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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using the System Complexity Metric (SCM) to Compare CO2 Removal Systems

A fundamental cause of difficulty in large engineering projects is their inherent complexity. An impression of complexity occurs if a system is simply difficult to understand, where there is no obvious mental model that correctly predicts its behavior. Higher system complexity is usually associated with higher cost and higher failure rate. Complexity is perceived if a system has many diverse components, multiple interactions and feedback loops, transients and dynamic behavior, and unanticipated failure modes. Identifying and removing these signs of complexity should improve performance and reduce the cost and failure rate. Complexity can be directly measured by the number of components and their interactions. The System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined as the sum of the number of parts in a system, N, plus the number of the one-way interconnections between them, I. SCM = N + I. The SCM is easily determined by direct inspection of the system block diagram. SCM can be used to compare systems and to guide their redesign to reduce cost and failure rate. Carbon dioxide removal systems are analyzed using SCM, cost, and failure rate. As in previous work, cost is directly proportional to SCM and that failure rate increases as a power of SCM for large differences in SCM. The SCM ranking of carbon dioxide removal systems is the same as their ranking in detailed analysis and practice.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using the System Complexity Metric (SCM) to Compare CO2 Reduction Systems

A fundamental cause of difficulty in large engineering projects is their inherent complexity. An impression of complexity occurs if a system is simply difficult to understand, where there is no obvious mental model that correctly predicts its behavior. Higher system complexity is usually associated with higher cost and higher failure rate. Complexity is perceived if a system has many diverse components, multiple interactions and feedback loops, transients and dynamic behavior, and unanticipated failure modes. Identifying and removing these signs of complexity should improve performance and reduce the cost and failure rate. Complexity can be directly measured by the number of components and their interactions. The System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined as the sum of the number of parts in a system, N, plus the number of the one-way interconnections between them, I. SCM = N + I. The SCM is easily determined by direct inspection of the system block diagram. SCM can be used to compare systems and to guide their redesign to reduce cost and failure rate. Carbon dioxide reduction systems are analyzed using SCM, cost, and failure rate. As in previous work, cost is directly proportional to SCM and that failure rate increases as a power of SCM for large differences in SCM. The SCM ranking of carbon dioxide reduction systems is the same as their ranking in detailed analysis and practice.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Path to Crew Autonomy - Situational Awareness in Scheduling and Rescheduling Tasks for Novice Schedulers

To increase crew autonomy for long duration exploration-class missions (LDEM), certain mission support tasks need to be completed by crew. Currently, crew activities are scheduled over the course of several weeks by ground-based experts with years of experience-based training. These experts display extensive amounts of situational awareness (SA) throughout task execution by maintaining a mental model of additional factors during scheduling such as constraints (e.g. physical space/layout), abilities and skills of the crew, and crew preferences allowing them to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. Thus, situational awareness is a key component for crews to manage their own schedules. In this paper, we examined situational awareness in novice schedulers in both a scheduling and rescheduling task. Our findings indicate that there is no significant difference between scheduling and rescheduling tasks for the development of SA in novice schedulers. Additionally, our experiment shows that novice schedulers are less able to develop sufficient SA for constraints that are dependent on one or more activities. Thus, we propose that software aids may be useful to support novice schedulers and increase SA in scheduling/rescheduling tasks. This work is vital to ensure the successful transfer of mission support tasks to the crew for future LDEM.

situation awareness↗
NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. Formalization of the process for creating these causal diagrams will enable the creation of a composite risk network that is vetted by members of the NASA community and configuration managed. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document outlines the pilot process, the standardized approaches, and guidance for risk custodian teams when creating and updating DAGs as a part of the NASA Human System Risk Management process.

Risk↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of A Directed Acyclic Graph for Venous Thromboembolism During Spaceflight

