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DOE OSTI2022

International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Alarm Interdiction and Adjudication and Source Recovery (Day 4) [Slides]

The objective of this presentation is for participants to understand the process for interdicting and adjudicating radiation alarms and review operational scenarios for radiological emergency response best practices. The specific goal is for participants to: (1) Become familiar with the Primary and Secondary Inspection process for alarm interdiction, investigation, and adjudication, (2) Gain knowledge of common operational scenarios where alarm interdiction, investigation and adjudication are conducted as best practices, and (3) Review several scenarios that could be encountered as part of the Nuclear Security measures for an MPE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Understanding Competing Risks

Highlights: • Clinicians and researchers need to be cognizant of competing risks (ie, the occurrence of an event that precludes future development of the outcome of interest). • Censoring is appropriate when a patient being censored at a particular time (eg, owing to loss to follow-up) is deemed to have approximately the same future risk of developing the outcome of interest as patients still being followed, and when the reason for censoring is not related to events of interest. • Censoring is not appropriate in many scenarios; for example, a dead patient can never develop a future cancer recurrence or late effect. • Kaplan-Meier (KM) analysis is commonly used for a time-to-event analysis when the primary outcome (eg, overall survival) has no meaningful competing risk and censoring is appropriate. Cox proportional hazards modeling can be used for multivariable analysis to examine the association between covariates and the primary outcome. • In the presence of competing events, incorrect use of the KM analysis will likely lead to an overestimation of the risk of the outcome of interest and biased estimates from both univariable and multivariable analyses. Therefore, KM usually should not be used to determine local recurrence risk because humanity is always at risk for dying, which is a competing risk. • A competing risk analysis is therefore most appropriate when there are competing events to the primary outcome of interest. The most commonly used multivariable model in these situations is the Fine-Gray model. • Many fundamental questions in radiation oncology—local and regional recurrence, treatment-related toxicity—are best addressed using competing risk methodologies.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2022

NIRP Core Software Suite v.5.1

SAND2023-06610O The Nuclear Incident Response Program (NIRP) Core Software Suite is a set of code that supports multiple applications. It includes miscellaneous base code for data objects, mathematic equations, and user interface components that are used for developing large applications, including those used for data management. Among the types of applications: • Analyst Manager is used for managing contact information, which is also often included in reports and identifies the owners of calculations. • Radionuclide Viewer provides access to the Dose Coefficient File Package (DCFPAK) radiological data, and it complements the Mixture Manager tool. • Mixture Manager creates and manages radionuclides mixtures that are commonly used in other applications. • High Explosive Manager manages explosives and properties. • Chart Viewer is used for data charts such as meteorology charts and other charts specific to data needs. • Unit Converter converts numeric values to/from different units. This package includes object-oriented base code such as data objects describing the date, time, and location of an event; weather conditions; data types that support predefined ranges of values; a unit library, and others. The package also includes mathematic equations such as determining the distance between two points; erf functions; factorial functions; incidence fractions of probit curves; and others. Other features are customized user interface components for text fields; unit selectors (combo boxes); menus; panels; bug-tracking; and automated checks for software updates. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Collins, Ian↗
DOE OSTI2022

Logistic Regression in Clinical Studies

• A logistic regression model is used when the outcome of interest is binary. The term “logistic” refers to the underlying “logit” (log odds) function that is used to model the binary outcome. • Odds ratios are produced from a logistic regression model and have a useful interpretation. • Tips, tricks and concepts used to fit logistic regression models are similar to those used in linear regression models. • Modeling building that is knowledge-based rather than automatic is preferred in most applications of logistic regression. • A logistic regression model that is overparameterized (ie, too many variables for too few events) can result in odds ratios that are implausibly large and confidence intervals that are wide and uninterpretable. These types of “overfitted” models should be avoided. • Logistic regression models can be fit using most standard statistical software.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Investigation of candidates for reactor produced radioactive materials in support of radiological training exercises

Bromine-82, Potassium-42 and Copper-64 have been successfully adopted as radioactive surrogates for outdoor large area contamination training. The goal of this project was to discover new materials that could supplement potassium bromide (KBr) and copper pellets in radiological dispersal device (RDD) training events to reduce the down time of the training fields and to broaden the toolbox of the RDD surrogate training event program at Idaho National Laboratory. Of the ten different materials investigated, sodium nitrite, gallium metal, and gallium oxide presented the greatest promise as potential materials to replace potassium bromide in RDD training events.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2021

METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS BASED ON DYNAMIC FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELING

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants (NPPs). It reviews the conservatisms in conventional physical security posture and regulations. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The dynamic assessment methodology leverages EMRALD to process results of force-on-force (FOF) simulations and crediting safety mitigation actions from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models as well as diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) mitigation strategies. Timing information from these simulations are compared against the available time to perform mitigations obtained from Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5) simulations. To illustrate the methodology, a station blackout (SBO) attack scenario was modeled in commercially available FOF simulation tools. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes and as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD, and were dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. RELAP5 simulations incorporating human and hardware uncertainties were performed to estimate the distribution of time-to-core damage. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, plant mitigation strategies provide significantly high-likelihood of preventing radiological release. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1991

Radioactive satellites - Intact reentry and breakup by debris impact

There is a substantial mass of radioactive material in nuclear reactors or radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs) in orbit about the earth. This paper examines the reentry of intact nuclear fuel cores and RTGs and the fragmentation and subsequent radioactive debris cloud deposition and evolution resulting from the impact of orbital debris upon an orbiting reactor, fuel core, or RTG. To assess the intact reentry, decay rates and a predicted decay date using historical and projected orbital decay data, are estimated. The current NASA debris environment model is utilized to estimate impact rates and debris cloud evolution of a fragmentation event. Results of these analyses are compared and concepts are tendered which would tend to minimize the radiological debris hazard to personnel and structures both on the earth's surface and in low earth orbit.

Anz-Meador, P. D.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Simplified Approach for Scoping Assessment of Non-LWR Source Terms

This report describes a structure to aid in evaluation of release mitigation strategies across a range of reactor technologies. The assessment performed for example reactor concepts utilizes previous studies of postulated accident sequences for each reactor concept. This simplified approach classifies release mitigation strategies based on a range of barriers, physical attenuation processes, and system performance. It is not, however, intended to develop quantitative estimates of radiological release magnitudes and compositions to the environment. Rather, this approach is intended to identify the characteristics of a reactor design concepts release mitigation strategies that are most important to different classes of accident scenarios. It uses a scoping methodology to provide an approximate, order-of-magnitude, estimate of the radiological release to the environment and associated off-site consequences. This scoping method is applied to different reactor concepts, considering the performance of barriers to fission product release for these concepts under sample accident scenarios. The accident scenarios and sensitivity evaluations are selected in this report to evaluate the role of different fission product barriers in ameliorating the source term to the environment and associated off-site consequences. This report applies this structure to characterize how release mitigation measures are integrated to define overall release mitigation strategies for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs), Sodium Fast Reactors (SFRs), and liquid fueled Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs). To support this evaluation framework, factors defining a chain of release attenuation stages, and thus an overall mitigation strategy, must be established through mechanistic source term calculations. This has typically required the application of an integral plant analysis code such as MELCOR. At present, there is insufficient evidence to support a priori evaluation of the effectiveness of a release mitigation strategy for advanced reactor concepts across the spectrum of events that could challenge the radiological containment function. While it is clear that these designs have significant margin to radiological release to the environment for the scenarios comprising the design basis, detailed studies have not yet been performed to assess the risk profile for these plants. Such studies would require extensive evaluation across a reasonably complete spectrum of accident scenarios that could lead to radiological release to the environment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2: Vol. 2—User’s Guide for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code

