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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2020

Mixed-Material Scintillators (MMSS Quarterly Report FY20Q2)

This project aims to invent, model, and prototype mixed-material scintillator systems (MMSSs), a new class of radiation detectors that use heterogenous internal structures of different scintillating materials to detect additional properties of radiation. These internal structures can be produced using additive manufacture (3D printing) of scintillator, a currently emerging application of additive manufacture technology. MMSSs combine the low cost and complexity of conventional scintillation detectors with capabilities currently only available in more expensive and complex detectors. By identifying promising MMSS designs, this project will enable a new class of detectors to meet DNN’s mission needs for SNM detection. This quarter, we delivered one the MMSS Particle-ID Modeling report, a major deliverable of this project. This report describes our results on simulations of the particle-ID (PID) class of detectors. We found that these detectors outperform competing approaches for neutron-gamma discrimination, neutron source pointing, and neutron spectroscopy. Further highlights of the report are described below. During this quarter, We alerted HQ to a change in schedule for the remaining simulations planned for this project: we plan to put off further simulation and reporting of the position-resolving (PR) detector class until July. This change in schedule has allowed us to go into additional detail in the PID work that is both very promising and motivates our upcoming proposal. The other active task in this project is prototyping 3D-printed scintillators with the aim of realizing the designs we’ve simulated. On that front, we had three focuses: measuring the light output, increasing the size of printed parts, and combining blue and green scintillators. We succeeded in measuring the light output, showing an output of 30% of commercial standard. This result leaves room for improvement but is within striking distance of where we need to be. We were on track to demonstrate a key requirement for increasing the size of parts and also to show combined green/blue prints before the laboratory moved to a Minimum Safe (MinSafe) Operations posture as a result of local Shelter In Place orders due to Covid-19.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Resilience as a Deterrence Strategy

This paper was written by the Cyber Deterrence and Resilience Strategic Initiative in partnership with the Resilience Energy Systems Strategic Initiative. Resilience and deterrence are both part of a comprehensive cyber strategy where tactics may overlap across defense, resilience, deterrence, and other strategic spaces. This paper explores how building resiliency in cyberspace can not only serve to strengthen the defender's posture and capabilities in a general sense but also deter adversaries from attacking.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework: Applying the NIST Risk Management Process

In an effort to strengthen the cybersecurity posture for federal agencies and reduce the time and complexities of following the Risk Management Framework (RMF) six-step process, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory has dedicated research into expanding the existing Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework to provide functionality that aids in the RMF steps. Users will have the opportunity to learn, document, and review the framework, saving time and resources. Existing functionality within the web application will continue to be available with added features for usability.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Department of Energy Hydrogen Program Plan

The DOE Hydrogen Program Plan provides a strategic view of how the Department conducts and coordinates hydrogen research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) activities under the DOE Hydrogen Program. With participation from the Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy, Nuclear Energy, Electricity, Science, and ARPA-E, the DOE Hydrogen Program is a coordinated Departmental effort to advance the affordable production, transport, storage, and use of carbon-neutral hydrogen across different sectors of the economy. This version of the Plan updates and expands upon previous versions, including the Hydrogen Posture Plan and the DOE Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Program Plan, and provides a coordinated high-level summary of hydrogen-related activities across DOE.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2020

DOE-NE LWRS Integrated Program Plan - Physical Security Pathway

Domestic nuclear power is facing increased financial pressures from a variety of areas and there is pressure on these utilities to reduce their cost of operation. Currently, about 20%-30% of all on-site personnel are related to physical security. The LWRS Program recognized that R&D related to physical security could play a role in providing nuclear utilities technical and staffing efficiency options to meet their physical security commitments, but utilities often lack the technical basis or the ability to create the technical basis to realize or implement these efficiencies; towards this end, the LWRS Program created the Physical Security Pathway in September 2019. The pathway performs R&D to develop methods, tools, and technologies to optimize and modernize a nuclear power facility’s security posture. The pathway will: (1) conduct research on risk-informed techniques for physical security that account for a dynamic adversary; (2) apply advanced modeling and simulation tools to better inform physical-security scenarios and reduce uncertainties in force-on-force modeling; (3) assess benefits from proposed enhancements and novel mitigation strategies and explore changes to best practices, guides, or regulation to enable modernization; and (4) enhance and provide the technical basis for stakeholders to employ new security methods, tools, and technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Testbeds for test Readiness: Strategic Snapshot

