SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Process Mission Teams”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2014

Space Mission Operations Ground Systems Integration Customer Service

The facility, which is now the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) at Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL, has provided continuous space mission and related services for the space industry since 1961, from Mercury Redstone through the International Space Station (ISS). Throughout the long history of the facility and mission support teams, the HOSC has developed a stellar customer support and service process. In this era, of cost cutting, and providing more capability and results with fewer resources, space missions are looking for the most efficient way to accomplish their objectives. One of the first services provided by the facility was fax transmission of documents to, then, Cape Canaveral in Florida. The headline in the Marshall Star, the newspaper for the newly formed Marshall Space Flight Center, read "Exact copies of Documents sent to Cape in 4 minutes." The customer was Dr. Wernher von Braun. Currently at the HOSC we are supporting, or have recently supported, missions ranging from simple ISS payloads requiring little more than "bentpipe" telemetry access, to a low cost free-flyer Fast, Affordable, Science and Technology Satellite (FASTSAT), to a full service ISS payload Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer 2 (AMS2) supporting 24/7 operations at three operations centers around the world with an investment of over 2 billion dollars. The HOSC has more need and desire than ever to provide fast and efficient customer service to support these missions. Here we will outline how our customer-centric service approach reduces the cost of providing services, makes it faster and easier than ever for new customers to get started with HOSC services, and show what the future holds for our space mission operations customers. We will discuss our philosophy concerning our responsibility and accessibility to a mission customer as well as how we deal with the following issues: initial contact with a customer, reducing customer cost, changing regulations and security, and cultural differences, to ensure an efficient response to customer issues using a small Customer Service Team (CST) and adaptability, constant communication with customers, technical expertise and knowledge of services, and dedication to customer service. The HOSC Customer Support Team has implemented a variety of processes, and procedures that help to mitigate the potential problems that arise when integrating ground system services for a variety of complex missions and the lessons learned from this experience will lead the future of customer service in the space operations industry.

Roth, Karl↗

NASA NTRS2022

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, and Psychosocial Adaptions within a Team

The Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team (the Team Risk) is primarily performance-focused, with a secondary emphasis on behavioral health outcomes resulting from team performance and interpersonal interactions. Monitoring tools, measures, and countermeasures are aimed at enhancing team processes and team composition configurations to optimize team performance and functioning. Long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) will include major challenges that could affect team performance, including social isolation, physical confinement, a small and diverse crew, communication delays between crew and ground, limited or no crew rotation or evacuation options, limited or no resupply, and a high-consequence environment. Each of these conditions will affect the crew’s coordination, cooperation, psychological well-being, and performance. Although the International Space Station (ISS) remains important for studies that require spaceflight testing and validation, the current conditions on the ISS do not adequately mimic the exploration environment that is required for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) teams research, and thus access to terrestrial or ground-based analogs of LDEM conditions is paramount. The emphasis on analogs for research is reflected in this updated evidence review of the Team Risk, and includes data from studies conducted at isolated, confined, extreme (ICE) environments (e.g., Antarctic stations), and from several mission simulation analogs such as the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) (HERA Experiment Information Package, 2014), also known as isolated, confined, controlled (ICC) environments. These studies have characterized many team factors regarding LDEMs, and the Team Risk has now matured from risk characterization to focusing more on countermeasure development. Because spaceflight evidence for team-level research is lacking, no reliable data is available to quantify the impact of team-level variables on individual and team-level outcomes during spaceflight missions. Until recently, no systematic attempt had been undertaken to measure the performance effects of team cohesion, team composition, team training, or team-related psychosocial adaptation during spaceflight. The Team Risk is a relatively young research area for NASA, with substantial growth only since the 2000s, and with limited access to spaceflight performance data. As a result, spaceflight evidence is lacking to identify specifically what team composition, level of training, amount of cohesion, or quality of psychosocial adaptation is necessary to reduce the risk of performance errors in space. However, astronaut journals and interviews and reports from spaceflight subject matter experts (SMEs) provide testimonies that team performance during spaceflight is important for mission success and to maintain crew health. Team spaceflight data is now being collected as part of the Spaceflight Standard Measures task (Clement, 2021)—a set of core measurements related to many human spaceflight risks that are collected from astronauts before, during, and after long-duration missions. The team-related standard measures focus on team cohesion, team performance, group living, team climate, and team processes. Collection of standard measures data is ongoing and published data is not yet available. Finally, although spaceflight evidence is lacking, evidence gleaned from ground studies and spaceflight analog studies will help close the gaps outlined in the Team Risk. Ground-based studies provide quantitative evidence for team functioning in ICE environments. Academic research on teams has produced dozens of meta-analyses that can be used to understand the general relationships among team inputs (e.g., team member characteristics and skills, job context), team processes, and emergent states (e.g., coordination, communication, cooperation, cohesion, trust, shared cognition), and team outcomes (e.g., effectiveness, errors, adaptation). Teams are complex, incorporating individual characteristics of team members, but also existing at a level that is greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the Team Risk must be integrated with other individual-focused NASA Human Research Program (HRP) risks, including Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Sleep, and Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and emerging research indicates more integration may needed between the Team Risk and the physiologically oriented risks. Much of this integration occurs through the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB). A lack of team functioning may be a stressor in some circumstances, but the team often acts as a countermeasure. For example, support for team leaders and teammates can facilitate individual functioning and encourage psychological and physically healthy behaviors and attitudes. However, more research is needed regarding teams during LDEMs and the remaining gaps in the research are described in the current report.

