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NASA NTRS2014

Human Exploration Science Office (KX) Overview

The Human Exploration Science Office supports human spaceflight, conducts research, and develops technology in the areas of space orbital debris, hypervelocity impact technology, image science and analysis, remote sensing, imagery integration, and human and robotic exploration science. NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) resides in the Human Exploration Science Office. ODPO provides leadership in orbital debris research and the development of national and international space policy on orbital debris. The office is recognized internationally for its measurement and modeling of the debris environment. It takes the lead in developing technical consensus across U.S. agencies and other space agencies on debris mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment. The Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) project evaluates the risks to spacecraft posed by micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD). HVIT facilities at JSC and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) use light gas guns, diagnostic tools, and high-speed imagery to quantify the response of spacecraft materials to MMOD impacts. Impact tests, with debris environment data provided by ODPO, are used by HVIT to predict risks to NASA and commercial spacecraft. HVIT directly serves NASA crew safety with MMOD risk assessments for each crewed mission and research into advanced shielding design for future missions. The Image Science and Analysis Group (ISAG) supports the International Space Station (ISS) and commercial spaceflight through the design of imagery acquisition schemes (ground- and vehicle-based) and imagery analyses for vehicle performance assessments and mission anomaly resolution. ISAG assists the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Program in the development of camera systems for the Orion spacecraft that will serve as data sources for flight test objectives that lead to crewed missions. The multi-center Imagery Integration Team is led by the Human Exploration Science Office and provides expertise in the application of engineering imagery to spaceflight. The team links NASA programs and private industry with imagery capabilities developed and honed through decades of human spaceflight, including imagery integration, imaging assets, imagery data management, and photogrammetric analysis. The team is currently supporting several NASA programs, including commercial demonstration missions. The Earth Science and Remote Sensing Team is responsible for integrating the scientific use of Earth-observation assets onboard the ISS, which consist of externally mounted sensors and crew photography capabilities. This team facilitates collaboration on remote sensing and participates in research with academic organizations and other Government agencies, not only in conjunction with ISS science, but also for planetary exploration and regional environmental/geological studies. Human exploration science focuses on science strategies for future human exploration missions to the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and beyond. This function provides communication and coordination between the science community and mission planners. ARES scientists support the operation of robotic missions (i.e., Mars Exploration Rovers and the Mars Science Laboratory), contribute to the interpretation of returned mission data, and translate robotic mission technologies and techniques to human spaceflight.

Calhoun, Tracy A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Next Generation of Kevlar® Fiber for Improved Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Protection

The next generation of Kevlar® fiber for Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection demonstrates the potential to increase orbital debris protection while optimizing the overall weight of the MMOD system and reducing damage to the rear wall of the shield. The DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology process combines numerous woven layers by infusing staple fiber to strengthen the fabric and enables lightweight and flexible protective solutions compared to traditional woven structures. DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology is a step-change in debris protection that allows for the improvement of system-level performance while removing heavier portions of the system. This paper introduces this new technology that will be available from DuPont starting in late 2023 and compares the performance of CoreMatrix™ Technology to legacy solutions. NASA’s Hypervelocity Impact Technology team has conducted hypervelocity impact tests on a subset of DuPont supplied samples that incorporate this latest Kevlar® material. The paper will describe the hypervelocity impact testing parameters, results, and path forward.

Christopher W. Seay↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Next Generation of Kevlar Fiber for Improved Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Protection

The next generation of Kevlar® fiber for Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection demonstrates the potential to increase orbital debris protection while optimizing the overall weight of the MMOD system and reducing damage to the rear wall of the shield. The DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology process combines numerous woven layers by infusing staple fiber to strengthen the fabric and enables lightweight and flexible protective solutions compared to traditional woven structures. DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology is a step-change in debris protection that allows for the improvement of system-level performance while removing heavier portions of the system. This paper introduces this new technology that will be available from DuPont starting in early 2024 and compares the performance of CoreMatrix™ Technology to legacy solutions. NASA’s Hypervelocity Impact Technology team has conducted hypervelocity impact tests on a subset of DuPont supplied samples that incorporate this latest Kevlar® material. The paper will describe the hypervelocity impact testing parameters, results, and path forward.

