SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This presentation is a NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program: Roadmap for FY15 and Beyond. This roadmap provides a snapshot for current plans and collaborations on testing and evaluation of electronics as well as a discussion of the technology selection approach.
This presentation provides an overview of the NEPP Program as well as the current roadmap for NEPP tasks.
This presentation provides an overview of the NEPP Program as well as the current roadmap for NEPP tasks.
This presentation provides an overview of the NEPP Program as well as the current roadmap for NEPP tasks.
This presentation provides an overview of the NEPP Program.
NEPP Mission Statement: Provide NASAs leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test, and reliable usage of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts by NASA, in collaboration with other government Agencies and industry.
The aerospace and semiconductor industries lost 2000 hours annually of research access when IUCF closed. An ad hoc team between the U.S. government and industry was formed to evaluate other facility options. In this presentation, we will discuss: 1) Why aerospace, semiconductor manufacturers, and others are interested in proton facility access, as well as, 2) Some of the basics of a typical test for electronics, and 3) We'll conclude with the brief current status on progress.
The aerospace and semiconductor industries lost approx. 2000 hours annually of research access when IUCF closed. An ad hoc team between the U.S. government and industry was formed to evaluate other facility options. In this presentation, we will discuss: 1) Why aerospace, semiconductor manufacturers, and others are interested in proton facility access, as well as, 2) Some of the basics of a typical test for electronics, and 3) We"ll conclude with the brief current status on progress.
Overview of agency-level electronic parts management, the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program, and NEPP Program Fiscal Year 2019 task investment areas.
This talk will wind through the details of history of reliability in the agency, where things are today, and where we need to go tomorrow. It will provide many examples of reliability that are often discounted because they are not tied to some mantra from the past. Furthermore, it will separate us from the red herrings that are ever present based on the misuse of terms and practices in reliability. It will delve into several key subject matter areas that have long been considered the key reliability drivers, such as parts, printed circuit boards, radiation, and workmanship. Finally, it will highlight how the Center and Agency need to change our approach at learning lessons from past experiences to maintain a basis for reliability long into the future.
The contents include: 1) United States Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 46, Quality Assurance; 2) NASA Quality Roadmap; 3) AS9003 Inspection and Test Quality Management System; 4) Government Oversight Responsibilities; and 5) Third Party vs Second Party Oversight.
This report summarizes a three-hour hybrid in-person/online workshop on June 7, 2024 on the topic of design assurance and the Safety Demonstrator Series (SDS), which was held at NASA Ames Research Center. The SDS provides an operational demonstration of, and recommendations for, requirements and standards necessary to monitor, assess, and mitigate risks to assure safety in disaster-oriented operations. Over sixty NASA personnel participated in the workshop. Four main topics were discussed: (1) assurance needs for the Safety Demonstrator Series, (2) assurance and the In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), (3) in-time assurance: existing efforts and future opportunities, and (4) demonstrating assurance tools in the Safety Demonstrators. Key takeaways are as follows: 1. Design assurance tools can be used to assure an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System, the systems that comprise it, and other systems or missions. Assurance must consider both systems and components and include the interactions between elements in both a systems/aircraft context and a systems-of-systems/airspace context. 2. Design-time assurance activities can support the identification of monitors needed for operational assurance activities (i.e., the “monitor” function in the monitor-assess-mitigate paradigm at the heart of the IASMS concept). 3. A major opportunity for design-time assurance tools to contribute to the IASMS concept is to support rapid re-validation of systems. This will be particularly important for (1) supporting novel operations in the IASMS, where operational data may disprove design-time assumptions (motivating re-analysis of system safety) and (2) adapting technologies (e.g., AI/ML for autonomous operations) to new operational domains, where there may be new or different safety considerations not included in the initial scope of operations. 4. There are several design assurance tools under development in the System-Wide Safety project that can support assurance of Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) in the Safety Demonstrators. Transitioning these tools from one-off research projects into a functioning part of IASMS assurance will require closer integration between these tools. 5. It is not clear whether the role of design assurance tools is primarily as a part of IASMS architecture or as an external check on IASMS. The workshop consisted of four discussion topics initiated via four lightning talks by System-Wide Safety researchers. Discussions utilized Mural to engage both in-person and online participants in the hybrid format. Polls and surveys were also utilized to gather participant input. The workshop closed with a reflection activity for participants, as well as new ideas for collaboration and coordination of ongoing System-Wide Safety research.
