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At least 73 records · Page 4

Readiness for First Crewed Flight

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to develop a generic framework for evaluating whether any given program has sufficiently complete and balanced plans in place to allow crewmembers to fly safely on a human spaceflight system for the first time (i.e., first crewed flight). The NESC assembled a small team which included experts with experience developing robotic and human spaceflight and aviation systems through first crewed test flight and into operational capability. The NESC team conducted a historical review of the steps leading up to the first crewed flights of Mercury through the Space Shuttle. Benchmarking was also conducted with the United States (U.S.) Air Force and U.S. Navy. This report contains documentation of that review.

Schaible, Dawn M.↗

Spacecraft Electrical Connector Selection and Application Processes

This assessment was initiated by the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) after a number of recent "high profile" connector problems, the most visible and publicized of these being the problem with the Space Shuttle's Engine Cut-Off System cryogenic feed-thru connector. The NESC commissioned a review of NASA's connector selection and application processes for space flight applications, including how lessons learned and past problem records are fed back into the processes to avoid recurring issues. Team members were primarily from the various NASA Centers and included connector and electrical parts specialists. The commissioned study was conducted on spacecraft connector selection and application processes at NASA Centers. The team also compared the NASA spacecraft connector selection and application process to the military process, identified recent high profile connector failures, and analyzed problem report data looking for trends and common occurrences. The team characterized NASA's connector problem experience into a list of top connector issues based on anecdotal evidence of a system's impact and commonality between Centers. These top issues are as follows, in no particular rank order: electrically shorted, bent and/or recessed contact pins, contact pin/socket contamination leading to electrically open or intermittencies, connector plating corrosion or corrosion of connector components, low or inadequate contact pin retention forces, contact crimp failures, unmated connectors and mis-wiring due to workmanship errors during installation or maintenance, loose connectors due to manufacturing defects such as wavy washer and worn bayonet retention, damaged connector elastomeric seals and cryogenic connector failure. A survey was also conducted of SAE Connector AE-8C1 committee members regarding their experience relative to the NASA concerns on connectors. The most common responses in order of occurrence were contact retention, plating issues, worn-out or damaged coupling mechanisms, bent pins, contact crimp barrel cracking and torn seals. In addition to these common themes, responses included issues with markings, dimensional errors on the build, contact/socket damage (handling), manufacturing defects and customer misapplication and mishandling. The NESC team concluded that considering the large quantity and wide variety of connectors successfully flown on human and robotic space applications, the number of failures is quite low. However, "high profile" failures with significant cost, schedule, safety, and/or mission success impacts continue to occur. It was also concluded that connector failures occur throughout a system's life-cycle with the majority of connector issues application related. A number of recommendations were identified for improving NASA connector selection processes and overall space connector reliability and performance.

Iannello, Chris↗

Small Launch Vehicle Concept Development for Affordable Multi-Stage Inline Configurations

The Advanced Concepts Office at NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center conducted a study of two configurations of a three-stage, inline, liquid propellant small launch vehicle concept developed on the premise of maximizing affordability by targeting a specific payload capability range based on current industry demand. The initial configuration, NESC-1, employed liquid oxygen as the oxidizer and rocket propellant grade kerosene as the fuel in all three stages. The second and more heavily studied configuration, NESC-4, employed liquid oxygen and RP-1 on the first and second stages and liquid oxygen and liquid methane fuel on the third stage. On both vehicles, sensitivity studies were first conducted on specific impulse and stage propellant mass fraction in order to baseline gear ratios and drive the focus of concept development. Subsequent sensitivity and trade studies on the NESC-4 concept investigated potential impacts to affordability due to changes in gross liftoff weight and/or vehicle complexity. Results are discussed at a high level to understand the impact severity of certain sensitivities and how those trade studies conducted can either affect cost, performance, or both.

Beers, Benjamin R.↗

Review of Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Tools for Verifying Command and Control Software

The Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Standing Review Board (SRB) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an independent review of the plan developed by Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) for identifying models and emulators to create a tool(s) to verify their command and control software. The NESC was requested to identify any issues or weaknesses in the GSDO plan. This document contains the outcome of the NESC review.

