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A Qualitative Assessment of Current CCF Guidance Based on a Review of Safety System Digital Implementation Changes with Evolving Technology

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is initiating a new rulemaking project to develop a digital system common-cause failure (CCF) rule. This rulemaking will review and modify or affirm the NRC's current digital system CCF policy as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls, in NRC Regulatory Guide (NUREG)-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (ML033580677). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is providing technical support to the NRC staff on the CCF rulemaking, and this report is one of several providing the technical basis to inform NRC staff members. For the task described in this report, ORNL examined instrumentation and controls (I&C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF is adequate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

LWRSP FY09 testing and analysis of reactor metal degradation

Current regulations require RPV steels to maintain conservative margins of fracture toughness so that postulated flaws do not threaten the integrity of the RPV during either normal operation and maintenance cycles or under accident transients, like pressurized thermal shock. Neutron irradiation degrades fracture toughness, in some cases severely. Thermal aging, while not generally considered a significant issue for a 40-y operating life, must be an additional consideration for operation to 60 or 80 years. Regulations, codified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Regulatory Guide 1.99 Rev 2, etc., recognize that embrittlement has a potential for reducing toughness below acceptable levels. The last few decades have seen remarkable progress in developing a mechanistic understanding of irradiation embrittlement. This understanding has been exploited in formulating robust, physically-based and statistically-calibrated models of CVN-indexed transition-temperature shifts (TTS). These semi-empirical models account for key embrittlement variables and variable interactions, including the effects of copper (Cu), nickel (Ni), phosphorous (P), fluence ({phi}t), flux ({phi}), and irradiation temperature (T{sub i}). However, these models and our present understanding of radiation damage are not fully quantitative, and do not treat all potentially significant variables and issues. Over the past three decades, developments in fracture mechanics have led to a number of consensus standards and codes for determining the fracture toughness parameters needed for development of databases that are useful for statistical analysis and establishment of uncertainties. The CVN toughness, however, is a qualitative measure, which must be correlated with the fracture toughness and crack-arrest toughness properties, K{sub Ic} and K{sub Ia}, necessary for structural integrity evaluations. Where practicable, direct measurements of the fracture toughness properties are desirable to reduce the uncertainties associated with correlations. Moreover, fracture-toughness data have been obtained in sufficient quantity to permit probabilistic application. The progress notwithstanding, however, there are still significant technical issues that need to be addressed to reduce the uncertainties in regulatory application. The major issues regarding irradiation effects are summarized in [1,2]. Of the many significant issues discussed, those deemed to have the most impact on the current regulatory process are: (1) high fluence, long irradiation times, and flux effects, (2) material variability and surrogate materials, (3) high-nickel materials, (4) the fracture toughness master curve, (5) the bias in reference toughness derived from precracked Charpy specimens, (6) attenuation, (7) modeling and microstructural analysis, (8) thermal annealing and reirradiation, and (9) thermal aging. Material variability and surrogate materials are an overarching issue. A more complete understanding of the other issues is needed in order to reduce the uncertainties associated with material variability. Moreover, the combination of irradiation experiments with modeling and microstructural studies provides an essential element in aging evaluations of RPVs. It is clear that embrittlement of RPV steels is a critical issue that may limit LWR plant life extension. The primary objective of the LWRSP RPV task is to develop robust predictions of transition temperature shifts (TTS) at high fluence ({phi}t) to at least 1020 n/cm2 (>1 MeV) pertinent to plant operation for 80 full power years. New and existing databases will be combined to support developing physically based models of TTS for high fluence-low flux ({phi} < 10 11/n/cm2-s) conditions, beyond the existing surveillance database. A summary of progress on the RPV task of the LWRSP Materials Pathway is presented here.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development of a Standard for Verification and Validation of Software Used to Calculate Nuclear System Thermal Fluids Behavior