Orbital Debris↗
NASA NTRS2010

A Ballistic Limit Analysis Program for Shielding Against Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris

A software program has been developed that enables the user to quickly and simply perform ballistic limit calculations for common spacecraft structures that are subject to hypervelocity impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) projectiles. This analysis program consists of two core modules: design, and; performance. The design module enables a user to calculate preliminary dimensions of a shield configuration (e.g., thicknesses/areal densities, spacing, etc.) for a ?design? particle (diameter, density, impact velocity, incidence). The performance module enables a more detailed shielding analysis, providing the performance of a user-defined shielding configuration over the range of relevant in-orbit impact conditions.

Ryan, Shannon↗
NASA NTRS2009

Characteristics of Whipple Shield Performance in the Shatter Regime

Between the onset of projectile fragmentation and the assumption of rear wall failure due to an impulsive load, multi-wall ballistic limit equations are linearly interpolated to provide reasonable yet conservative predictions of perforation thresholds with conveniently simple mathematics. Although low velocity and hypervelocity regime predictions are based on analytical expressions, there is no such scientific foundation for predictions in the intermediate (or shatter) regime. As the debris flux in low earth orbit (LEO) becomes increasingly dominated by manmade pollution, the profile of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk shifts continually towards lower velocities. For the International Space Station (ISS), encounter velocities below 7 km/s now constitute approximately 50% of the penetration risk. Considering that the transition velocity from shatter to hypervelocity impact regimes described by common ballistic limit equations (e.g. new non-optimum Whipple shield equation [1]) occurs at 7 km/s, 50% of station risk is now calculated based on failure limit equations with little analytical foundation. To investigate projectile and shield behavior for impact conditions leading to projectile fragmentation and melt, a series of hypervelocity impact tests have been performed on aluminum Whipple shields. In the experiments projectile diameter, bumper thickness, and shield spacing were kept constant, while rear wall thickness was adjusted to determine spallation and perforation limits at various impact velocities and angles. The results, shown in Figure 1 for normal and 45 impacts, demonstrated behavior that was not sufficiently described by the simplified linear interpolation of the NNO equation (also shown in Figure 1). Hopkins et al. [2] investigated the performance of a nominally-identical aluminum Whipple shield, identifying the effects of phase change in the shatter regime. The results (conceptually represented in Figure 2) were found to agree well with those obtained in this study at normal incidence, suggesting that shielding performance in the shatter regime could be well described by considering more complex phase conditions than currently implemented in most BLEs. Furthermore, evidence of these phase effects were found in the oblique test results, providing the basis for an empirical description of these effects that can be applied in MMOD risk assessment software. In this paper, results of the impact experiments are presented, and characteristics of target damage are evaluated. A comparison of intermediate velocity impact failure mechanisms in current BLEs are discussed and compared to the findings of the experimental study. Risk assessment calculations have been made on a simplified structure using currently implemented penetration equations and predicted limits from the experimental program, and the variation in perceived mission risk is discussed. It was found that ballistic limit curves that explicitly incorporated phase change effects within the intermediate regime lead to a decrease in predicted MMOD risk for ISS-representative orbits. When considered for all Whipple-based shielding configurations onboard the ISS, intermediate phase change effects could lead to significant variations in predicted mission risk.

Ryan, Shannon↗
NASA NTRS2005

NASA Ames Arc Jets and Range, Capabilities for Planetary Entry

NASA is pursuing innovative technologies and concepts as part of America's Vision for Space Exploration. The rapidly emerging field of nanotechnology has led to new concepts for multipurpose shields to prevent catastrophic loss of vehicles and crew against the triple threats of aeroheating during atmospheric entry, radiation (Solar and galactic cosmic rays) and Micrometorid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) strikes. One proposed concept is the Thermal Radiation Impact Protection System (TRIPS) using carbon nanotubes, hydrogenated carbon nanotubes, and ceramic coatings as a multi-use TPS. The Thermophysics Facilities Branch of the Space Technology Division at NASA Ames Research Center provides testing services for the development and validation of the present and future concepts being developed by NASA and national and International research firms. The Branch operates two key facilities - the Range Complex and the Arc Jets. The Ranges include both the Ames Vertical Gun Range (AVGR) and the Hypervelocity Free Flight (HFF) gas guns best suited for MMOD investigations. Test coupons can be installed in the AVGR or HFF and subjected to particle impacts from glass or metal particles from micron to _ inch (6.35-mm) diameters and at velocities from 5 to 8 kilometers per second. The facility can record high-speed data on film and provide damage assessment for analysis by the Principle Investigator or Ames personnel. Damaged articles can be installed in the Arc Jet facility for further testing to quantify the effects of damage on the heat shield s performance upon entry into atmospheric environments.

