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NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Design Process: Evolution and Lessons Learned

The Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Design team is responsible for defining a launch to orbit trajectory profile that satisfies all programmatic mission objectives and defines the ground and onboard reconfiguration requirements for this high-speed and demanding flight phase. This design, verification and reconfiguration process ensures that all applicable mission scenarios are enveloped within integrated vehicle and spacecraft certification constraints and criteria, and includes the design of the nominal ascent profile and trajectory profiles for both uphill and ground-to-ground aborts. The team also develops a wide array of associated training, avionics flight software verification, onboard crew and operations facility products. These key ground and onboard products provide the ultimate users and operators the necessary insight and situational awareness for trajectory dynamics, performance and event sequences, abort mode boundaries and moding, flight performance and impact predictions for launch vehicle stages for use in range safety, and flight software performance. These products also provide the necessary insight to or reconfiguration of communications and tracking systems, launch collision avoidance requirements, and day of launch crew targeting and onboard guidance, navigation and flight control updates that incorporate the final vehicle configuration and environment conditions for the mission. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, ascent trajectory design and mission planning has evolved in order to improve program flexibility and reduce cost, while maintaining outstanding data quality. Along the way, the team has implemented innovative solutions and technologies in order to overcome significant challenges. A number of these solutions may have applicability to future human spaceflight programs.

Picka, Bret A.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Lunar Rover Design Concepts Assessments

Mass is a significant risk to programs and projects as they transition from formulation to implementation, especially in larger human space systems where delivery mass or volume can be a constrained commodity. • Concepts developed without an adequate systems-engineering basis, including design and operations experience, may miss significant functionality and subsequent mass required for integration or operations. • Further uncertainty can be associated with not fully understanding design best practices and standards that drive mass, such as design for minimum risk or fault tolerance.1 • Finally, the appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate mass growth allowance (MGA) to ensure program success. Mass is a key quantity that should be constantly monitored by the systems engineer and the program/project management stakeholder to ensure mission compatibility throughout the project life cycle. In addition, mass is a key programmatic performance metric monitored by the NASA Chief Financial Officer for current and future program cost estimating. NASA Exploration Systems sought an assessment of reasonableness with respect to different potential rover concepts that balances mass needs and human-class cargo lander capabilities. Appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight were used, and are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate MGA to ensure program success. Two independent Lunar rover concepts were evaluated, with a goal to understand concept credibility and the Lunar rover designs potential extensibility for Mars surface operations. A notional generic rover concept is shown in Figure 1.

Systems Engineering↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗
NASA NTRS1993

Risk management for the Space Exploration Initiative

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a quantitative engineering process that provides the analytic structure and decision-making framework for total programmatic risk management. Ideally, it is initiated in the conceptual design phase and used throughout the program life cycle. Although PRA was developed for assessment of safety, reliability, and availability risk, it has far greater application. Throughout the design phase, PRA can guide trade-off studies among system performance, safety, reliability, cost, and schedule. These studies are based on the assessment of the risk of meeting each parameter goal, with full consideration of the uncertainties. Quantitative trade-off studies are essential, but without full identification, propagation, and display of uncertainties, poor decisions may result. PRA also can focus attention on risk drivers in situations where risk is too high. For example, if safety risk is unacceptable, the PRA prioritizes the risk contributors to guide the use of resources for risk mitigation. PRA is used in the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) Program. To meet the stringent requirements of the SEI mission, within strict budgetary constraints, the PRA structure supports informed and traceable decision-making. This paper briefly describes the SEI PRA process.

Buchbinder, Ben↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Utilizing Gaps and Key Performance Parameters to Inform NASA Environmental Control and Life Support Capability Technology Decisions

Human spaceflight is a complex endeavor requiring multiple capabilities for transportation, crew health, scientific goals, and safe return to Earth. The difference between spaceflight proven capabilities and those needed for future exploration architectures is defined as a capability gap. Capability gaps are not technology specific. Each capability gap may be closed with a wide array of technologies that have unique benefits and challenges. Determining what a capability’s relevant and distinguishing key performance parameters (KPPs) are for a mission is critical. Mass, power, and volume are always constrained and important, but defining these in a way normalized by performance is very important. KPP definition for reliability, dormancy, and integration needs are hard to define but critical. Outside of technical considerations, the programmatic factors of the estimated time to develop the technology vs when a mission element is also a strong consideration in which technologies should be pursued. The Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS) capability areas include: life support, environmental monitoring, fire safety, and logistics. These capability areas are decomposed to high level gaps. While KPPs should be technology agnostic, they can be used to both compare technologies and measure progress of technology development over time. KPPs help define when the gap is closed, and the core mission objectives can be accomplished. Proposed technology improvements to enhance a capability should balance improved KPPs and against investments in other capabilities that are not yet closed. A selection of ECLSS gaps and KPPs and their formulation, current state, and how they inform capability roadmap planning are discussed.