Lauren Blackwell Landon↗

NASA NTRS2016

Final Report of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Agile Benchmarking Team

To ensure that the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) community remains in a position to perform reliable Software Assurance (SA) on NASAs critical software (SW) systems with the software industry rapidly transitioning from waterfall to Agile processes, Terry Wilcutt, Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) established the Agile Benchmarking Team (ABT). The Team's tasks were: 1. Research background literature on current Agile processes, 2. Perform benchmark activities with other organizations that are involved in software Agile processes to determine best practices, 3. Collect information on Agile-developed systems to enable improvements to the current NASA standards and processes to enhance their ability to perform reliable software assurance on NASA Agile-developed systems, 4. Suggest additional guidance and recommendations for updates to those standards and processes, as needed. The ABT's findings and recommendations for software management, engineering and software assurance are addressed herein.

Software Assurance↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Goes-16 On-Station Custom Maneuver Generation with Focussuite

This paper discusses the process of the NOAA GOES Mission Operations Support Team (MOST) in mitigating the effects of inconsistently performing ArcJet Thrusters (AJTs) aboard the GOES-16 spacecraft in geostationary orbit. These AJTs are hot-gas thrusters which augment the gas flow using an electric arc to increase the exit velocity of the gases. Fuel flow problems have led to GOES-16 being unable to safely use its AJTs for maneuvers at times. This primarily affects North/South Station-Keeping (NSSK) maneuvers, which control inclination and use a majority of the station-keeping fuel budget. As a result, GOES-16 has had to occasionally resort to using non-AJT hot-gas thrusters. These thrusters are not placed as close to GOES-16's centerline, have lower thrust, and have lower specific impulse when compared to AJTs. In addition, MOST’s ground systems do not officially support using these non-AJT thrusters for NSSK maneuvers. MOST had to quickly develop workaround solutions using the FocusSuite Autofocus programming environment to compute the maneuvers. This paper outlines the mixture of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and MOST-developed products which have allowed GOES-16 to continue station-keeping even with inconsistently-per-forming AJTs, showing that script-based automation systems like Autofocus can simplify complex solutions to a few scripted user inputs.

Henry Heim↗

NASA NTRS2012

The NASA X-Ray Mission Concepts Study

The 2010 Astrophysics Decadal Survey recommended a significant technology development program towards realizing the scientific goals of the International X-ray Observatory (IXO). NASA has undertaken an X-ray mission concepts study to determine alternative approaches to accomplishing IXO's high ranking scientific objectives over the next decade given the budget realities, which make a flagship mission challenging to implement. The goal of the study is to determine the degree to which missions in various cost ranges from $300M to $2B could fulfill these objectives. The study process involved several steps. NASA released a Request for Information in October 2011, seeking mission concepts and enabling technology ideas from the community. The responses included a total of 14 mission concepts and 13 enabling technologies. NASA also solicited membership for and selected a Community Science Team (CST) to guide the process. A workshop was held in December 2011 in which the mission concepts and technology were presented and discussed. Based on the RFI responses and the workshop, the CST then chose a small group of notional mission concepts, representing a range of cost points, for further study. These notional missions concepts were developed through mission design laboratory activities in early 2012. The results of all these activities were captured in the final X-ray mission concepts study report, submitted to NASA in July 2012. In this presentation, we summarize the outcome of the study. We discuss background, methodology, the notional missions, and the conclusions of the study report.

