Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Plant Protection System”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

A new bioenergy model that simulates the impacts of plant‐microbial interactions, soil carbon protection, and mechanistic tillage on soil carbon cycling

Abstract Advancing our predictive understanding of bioenergy systems is critical to design decision tools that can inform which feedstock to plant, where to plant it, and how to manage its production to provide both energy and ecosystem carbon (C) benefits. Here, we lay the foundation for that advancement by integrating recent developments in the science of belowground processes in shaping the C cycle into a new bioenergy model, FUN‐BioCROP (Fixation and Uptake of Nitrogen‐Bioenergy Carbon, Rhizosphere, Organisms, and Protection). We show that FUN‐BioCROP can approximate the historical trajectory of soil C dynamics as natural ecosystems were successively converted into intensive agriculture and bioenergy systems. This ability relies in part on a novel tillage representation that mechanistically models tillage as a process that increases microbial access to C. Importantly, the impacts of tillage and feedstock choice also influence FUN‐BioCROP simulations of warming responses with no‐till perennial feedstocks, miscanthus, and switchgrass, having more C that is unprotected and susceptible to warming than tilled annual feedstocks like corn–corn–soybean. However, this susceptibility to warming is balanced by a greater potential for increases in belowground C allocation to enhance soil C stocks in perennial systems. Collectively, our model results highlight the importance of belowground processes in evaluating the ecosystem C benefits of bioenergy production.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Testing of Instrumentation and Control Sensors and Cables for Small Modular Reactors

As advanced reactor concepts like small modular reactors (SMRs) progress towards design maturity and commercial deployment, it is important to assess their instrumentation and control (I&C) system sensors and cables to assure their safe, reliable, and efficient operation throughout their service lifetimes. The I&C system of any nuclear power plant (NPP) is the central nervous system of the plant and is made up of field devices such as sensors which are connected via cables to analog and/or digital systems. These systems are responsible for control and/or protection of the plant. The performance of I&C sensors and cables is dependent on several factors, including plant operating conditions. In particular, the plant operation can affect the static (accuracy) and dynamic (response) performance of the sensor, whereas the surrounding ambient environment can impact the remaining useful life of the cables, connectors, and other associated components within I&C sensor circuits.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Compact System for Operating and Decommissioned Reactor Used Fuel Management - 17243

Most nuclear power plants in operation today were designed with limited wet storage for their discharged used nuclear fuel (UNF), predicated on the assumption that either recycling or geologic storage would be available within the reactor's lifetime. While that has proven to be the case in some countries such as France with its recycling, it has not for most. In the USA, dry storage of UNF at the plant site at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) has since the mid-1980s been the primary mode of interim storage so that the plant can off-load its UNF from the pools at the power plants. Initially the space reserved for the ISFSI at a reactor site was based on the assumption that the Department of Energy (DOE) would be transporting that UNF to a geological repository site, such as Yucca Mountain, by 1998. However, due to the delay in the opening of any geological repository the utilities are running out of space on their existing ISFSIs for additional UNF dry storage systems. Since plants prefer to keep their ISFSIs inside the protected area of the plant, options for expanding the ISFSI are becoming limited. At the same time, increasing the capacity of the dry storage systems is also not an option in most cases as the dry storage systems have almost reached their capacity limits with the 37 PWR or 89 BWR fuel assembly canister designs. For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the UNF from the pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. Thus, keeping the size of the ISFSI compact is very important for safety, security and economics. This paper will describe the details of a reduced footprint version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System that addresses the need for maximizing ISFSI capacity. This system not only offers a compact design that stores nearly double the number of UNF assemblies in the same space, it also offers superior radiation protection to the workers and public. In addition, it offers unmatched protection against beyond design basis (BDB) events like the tsunami at Fukushima in Japan, the earthquake at North Anna site, tornadoes and manmade attacks such as the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. It also includes significant enhancement for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. The utilities in the USA are currently using dry storage systems with canisters of different diameter, different length, and different weights. The fuel assemblies that are stored in these canisters are also different in their fuel types (PWR or BWR),different fuel parameters like burnups, enrichments, and cooling times and different storage orientations in the storage overpacks like horizontal or vertical. The compact version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all these different design dry storage canister available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for consolidated storage, compact ISFSIs and aging management, this new evolution of the AREVA TN NUHOMS{sup R} system offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technical Basis for Evaluating Software-Related Common-Cause Failures