Life Support↗
NASA NTRS2009

Shuttle Shortfalls and Lessons Learned for the Sustainment of Human Space Exploration

Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.

Zapata, Edgar↗
NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗
NASA NTRS1999

Engineered Solutions to Reduce Occupational Noise Exposure at the NASA Glenn Research Center: A Five-Year Progress Summary (1994-1999)

At the NASA John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field (formerly the Lewis Research Center), experimental research in aircraft and space propulsion systems is conducted in more than 100 test cells and laboratories. These facilities are supported by a central process air system that supplies high-volume, high-pressure compressed air and vacuum at various conditions that simulate altitude flight. Nearly 100,000 square feet of metalworking and specialized fabrication shops located on-site produce prototypes, models, and test hardware in support of experimental research operations. These activities, comprising numerous individual noise sources and operational scenarios, result in a varied and complex noise exposure environment, which is the responsibility of the Glenn Research Center Noise Exposure Management Program. Hearing conservation, community noise complaint response and noise control engineering services are included under the umbrella of this Program, which encompasses the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard on occupational noise exposure, Sec. 29CFR 1910.95, as well as the more stringent NASA Health Standard on Hearing Conservation. Prior to 1994, in the absence of feasible engineering controls, strong emphasis had been placed on personal hearing protection as the primary mechanism for assuring compliance with Sec. 29CFR 1910.95 as well as NASA's more conservative policy, which prohibits unprotected exposure to noise levels above 85 dB(A). Center policy and prudent engineering practice required, however, that these efforts be extended to engineered noise controls in order to bring existing work areas into compliance with Sec. 29CFR 1910.95 and NASA's own policies and to ensure compliance for new installations. Coincident with the establishment in 1995 of a NASA wide multi-year commitment of funding for environmental abatement projects, the Noise Exposure Management Program was established, with its focus on engineering approaches to reducing occupational and community noise exposure. The organization and mission of this Program were documented shortly after its inception, and individual programmatic components have been the subject of subsequent papers. This paper summarizes the status and accomplishments of the engineering aspects of the Program from a five-year retrospective viewpoint and includes a review of retrofit noise control solution strategies, which have not been previously documented.

Cooper, Beth A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2011

Current Status of the Nitrogen Oxygen Recharge System

This paper presents an overview of the Nitrogen Oxygen Recharge System (NORS) to date and the current development status of the system. NORS is an element of the International Space Station (ISS) Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) used to resupply the ISS with Nitrogen and Oxygen following the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle. The paper will discuss why NASA is developing NORS, including a summary of other concepts considered, and other related concepts currently being developed by NASA. The current system architecture will be described, along with a summary of the current design of the NORS. The overall programmatic schedule of the NORS in the context of the upcoming shuttle retirement and future launch vehicle development will also be presented. Finally, the paper will examine the significant technical challenges encountered during the requirements and preliminary design phase of NORS development. A key challenge to the development of NORS is the international shipment - and associated regulations - of pressurized Oxygen, which is necessary due to the use of launch vehicles based in Japan and French Guiana to send NORS gasses to the ISS. The storage and use of relatively large quantities of high pressure (41,000 kPa) Oxygen and Nitrogen within the ISS, which is unprecedented both on the ISS and other space vehicles, has had a significant impact on the design and architecture of the system. The high pressure of the system also poses unique thermal considerations, which has led to the development of a heater system for thermal conditioning of high pressure gas to avoid thermal impacts on downstream hardware. The on-orbit envelope allocated to the NORS has changed (gotten smaller) and has impacted both the design and architecture of the system. Finally, the balance of safety considerations associated with these high pressure gasses, particularly high pressure Oxygen, with the functionality of the system has profoundly impacted the form of the system and will be discussed.

