in order to minimize tension and sustain performance. Career motivation also needs to be examined for the purpose of improving crew cohesion and preventing subgrouping, scapegoating, and territorial behavior. Periods of monotony and reduced activity should be addressed in order to maintain morale, provide meaningful use of leisure time, and prevent negative consequences of low stimulation, such as asthenia and crew member withdrawal. Leadership roles and lines of authority need to be studied further to understand the factors leading to status leveling, leadership competition, and role confusion. Finally, the relationship between crews and ground personnel should be characterized in order to minimize the displacement of anger and tension to the outside, to counter the effects of inter-group miscommunications, and to develop support strategies that can help to counter in-group/out-group conflicts. Ground-based space simulations still have a role to play in terms of understanding the impact of these factors and ways of dealing with them. In particular, issues involving language, cultural differences, gender biases, career motivation, monotonous conditions, use of free time, leadership, lines of authority, and the relationship between crews and outside monitoring personnel need to be further characterized and examined under controlled conditions. Until such time as these factors can be studied directly in space, simulations provide an opportunity to learn more about these psychosocial issues and to plan ways of minimizing their negative consequences during actual space missions.