Fretter, Ernest F.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Office

- HVIT’s operational objectives for NASA, commercial, and international partners are to 1) help to define MMOD risk requirements 2) provide assessments that identify risk drivers for a specific spacecraft design, and 3) work to design and optimize shielding technologies based on increasing performance and reducing mass. - The use of Bumper-code underpins all risk assessments provided by HVIT – by using a complete FEM model, Bumper can provide a wholistic view of risk for a given design and mission profile. - A full risk assessment, however, requires an iterative approach, where Bumper is first used to identify potential risk drivers. Subsequent analysis can focus on iterating the shield design in highest risk areas. And may include the refinement of BLEs through testing, design modification, or reexamination of the failure criteria. - HVIT utilizes a wide-range of expertise to provide the most accurate risk assessments possible – areas of active research are highlighted below.

hypervelocity impact↗
NASA NTRS2018

Cumulative Distribution of Ballistic Impact Failures of Common Twisted-Pair Data Cables at Orbital Speeds

Data wire cable runs are a significant presence on the exterior of the International Space Station (ISS), and continued ISS mission support requires detailed assessment of cables due to micrometeoroid and orbit debris (MMOD) impact. These data wire cables are twisted-pair cables consisting of two 22AWG stranded conductors and fillers inside a tight fitting braided copper shield. The copper shield and its contents are covered with a jacket that has a nominal outer diameter of 3.76 mm and beta-cloth tape. The ISS engineering community has identified two loss-of-function mechanisms for these cables: open circuits due to severed conductors within the cable, and short circuits due to contact between conductors or grounded components. As these data cables are low power systems, short circuits are not expected to burn away the contact, so both open and short circuits are considered permanent loss-of-function for the cable. A total of ninety-seven impact experiments have been performed into these cables to develop a statistical model for the failure of these cables to be used in reliability studies. The experimental work has yielded cumulative distribution functions for these cables for steel and aluminum components of the orbital debris environment at representative speeds and impact obliquities.

Miller, Joshua E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. This paper will expand on the hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing and ballistic limit equation (BLE) definition work that was partially presented at the 2nd International Orbital De-bris (IOC-II) Conference held in Sugar Land, TX in December 2023. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the co-efficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for space-craft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar sur-face assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environ-ment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Mar-shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRS2019

Landsat 9 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Mission Success Approach

Landsat 9* (L9) is the successor mission to Landsat 8 (L8) previously known as Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM). Both missions are large unmanned remote sensing satellites operating in sunsynchronous polar orbits. As opposed to L8/LDCM, systems engineers for L9 incorporated Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection for small object collisions as part of the L9’s mission success criteria. In other words, the NASA Process for Limiting Orbital Debris (NASA-STD-8719.14A) only calls for analyses of the protection of disposal-critical hardware, but L9 opted to also assess and provide small particle penetration protections for all observatory components including instruments that are not part of the spacecraft components needed for controlled reentry. Systems engineers at Goddard developed a design process to protect against MMOD during the life of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) observatories, and in particular the Landsat 9 Mission. Simply stated, this design process enhanced the effectiveness of existing Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) to provide the needed protection. The end goal of the design process was to establish a necessary blanket areal density for a given electronics box or instrument wall thickness and a separation between the outer MLI blanket and the structure underneath. The trade space was presented as a set of design curves for different combinations of blanket density, box wall thickness, and separation distance between MLI and structure. An advantage of this process was that it is largely independent of MMOD flux data on a surface-by surface basis. Ultimately, cost savings should result from incorporating small object penetration protection early in the design cycle, rather than adding spot shielding blankets later as needed to meet an overall penetration risk standard (the more traditional approach). The approach and implementation to the L9 Observatory design will be addressed in this paper. *L9 is a joint mission being formulated, implemented, and operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) United States Geological Survey (USGS).