Dick, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2024

Safe Operations at Roadway Junctions: Intelligent Roadway Infrastructure as Functional Interlocking

Automated vehicle (AV) technology is quickly maturing, and the corresponding infrastructure systems that evaluate traffic and communicate to vehicles requires sophisticated sensing and perception technologies, referred to as intelligent roadway infrastructure (IRI), to complement emerging AV capabilities. IRI provides signals to vehicles, indicating right-of-way for vehicles and communicating to approaching AVs that no other vehicle is failing to yield. This capability, denoted as safety-affirmative signaling, provides a green light or a green arrow as appropriate and affirms through communication links to connected vehicles when it is safe to proceed. About 36% of collisions occur at intersections, with most occurring upon left turns (22.2%) or crossing over (12.6%), and only a small percentage (1.2%) while turning right at an intersection. Of all intersection crashes about half (52.5%) of those vehicles were traveling through a signalized intersection 2. Safety-affirmative signaling would guarantee safety of AV fleet vehicles, by providing the interlocking principle, a term from automated train control that only allows progression through a railway intersection after affirming no opportunity for a crash exists. IRI through safety-affirmative signaling would bring performance and safety to complex roadway intersections where AV transit fleet service is most needed, as well as safety benefits to traditional, non-automated vehicles and vulnerable road users. The implementation of IRI has functional, programmatic, and technical challenges. Research work performed at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in an integrative approach encapsulating these themes, and termed infrastructure perception and control (IPC) is motivated by improved performance (travel time), improved safety (reduced collisions), and improved energy efficiency (less fuel burned and minimized production of greenhouse gases). IPC is intended not only for roadway and intersection applications but also in extension to inform complementary buildings and grid systems to enable better co-management, as vehicles and their charging needs become increasingly integrated into the built environment. The NREL IPC project presents an open-source framework, architecture, and supporting technology to implement IRI, addressing critical issues such as fusion of data, reliability, standardization of data interfaces, and confidence of detection. The framework is informed by previous experience in U.S. Department of Defense research technology, specifically in the use of radar to detect, identify, and track aerial threats. These principles combined with multi-sensor fusion provides for a complete digital twin with known and measurable confidence and accuracy from which safety-affirmative signaling can be developed and deployed.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,MATHEMATICS AND COMPUT↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Research Project Management Can Benefit from Engineering Technology Selection Methods

Many engineering methods have been developed to help management select technology for a system design or further research. The simplest way to compare technologies is to use a checklist containing all the more or less important selection criteria, so that nothing is overlooked. The criteria usually include cost, safety, reliability and maintainability, and potential problems such as noise generation and microgravity sensitivity. The next step typically is to weight and score all the criteria. The process of weighting and scoring is helpful in bringing out different priorities and reaching a shared point of view. Group technology selection methods are designed to highlight initial disagreements and produce a shared consensus. Often a frank discussion led by management rather than decision analysts can be more effective. The final selection depends on management and engineering judgment and may include programmatic and organizational factors that are beyond the engineering checklist. The objective of engineering technology selection methods is to provide engineering information to assist management in making sound decisions. Project management and technology selection are assumed to use rational engineering analytic methods, but they often do not. The reason is that human insight, intuition, and “gut feel,” rather than logic, more frequently determine our decisions. Project selection and management are strongly influenced by nonrational psychological influences, which can produce unjustified confidence and determination. Nevertheless, there is a strong need for space projects to do rational project analysis and selection. Demonstrating a rational spirit is necessary for a scientific and technical organization. Professional ethics at its best requires an open, honest, and fair process, without damaging politics. Rational analysis can help improve good projects and avoid selecting bad ones. A sanity check using rational analysis guided by a checklist can help avoid egregious and damaging errors.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Searching for 'Unknown Unknowns'

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was established to improve safety through engineering excellence within NASA programs and projects. As part of this goal, methods are being investigated to enable the NESC to become proactive in identifying areas that may be precursors to future problems. The goal is to find unknown indicators of future problems, not to duplicate the program-specific trending efforts. The data that is critical for detecting these indicators exist in a plethora of dissimilar non-conformance and other databases (without a common format or taxonomy). In fact, much of the data is unstructured text. However, one common database is not required if the right standards and electronic tools are employed. Electronic data mining is a particularly promising tool for this effort into unsupervised learning of common factors. This work in progress began with a systematic evaluation of available data mining software packages, based on documented decision techniques using weighted criteria. The four packages, which were perceived to have the most promise for NASA applications, are being benchmarked and evaluated by independent contractors. Preliminary recommendations for "best practices" in data mining and trending are provided. Final results and recommendations should be available in the Fall 2005. This critical first step in identifying "unknown unknowns" before they become problems is applicable to any set of engineering or programmatic data.