Petre, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2003

Rapid Prototyping of an Aircraft Model in an Object-Oriented Simulation

A team was created to participate in the Mars Scout Opportunity. Trade studies determined that an aircraft provided the best opportunity to complete the science objectives of the team. A high fidelity six degree of freedom flight simulation was required to provide credible evidence that the aircraft design fulfilled mission objectives and to support the aircraft design process by providing performance evaluations. The team created the simulation using the Langley Standard Real-Time Simulation in C++ (LaSRS++) application framework. A rapid prototyping approach was necessary because the team had only three months to both develop the aircraft simulation model and evaluate aircraft performance as the design and mission parameters matured. The design of LaSRS++ enabled rapid-prototyping in several ways. First, the framework allowed component models to be designed, implemented, unit-tested, and integrated quickly. Next, the framework provides a highly reusable infrastructure that allowed developers to maximize code reuse while concentrating on aircraft and mission specific features. Finally, the framework reduces risk by providing reusable components that allow developers to build a quality product with a compressed testing cycle that relies heavily on unit testing of new components.

Kenney, P. Sean↗

NASA NTRS2018

Mars 2020 Surface Mission Modeling Landing Site Thermal Environments

This paper presents work done by the Mars 2020 Mission Planning Team to characterize landing site thermal environments. A process was developed to take in ground temperature simulation data for each landing site and efficiently discretize it into six thermal environment bins. The Mars 2020 Thermal Team then performed detailed heater and energy modeling in each of those environments. The heater modeling results were implemented into a Monte Carlo based surface mission model to understand mission performance impacts. The Mars 2020 Instrument Teams used the results to inform their design and to better understand how the thermal conditions at each landing site affected their instruments.

Lange, Robert D.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Mars 2020 Surface Mission Modeling Landing Site Thermal Environments

Lange, Robert D.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Mars 2020 Surface Mission Modeling: Landing Site Thermal Environments

This paper presents work done by the Mars 2020 Mission Planning Team to characterize landing site thermal environments. A process was developed to take in ground temperature simulation data for each landing site and efficiently discretize it into a handful of thermal bin environments. The Mars 2020 Thermal Team then performed detailed heater and energy modeling in each of those environments. The heater modeling results were implemented into a Monte Carlo based surface mission model to understand mission performance impacts. The Mars 2020 Instrument Teams used the results to inform their design and to better understand how the thermal conditions at each landing site affected their instruments.

Lange, Robert D.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Preparing Cassini Uplink Operations for Extended Mission

The Cassini-Huygens Mission to Saturn and Titan, a joint venture between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the European Space Agency, and the Italian Space Agency, is conducting a four-year, prime mission exploring the Saturnian system, including its atmosphere, rings, magnetosphere, moons and icy satellites. Launched in 1997, Cassini began its prime mission in 2004. Cassini is now preparing for a new era, a two-year extended mission to revisit many of the highlights and new discoveries made during the prime mission. Because of the light time delay from Earth to Saturn, and the time needed to coordinate the complicated science and engineering activities that take place on the spacecraft, commanding on Cassini is done in approximately 40-day intervals known as sequences. The Cassini Uplink Operations team is responsible for the final development and validation of the pointing profile and instrument and spacecraft commands that are contained in a sequence. During this final analysis prior to uplink to the spacecraft, thorough and exact evaluation is necessary to ensure there are no mistakes during commanding. In order to perform this evaluation, complete and refined processes and procedures are fundamental. The Uplink Operations team is also responsible for anomaly response during sequence execution, a process in which critical decisions often are made in real-time. Recent anomalies on other spacecraft missions have highlighted two major risks in the operations process: (1) personnel turnover and the retirement of critical knowledge and (2) aging, outdated operations procedures. If other missions are a good barometer, the Cassini extended mission will be presented with a high personnel turnover of the Cassini flight team, which could lead to a loss of expertise that has been essential to the success of the prime mission. In order to prepare the Cassini Uplink Operations Team for this possibility and to continue to develop and operate safe science and engineering sequences, a review and major update of the current documentation and operations procedures was needed. This paper will address the changes made to extended mission sequence generation processes primarily due to new restrictions in spacecraft operating capability and lessons learned from prime mission. In addition, it will address the state of the prime mission operations procedures, the philosophy changes and updates that were made to those procedures in response to process improvement, and the validation of those new procedures through the training of current and new personnel. And lastly, it will address the lessons learned throughout prime mission and how the Uplink Operations team chose to incorporate those lessons into the working documentation and team knowledge. This incorporation was necessary to facilitate the success of the extended mission with potentially all new personnel at some point prior to the end of the mission.