Aguilar, Michael L.↗

Small Launch Vehicle Concept Development for Affordable Multi-Stage Inline Configurations

The Advanced Concepts Office at NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center conducted a study of two configurations of a three stage, inline, liquid propellant small launch vehicle concept developed on the premise of maximizing affordability by targeting a specific payload capability range based on current industry demand. The initial configuration, NESC-1, employed liquid oxygen as the oxidizer and rocket propellant grade kerosene as the fuel in all three stages. The second and more heavily studied configuration, NESC-4, employed liquid oxygen and rocket propellant grade kerosene on the first and second stages and liquid oxygen and liquid methane fuel on the third stage. On both vehicles, sensitivity studies were first conducted on specific impulse and stage propellant mass fraction in order to baseline gear ratios and drive the focus of concept development. Subsequent sensitivity and trade studies on the NESC-4 configuration investigated potential impacts to affordability due to changes in gross liftoff weight and/or vehicle complexity. Results are discussed at a high level to understand the severity of certain sensitivities and how those trade studies conducted can either affect cost, performance or both.

Beers, Benjamin R.↗

Small Launch Vehicle Concept Development for Affordable Multi-Stage Inline Configurations

The Advanced Concepts Office at NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center conducted a study of two configurations of a three-stage, inline, liquid propellant small launch vehicle concept developed on the premise of maximizing affordability by targeting a specific payload capability range based on current and future industry demand. The initial configuration, NESC-1, employed liquid oxygen as the oxidizer and rocket propellant grade kerosene as the fuel in all three stages. The second and more heavily studied configuration, NESC-4, employed liquid oxygen and rocket propellant grade kerosene on the first and second stages and liquid oxygen and liquid methane fuel on the third stage. On both vehicles, sensitivity studies were first conducted on specific impulse and stage propellant mass fraction in order to baseline gear ratios and drive the focus of concept development. Subsequent sensitivity and trade studies on the NESC-4 concept investigated potential impacts to affordability due to changes in gross liftoff mass and/or vehicle complexity. Results are discussed at a high level to understand the impact severity of certain sensitivities and how those trade studies conducted can either affect cost, performance, or both.

Beers, Benjamin R.↗

Spin Forming Aluminum Crew Module (CM) Metallic Aft Pressure Vessel Bulkhead (APVBH) - Phase II

The principal focus of this project was to assist the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program in developing a spin forming fabrication process for manufacture of the Orion crew module (CM) aft pressure vessel bulkhead. The spin forming process will enable a single piece aluminum (Al) alloy 2219 aft bulkhead resulting in the elimination of the current multiple piece welded construction, simplify CM fabrication, and lead to an enhanced design. Phase I (NASA TM-2014-218163, (1)) of this assessment explored spin forming the single-piece CM forward pressure vessel bulkhead. The MPCV Program and Lockheed Martin (LM) recently made two critical decisions relative to the NESC Phase I work scope: (1) LM selected the spin forming process to manufacture a singlepiece aft bulkhead for the Orion CM, and (2) the aft bulkhead will be manufactured from Al 2219. Based on the Program's new emphasis related to the spin forming process, the NESC was asked to conduct a Phase II assessment to assist in the LM manufacture of the aft bulkhead and to conduct a feasibility study into spin forming the Orion CM cone. This activity was approved on June 19, 2013. Dr. Robert Piascik, NASA Technical Fellow for Materials at the Langley Research Center (LaRC), was selected to lead this assessment. The project plan was approved by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Review Board (NRB) on July 18, 2013. The primary stakeholders for this assessment are the NASA and LM MPCV Program offices. Additional benefactors are commercial launch providers developing CM concepts.

Hoffman, Eric K.↗

International Space Station (ISS) Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) Utilization Plan Assessment Update