Approach↗
NASA NTRS2006

Metal Foam Shields

This paper compares the ballistic performance of metallic foam sandwich structures with honeycomb structures. Honeycomb sandwich structures, consisting of metallic or composite facesheets and honeycomb cores, are often used in spacecraft construction due to their light-weight and structural stiffness. Honeycomb panels, however, are considered rather poor candidates for protection from micrometeoroid orbital debris (MMOD) particles because the honeycomb channels the debris cloud from MMOD impacts on outer facesheet causing a concentrated load on the second facesheet. Sandwich structures with light-weight, open-cell metallic cores and metal or composite facesheets provide improved MMOD protection because channeling does not occur and because the core is more effective at disrupting hypervelocity impacts then honeycomb. This paper describes hypervelocity impact tests on metallic foam sandwich structures (aluminum and titanium) with metallic facesheets, compare them to equivalent mass and thickness honeycomb panels, based on the results of hypervelocity impact tests.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Threat Assessment: Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle

This report provides results of a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risk assessment of the Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle (MSR EEV). The assessment was performed using standard risk assessment methodology illustrated in Figure 1-1. Central to the process is the Bumper risk assessment code (Figure 1-2), which calculates the critical penetration risk based on geometry, shielding configurations and flight parameters. The assessment process begins by building a finite element model (FEM) of the spacecraft, which defines the size and shape of the spacecraft as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations. This model is built using the NX I-deas software package from Siemens PLM Software. The FEM is constructed using triangular and quadrilateral elements that define the outer shell of the spacecraft. Bumper-II uses the model file to determine the geometry of the spacecraft for the analysis. The next step of the process is to identify the ballistic limit characteristics for the various shield types. These ballistic limits define the critical size particle that will penetrate a shield at a given impact angle and impact velocity. When the finite element model is built, each individual element is assigned a property identifier (PID) to act as an index for its shielding properties. Using the ballistic limit equations (BLEs) built into the Bumper-II code, the shield characteristics are defined for each and every PID in the model. The final stage of the analysis is to determine the probability of no penetration (PNP) on the spacecraft. This is done using the micrometeoroid and orbital debris environment definitions that are built into the Bumper-II code. These engineering models take into account orbit inclination, altitude, attitude and analysis date in order to predict an impacting particle flux on the spacecraft. Using the geometry and shielding characteristics previously defined for the spacecraft and combining that information with the environment model calculations, the Bumper-II code calculates a probability of no penetration for the spacecraft.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Cratering Equations for Zinc Orthotitanate Coated Aluminum

The final STS-125 servicing mission (SM4) to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) in May of 2009 saw the return of the 2nd Wide Field Planetary Camera (WFPC2) aboard the shuttle Discovery. This hardware had been in service on HST since it was installed during the SM1 mission in December of 1993 yielding one of the longest low Earth orbit exposure times (15.4 years) of any returned space hardware. The WFPC2 is equipped with a 0.8 x 2.2 m radiator for thermal control of the camera electronics (Figure 1). The space facing surface of the 4.1 mm thick aluminum radiator is coated with Z93 zinc orthotitanate thermal control paint with a nominal thickness of 0.1 0.2 mm. Post flight inspections of the radiator panel revealed hundreds of micrometeoroid/orbital debris (MMOD) impact craters ranging in size from less than 300 to nearly 1000 microns in diameter. The Z93 paint exhibited large spall areas around the larger impact sites (Figure 2) and the craters observed in the 6061-T651 aluminum had a different shape than those observed in uncoated aluminum. Typical hypervelocity impact craters in aluminum have raised lips around the impact site. The craters in the HST radiator panel had suppressed crater lips, and in some cases multiple craters were present instead of a single individual crater. Humes and Kinard observed similar behavior after the WFPC1 post flight inspection and assumed the Z93 coating was acting like a bumper in a Whipple shield. Similar paint behavior (spall) was also observed by Bland2 during post flight inspection of the International Space Station (ISS) S-Band Antenna Structural Assembly (SASA) in 2008. The SASA, with similar Z93 coated aluminum, was inspected after nearly 4 years of exposure on the ISS. The multi-crater phenomena could be a function of the density, composition, or impact obliquity angle of the impacting particle. For instance, a micrometeoroid particle consisting of loosely bound grains of material could be responsible for creating the multiple craters. Samples were obtained from the HST largest craters for examination by electron microscope equipped with x-ray spectrometers to determine impactor source (micrometeoroid or orbital debris). In an attempt to estimate the MMOD particle diameters that produced these craters, this paper will present equations for spall diameter, crater depth and crater diameter in Z93 coated aluminum. The equations will be based on hypervelocity impact tests of Z93 painted aluminum at the NASA White Sands Test Facility. Equations inputs for velocities beyond the testable regime are expected from hydrocode simulations of Z93 coated aluminum using CTH and ANSYS AUTODYN.