The instrumentation and control (I&C) system architecture at a nuclear power plant (NPP) incorporates protections against common-cause failures (CCFs) through the use of diversity and defense-in-depth. Even for well-established analog-based I&C system designs, the potential for CCFs of multiple systems (or redundancies within a system) constitutes a credible threat to defeating the defense-in-depth provisions within the I&C system architectures. The integration of digital technologies into the I&C systems provides many advantages compared to the aging analog systems with respect to reliability, maintenance, operability, and cost effectiveness. However, maintaining the diversity and defense-in-depth for both the hardware and software within the digital system is challenging. In fact, the introduction of digital technologies may actually increase the potential for CCF vulnerabilities because of the introduction of undetected systematic faults. These systematic faults are defined as a “design fault located in a software component” and at a high level, are predominately the result of (1) errors in the requirement specification, (2) inadequate provisions to account for design limits (e.g., environmental stress), or (3) technical faults incorporated in the internal system (or architectural) design or implementation. Other technology-neutral CCF concerns include hardware design errors, equipment qualification deficiencies, installation or maintenance errors, instrument loop scaling and setpoint mistakes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Acquired experience resulting from transforming a chemical installation into a nuclear one

ICIT-Valcea has developed an experimental pilot-scale installation for tritium and deuterium separation. The main objective of this pilot was to demonstrate the water detritiation technology and to transfer this technology to the CANDU reactors of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant. The pilot-scale installation was initiated in 1992. The initial design and construction were performed similarly to chemical plants as the separation of isotopes was focused on only hydrogen and deuterium to assess feasibility. In a second phase we have begun to transform it into a nuclear facility with the aim of separating tritium. Moving to tritium separation has imposed a lot of changes. Changes consisted mainly of: -) re-design of the technological systems for nuclear material processing, applying specific codes and standards (ASME, Romanian nuclear specific pressure boundary prescriptions for code classification); -) design and implementation of new systems, classified as safety systems; -) re-design and implementation of command and control systems, complying with the requirements of reliability and maintenance required for the project promoted; -) revaluation of auxiliary systems (utilities, power supply); -) implementing radiation protection systems, including secondary barriers; -) implementing and maintaining environment operational program specific to the new nuclear plant; -) developing and conducting safety analyzes; and -) the production of specific documentation to obtain the necessary permits for construction, commissioning and operation of the plant.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Security by Design Handbook

This document is a draft Security-by-Design (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to “encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.” The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PAS-PP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessons-learned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the system-level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A four-element strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

Snell, Mark Kamerer↗

Final Report Regulatory Off-Gas Emissions Testing on the DM1200 Melter System Using HLW and LAW Simulants

The operational requirements for the River Protection Project - Waste Treatment Plant (RPP-WTP) Low Activity Waste (LAW) and High Level Waste (HLW) melter systems, together with the feed constituents, impose a number of challenges to the off-gas treatment system. The system must be robust from the standpoints of operational reliability and minimization of maintenance.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture Design Using Force-on-Force Cyber-Physical Modeling

Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Reassessing Double-Ended Guillotine Break Requirements: Evidence-Based Analysis of Regulatory Assumptions After Five Decades of Nuclear Operation

After five decades of nuclear power operation encompassing more than 20,000 reactor-years across 35 countries and 647 reactors, zero double-ended guillotine breaks (DEGBs) have been documented in commercial reactor coolant systems—despite DEGB being the fundamental design-basis assumption driving Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sizing, structural protection requirements, and containment design specifications. This report examines the basis for DEGB requirements in nuclear power plant design. The DEGB postulate assumes the instantaneous, complete circumferential severance of the largest diameter pipes in reactor coolant systems, driving major design requirements under 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.46, General Design Criterion 4 and containment design specifications. The United States (4,880 reactor-years) and France (2,505 reactor-years) contribute the largest operational datasets. Probabilistic assessments estimate direct DEGB occurrence probabilities with extremely low event frequencies, far below the 10-5/reactor-year thresholds typically used to define non-credible events in nuclear-safety analyses; i.e., events with probability this low fall into beyond-design-basis events. Current material-science knowledge demonstrates that the ductile steel materials used in nuclear piping systems exhibit stable crack-growth behavior fundamentally incompatible with instantaneous severance. International regulatory experience, particularly Germany’s comprehensive break-preclusion implementation, and successful leak-before-break (LBB) applications in almost all of U.S. pressurized water reactor units validate that alternatives can maintain safety performance while reducing economic burden. Current DEGB protection systems impose estimated lifetime costs of hundreds of millions of dollars per unit, over the life of a plant across the nuclear industry (including ongoing costs), representing substantial resource allocation toward scenarios with extremely low probability. Although this report acknowledges uncertainties regarding long-term aging effects, potential synergistic degradation mechanisms, and site-specific seismic considerations that warrant continued evaluation as regulatory policy evolves, there remains no documented evidence that a DEGB has occurred as a consequence of the conditions or mechanisms described in this report. This report acknowledges the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) recent efforts—outlined in the draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) NRC-DSS-ISG-2025-XX (“Treatment of Certain Loss-of-Coolant Accident Locations as Beyond-Design-Basis Accidents Draft Interim Staff Guidance”)—to reduce overly conservative requirements for large-break loss of coolant accidents through technical justifications and exemptions. However, extensive operating experience and validated methodologies—such as LBB and in-service inspection programs—demonstrate that the probability of a DEGB in reactor coolant-loop piping is extremely low, even under seismic conditions. The authors and reviewers of this report recommend that DEGB be removed as a design-basis event through formal rulemaking, rather than case-by-case exemptions, to better reflect credible failure modes, align with current data, and align with modern, risk-informed safety analysis.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of a security-by-design handbook.