Maxwell, Jennifer L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

The First Flight Decision for New Human Spacecraft Vehicles - A General Approach

Determining when it is safe to fly a crew on a launch vehicle/spacecraft for the first time, especially when the test flight is a part of the overall system certification process, has long been a challenge for program decision makers. The decision on first flight is ultimately the judgment of the program and agency management in conjunction with the design and operations team. To aid in this decision process, a NASA team undertook the task to develop a generic framework for evaluating whether any given program or commercial provider has sufficiently complete and balanced plans in place to allow crewmembers to safely fly on human spaceflight systems for the first time. It was the team s goal to establish a generic framework that could easily be applied to any new system, although the system design and intended mission would require specific assessment. Historical data shows that there are multiple approaches that have been successful in first flight with crew. These approaches have always been tailored to the specific system design, mission objectives, and launch environment. Because specific approaches may vary significantly between different system designs and situations, prescriptive instructions or thorough checklists cannot be provided ahead of time. There are, however, certain general approaches that should be applied in thinking through the decision for first flight. This paper addresses some of the most important factors to consider when developing a new system or evaluating an existing system for whether or not it is safe to fly humans to/from space. In the simplest terms, it is time to fly crew for the first time when it is safe to do so and the benefit of the crewed flight is greater than the residual risk. This is rarely a straight-forward decision. The paper describes the need for experience, sound judgment, close involvement of the technical and management teams, and established decision processes. In addition, the underlying level of confidence the manager has in making the decision will also be discussed. By applying the outlined thought processes and approaches to a specific design, test program and mission objectives, a project team will be better able to focus the debate and discussion on critical areas for consideration and added scrutiny -- allowing decision makers to adequately address the first crewed flight decision.

Schaible, Dawn M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures Harmonized Across HERA, NEK, and ISS: Teams Risk