The International Space Station (ISS) vehicle undergoes spacecraft charging as it interacts with Earth's ionosphere and magnetic field. The interaction can result in a large potential difference developing between the ISS metal chassis and the local ionosphere plasma environment. If an astronaut conducting extravehicular activities (EVA) is exposed to the potential difference, then a possible electrical shock hazard arises. The control of this hazard was addressed by a number of documents within the ISS Program (ISSP) including Catastrophic Safety Hazard for Astronauts on EVA (ISS-EVA-312-4A_revE). The safety hazard identified the risk for an astronaut to experience an electrical shock in the event an arc was generated on an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) surface. A catastrophic safety hazard, by the ISS requirements, necessitates mitigation by a two-fault tolerant system of hazard controls. Traditionally, the plasma contactor units (PCUs) on the ISS have been used to limit the charging and serve as a "ground strap" between the ISS structure and the surrounding ionospheric plasma. In 2009, a previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team evaluated the PCU utilization plan (NESC Request #07-054-E) with the objective to assess whether leaving PCUs off during non-EVA time periods presented risk to the ISS through assembly completion. For this study, in situ measurements of ISS charging, covering the installation of three of the four photovoltaic arrays, and laboratory testing results provided key data to underpin the assessment. The conclusion stated, "there appears to be no significant risk of damage to critical equipment nor excessive ISS thermal coating damage as a result of eliminating PCU operations during non- EVA times." In 2013, the ISSP was presented with recommendations from Boeing Space Environments for the "Conditional" Marginalization of Plasma Hazard. These recommendations include a plan that would keep the PCUs off during EVAs when the space environment forecast input to the ISS charging model indicates floating potentials (FP) within specified limits. These recommendations were based on the persistence of conditions in the space environment due to the current low solar cycle and belief in the accuracy and completeness of the ISS charging model. Subsequently, a Noncompliance Report (NCR), ISS-NCR-232G, Lack of Two-fault Tolerance to EVA Crew Shock in the Low Earth Orbit Plasma Environment, was signed in September 2013 specifying new guidelines for the use of shock hazard controls based on a forecast of the space environment from ISS plasma measurements taken prior to the EVA [ISS-EVA-312-AC, 2012]. This NESC assessment re-evaluates EVA charging hazards through a process that is based on over 14 years of ISS operations, charging measurements, laboratory tests, EMU studies and modifications, and safety reports. The assessment seeks an objective review of the plasma charging hazards associated with EVA operations to determine if any of the present hazard controls can safely change the PCU utilization plan to allow more flexibility in ISS operations during EVA preparation and execution.

Hernandez-Pellerano, Amri↗

Spin Forming Aluminum Crew Module (CM) Metallic Aft Pressure Vessel Bulkhead (APVBH) - Phase II

The principal focus of this project was to assist the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Program in developing a spin forming fabrication process for manufacture of the Orion crew module (CM) aft pressure vessel bulkhead. The spin forming process will enable a single piece aluminum (Al) alloy 2219 aft bulkhead resulting in the elimination of the current multiple piece welded construction, simplify CM fabrication, and lead to an enhanced design. Phase I (NASA TM-2014-218163 (1)) of this assessment explored spin forming the single-piece CM forward pressure vessel bulkhead. The Orion MPCV Program and Lockheed Martin (LM) recently made two critical decisions relative to the NESC Phase I work scope: (1) LM selected the spin forming process to manufacture a single-piece aft bulkhead for the Orion CM, and (2) the aft bulkhead will be manufactured from Al 2219. Based on the Program's new emphasis related to the spin forming process, the NESC was asked to conduct a Phase II assessment to assist in the LM manufacture of the aft bulkhead and to conduct a feasibility study into spin forming the Orion CM cone. This activity was approved on June 19, 2013. Dr. Robert Piascik, NASA Technical Fellow for Materials at the Langley Research Center (LaRC), was selected to lead this assessment. The project plan was approved by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Review Board (NRB) on July 18, 2013. The primary stakeholders for this assessment were the NASA and LM MPCV Program offices. Additional benefactors are commercial launch providers developing CM concepts.

Hoffman, Eric K.↗

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) (Orion) Occupant Protection: Appendices - Part 1

Dr. Nancy J. Currie, of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), Chief Engineer at Johnson Space Center (JSC), requested an assessment of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) occupant protection as a result of issues identified by the Constellation Program and Orion Project. The NESC, in collaboration with the Human Research Program (HRP), investigated new methods associated with occupant protection for the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), known as Orion. The primary objective of this assessment was to investigate new methods associated with occupant protection for the CEV, known as Orion, that would ensure the design provided minimal risk to the crew during nominal and contingency landings in an acceptable set of environmental and spacecraft failure conditions. This documents contains the appendices to the NESC assessment report. NASA/TM-2013-217380, Application of the Brinkley Dynamic Response Criterion to Spacecraft Transient Dynamic Events supersedes this document.