There is an increasing awareness that efficient and effective nuclear facility design is best achieved when requirements from the 3S disciplines Safety, Safeguards, and Security - are balanced and intrinsic to the facility design. This can be achieved when policy, processes, methods, and technologies are understood and applied in these areas during all phases of the design process. For the purposes of this paper, Security-by-design will be defined as the system level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new or retrofitted nuclear power plant (NPP) or nuclear facility (NF) resulting in intrinsic security. Security-by-design can also be viewed as a framework to achieve robust and durable security systems. This paper reports on work performed to date to create a Security-by-Design Handbook, under a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, specifically, a review of physical protection principles and best practices, and a decommissioning to better understand where these principles and practices can be applied. This paper describes physical protection principles and best practices to achieve security-by- design that were gathered from International, Japanese, and U.S. sources. Principles are included for achieving security early in the design process where security requirements are typically less costly and easier to incorporate. The paper then describes a generic design process that covers the entire facility lifecycle from scoping and planning of the project to decommissioning and decontamination. Early design process phases, such as conceptual design, offer opportunities to add security features intrinsic to the facility design itself. Later phases, including design engineering and construction, are important for properly integrating security features into a coherent design and for planning for and assuring the proper performance of the security system during the operation and decommissioning of the facility. The paper also describes some future activities on this bilateral project to create a Security-by-Design Handbook. When completed, the Handbook is intended to assist countries with less experience in nuclear power programs to apply principles and best practices in an effective and efficient manner as early in the design as possible to achieve robust and durable security.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Analysis of, and defense against, spurious actuations and other incorrect behaviors of digital control systems - 390

Modern digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems offer nearly unlimited functional capability. However, the complexity of their design (including their system software and application software) is significantly higher than that of conventional, hardwired systems, to the point that it is generally impossible to demonstrate that there are no residual design errors, even when the best development and verification techniques have been applied. When activated by specific conditions, design errors could result in systematic failures, i.e., failures that occur deterministically each time and wherever an activating condition is present. Redundancy could be defeated when the same design error affects multiple channels or systems, and the activating condition affects several of these channels or systems. In the case of safety I and C systems, most of the functions are poised protection functions that must be actuated when and only when a demand situation occurs in the plant. In nuclear power plants, the most dangerous failure mode for such functions generally is failure to actuate, and many measures are taken to protect from such failure mode. This paper considers the other failure modes of safety I and C functions, and also the failure modes of the other I and C functions that are less important to safety. It is not limited to poised functions, and considers other types of functions such as regulation functions or human interface functions. It proposes a framework for analyzing and providing defense against spurious actuations and other incorrect behaviors from digital I and C systems directly interacting with the plant process or with operators: these might be useful for example to justify that design bases for reactor protection are adequate, or to ensure plant performance and availability. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Joint probability safety assessment for NPP defense infrastructure against extreme external natural hazards

With the increasing tendency of natural hazards, the typhoon, hurricane and tropical Cyclone induced surge, wave, precipitation, flood and wind as extreme external loads menacing Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) in coastal and inland provinces of China. For all of planned, designed And constructed NPP the National Nuclear Safety Administration of China and IAEA recommended Probable Maximum Hurricane /Typhoon/(PMH/T), Probable Maximum Storm Surge (PMSS), Probable Maximum Flood (PMF), Design Basis Flood (DBF) as safety regulations for NPP defense infrastructures. This paper discusses the joint probability analysis of simultaneous occurrence typhoon induced extreme external hazards and compare with IAEA 2006-2009 recommended safety regulation design criteria for some NPP defense infrastructures along China coast. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Identification of beneficial and detrimental bacteria impacting sorghum responses to drought using multi-scale and multi-system microbiome comparisons