Parsons, Vickie S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

22 N HPGP Thruster Life Testing

In the ever-changing paradigm of efficient and capable spacecraft design, scientific missions continue pushing the envelope enabling spacecraft subsystems to deliver effective solutions to meet challenging new mission/spacecraft needs. From an in-space storable liquid chemical propulsion perspective, monopropellant hydrazine has been, and continues to be, a dependable propellant with considerable flight heritage, a variety of engine thrust classes available from multiple vendors, with repeatable and reliable performance. Additionally, the space propulsion industry has learned to successfully handle hydrazine, its regulations, the safety protocols, the personnel protective equipment, and the unique training standards–all requisite for loading spacecraft propulsion systems with toxic hypergolic hydrazine. The question now arises as to “what is next for in-space chemical propulsion?” Further, with the evolution and concrete advancements in innovative in-space green propellant technologies, capable of providing realizable benefits to scientific missions, concern over the reliability and availability of this higher performing and safer to handle class of propellants is waning. As science missions move forward with the potential flight in fusion of High Performance Green Propulsion (HPGP), NASA and its industry partners are working to address any gaps in system reliability, performance, or unique operational considerations. Propellant technology that offers both higher performance and significant reduction in personnel hazards compared to hydrazine presents an attractive propulsion subsystem design opportunity. Increased propulsion subsystem performance can result in lower spacecraft launch mass, larger scientific payloads, or extended on-orbit lifetimes. Mission trades using green propulsion technologies have been documented on multiple NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) mission classes, examining various parameters and requirements to support mission architectures in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), High Earth Orbit (HEO), geostationary, lunar, planetary, and Quasi-halo orbit around Sun-Earth Lagrange point (L2). The results of these trade studies show promising, attainable benefits. The perceived programmatic risk of flying a newer propulsion technology has, unfortunately, not outweighed the benefits to date. To take advantage of the improved performance and mitigate programmatic risk, HPGP engines must demonstrate life testing at higher propellant throughputs than have currently been demonstrated. In an effort to proactively address the challenges with technology infusion into a risk-averse community, NASA and the Swedish National Space Agency (SNSA) outlined a collaborative Implementing Arrangement (IA) for the respective agencies to pursue increased HPGP technology maturation. This initial IA effort began in 2013, fresh off the heels of the successful PRISMA HPGP technology demonstration mission. The IA targeted objective is to reduce risk to potential future HPGP missions and fully characterize the LMP-103S propellant and associated engine performance. Over the past eight years, HPGP has flown in propulsion systems on twenty-five(25) spacecraft from seven(7) different Launch Ranges around the globe and on seven (7) different Launch Vehicles. Six(6) of these launches involved multiple loading operations for multiple spacecraft. For U.S. Range operations, nine (9) HPGP systems have been processed at Vandenberg Space Force Base(VSFB):six(6) in 2017, and three (3) in 2018. Six (6) more have been processed at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS)in May 2020, with three (3) systems launched in June 2020 and the remaining three (3) system were left loaded and ready until their launch in August of 2020. Three (3) more systems have been processed at Wallops Flight Facility(WFF)and launched in June 2021. In addition, these propulsion subsystems employed heritage propulsion subsystem component such as valves, filters, and pressure transducers, and have further demonstrated nominal functionality in both diaphragm and Propellant Management Device (PDM) propellant tanks. Based on these successes, HPGP technology continues to be considered for NASA Science Mission Directorate missions at GSFC. The work presented herein represents many years of development and collaborative efforts to successfully align higher performance, low toxicity hydrazine alternatives into scientific missions. NASA GSFC Propulsion Engineering, in collaboration with Bradford ECAPS, has developed mission specific thruster design and testing requirements to establish GSFC’s desired test conditions and firing sequences.In2017, the first flight-like 22N HPGP thruster Engineering Qualification Model (EQM-1)was designed and built by Bradford ECAPS to prove out the thruster design, materials, build process, and test campaign with respect to NASA GSFC critical component and mission requirements. This test program was developed to comprehensively test the thruster, the technology, and ultimately increase the 22N HPGP Technology Readiness Level(TRL). EQM-1was tested to environmental qualification levels prior to hot fire performance testing to represent the relevant end-to-end environment (launch to on-orbit operation)with required margin. This thruster demonstrated steady-state and pulse mode operational capability with propellant thruster throughput up to~53kg.At this throughput level, the EQM-1 engine began to present off-nominal performance and the test campaign was halted to allow for non-destructive testing and identify the root cause for the an omalous performance. Capitalizing on the successful elements of the EQM-1 campaign, an upgraded 22N HPGP EQM-2 has been manufactured by Bradford ECAPS to meet the complete GSFC requirements. The EQM-2 thruster’s test campaign has further demonstrated the robustness of the HPGP propulsion technology and increased the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) by undergoing a full acceptance test program, then proceeding into qualification, including environmental testing (vibration and shock to qualification levels),as well as hot-fire life testing, operating at steady-state and pulse modes with increased propellant thruster throughput to~150kg. The HPGP thruster performance testing enables effective HPGP thruster readiness evaluation to meet NASA candidate mission requirements in the future.