Introduction: Recent studies have reported the development of venous blood flow stasis in astronauts and an occlusive venous thrombosis during spaceflight. Subsequent investigations revealed approximately one quarter of surveilled crew members had some degree of blood flow stasis in the left internal jugular vein. Therefore, NASA’s Human System Risk Board now formally tracks venous thromboembolism (VTE) as a “concern” for human spaceflight. To investigate potential mechanisms by which exposures concomitant with spaceflight (e.g., microgravity, radiation) may contribute to VTE, we developed a causal diagram in the form of a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Methods: The mechanisms by which spaceflight exposures may elevate the risk of VTE and the downstream effects on mission outcomes were critically analyzed, taking into account scientific literature and subject matter expertise consultation, and a DAG was generated. A Level-of-Evidence score for each causal relationship was assigned based on assessing the literature against a set of criteria derived from the A. Bradford Hill Causal Guidelines. Results: The set of three main factors that predispose people to VTE (hypercoagulability, endothelial damage, and blood stasis) is known as Virchow’s Triad. In constructing the DAG for VTE we articulated various mechanisms by which the principal spaceflight hazards (microgravity, radiation, closed hostile environment, isolation and confinement, distance from Earth) are thought to interact with or cause the components in Virchow’s triad. We found sufficient evidence to at least speculate that fluid shifts from microgravity, compensatory alterations in hematologic indices, spaceflight atmospheric conditions, and oxidative stress/inflammation from radiation may be potential contributors to VTE development. Discussion: Developing the DAG entailed a systematic and repeatable approach for visualizing relationships between contributing factors that may lead to VTE in spaceflight. Articulating pathways linking spaceflight exposures to VTE risk factors and possible VTE development enables subject matter experts from different domains to construct a shared mental model. Assignment of levels of evidence scores to the relationships helps identify knowledge and capability gaps that should be considered for further investigation. Furthermore, the DAG highlights modifiable variables and may therefore facilitate the development of new VTE risk mitigation strategies.

Alexander Svoronos↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human System Risk Communication: Directed Acyclic Graphs

- The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for the management of a portfolio of 30 human system risks that NASA tracks and configuration manages to mitigate for future crewed exploration missions. - The HSRB has been exploring the concept of causal diagrams (in the form of Directed Acyclic Graphs or DAGs) as an approach to creating knowledge graphs for each risk to enable shared mental models of causal flow from spaceflight hazards to mission outcomes among HSRB Stakeholders. - These diagrams are intended to improve insight and communication of risk across the myriad subject matter experts and management interested in human system risk reduction. This includes program managers, systems engineers, and operators in addition to the Human Health and Performance Directorate. - The DAG project was intended to create the foundation for composition of the 30 baselined DAGs into a single risk network and software is being developed in parallel to enable this forward work.

directed acrylic graph↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of A Crew Health and Performance System Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool: Proof-of-Concept Approach

The crew health and performance (CHP) system represents the span of technological interventions and tested processes and procedures that in combination address the human risk to space flight. The Human Research Program (HRP) mental model of the CHP system breaks the capabilities needed to meet NASA human flight systems standards into specific categories (i.e., countermeasures, behavioral health, medical intervention). These categories are further broken down into specific sub-groups generally associated with the human system risks that these capabilities seek to mitigate. Like the approach used to develop the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) and the Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Analysis Tool (MEDPRAT), HRP tasked NASA GRC’s Cross-Cutting Computational Modeling Project with developing a CHP probabilistic risk assessment tool, the CHP-PRA. The CHP-PRA model seeks to quantify and relatively assess the human risk state within the crew health and performance domain, using a combination of knowledge about human system risks and technology and practices likely to be applied during space flight missions. This modeling system will incorporate customer and stakeholder feedback and be flexible enough to address multiple different questions about important low-level mission-specific parameters. This presentation will introduce the initial concept and development timeline for this tool and demonstrate proof-of-concept through an application addressing a specific human risk question posed within the Artemis program.

Risk analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Vehicles for Ease of Operation

To date the air transportation system has been developed with the in-cremental introduction of new technology and with highly experienced air transport pilots and air traffic controllers overseeing flight operations. Thus, we currently have one of the safest commercial aviation systems in the world. General Aviation (GA) in the United States, however, has not always followed the same cautious and monitored approach to implementation; consequently, the GA safety record does not meet the high standards of commercial aviation. Recently, a new system known as Urban Air Mobility (UAM), is attracting considerable interest and investment from industry and government agencies. UAM refers to a system of passenger and small-cargo air transportation vehicles within an urban area with the goal of reducing the number of times we need to use our cars, thus improving urban traffic by moving people and cargo from crowded single pas-senger vehicles on our roads to personal and on-demand air vehicles. These UAM vehicles will be small and based on electric, Vertical-Take-Off-and-Landing (eV-TOL) systems. A significant component of UAM is offloading of flight-man-agement responsibilities from human pilots to newly-developed autonomy. Cur-rently, over 100 UAM vehicles are either in development or production. Most, if not all, have a goal of fully autonomous vehicle operations, but fully autonomous flying vehicles are not expected in the near future. Therefore, we are de-veloping concepts for UAM vehicles that will be easy to fly and/or manage by operators with minimal pilot training. In this paper we will discuss our human-automation teaming approach to develop an easy-to-operate VTOL aircraft, and some of the fly-by-wire technology needed to stabilize the vehicle so that a sim-ple ecological mental model of the flying task can be implemented. We will discuss the requirements for a stability augmentation system that must be developed to support our simple pilot input model, and also present design guidelines and requirements based on a pilot input and management model. Finally, our ap-proach to vehicle development will involve considerable operator testing and evaluation: improving pilot model, inceptors, displays and also work on a plan for how a UAM vehicle can be integrated with terminal area air traffic control airspace with minimal impact on controller workload.