Test bed engineering, monitoring for underground explosive and nuclear testing will be needed if the United States returns to a test posture of nuclear device testing. To maintain and rebuild the capability of test readiness, agile cost-effective test beds are needed and LANL as well as NNSS are the perfect locations to do this. Shallow and deep boreholes should be created to research containment science, diagnostic placement and optimization, coupling and emplacement science, tracer use for fracture and cratering research, and validation of test article performance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Identification and Testing of Electric Vehicle Fast Charger Cybersecurity Mitigations

Fast-charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is needed to enable and achieve the national goals of transitioning the vehicle fleet toward more electrification. Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) have jointly worked to identify, evaluate, and mitigate potential cyber-related consequences associated with fast charger systems. NREL contributed by considering cyberattack scenarios and consequences associated with integrating distributed energy resources (DERs) at fast-charging stations. The dynamic nature of fast-charger load profiles would encourage site operators to incorporate solar for energy cost reduction and energy storage for peak demand cost management at future charging facilities with multiple fast chargers at a site. These energy resources would be monitored and coordinated via a site energy management controller with data exchange between devices and local power metering infrastructure; thus, networking between devices and the design of the system becomes important in the overall cybersecurity posture. In addition, component vendors and system operators might have remote interfaces to any of these systems. It is therefore important to understand the breadth of the cyberattack surface and potential strategies to mitigate impacts. This project has focused on components and protocols expected to be found within a local charging site that includes multiple chargers and DER resources. Our methods and results are summarized in this final report.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Machine Learning Modeling Pipeline for Extracting Nuclear Proliferation Events of Interest from Open Data Sources (U)

In FY2020, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the Sanghani Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University entered a collaboration funded by Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development. The project’s mission was to take the first steps toward developing a demonstration prototype system that uses multiple machine learning and data analytics methods on largescale open data sources to identify new, developing, and/or undeclared nuclear programs. Given the SRNL team’s on-site perspective of events culminating in the DOE’s decision to pursue the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), the team targeted the identification of events and indicators in retrospective datasets that pointed to the activity of “fissile core fabrication at the Savannah River Site” prior to the official announcement in May of 2018. A preliminary modeling pipeline was developed in FY20 that showed the datasets contained adequate signal for continuation of efforts. In FY21, a modular demonstration prototype modeling pipeline has continued in development for two text-based data sources: a broad internet archive (Webhose Ltd.) and a decahose Twitter database (i.e., a global sampling of one in every ten Tweets). The techniques that have been developed rely on graph theory and anomaly detection to identify contextual shifts in key words and phrases at various points in time such that indicators of events of interest could be identified and subsequently, events could be extracted from the corpuses. The foundational concept behind the approaches is that contextual shifts in key words and phrases can act as indicators of events of interest. Both datasets have proven successful in extracting events of interest related to pit production at the Savannah River Site prior to the official announcement. In addition, the pipelines have generated a wide range of events broadly summarized as: the awarding of DOE contracts at major sites, DOE investments in various programs, accidents at DOE national laboratories, speculations about the fate of pit production in the DOE complex, domestic and international shipments and receipts of nuclear materials at DOE sites, termination of non-proliferation agreements with Russia, termination of MOX, new weapons development approvals/testing, nuclear posture reviews, major DOE cleanup/production milestones, political opinions, and nuclear watch groups’ opinions, among many others.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Energy and Water Resilience Indicator Library

Energy and water resilience indicators provide a way to assess a site’s current energy and water resilience status relative to higher-level organizational goals. Using a consistent approach for evaluating the resilience posture of a portfolio of sites provides a mechanism for an organization to track progress over time. It also provides a mechanism for identifying opportunity areas across sites so that organizations can prioritize funding of measures that would benefit multiple sites. The information presented in this document provides an approach to defining energy and water resilience indicators that align with organizational goals, and a reference library of indicators that can help organizations create their own process of tracking the resilience performance of their sites over time.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Guide to the Distributed Energy Resource Risk Management Framework

The emergence of distributed energy resources (DERs) has transformed the electric power sector and will likely have even more profound impacts on the future evolution of the United States energy sector as it modernizes and becomes more reliant upon complex informatics programming and systems to ensure that our power grid remains safe from malicious interference. To mitigate risks associated with the increased and diversified use of DERs, the Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) was developed in 2019. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory extended the scope of the DER-CF to include the RMF. To address the challenges faced by federal energy managers and energy system stakeholders in applying the RMF to DER systems, the Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) is a six-step process to proactively manage cybersecurity risk in a methodical manner. The DER-RM is independent of the DER-CF's existing assessment, allowing users to focus specifically on the RMF steps. The tools are targeted to different processes - DER-CF enables organizations to perform self-assessments to improve their cybersecurity posture, while DER-RM assists organizations in achieving compliance with specific requirements. This document provides an overview of the DER-RM. The RMF process outlined in this report serves as a guide to diagnose information and operational system threats, gather required materials to comply with industry standards, and document plans for achieving Authority to Operate. Using the DER-RM, federal agencies and other organizations can easily and intuitively follow the RMF process, manage the risks to their grid-edge infrastructure through the integration of their on-site DERs, and comply with appropriate requirements.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Using Splunk® Enterprise Search Commands for Advanced Analysis of Ivanti Connect Secure© Logs