Transformations of the National Airspace System, such as envisioned with Advanced Air Mobility, will enable improvements for managing and assuring safety for Part 135 transportation of passengers and cargo. The purpose of this paper is to describe the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations (ConOps) and how its innovations such as using predictive analytics could benefit operators for risk management and safety assurance. The National Academies recommended development of an IASMS ConOps to secure a safe future NAS. Part 135 operators are currently not required to have a formal safety management system.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
A United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of twelve NASA programs found widespread parts quality problems contributing to significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced system reliability. Direct part-marking with Data Matrix symbols could significantly improve the quality of inventory control and parts lifecycle management. This paper examines the feasibility of using 15 marking technologies for use in future NASA programs. A structural analysis is based on marked material type, operational environment (e.g., ground, suborbital, orbital), durability of marks, ease of operation, reliability, and affordability. A cost-benefits analysis considers marking technology (data plates, label printing, direct part marking) and marking types (two-dimensional machine-readable, human-readable). Previous NASA parts marking efforts and historical cost data are accounted for, including in-house vs. outsourced marking. Some marking methods are still under development. While this paper focuses on NASA programs, results may be applicable to a variety of industrial environments.
A United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of twelve NASA programs found widespread parts quality problems contributing to significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced system reliability. Direct part marking with Data Matrix symbols could significantly improve the quality of inventory control and parts lifecycle management. This paper examines the feasibility of using direct part marking technologies for use in future NASA programs. A structural analysis is based on marked material type, operational environment (e.g., ground, suborbital, Low Earth Orbit), durability of marks, ease of operation, reliability, and affordability. A cost-benefits analysis considers marking technology (label printing, data plates, and direct part marking) and marking types (two-dimensional machine-readable, human-readable). Previous NASA parts marking efforts and historical cost data are accounted for, including inhouse vs. outsourced marking. Some marking methods are still under development. While this paper focuses on NASA programs, results may be applicable to a variety of industrial environments.
NEPP Mission Statement: Provide NASA's leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test, and reliable usage of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts by NASA, in collaboration with other government Agencies and industry.
The purpose of this lessons learned is to communicate the utility of shielding in small spacecraft planning for the support of mission assurance and reliability. Numerous SmallSats have been flying in polar low earth orbit for scientific, communications, technology demonstrations, and imaging with academic, commercial, and government interests. Shielding has been part of mission assurance and reliability from the advent of long duration spacecraft missions. The Shields-1 CubeSat has been operating in polar low earth orbit since 16 December 2018 with atomic number (Z)-grade radiation shielding and demonstrates shielding effectiveness. Shields-1 has collected a representative example of solar minimum data in 2019 with 8 Teledyne dosimeters over varying shielding effectiveness. It serves as current experimental data and has been compared with NOVICE Shielding estimates using the AP8 –AE8 trapped radiation model with the Shields-1 CAD and generic CubeSat 3 unit (U) models. Using NOVICE model radiation analysis coding, the shielding effectiveness's, based on a generic CubeSat 3U structure with 4 electronic boards, were estimated for aluminum wall thicknesses ranging from 0.204 cmto4.44 cm (0.550 g/cm2–12.0 g/cm2) thick aluminum. For modeled polar orbiting spacecraft, solar maximum total ionizing dose (TID)increases by nearly a magnitude for thin-walled aluminum 0.550g/cm2-0.686 g/cm2(0.204 cm –0.254 cm) typical CubeSat structures. The shielding effectiveness by NOVICE Sigma estimates, which is a shielding sphere approximation around a detector, showed a linear relationship with wall thickness, which increased over the wall thickness by a ratio of 1.43 determined by linear regression analysis. Using NOVICE Adjoint Monte-Carlo Modeling of solar minimum and solar maximum with the inclusion of a worst-case solar particle event over a one year mission without geomagnetic shielding, the TID for minimum and maximum conditions for a generic 3U with a wall thickness of 0.254 cm is 158 RAD and 1540 RAD, respectively. The modeled total solar maximum TID is over estimated, because at low orbital latitudes a spacecraft will have shielding from Earth's magnetic field. However, TID will still be significant at high latitudes over the poles, where a spacecraft is exposed in a solar particle event. In contrast, to a thin walled generic 3U CubeSat, Shields-1 electronics enclosure has a shielding effectiveness of 21.3 g/cm2from NOVICE Sigma modeling and is expected to show reduced total ionizing dose increases during the present active Solar Cycle 25 period. Because solar particle events during solar maximum increase TID on electronic parts with thin-walled shielding in short periods of time, it is a mission assurance and reliability consideration on the spacecraft’s mission value versus adding shielding for risk reduction of premature spacecraft or instrument payload loss. Since the volumes of many instruments and system electronics have reduced with small spacecraft, shielding material costs and weight penalties have diminished. A small spacecraft project budget and schedule may limit traditional radiation-hardened part use and radiation testing requirements, where shielding can contribute to mission assurance and reliability with reduced costs.