Version 2.0 of the RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code is designed to support the implementation of protective action guides (PAGs) after a nuclear emergency incident including a radiological dispersal device (RDD) and/or an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident (EPA 2017). Eight different group types, addressing various decisions, are available for selection. The RESRAD-RDD&IND code calculates radiological doses, stay times, etc., for the selected group that the user wishes to focus on. (That is, the results for all the groups are not calculated simultaneously, and the input for those other groups do not matter, although some parameter values are shared between groups.) Version 2.0 has a user-friendly interface so that the RESRAD-RDD&IND code can be used with minimal training. For example, the user can select the major characteristics of the problem-event type, source term, and decision type from the left side of the interface and then calculate the results with the default assumptions for the exposure scenarios. More in-depth analysis would include specifying site-specific exposure scenario characteristics in the right side of the interface. The procedures for data entry and results viewing are self-explanatory. This is because common window maneuvering features and text instructions were incorporated in the interface design. General and context-specific help are available to aid users entering parameter values, as well. The RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code gives the user the option to select either an RDD or IND incident for analysis. For an RDD event analysis, 11 radionuclides (Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, Po-210, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-226, and Sr-90) are included. These 11 radionuclides are the radionuclides most likely used for an RDD. More than 90 radionuclides can be selected for an IND event analysis. Initial default concentrations are provided for 44 radionuclides for a uranium-fueled IND event. These 44 radionuclides are those that would contribute significantly to the radiation dose associated with a uranium-fueled bomb detonation. The radionuclides generated from ingrowth of these 44 initial radionuclides are also automatically included in the analysis. Pu-239, Cs-134m, Ru-105, and Rb-89 and their progeny can be selected for analysis if they are detected and their concentrations are determined. This user’s guide, which is Volume 2 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2, provides instructions to users on how to install the RESRAD-RDD&IND code, navigate the interface, and use the various features, including those discussed above, to set up an analysis and view/print the results in text outputs. Volume 1 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2 (Yu et al. 2026), which contains descriptions of the methodology and theoretical basis for dose modeling and the mathematical equations implemented in the code, can be accessed and viewed through the Help menu in the code or can be downloaded from the RESRAD website (https://resrad.evs.anl.gov).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Modernization of Radiation Therapy Services in Cambodia: A Model of International Collaboration

Cambodia is a Southeast Asian low-middle-income country with a population of >15 million. In 2020, Cambodia was estimated to have 18,375 new diagnoses of cancer and 12,638 deaths attributable to cancer. Cambodia was estimated to have a deficit of 16 megavoltage machines in 2012. Cambodia's radiation therapy services have suffered through the tumultuous events of the country's history, with intermittent services until the last decade. In recent years, Cambodia has undergone rapid economic growth and, with this, the development of its first comprehensive cancer center, the National Cancer Centre (NCC).

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI1993

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1993

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Full core LOCA safety analysis for a PWR containing high burnup fuel

For economic reasons, the US nuclear industry is renewing efforts to build a technical basis to extend peak rod average burnup limits above the current regulatory burnup limit of 62 GWd/MTU. The primary driver of these efforts is to economically increase pressurized water reactor (PWR) cycle lengths to 24 months, reduce the number of fresh fuel assemblies, increase time online, thereby reducing number of outages and their associated cost, higher fuel utilization, and possibly reduce core design constraints. In order for US nuclear utilities to leverage these economic efficiencies, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will likely require nuclear power plants (NPPs) to analyze a number of potential operational occurrences and their potential consequences with each new core design prior to resuming normal operation. Potential operational occurrences can be divided into three primary regimes: (1) normal operation, (2) anticipated operation occurrences (AOOs), and (3) design basis accidents (DBAs). Normal plant operation is an operating regime in which the plant operates within specified operational limits until the end of the cycle, whereas AOOs are events that result in the NPP deviating outside the normal operating regime. A key attribute of an AOO is that the occurrence should be expected. However, by definition, the occurrence of an AOO does not result in significant impact to critical safety functions. The last potential operational occurrence is a DBA. From the fuel performance point-of-view, DBAs can be subdivided into two bounding categories: (1) loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs), and (2) reactivity insertion accidents (RIAs). Unlike AOOs, DBAs may result in fuel rod failure. The NRC imposes fundamental acceptance criteria to minimize radiological consequences to the public and onsite staff. Furthermore, safety criteria are typically linked to the fulfillment of other acceptance criteria related to reactor safety equipment designed to mitigate DBAs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Modeling and Simulation to Characterize Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Source Terms to Support a Regulatory Approval Pathway for Right-Sized Emergency Planning Zone. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (A-BWR) Project Phase 2

The United States Department of Energy (US DOE) is currently supporting the development of various small modular reactor (SMR), microreactor and advanced reactor designs. These reactors have improved safety features as compared to conventional Large Light Water Reactors (LLWRs), which include features that improve potential reduction of radiological source terms in the event of design and beyond-design basis accidents. Specifically, some reactors feature a relatively smaller containment volume with respect to the available surface area for fission product deposition; these include Integrated Pressurized Water Reactors (iPWRs), such as the NuScale SMR and SMR-type Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) such as General Electric-Hitachi’s BWRX-300 design.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI1988