High↗
NASA NTRS2019

Orion Heat Shield Manufacturing Producibility Improvements for the EM-1 Flight Test Program

This paper describes how the Orion program is incorporating improvements in the heat shield design and manufacturing processes reducing programmatic risk and ensuring crew safety in support of NASA’s Exploration Missions. The Orion program successfully completed the EFT-1 flight test in 2014 and is currently developing the EM-1 spacecraft to meet the test objectives of an orbital mission to the moon and return to earth in 2019. Lessons learned from the EFT-1 manufacturing and flight test experience are being incorporated into a wide variety of vehicle systems and manufacturing processes to reduce risk to the Orion missions and flight crew. A critical contributor to crew safety is the heat shield that protects the crew capsule during re-entry through the earth’s atmosphere for return from deep space. The first flight test vehicle, EFT-1, was manufactured and tested in the Neil Armstrong Operations and Checkout (O&C) facility at KSC to demonstrate early risk reduction including the functionality of the Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) for capsule safe return to earth. The approach for the EFT-1 heat shield utilized a low risk approach using Apollo heritage design and manufacturing processes using an Avcoat TPS ablator with a honeycomb substrate to provide a one piece heat shield to meet the mission re-entry heating environments. The manufacturing processes used honeycomb cell injection guns which were redeveloped from the Apollo Lunar Program processes to build the EFT-1 heat shield. The completed heat shield was transported across the country by aircraft to the O&C at KSC for installation onto the capsule. The EFT-1 heat shield successfully performed its mission and experienced ~80% of the re-entry velocity (50% heating rate) for a lunar return for an Exploration Mission. The second flight test vehicle is the EM-1 mission which will have additional flight systems installed to fly to the moon and return. Heat shield design and producibility improvements have been incorporated in the EM-1 vehicle to meet deep space mission and programmatic requirements. The design continues to use the Avcoat material, but in a “block” configuration to enable improvements in the application processes as well as additional improvements in the carrier structure design and manufacturing operations. Incorporating flight test results and producibility improvements from EFT-1 for the heat shield system design and processes have improved the thermal protection capability, improved the producibility, and cost for EM-1 flight test.

Producibility↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)