Abstract Drought is a major abiotic stress limiting agricultural productivity. Previous field-level experiments have demonstrated that drought decreases microbiome diversity in the root and rhizosphere. How these changes ultimately affect plant health remains elusive. Toward this end, we combined reductionist, transitional and ecological approaches, applied to the staple cereal crop sorghum to identify key root-associated microbes that robustly affect drought-stressed plant phenotypes. Fifty-three Arabidopsis-associated bacteria were applied to sorghum seeds and their effect on root growth was monitored. Two Arthrobacter strains caused root growth inhibition (RGI) in Arabidopsis and sorghum. In the context of synthetic communities, Variovorax strains were able to protect plants from Arthrobacter-caused RGI. As a transitional system, high-throughput phenotyping was used to test the synthetic communities. During drought stress, plants colonized by Arthrobacter had reduced growth and leaf water content. Plants colonized by both Arthrobacter and Variovorax performed as well or better than control plants. In parallel, we performed a field trial wherein sorghum was evaluated across drought conditions. By incorporating data on soil properties into the microbiome analysis, we accounted for experimental noise with a novel method and were able to observe the negative correlation between the abundance of Arthrobacter and plant growth. Having validated this approach, we cross-referenced datasets from the high-throughput phenotyping and field experiments and report a list of bacteria with high confidence that positively associated with plant growth under drought stress. In conclusion, a three-tiered experimental system successfully spanned the lab-to-field gap and identified beneficial and deleterious bacterial strains for sorghum under drought.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Application and development of technologies for engine-condition-based maintenance of emergency diesel generators

The emergency diesel generator (EDG) of a nuclear power plant has the role of supplying emergency electric power to protect the reactor core system in the event of the loss of offsite power supply. Therefore, EDGs should be subject to periodic surveillance testing to verify their ability to supply specified frequencies and voltages at design power levels within a limited time. To maintain optimal reliability of EDGs, condition monitoring/diagnosis technologies must be developed. Changing from periodic disassemble maintenance to condition-based maintenance (CBM) according to predictions of equipment condition is recommended. In this paper, the development of diagnosis technology for CBM and the application of a diesel engine condition-analysis system are described. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Supervisory Control System for Multi-Modular Advanced Reactors

The proposed supervisory control system (SCS) may provide considerable benefits to advanced small modular reactors, including reduced plant staffing, optimized maintenance activities, greater plant availability, and higher operating efficiency. The SCS makes risk-informed decisions based on (1) a probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of success given the status of the plant/systems and component health, and (2) a deterministic assessment between plant operating parameters and reactor protection parameters to prevent unnecessary trips and challenges to plant safety system—one measure of SCS success. The probabilistic portion of the decision-making engine of the SCS is based on the control actions associated with an advanced liquid-metal reactor (ALMR) Power Reactor, Innovative, Small Module (PRISM). Within the SCS, the probabilistic assessment provides a ranking of viable control actions; however, certain instructions generated by the probabilistic model only include an abstract notion of action without specifications. For instance, one instruction may be to reduce power without specifying how much reduction is needed. The prognostic/diagnostic models incorporate the health of components into the decision-making process. Once the control options are identified and ranked based on the likelihood of success, the SCS transmits the options to the deterministic portion of the platform. The performance-based system models assess and rank each of the probabilistically identified control actions by taking into account the physical behavior (current and projected) of the system. The performance-based decision making module receives inputs from the probabilistic decision-making module and the ERM module to generate a single solution. Interfaces to these modules are defined later in the section. A utility theory algorithm factors into the decision making by estimating the distance from and approach to a trip setpoint for each control option. If the magnitude of a negative utility value increases rapidly as the system approaches the trip setpoint, that option is not likely to be the preferred option. This can lead to a re-ranking of the control options. The SCS then transmits a control signal(s) to a component or system and informs the operator of actions taken based on the action chosen. The SCS successfully coupled probabilistic and performance-based system models to arrive at optimal control decisions based on the actual status of the plant and components. The automatic, autonomous, and real-time performance requirements for a control system were met by the SCS. The value of coupling probabilistic and performance-based system models was demonstrated by the re-ranking of control options based on the use of a utility algorithm. The use of ERM monitors provides added value to the SCS as demonstrated by the re-ranking of control options based on a components degraded state.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Developmental study of advanced HIS design method for digital I and C+HMIT of PWR plant - 277

A new conceptual frame of how to design and validate a digital HIS (human interface system) on an innovative numerical simulation basis is proposed for the support of plant operators' supervisory control of various types of automated complex NPPs (nuclear power plants). The proposed conceptual framework utilizes the object-oriented software for plant DiD (defense-in depth) risk monitor with the combination of nuclear reactor accident simulation by an advanced nuclear safety analysis code RELAP5/MOD4. The conceptual frame proposed in this paper will be applied for an example practice for the SBLOCA (small break loss of coolant accident) case of passive safety PWR (pressurized water reactor) AP1000. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