UAM↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Risk Quantification of Spaceflight Crew Health and Performance Using Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment

At NASA, the Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system represents the span of countermeasures, capabilities, interventions, and tested processes and procedures that in combination work to mitigate the human component of spaceflight mission risk. Across the varying NASA mental models of the CHP system, the different functionalities needed to meet human flight systems standards can be broken down into specific categories (i.e. medical capability, environmental health, behavioral health). These categories can be further broken down into specific subgroups generally associated with the CHP functionalities meant to mitigate or buy down individual human system risks. Taking a similar development approach we seek to leverage dynamic probabilistic risk assessment as a means to quantify and relatively assess the human risk state within the crew health and performance domain. By utilizing existing tools as integrators, we propose a rapid development strategy for incorporating research and operational data that represent the influence of the CHP system functionalities, in order to provide order of magnitudes estimates of the influence on most human system risks outcomes. The model system utilizes a modest cumulative risk approach and that limits the scope to primary paths of influence between the CHP functionalities and human system risks, thus enabling quick prototypes of the integrative effects of CHP functional combinations to solicit valuable feedback from stakeholders and customers on the data, relationship, and structure of the integration.

Drayton Munster↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Interface Consistency: Phase I Results & Phase II Status

Future exploration missions will rely on designing and developing vehicles and complex systems from within NASA and through multiple external commercial partners to meet mission goals. Despite existing consistency-related agency requirements, NASA’s approach to commercial spaceflight development encourages providers’ flexibility and innovation. This strategy is resulting in significant design diversity across Artemis vehicles. Design best practices and guidelines champion interface consistency to promote mental model development and knowledge transfer. However, research investigating the benefits of consistency is mixed, and little is known about its role in complex systems. Determining the level of risk that system diversity presents is difficult, as there is no established method for quantifying the degree of consistency within and across interfaces, nor is there information about the differential impacts of different types of inconsistency. Phase I of this project (Characterization and Measurement) served as a starting point to better understand the construct of consistency, its application, and the range of studies and methods for measuring it. The project team created a taxonomy of consistency to apply to interfaces as a framework to guide the development of tools to assess intersystem consistency. Checklist and cognitive walkthrough methods were developed for use by human factors (HF) and human-computer interaction (HCI) experts. The Intersystem Consistency Scale (ICS) was developed for interface evaluations with crew. A pilot study evaluated the methods’ ability to distinguish differences between Artemis-like prototype pairs exhibiting either high or low design consistency. In addition, click errors and time on task were collected within the ICS (crew-like) group. Results from our exploratory analysis and lessons learned from the pilot study will be discussed. The project team will also present the status of Phase II (Risk Assessment, Standards and Guidelines). This includes incorporating feedback to redesign the assessment tools, and inputs from displays and training Subject Matter Experts to update tasks and prototype designs. The team will present the risk assessment study design to identify the types and levels of inconsistency that pose the greatest risk to performance. Plans to apply these results toward agency standards and guideline recommendations will also be discussed.

Human-Computer Interaction↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Content and Representation of Information Needed to Support Time-Constrained Problem Solving

