Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “NASA standard”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Color/magnitude calibration for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) standard Fixed-Head Star Trackers (FHST)

This paper characterizes and analyzes the spectral response of Ball Aerospace fixed-head star trackers, (FHST's) currently in use on some three-axis stabilized spacecraft. The FHST output is a function of the frequency and intensity of the incident light and the position of the star image in the field of view. The FHST's on board the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) have had occasional problems identifying stars with a high B-V value. These problems are characterized by inaccurate intensity counts observed by the tracker. The inaccuracies are due to errors in the observed star magnitude values. These errors are unique to each individual FHST. For this reason, data were also collected and analyzed from the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS). As a consequence of this work, the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Flight Dynamics Division (FDD) hopes to improve the attitude accuracy on these missions and to adopt better star selection procedures for catalogs.

Landis, J.↗

International Docking Standardization NASA

This slide presentation reviews the different types of docking types. The objective is the pressurized vehicle connection and crew transfer. Androgynous Docking is defined as the joining or coming together of two free flying space vehicles with alike interfaces. Androgynous mating allows for collaboration between any two vehicles. The subsytems of an androgynous mating system are reviewed, including: Hard docking subsystems: latch system, tunnel housing, alignment system and seal.

Donahoe, Stanley↗

Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Management and Control Requirements for Space Flight Hardware and Critical Ground Support Equipment...aka... The NASA EEE Parts Standard, NASA-STD 8739.10

Describes development and content of a new NASA Standard for Electrical Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) parts. This Standard reflects current practices, instead of changing them. Most NASA Centers utilize local documents, but there is minimal consistency across the Agency. A gap analysis clearly shows the differences that exist among the different centers and with respect to the NASA Parts Policy. Once approved, the new standard can be referenced in contracts and agreements with organizations outside of NASA.

Electronic↗

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft (manned or unmanned) launched that did not have a computer on board that provided vital command and control services. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Led by the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard (STD-18l9.13B) has recently undergone a significant update in an attempt to provide that consistency. This paper will discuss the key features of the new NASA Software Safety Standard. It will start with a brief history of the use and development of software in safety critical applications at NASA. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Working Group and the approach it took to revise the software engineering process across the Agency.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗

The New NASA Orbital Debris Mitigation Procedural Requirements and Standards

NASA has issued major updates to its principal orbital debris mitigation policy directive and standards. The new NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris (NPR 8715.6), with its supporting NASA Standard 8719.14, both refine earlier orbital debris mitigation documents and in some areas expand their applicability. Organizational and individual responsibilities along with general directives are set forth in NPR 8715.6. New requirements include routine conjunction assessments for all maneuverable NASA spacecraft in LEO and GEO, prompt notifications of intended or unintended debris generation, preparation and maintenance of formal end-of-mission plans, and disposal of vehicles in operation around the Moon and Mars and at the Earth-Sun Lagrangian points. NASA Standard 8719.14 replaces the 1995 NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 with no major new requirements but with several refinements and additions, some of which had already been adopted. Compliance with human casualty risk limitations from reentering debris will be calculated explicitly and not be expressed in terms of average debris casualty area. Moreover, the minimum kinetic energy threshold for potentially injurious reentering debris is set at 15 Joules. The overarching requirement for the disposal of GEO spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages is to ensure that the vehicles do not come within GEO + 200 km for at least 100 km after end of mission, rather than setting specific requirements for the disposal orbit. Spacecraft operating in or routinely transiting LEO must remain in the region for no more than 25 years after end of mission or 30 years after launch, whichever occurs sooner. A comprehensive new NASA handbook on orbital debris has also been prepared to provide background on the orbital debris environment and the related NASA mitigation requirements and standards.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗

NASA Space Flight Human System Standards

NASA has begun a new approach to human factors design standards. For years NASA-STD-3000, Manned Systems Integration Standards, has been a source of human factors design guidance for space systems. In order to better meet the needs of the system developers, NASA is revising its human factors standards system. NASA-STD-3000 will be replaced by two documents: set of broad human systems specifications (including both human factors and medical topics) and a human factors design handbook

Tillman, Barry↗

Comparison of Structural and Functional Ocular Outcomes Between 14- and 70 Day Bed Rest