BACKGROUNDThe Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures (HFBP-EM) suite is a set of standardized measures to assess behavioral health and performance risk related to future exploration class missions, and to support reduction of the Human Research Program’s (HRP) Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Sleep, and Human Systems Integration Architecture risks. HFBP-EM were collected during Human Exploration Research Analogs (HERA) campaigns 4 (C4) and 5 (C5), and during SIRIUS 17 and 19 missions in the Russian Ground Based Experiment Complex, NEK, to document the feasibility, flexibility, and acceptability of these measures in analogsof the spaceflight environment. A subset of the HFBP-EM suite was collected during spaceflight as part HRP’s Standard Measures in Spaceflight Project. Whenever possible, the HFBP-EM protocol and measures are kept the same across studies, however, differences across research settings (e.g., experimental manipulations, mission scenarios, mission length) and implementation of the measures require the data are harmonized to ensure comparable views across missions. The purpose of our project is to develop a harmonized database of HFBP-EM data from different settings, and to summarize the trajectory of behavioral health and performance within and between research settings. In this presentation, we will summarize the harmonized dataset and the trajectory of measures related to the Team Risk, including team performance, team cohesion, team processes, and psychological safety, over time and between and within settings.METHODSWe followed best practices for data harmonization. Characteristics of each research setting were assessed for harmonization potential, and we deemed NEK-SIRIUS 17 as inappropriate due to study aims, length, and data quality. Common variables of interest were identified. Study characteristics and key variables with which datafiles could be merged were defined as “meta-data.” HFBP-EM data from all settings were processed under a common format. We then created a harmonized team-level database designed to facilitate analyses that address HRP research gaps related to HRP’s Team risk. In this database, team cohesion, processes, performance, psychological safety, and group living were operationalized as the team mean of the crew responses for each data collection (e.g., on mission day 7). Data collected on the International Space Station (ISS) included a subset of scale items administered to participants. Data collected from ISS team members within +/- 7 days of the first data collection and every following 30 +/-4 days were aggregated to the team level. We generated figures that display the mean and variability of team constructs across research settings. We also generated plots of changes in team constructs with mission day and with percentage of the mission completed. Where possible, we compared data from spaceflight analogs with data from astronauts aboard the ISS. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONThe team-level harmonized database was structured such that each row represents data for a team on a specific mission day. Team constructs (e.g., team cohesion) were included as columns (i.e., wide format) with repeated measures across mission days given in rows (i.e., long format). The database included data from 18 crews: five, 4-person American crews in HERA C4, four 4-person American crews in HERA C5, one 6-person multinational crew in NEK-SIRIUS 19, and eight, 2–11-person multinational crews aboard the ISS. Results provide insights into mission and campaign differences in team functioning and performance. For example, between campaign differences were observed for team processes—the interdependent team actions that orchestrate taskwork in pursuit of the team’s goals [1]. Greater between-team variability on team processes was detected during HERA C4 than during C5, and a downward trend was observed over the duration of C4, but not C5 or SIRIUS 19. This may be due to the campaign-level differences such as the sleep deprivation implemented during C4. Responses on the subset of team process items administered on the ISS indicate between-crew variability more like those observed in C4 than C5 and NEK, with some, but not all ISS crews demonstrating a downward trend over time. Additional findings will be presented. REFERENCESMarks, M. A., et al (2001) Academy of Management Review, 26(3), 356-376.

S T Bell↗

NASA NTRS2007

An Overview of the Space Shuttle Orbiter's Aging Aircraft Program

The Space Shuttle Orbiter has well exceeded its original design life of 10 years or 100 missions. The Orbiter Project Office (OPO) has sponsored several activities to address aging vehicle concerns, including a Corrosion Control Review Board (CCRB), a mid-life certification program, and most recently the formation of the Aging Orbiter Working Group (AOWG). The AOWG was chartered in 2004 as a proactive group which provides the OPO oversight for aging issues such as corrosion, non-destructive inspection, non-metallics, wiring and subsystems. The core team consists of mainly representatives from the Materials and Processes Problem Resolution Team (M&P PRT) and Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Subsystem engineers and subject matter experts are called in as required. The AOWG has functioned by forming issues based sub-teams. Examples of completed sub-teams include adhesives, wiring and wing leading edge metallic materials. Current sub-teams include Composite Over-Wrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV), elastomeric materials and mechanisms.

Russell, Richard W.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Exploring the Science Trade Space with the JPL Innovation Foundry A-Team

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory Innovation Foundry has established a new approach for exploring, developing, and evaluating early concepts with a group called the Architecture Team. The Architecture Team combines innovative collaborative methods and facilitated sessions with subject matter experts and analysis tools to help mature mission concepts. Science, implementation, and programmatic elements are all considered during an A-Team study. In these studies, Concept Maturity Levels are used to group methods. These levels include idea generation and capture (Concept Maturity Level 1), initial feasibility assessment (Concept Maturity Level 2), and trade space exploration (Concept Maturity Level 3). Methods used for exploring the science objectives, feasibility, and scope will be described including the use of a new technique for understanding the most compelling science, called a Science Return Diagram. In the process of developing the Science Return Diagram, gradients in the science trade space are uncovered along with their implications for implementation and mission architecture. Special attention is paid toward developing complete investigations, establishing a series of logical claims that lead to the natural selection of a measurement approach. Over 20 science-focused A-Team studies have used these techniques to help science teams refine their mission objectives, make implementation decisions, and reveal the mission concept's most compelling science. This article will describe the A-Team process for exploring the mission concept's science trade space and the Science Return Diagram technique.

science↗

NASA NTRS2021

The Origins Space Telescope: Trades and Decisions Leading to the Baseline Mission Concept