Analyzing the logs of even the smallest Information Technology (IT) system can be a challenge considering they can generate millions of lines of log data in a very short time. Splunk® Enterprise is an industry leading tool that allows analysis of log data, which can enhance troubleshooting capabilities, improve system performance, and improve the security posture of an IT system. Ivanti Connect Secure© (ICS) is a market-leading platform powered by the Ivanti Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) appliance, providing an architecture for secure access to and protection of network resources. This paper describes an approach for using Splunk Enterprise search capabilities to perform advanced data analysis of ICS logs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Towards a New Supply Chain Cybersecurity Risk Analysis Technique

Supply chain cyber-attacks, such as the SolarWinds Orion attack, are occurring with greater frequency. These attacks compromise a digital device before it is sent to customers, bypassing traditional security controls to remain persistent and undetected in operational environments. While supply chain attacks are prevalent, methods for analyzing the risk of these attacks are currently unavailable. This paper proposes new supply chain cyber-attack difficulty and risk metrics to evaluate the relative risk of an attack throughout the supply chain lifecycle. Difficulty metrics for each stakeholder in a digital device’s supply chain (e.g., hardware manufacturing, firmware development, software development, storage, and distribution entities) are calculated using scores from cybersecurity maturity questionnaires in a Bayesian Network leaky Noisy-MAX model. These difficulty metrics are then used to calculate an overall supply chain cyber-attack risk. Vulnerability and recoverability metrics are also proposed to evaluate the relative stakeholder influence in the attack risk. These proposed relative risk metrics enable continuous supply chain monitoring, provide decision-makers with information necessary for improved supplier selection, and help drive improvements in the cybersecurity posture of the stakeholders in their supply chain.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) identifies DARHT as a weapons mission critical facility along with the need to modernize DARHT to support weapons modernization efforts. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75 th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding with no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Indoor Occupant Counting by RF Backscattering

Building HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) consumes approximately 13% of all energy consumption in USA. Motion detectors, cameras and user programmable thermostats have been shown to be ineffective for HVAC controls to save energy, mostly due to the user concerns of comfort, reliability and privacy. A new HVAC control system based on real-time occupant counting that is fully automated, highly accurate, economically sensible and preserving privacy and aesthetics can thus bring forth a disruptive impact to this large energy sector. Our indoor occupant monitoring technology is based on the radio-frequency identification system (RFID), deployed in the room, not on the occupants. One reader with four antennas can be deployed on the ceiling or behind the ceiling panels for every thousand square feet in home, office and assisted living, with or without room partitions. The sticker-like passive tag, 10 cents each and maintenance-free, are profusely hidden on the wall or inside the furniture at arbitrary position, preserving privacy and aesthetics. The large number of tags can realize diverse observation points to accommodate arbitrary room layouts, which is impractical by other active units of camera, infrared, radar or lidar. With 20 tags, the system can reliably detect the number of occupants. For 100 tags, occupant posture and location can be known. The technology has been verified in the research labs and test buildings with very high accuracy. When the real-time occupant number can be accurately known without assuming devices on occupants or occupant motion, the building HVAC system can be automated to achieve building energy saving without sacrificing occupant comfort. According to our limited testing in a few types of building models and the simplified cost calculation, the RFID system has low overall cost in production, deployment, operation and maintenance. The signal processing algorithm based on machine learning requires very small number of training cases as most learning is transferrable for various layouts, and very low computational needs during operation, according to our testing in four different room sizes and layouts. In our preliminary estimate from HVAC saving alone, the RFID system can potentially pay for itself within 1.5 years, in addition to the other enhancement in building automation systems (BAS). Our commercialization strategy and business pitch deck focus on venturing this Cornell occupant monitoring technology into BAS and energy management markets. We have identified three broad BAS market segments of senior living, residential buildings, and office buildings. We have put together the minimum viable product characteristics for these identified segments, including analyses on total cost and competing technologies, as well as the fit and technical gaps for these market segments. We intend to bring the technology to market by licensing or partnering with existing BAS vendors. A list of potential collaborators and licensing partner candidates was assembled for different aspects of integrating our technology into a potential product that can be used with BAS.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2022