NASA’s current mission-operations paradigm originated with Project Mercury and endured with minimum evolution through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions. At its foundation is a near-complete real-time dependence on a ground team to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. Utilizing many engineers and operators with broad and deep expertise; large, distributed datasets including extensive telemetry; and expansive analytical and computing power, this ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years. This approach must change to address challenges associated with missions beyond low Earth orbit (BLEO), including infrequent resupply, reduced ability to evacuate, and delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational support. We anticipate that a necessary part of this change will be increased independence for the crew, as roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by ground teams move on board the vehicle. While many risks are associated with Earth-independent operations, one particular concern is ensuring that the crew will have adequate onboard support to perform urgent problem solving when communication with the ground is delayed or intermittent. A key resource that enables the ground team to respond to anomalies quickly and effectively is the extraordinary expertise and experience it possesses. It is comprised of 80+ experts on at any given time, with a combined 600+ years of system-specific experience across 22 unique console disciplines. A small crew will face the unprecedented challenge of independently responding to anomalies that have historically been handled by a team 20 times their size. Another important resource upon which the ground heavily relies to support procedure execution and anomaly response is data. The amount of telemetry data that each flight controller monitors is extensive. In addition, as the ground team works to further assess impacts, trouble shoot, identify workarounds, and oversee procedure execution, it accesses and synthesizes engineering and procedure information, as well as system build, test, and configuration documentation. It is not feasible nor useful to put all these data onboard as crews become more Earth independent. Each member of a small Mars mission small crew will have multiple roles beyond monitoring telemetry and data gathering, and multiple roles within anomaly resolution processes, thereby limiting their capacity for copious amounts of information. Moreover, while access is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Information will need to be compiled, refined, and represented appropriately to support the crew’s reduced attention and expertise. This work seeks to understand the content and representation of information needed to support time-constrained problem solving and decision making by the crew without real-time ground support. To build this understanding, we first surveyed the literature, focusing on how expert problem solvers construct and manipulate their mental models. Next, we interviewed expert problem solvers in spaceflight and analogous domains and surveyed industry solutions for data presentation. Finally, we analyzed current spaceflight operations by investigating flight controller anomaly resolution processes during ISS training simulations and real operational events. These methods led to creating a problem-solving framework that details common themes and features of attending to, assessing, analyzing, and acting on problems in complex, time-constrained domains. Using this framework and the results of our analysis, we identified conceptual data representations needed for crew-led problem-solving. Preliminary onboard user interface concepts to meet identified needs will be presented.

anomaly response↗
NASA NTRS1978

Measurements of solar UV flux in the stratosphere

Solar UV flux measurements were obtained on STRATCOM-VIII from liftoff to sunset. Spectra cover the wavelength range from 1979A to 2879A and altitudes from about 25-42 km over a wide range of solar zenith angles. Good agreement is obtained between the observed spectra and synthetic spectra calculated using a two stream radiative transfer model.

Mentall, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Cognitive and affective components of mental workload: Understanding the effects of each on human decision making behavior

Human factors and ergonomics researchers have recognized for some time the increasing importance of understanding the role of the construct of mental workload in flight research. Current models of mental workload suggest that it is a multidimensional and complex construct, but one that has proved difficult to measure. Because of this difficulty, emphasis has usually been placed on using direct reports through subjective measures such as rating scales to assess levels of mental workload. The NASA Task Load Index (NASA/TLX, Hart and Staveland) has been shown to be a highly reliable and sensitive measure of perceived mental workload. But a problem with measures like TLX is that there is still considerable disagreement as to what it is about mental workload that these subjective measures are actually measuring. The empirical use of subjective workload measures has largely been to provide estimates of the cognitive components of the actual mental workload required for a task. However, my research suggests that these measures may, in fact have greater potential in accurately assessing the affective components of workload. That is, for example, TLX may be more likely to assess the positive and negative feelings associated with varying workload levels, which in turn may potentially influence the decision making behavior that directly bears on performance and safety issues. Pilots, for example, are often called upon to complete many complex tasks that are high in mental workload, stress, and frustration, and that have significant dynamic decision making components -- often ones that involve risk as well.

Nygren, Thomas E.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Modeling Common-Sense Decisions in Artificial Intelligence

A methodology has been conceived for efficient synthesis of dynamical models that simulate common-sense decision- making processes. This methodology is intended to contribute to the design of artificial-intelligence systems that could imitate human common-sense decision making or assist humans in making correct decisions in unanticipated circumstances. This methodology is a product of continuing research on mathematical models of the behaviors of single- and multi-agent systems known in biology, economics, and sociology, ranging from a single-cell organism at one extreme to the whole of human society at the other extreme. Earlier results of this research were reported in several prior NASA Tech Briefs articles, the three most recent and relevant being Characteristics of Dynamics of Intelligent Systems (NPO -21037), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 26, No. 12 (December 2002), page 48; Self-Supervised Dynamical Systems (NPO-30634), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 27, No. 3 (March 2003), page 72; and Complexity for Survival of Living Systems (NPO- 43302), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 33, No. 7 (July 2009), page 62. The methodology involves the concepts reported previously, albeit viewed from a different perspective. One of the main underlying ideas is to extend the application of physical first principles to the behaviors of living systems. Models of motor dynamics are used to simulate the observable behaviors of systems or objects of interest, and models of mental dynamics are used to represent the evolution of the corresponding knowledge bases. For a given system, the knowledge base is modeled in the form of probability distributions and the mental dynamics is represented by models of the evolution of the probability densities or, equivalently, models of flows of information. Autonomy is imparted to the decisionmaking process by feedback from mental to motor dynamics. This feedback replaces unavailable external information by information stored in the internal knowledge base. Representation of the dynamical models in a parameterized form reduces the task of common-sense-based decision making to a solution of the following hetero-associated-memory problem: store a set of m predetermined stochastic processes given by their probability distributions in such a way that when presented with an unexpected change in the form of an input out of the set of M inputs, the coupled motormental dynamics converges to the corresponding one of the m pre-assigned stochastic process, and a sample of this process represents the decision.