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 259 Fifteenth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting by E. G. Silver; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 284 Reliability Technology to Improve and/or Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Performance by S. Karimian and J. H. Taylor, 293 A Noise Diagnostics System for Operator Advice by G. Hessel, P. Liewers, P. Schumann, W. Schmitt, and F.-P. Weiss; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 307 A Passive Containment System for Advanced Light-Water Reactors by O. B. Falls, Jr., and F. W. Kleimola; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 318 Data Base Construction for a Computerized Radiological Risk Investigation System by L. M. Hively, J. E. Nyquist, J. L. Bledsoe, and A. L. Sjoreen, 326 Erratum to "Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety," Vol. 29, No. 1; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 327 Operational Safety Experience and Passive Safety Testing at the Fast Flux Text Facility by Q. L. Baird, J. L. Rathbun, D. D. Stepnewski, R. L. Stover, and A. E. Waltar, 344 Backfilling of Independent Residual Heat Removal Systems in West Germany and Switzerland by G. Eckert and Y. Salomon, 353 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 356 Selected Safety-Related Events Compiled by G. A. Murphy, 363 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 384 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 390 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 395 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 400 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31,1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 283 International ENS/ANS Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety "NUCSAFE 88", 317 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 407 Second International Seminar on Small- and Medium-Sized Nuclear Reactors, 407 International Workshop on New Developments in Occupational Dose Control and ALARA Implementation at Nuclear Power Plants and Similar Facilities, 408 Fourth International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics (NURETH-4), 404 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1988

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 259 Fifteenth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting by E. G. Silver; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 284 Reliability Technology to Improve and/or Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Performance by S. Karimian and J. H. Taylor, 293 A Noise Diagnostics System for Operator Advice by G. Hessel, P. Liewers, P. Schumann, W. Schmitt, and F.-P. Weiss; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 307 A Passive Containment System for Advanced Light-Water Reactors by O. B. Falls, Jr., and F. W. Kleimola; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 318 Data Base Construction for a Computerized Radiological Risk Investigation System by L. M. Hively, J. E. Nyquist, J. L. Bledsoe, and A. L. Sjoreen, 326 Erratum to "Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety," Vol. 29, No. 1; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 327 Operational Safety Experience and Passive Safety Testing at the Fast Flux Text Facility by Q. L. Baird, J. L. Rathbun, D. D. Stepnewski, R. L. Stover, and A. E. Waltar, 344 Backfilling of Independent Residual Heat Removal Systems in West Germany and Switzerland by G. Eckert and Y. Salomon, 353 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 356 Selected Safety-Related Events Compiled by G. A. Murphy, 363 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 384 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 390 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 395 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 400 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31,1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 283 International ENS/ANS Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety "NUCSAFE 88", 317 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 407 Second International Seminar on Small- and Medium-Sized Nuclear Reactors, 407 International Workshop on New Developments in Occupational Dose Control and ALARA Implementation at Nuclear Power Plants and Similar Facilities, 408 Fourth International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics (NURETH-4), 404 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Summary of Factory Fueling and Testing Risks to Support the Transformation of Regulatory Requirements for Microreactors

Microreactors have the potential to open new markets and applications for nuclear energy. New manufacturing and operational regimes, such as factory fueling and testing prior to site installation, are being proposed to meet these new markets. The radiological hazards associated with traditional commercial power reactors are not the same as the hazards of a reactor being constructed in a factory. Currently, a reactor operating license specified under 10 CFR Part 50, Part 52, or (in the near future) Part 53 is required prior to loading fuel in the reactor. This is logical for plants that are immediately to begin full-power operations soon after fuel loading. However, for microreactors, this may not be the case. Some deployment concepts may stage reactors as “ready to go” in a factory prior to site installation and startup. This approach is being considered in the case of diesel generator replacements, mobile or roaming mining operations, and emergency response situations, such as after a major disaster event. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate hazards assuming low power operation for a short irradiation time. This report investigates the primary hazards unique to microreactors associated with low power reactor and physics tests necessary to confirm core safety assumptions, neutronic and core design performance parameters, and other assumptions.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