Hyde, James↗
NASA NTRS2006

Carbon Nanotube-enhanced Carbon-phenolic Ablator Material

Phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA) is a thermal protection system (TPS) material developed at NASA Ames Research Center in the mid-90 s for Discovery missions. It was used on the Stardust return capsule heat shield which successfully executed the highest speed Earth entry to date on January 15, 2006. PICA is a porous fibrous carbon insulation infiltrated with phenolic resin, and is an excellent ablator that is effective for heating rates up to 1000 W/sq cm. It is one of several candidate TPS materials for the next generation of crewed spacecraft for Lunar and Mars missions. We will describe an ongoing research effort at NASA to improve mechanical properties of the phenolic matrix with carbon nanotubes. The aim is two-fold: to increase overall TPS strength during reentry and to improve Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection in space. The former requires at least a good dispersion of nanotubes in phenolic, while the latter also requires covalent bonding between them to couple and transfer impact energy effectively from matrix to nanotubes. We will discuss the required chemical functionalization of nanotubes, processing issues and test results.

Nikolaev, P.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Extravehicular Activity Micormeteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from an micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. To assess the risk of failure, a detailed finite element model (FEM) of the EMU has been created which has regions for the various shielding configurations. Each shielding configuration is based on the layers and materials over the innermost bladder layer that maintains the acceptable atmospheric environment for the astronaut. Ballistic limit equations (BLE) for each shielding configuration have been determined from hypervelocity impact testing of samples of the EMU layup.

Hoffman, K. D.↗
NASA NTRS2023

B 4 C-Al Metal Matrix Composites for Extreme Space Environments

Extreme space environments such as space vacuum, radiation, thermal extremes and cycles, jagged lunar dust, microgravity, micrometeoroids and orbit debris (MMOD), thrust plume ejecta, and their synergistically-adverse effects are difficult challenges for safe and sustainable space exploration to outer planets and satellites. Prolonged space radiation exposure embrittles materials and structures and abrasive jagged dust particles aggressively wear and erode moving parts leading to premature failure. To counter or even alleviate such potential failures, robust and exceptional materials are needed to make NASA missions including Artemis program sustainable with minimum service and repair needs. This study reports that boron-containing inclusion, B 4 C, can improve wear resistance and radiation shielding/resistance of aluminum alloy (Al6061) significantly to extend the service life in extreme space environments. With increasing B 4 C inclusions, the tensile strength increased up to 20 vol% at both room temperature and an elevated temperature (200˚C) while thermal conductivity decreased gradually as a function of B 4 C concentration. The neutron shielding effectiveness increased more than 110 times when 50 vol% B 4 C is incorporated in Al6061 when compared with the pristine Al6061. The shielding effectiveness under galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and solar particle events (SPE) was also studied computationally using on-line tool for the assessment of radiation in space (OLTARIS). By adding B 4 C, the adverse effect caused by secondary radiation through the Al6061 matrix was effectively suppressed to improve the shielding effectiveness against GCR and SPE. The presence of boron in B 4 C was the main reason for the enhanced radiation shielding capability against neutron, GCR, and SPE environments.

Sang-Hyon Chu↗