The Origins Space Telescope will trace the history of our origins from the time dust and heavy elements permanently altered the cosmic landscape to present-day life. How did galaxies evolve from the earliest galactic systems to those found in the universe today? How do habitable planets form? How common are life-bearing worlds? We describe how Origins was designed to answer these alluring questions. We discuss the key decisions taken by the Origins mission concept study team, the rationale for those choices, and how they led through an exploratory design process to the Origins baseline mission concept. To understand the concept solution space, we studied two distinct mission concepts and descoped the second concept, aiming to maximize science per dollar and hit a self-imposed cost target. We report on the study approach and describe the concept evolution. The resulting baseline design includes a 5.9-m diameter telescope cryocooled to 4.5 K and equipped with three scientific instruments. The chosen architecture is similar to that of the Spitzer Space Telescope and requires very few deployments after launch. The cryo-thermal system design leverages JamesWebb Space Telescope technology and experience.

Infrared↗

NASA NTRS2018

Dawn Mission's Search for Satellites of Ceres: Intact Protoplanets Don't Have Satellites

Upon its approach to orbit the dwarf planet Ceres in early 2015, optical navigation and dedicated satellite search images were acquired with the Dawn mission's framing camera 2. A team of searchers individually processed and examined the images for evidence of objects moving with Ceres. Completeness of search with respect to the space searched was calculated as a function of distance to Ceres and found to be complete down to 15 Ceres radii (Ceres' mean radius is 470 kilometers). Upper limits of detectable magnitude were determined for each observed set of images and an upper limit in size was calculated assuming for the putative objects, Ceres' geometric albedo of 0.11. Nothing was found associated with Ceres down to a radius of 12 meters for the most sensitive search, and down to a radius of 323m for the least sensitive search circumstances. Examination of the physical properties of the 41 largest and most massive main belt asteroids suggests that large asteroids without satellites are intact and their interiors have internal strength. This is consistent with results from the Dawn mission at both Vesta and Ceres. Ceres' volatile-rich composition also is a likely contributor to both the absence of satellites at Ceres and of Ceres meteorites at Earth. These results suggest that collisional disruption creating rubble pile structure is a necessary condition for formation of satellites around main belt asteroids.

McFadden, Lucy A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

The MSFC Collaborative Engineering Process for Preliminary Design and Concept Definition Studies

This paper describes a collaborative engineering process developed by the Marshall Space Flight Center's Advanced Concepts Office for performing rapid preliminary design and mission concept definition studies for potential future NASA missions. The process has been developed and demonstrated for a broad range of mission studies including human space exploration missions, space transportation system studies and in-space science missions. The paper will describe the design team structure and specialized analytical tools that have been developed to enable a unique rapid design process. The collaborative engineering process consists of integrated analysis approach for mission definition, vehicle definition and system engineering. The relevance of the collaborative process elements to the standard NASA NPR 7120.1 system engineering process will be demonstrated. The study definition process flow for each study discipline will be will be outlined beginning with the study planning process, followed by definition of ground rules and assumptions, definition of study trades, mission analysis and subsystem analyses leading to a standardized set of mission concept study products. The flexibility of the collaborative engineering design process to accommodate a wide range of study objectives from technology definition and requirements definition to preliminary design studies will be addressed. The paper will also describe the applicability of the collaborative engineering process to include an integrated systems analysis approach for evaluating the functional requirements of evolving system technologies and capabilities needed to meet the needs of future NASA programs.

Mulqueen, Jack↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Overview of the Lunar Gateway External Contamination Environment

As a part of the Artemis mission, Gateway will be a long duration space station in a near rectilinear halo orbit around the Moon. Gateway will be exposed to a variety of external contamination sources, which can degrade external hardware / surfaces and impact science utilization objectives. Requirements and methodologies addressing material outgassing, chemical and electric thruster plumes, vacuum venting, and visiting vehicle interactions have been developed by the Gateway Induced Environments team to ensure vehicle performance and mission success. The external contamination requirements and integration process are described along with required data deliverables. Integrated external contamination analyses are conducted by the Gateway Environments Team to assess compliance with external contamination requirements. This paper provides a current status of integration activities and analysis results, as well as future plans to improve external contamination characterization.

Crystal A. Quiroz↗