Currie-Gregg, Nancy J.↗

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) (Orion) Occupant Protection

Dr. Nancy J. Currie, of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), Chief Engineer at Johnson Space Center (JSC), requested an assessment of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) occupant protection as a result of issues identified by the Constellation Program and Orion Project. The NESC, in collaboration with the Human Research Program (HRP), investigated new methods associated with occupant protection for the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), known as Orion. The primary objective of this assessment was to investigate new methods associated with occupant protection for the CEV, known as Orion, that would ensure the design provided minimal risk to the crew during nominal and contingency landings in an acceptable set of environmental and spacecraft failure conditions. This documents contains the outcome of the NESC assessment. NASA/TM-2013-217380, "Application of the Brinkley Dynamic Response Criterion to Spacecraft Transient Dynamic Events." supercedes this document.

Currie-Gregg, Nancy J.↗

Large Male Anthropomorphic Test Device (ATD) Finite Element Model (FEM) Correlation Improvement

As part of an activity for the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team conducted tests of small female, medium male, and large male Hybrid III anthropomorphic test device (ATD) head-neck complexes. The results were compared to simulation results from ATD finite element model (FEM) predictions to determine the validity and fidelity of ATD models for use in certifying CCP vehicles. The NESC was requested to help improve the large male ATD FEM to better represent physical responses. This report contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Kelly, Michael J.↗

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV) Damage Tolerance Life Analysis Methodology and Test Best Practices

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Deputy Director requested an independent assessment to develop data to understand the limitations of linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) computational methods used to predict fatigue crack growth rate (da/dN) behavior of small detectable cracks in thin metal liners for composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs). The NESC assessment team was also requested to demonstrate a test-based methodology for validating damage tolerance requirements for COPVs with elastically responding metal liners where LEFM methods are not appropriate. This report contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels; Linear Ela↗

Buckling of Thin-Walled Circular Cylinders

Recent industry and NASA experience with the development of launch vehicle structures have indicated a need for updated monographs for the design of buckling-critical structures that account for state-of-the-art structural configurations, material systems, and computational tools. This monograph provides an update to NASA SP-8007 (circa 1965, and 1968) and was prepared under the cognizance of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). It summarizes all significant knowledge and experience accumulated from the NESC Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor (SBKF) Assessment (NESC Assessment #: 07-010-E) to date for use in the design of buckling-critical thin-walled circular cylinders. The format and terminology used in this monograph is similar to previous versions of NASA SP-8007 for ease of understanding and implementation. In addition, as with the design recommendations contained in the previous versions of NASA SP-8007, this monograph is to be regarded as a guideline to design and not as a NASA requirement, unless specified in formal program requirements. Furthermore, it is expected that the guidelines presented in this monograph will be updated as appropriate. Designers are advised to stay abreast of updates in the state-of-the-art and corresponding design criteria.

Buckling↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletins 2007-2023

An NESC Technical Bulletin captures critical knowledge in the form of new engineering information or best practices in a one-page format that have resulted from NESC independent testing, analysis, and assessments. This document contains all NESC Technical Bulletins from 2007 through 2023.

additive manufacturing, battery, braycote, capacit↗

Arecibo Observatory Auxiliary M4N Socket Termination Failure Investigation

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to support the Arecibo Observatory failure investigation in determining the root cause of the Auxiliary M4N cable failure. The NESC and Kennedy Space Center led an integrated NASA investigation with support from Marshall Space Flight Center and The Aerospace Corporation that included forensic investigation of failed hardware, finite element modeling, materials characterization, and root cause analysis. This document contains the outcome of the NESC Assessment.

Zinc Spelter Sockets↗

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

NASA Exploration Systems Maintainability Standards for Artemis and Beyond

This assessment was requested by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), which, based on findings from the NESC study “Safe Human Expeditions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO)” (Valinia et al., 2022), determined its topic to be an underrecognized critical and urgent Agency need, due to impending Artemis vehicle procurements. The principal objective of this assessment was to review and update current Agency-level maintainability requirements for space systems to support crew on expeditions beyond LEO in both preventive and corrective maintenance. This report contains the results of the NESC assessment.

Orbital Replacement Units↗