Purpose: To compare structural and functional ocular outcomes in healthy human subjects undergoing 14- and/or 70-day head-down-tilt bed rest (HDTBR). We hypothesized the amount of HDTBR-induced ocular changes be affected by the HDTBR duration. Methods: The studies were conducted at the NASA Flight Analogs Research Unit, The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Galveston, TX. Participants were selected using NASA standard screening procedures. Standardized NASA screening procedures and bed rest conditions (e.g., strict sleep-wake cycle, standardized diet, continuous video monitoring) were implemented in both studies. Participants maintained a 6deg HDTBR position for 14 and/or 70 consecutive days and did not engage in exercise. Weekly ophthalmological examinations were conducted in the sitting (pre/post-bed rest only) and HDT positions. Ocular outcomes of interest included: near best-corrected visual acuity (BCVA); spherical equivalent, as determined by cycloplegic autorefraction; Goldmann applanation tonometry and iCare (Icare Finland Oy, Espoo, Finland) intraocular pressure (IOP) measurement; color vision; red dot test; modified Amsler grid test; confrontational visual field; stereoscopic color fundus photography; Spectralis OCT (Heidelberg Engineering, GmbH, Heidelberg, Germany) retinal nerve fiber layer thickness (RNFLT), peripapillary and macular retinal thicknesses. Mixed-effects linear models were used to compare pre- and post-HDTBR observations between 14- and 70-day HDTBR for our continuously scaled outcomes.

Cromwell, R. L.↗

NASA DOEPOD NDE Capabilities Data Book

This data book contains the Directed Design of Experiments for Validating Probability of Detection (POD) Capability of NDE Systems (DOEPOD) analyses of the nondestructive inspection data presented in the NTIAC, Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Capabilities Data Book. DOEPOD is designed as a decision support system to validate inspection system, personnel, and protocol demonstrating 0.90 POD with 95% confidence at critical flaw sizes, a90/95. Although 0.90 POD with 95% confidence at critical flaw sizes is often stated as an inspection requirement in inspection documents, including NASA Standards, NASA critical aerospace applications have historically only accepted 0.978 POD or better with a 95% one-sided lower confidence bound exceeding 0.90 at critical flaw sizes, a90/95.

Generazio, Edward R.↗

NASA Technical Standards Program

The NASA Technical Standards Program was officially established in 1997 as result of a directive issued by the Administrator. It is responsible for Agency wide technical standards development, adoption (endorsement), and conversion of Center-unique standards for Agency wide use. One major element of the Program is the review of NSA technical standards products and replacement with non-Government Voluntary Consensus Standards in accordance with directions issued by the Office of Management and Budget. As part of the Program's function, it developed a NASA Integrated Technical Standards Initiative that consists of and Agency wide full-text system, standards update notification system, and lessons learned-standards integration system. The Program maintains a 'one stop-shop' Website for technical standards ad related information on aerospace materials, etc. This paper provides information on the development, current status, and plans for the NAS Technical Standards Program along with metrics on the utility of the products provided to both users within the nasa.gov Domain and the Public Domain.

Gill, Paul S.↗

NASA Technical Standards Program

The NASA Technical Standards Program was officially established in 1997 as result of a directive issued by the Administrator. It is responsible for Agency wide technical standards development, adoption (endorsement), and conversion of Center-unique standards for Agency wide use. One major element of the Program is the review of NSA technical standards products and replacement with non-Government Voluntary Consensus Standards in accordance with directions issued by the Office of Management and Budget. As part of the Program s function, it developed a NASA Integrated Technical Standards Initiative that consists of and Agency wide full-text system, standards update notification system, and lessons learned - standards integration system. The Program maintains a "one stop-shop" Website for technical standards ad related information on aerospace materials, etc. This paper provides information on the development, current status, and plans for the NAS Technical Standards Program along with metrics on the utility of the products provided to both users within the nasa.gov Domain and the Public Domain.

Gill, Paul S.↗

Spaceflight Human System Standards

NASA created a new approach for human system integration and human performance standards. NASA created two documents a standard and a reference handbook. The standard is titled NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard (SFHSS) and consists of two-volumes: Volume 1- Crew Health This volume covers standards needed to support astronaut health (medical care, nutrition, sleep, exercise, etc.) Volume 2 Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health This volume covers the standards for system design that will maintain astronaut performance (ie., environmental factors, design of facilities, layout of workstations, and lighting requirements). It includes classic human factors requirements. The new standards document is written in terms so that it is applicable to a broad range of present and future NASA systems. The document states that all new programs prepare system-specific requirements that will meet the general standards. For example, the new standard does not specify a design should accommodate specific percentiles of a defined population. Rather, NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2 states that all programs shall prepare program-specific requirements that define the user population and their size ranges. The design shall then accommodate the full size range of those users. The companion reference handbook, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH), was developed to capture the design consideration information from NASA-STD-3000, and adds spaceflight lessons learned, gaps in knowledge, example solutions, and suggests research to further mature specific disciplines. The HIDH serves two major purposes: HIDH is the reference document for writing human factors requirements for specific systems. HIDH contains design guidance information that helps insure that designers create systems which safely and effectively accommodate the capabilities and limitations of space flight crews.

Holubec, Keith↗