NASA, in partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA), is seeking to return Martian geological and atmospheric samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Due to the possibility that the samples could contain extraterrestrial life, Mars Sample Return (MSR) is classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return mission by the NASA Planetary Protection Office. As a result of this classification, a MSR Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) must not only provide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence) to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized. The nominal utilization period for a SRF is anticipated to be 2-5 years and is intended to enable curation activities, biohazard assessment, select early science activities, and the rapid release of samples to the scientific community. However, to account for possible delays in schedule or the identification of extant life, this anticipated period of time must be flexible to accommodate schedule extensions and contingency plans. Due to requirements for high-level biological containment and cleanliness, a traditional receiving/curation facility cannot be utilized for MSR. Therefore, beginning in 2022, NASA Johnson Space Center is performing a MSR SRF Assessment Study (MSAS) to investigate the most optimal facility modality for a MSR SRF, as well as start to define programmatic early estimate of costs and schedules before the initial design phase begins. NASA is partnering with industry contractors (architectural and engineering firms with BSL-4 and cleanroom technology experience, as well as other contracted infrastructure and construction specialists) along with selected experts from NASA, ESA, existing U.S. BSL-4 facilities, and other U.S. government agencies, to carry out the assessment study. The MSAS should also aid in the future refinement of the science requirements (e.g., contamination control, equipment accommodations) before site-specific design would commence. As part of the MSAS, NASA is planning to assess an array of possibilities for a MSR SRF. One of the main considerations is the facility modality and whether an existing BSL-4 facility can be utilized (for some or all functions); or, if new constructure would be required, would a traditional fixed facility or a modular facility the best choice. MSAS will also investigate the ability of the modalities to accommodate two different facility capability endmembers: 1) a minimal facility focusing on biohazard assessment and curation tasks with a small footprint, and 2) an enhanced facility with additional capabilities to enable expedited processing and the completion of time-sensitive and (some) sterilization-sensitive science. The assessment is intended to generate information that will inform the selection of facility modalities for high-level conceptual design development. While the assessment study will focus on SRF requirements for accommodating curation, science, and sample safety assessment infrastructure, it will also consider an array of other factors, such as ease of access for international users, decommissioning, repurposing, future sale or lease following MSR’s use of the facility, and uncontained preparatory laboratory spaces. Upon completion of the study, the preferred modality and refined requirements would be utilized for site-specific design but will not be finalized until NASA’s completion of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.

A.D. Harrington↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Autonomy for Enabling Deep Space Exploration

The Gateway spacecraft is an important stepping-stone to exploration of the solar system, integrating commercial and international partners into a tightly coupled system, enabling cislunar activities, and implementing key technologies for missions to Mars. Autonomy is a capability area necessary to handle long communication outages where intervention from Earth is impossible, to prepare to operate with long communication delays that will be common in interplanetary travel, and to make spaceflight more affordable and accessible by reducing sustaining operations costs. The Gateway Concept of Operations states that one of Gateway’s goals is to “focus on infrastructure and systems that will allow autonomous operations aboard the Gateway with robotics, automated systems, advanced communications, and distributed computing.” Gateway’s Vehicle Systems Manager (VSM) and associated Autonomous Spacecraft Management Architecture (ASMA) are key products towards delivering autonomous capability. The primary functions of the control architecture are Mission Management and Timeline Execution, Resource Management, Fault Management, and Vehicle Control and Operation (VCO). In each of these areas, there is an initial level of capability to be delivered at launch, with plans to continue development and grow to greater capability. The initial deployment of VSM will focus on maintaining vehicle safety by focusing on full fault management capabilities and deploying only enough resource and timeline planning functionality to support that. The final deployment of VSM will add significant planning and control optimization functionality to support nominal operations for up to 21 days without ground support, even accommodating fault and failure conditions. While the VSM is the vehicle-level representation of autonomous reasoning, distributed automation is essential to provide the right scope and abstraction of information to process. Module and system support of automation and simplicity of interfaces are two important design paradigms that Gateway is focusing on to garner a systems approach to autonomy. Distribution of reasoning can increase complexity, so Gateway is also taking a strict hierarchical approach to information flow and decision making. VSM is not the only capability necessary to achieve an autonomous spacecraft. Robotics support for maintenance of the spacecraft will be essential to provide continued vehicle functionality even when crew is not present. Technical and programmatic challenges exist when implementing autonomous robotics operations. These challenges include sufficient network flexibility to support data transfer to the rest of the vehicle to coordinate module-to-module robotic walk-offs and finding the proper interfaces to allow sufficient dexterity. Communication system upgrades planned for Gateway include Delay Tolerant Networking to best utilize the complex network of relays that will be part of mature cislunar operations. Distributed computing and management will provide failure tolerance, robustness, and growth of capabilities while still allowing significant reuse of heritage software on heritage systems as well as reuse of common applications across a spacecraft to minimize new development, but this requires adherence to key standards and interfaces. The Gateway program has demonstrated significant progress towards these capabilities and has identified challenges other spacecraft developers should be aware of from the start.

Molly Anderson↗