Zak, Michail↗
NASA NTRS2010

Physical Invariants of Intelligence

A program of research is dedicated to development of a mathematical formalism that could provide, among other things, means by which living systems could be distinguished from non-living ones. A major issue that arises in this research is the following question: What invariants of mathematical models of the physics of systems are (1) characteristic of the behaviors of intelligent living systems and (2) do not depend on specific features of material compositions heretofore considered to be characteristic of life? This research at earlier stages has been reported, albeit from different perspectives, in numerous previous NASA Tech Briefs articles. To recapitulate: One of the main underlying ideas is to extend the application of physical first principles to the behaviors of living systems. Mathematical models of motor dynamics are used to simulate the observable physical behaviors of systems or objects of interest, and models of mental dynamics are used to represent the evolution of the corresponding knowledge bases. For a given system, the knowledge base is modeled in the form of probability distributions and the mental dynamics is represented by models of the evolution of the probability densities or, equivalently, models of flows of information. At the time of reporting the information for this article, the focus of this research was upon the following aspects of the formalism: Intelligence is considered to be a means by which a living system preserves itself and improves its ability to survive and is further considered to manifest itself in feedback from the mental dynamics to the motor dynamics. Because of the feedback from the mental dynamics, the motor dynamics attains quantum-like properties: The trajectory of the physical aspect of the system in the space of dynamical variables splits into a family of different trajectories, and each of those trajectories can be chosen with a probability prescribed by the mental dynamics. From a slightly different perspective, the mechanism of decision-making is feedback from the mental dynamics to the motor dynamics, and this mechanism provides a quantum-like collapse of a random motion into an appropriate deterministic state, such that entropy undergoes a pronounced decrease. The existence of this mechanism is considered to be an invariant of intelligent behavior of living systems, regardless of the origins and material compositions of the systems.

Zak, Michail↗
NASA NTRS1997

Incongruity, Incongruity Resolution, and Mental States: The Measure and Modification of Situational Awareness and Control

Cognition and emotion combine to define mental states. Situational awareness depends on both knowledge of the environment and the mood of the individual. Cognitive scientists from William James and Sigmond Freud to contemporary theorists in artificial intelligence and neuropsychology have acknowledged the critical role of subjective state in determining the efficiency and flexibility of information processing. One of the most explicit computational models of mental states to incorporate both knowledge and arousal has been described. Knowledge is carried in a typical neural net with categorical nodes and probabilistic links. Arousal determines the focus among these nodes and links. High arousal results in a restricted range of activation. Low arousal causes a wider range of stimulation and a broader linking of categories or "ideas." From this model Gerlernter generates "creativity" in problem solving from a network that is widely active and the possibility of "fixation" from a highly aroused system.

Derks, Peter L.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Simulating Human Cognition in the Domain of Air Traffic Control

Experiments intended to assess performance in human-machine interactions are often prohibitively expensive, unethical or otherwise impractical to run. Approximations of experimental results can be obtained, in principle, by simulating the behavior of subjects using computer models of human mental behavior. Computer simulation technology has been developed for this purpose. Our goal is to produce a cognitive model suitable to guide the simulation machinery and enable it to closely approximate a human subject's performance in experimental conditions. The described model is designed to simulate a variety of cognitive behaviors involved in routine air traffic control. As the model is elaborated, our ability to predict the effects of novel circumstances on controller error rates and other performance characteristics should increase. This will enable the system to project the impact of proposed changes to air traffic control procedures and equipment on controller performance.

Freed, Michael↗
NASA NTRS1983

Model-based estimation and prediction of task-imposed mental workload

Mental workload has been an area of intensive research for better than a decade. One specific area of interest in aircrew related workload research is concerned with the development of quantitative indices of workload in aircraft piloting tasks. This paper presents a model-based approach for quantifying mental workload in operational terms. The suggested modeling framework is based on an interpreted Petri net characterization of a task in which 'places' are equated to specific task-related activities and 'transitions' are viewed as internal or external forcing events. It is shown that within this framework quantitative assessments can be made of both cumulative and instantaneous workload associated with the performance of a task and its individual component subtasks. It is suggested that insights gained from analyzing task-specific workload within this modeling paradigm can suggest plausible explanations for reconciling discrepancies between subjectively elicited workload estimates and behavioral/performance measures.

Madni, A. M.↗