FIC Threat Profile: Provided by Shamrock Cyber

The FIC team has engaged with PNNL’s Shamrock Cyber Team to produce this Threat Profile. The Threat Profile provides the foundation for a thorough understanding of threats for development teams and stakeholders, and users of the system. The Threat Profile can be used as is, or as content to inform other reports tailored to a specific audience. It is intended to enable decision makers at all levels to improve the security posture of the system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Approach and Model Used to Represent a Timeline Analysis for Security Design Enhancements

Next-generation reactors will be able to use risk to inform and performance base the licensing of many aspects of the reactor, facility, and site design, including attributes of physical security. There are several factors related to security, including site topography, reactor design, and physical protection system components, to consider when designing the physical protection system into the overall facility design and plan of operation. With the versatility of advanced reactors, especially micro reactors, methods are needed to simplify and quickly evaluate potential timelines for designing a site configuration. This report describes an approach to generate qualitative and quantitative insights using a risk-informed simulation. The modeling process is described in detail, focusing on three aspects: (1) the facility mission time (the time required to control the plant until safe), (2) the attacker timeline (the time to potential sabotage), and (3) the response timeline (the time to counter the facility attack). The modeling capabilities also are extended to include facility physical phenomena such as thermal-hydraulics and heat transfer to capture realistic representation of dynamic changes to a facility. While the plant models and examples are hypothetical and do not represent a real facility, these modeling approaches could be used for future security-by-design engineering in advanced reactors. The outputs and insights from the modeling approach may be used to modify and optimize the security posture of a facility by efficiently making modifications to the model and seeing the overall impact from the modification. Lastly, use of the approach described in this report can also provide the technical basis for a physical protection program, describing how the facility and security strategy will cope with off-normal events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Simulation and Computing: ASC FY24 Implementation Plan

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including previous nuclear tests, stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The ASC program is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computational resources to support the annual stockpile assessment and certification process, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This work requires a balance of resources, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. The ASC program focuses on increasing the predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The Program continues to improve its unique tools for understanding and solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further from the original test base. While the focus remains on the U.S. nuclear weapons program, where possible, the Program also enables the use of high-performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and nuclear counterterrorism. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for NNSA to “deliver a modern, adaptive nuclear security enterprise based on an integrated strategy for risk management, production-based resilience, science and technology innovation, and workforce initiatives.” Furthermore, “NNSA will establish a Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate the integration of science and technology (S&T) throughout its activities.” Executing this strategy necessitates the continued emphasis on developing and sustaining high-quality scientific and engineering staff, as well as supporting computational and experimental capabilities. These components constitute the foundation of the nuclear weapons program. The continued success of the SSP and LEPs is predicated upon the ability to credibly certify the stockpile, without a return to underground nuclear tests (UGTs). Shortly after the nuclear test moratorium entered into force in 1992, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) was established to provide an extensive simulation capability to underpin stockpile certification. While computing and simulation have always been essential to the success of the nuclear weapons program, the program goal of ASCI was to execute NNSA’s vision of using these tools in support of the stockpile stewardship mission. The ASCI program was essential to the successful demonstration of the SSP, providing critical nuclear weapons simulation and modeling capabilities. ASCI officially evolved into the ASC program in fiscal year (FY) 2005, but the mission remains essentially the same: provide the simulation and computational capabilities that underpin the ability to maintain a safe, secure, effective nuclear weapon stockpile, without returning to underground nuclear testing. The capabilities that the ASC program provides at the national laboratories play a vital role in the nuclear security enterprise and are necessary for fulfilling the stockpile stewardship and life extension requirements outlined for NNSA. The Program develops modern simulation tools that provide insights into stockpile aging issues, provide the computational and simulation tools that enable designers and analysts to certify the current stockpile and life-extended nuclear weapons, and inform the decision-making process when any modifications in nuclear warheads or the associated manufacturing processes are deemed necessary. Furthermore, ASC is enhancing the predictive simulation capabilities that are essential to evaluate weapons effects, design experiments, and ensure test readiness. The ASC program continues to improve its unique tools to solve stockpile problems— with a focus on sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific detail—to enable Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) and to resolve the increasingly difficult analyses needed for stockpile stewardship. The needs of the Stockpile Management and Production Modernization programs (formerly Directed Stockpile Work) also drive the requirements for simulation and computational resources. These requirements include planned LEPs, stockpile support activities, and mitigation efforts against the potential for technical surprise. All of the weapons within the current stockpile are in some stage of the life extension process. The simulation and computational capabilities are crucial for successful execution of these life extensions and for ensuring NNSA can certify these life-extended weapons without conducting a UGT.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