With the resurgence of nuclear power and increased interest in advanced nuclear reactors as an option to supply abundant energy without the associated greenhouse gas emissions of the more conventional fossil fuel energy sources, there is a need to establish internationally recognized standards for the verification and validation (V&V) of software used to calculate the thermal-hydraulic behavior of advanced reactor designs for both normal operation and hypothetical accident conditions. To address this need, ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Standards and Certification has established the V&V 30 Committee, under the responsibility of the V&V Standards Committee, to develop a consensus Standard for verification and validation of software used for design and analysis of advanced reactor systems. The initial focus of this committee will be on the V&V of system analysis and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software for nuclear applications. To limit the scope of the effort, the committee will further limit its focus to software to be used in the licensing of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors. In this framework, the standard should conform to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) practices, procedures and methods for licensing of nuclear power plants as embodied in the United States (U.S.) Code of Federal Regulations and other pertinent documents such as Regulatory Guide 1.203, “Transient and Accident Analysis Methods” and NUREG-0800, “NRC Standard Review Plan”. In addition, the standard should be consistent with applicable sections of ASME Standard NQA-1 (“Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (QA)”). This paper describes the general requirements for the V&V Standard, which includes; (a) the definition of the operational and accident domain of a nuclear system that must be considered if the system is to licensed, (b) the corresponding calculational domain of the software that should encompass the nuclear operational and accident domain to be used to study the system behavior for licensing purposes, (c) the definition of the scaled experimental data set required to provide the basis for validating the software, (d) the ensemble of experimental data sets required to populate the validation matrix for the software in question, and (e) the practices and procedures to be used when applying a validation standard. Although this initial effort will focus on software for licensing of High-Temperature Gas Reactors, it is anticipated that the practices and procedures developed for this standard can eventually be extended to other nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Application of the DG-1199 methodology to the ESBWR and ABWR.

Appendix A-5 of Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1199 'Alternative Radiological Source Term for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors' provides guidance - applicable to RADTRAD MSIV leakage models - for scaling containment aerosol concentration to the expected steam dome concentration in order to preserve the simplified use of the Accident Source Term (AST) in assessing containment performance under assumed design basis accident (DBA) conditions. In this study Economic and Safe Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) and Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) RADTRAD models are developed using the DG-1199, Appendix A-5 guidance. The models were run using RADTRAD v3.03. Low Population Zone (LPZ), control room (CR), and worst-case 2-hr Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) doses were calculated and compared to the relevant accident dose criteria in 10 CFR 50.67. For the ESBWR, the dose results were all lower than the MSIV leakage doses calculated by General Electric/Hitachi (GEH) in their licensing technical report. There are no comparable ABWR MSIV leakage doses, however, it should be noted that the ABWR doses are lower than the ESBWR doses. In addition, sensitivity cases were evaluated to ascertain the influence/importance of key input parameters/features of the models.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Peer Review of NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Models underwent a Peer Review using ASME PRA standard (Addendum C) as endorsed by NRC in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200. The review was performed by a mix of industry probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) experts and NRC PRA experts. Representative SPAR models, one PWR and one BWR, were reviewed against Capability Category I of the ASME PRA standard. Capability Category I was selected as the basis for review due to the specific uses/applications of the SPAR models. The BWR SPAR model was reviewed against 331 ASME PRA Standard Supporting Requirements; however, based on the Capability Category I level of review and the absence of internal flooding and containment performance (LERF) logic only 216 requirements were determined to be applicable. Based on the review, the BWR SPAR model met 139 of the 216 supporting requirements. The review also generated 200 findings or suggestions. Of these 200 findings and suggestions 142 were findings and 58 were suggestions. The PWR SPAR model was also evaluated against the same 331 ASME PRA Standard Supporting Requirements. Of these requirements only 215 were deemed appropriate for the review (for the same reason as noted for the BWR). The PWR review determined that 125 of the 215 supporting requirements met Capability Category I or greater. The review identified 101 findings or suggestions (76 findings and 25 suggestions). These findings or suggestions were developed to identify areas where SPAR models could be enhanced. A process to prioritize and incorporate the findings/suggestions supporting requirements into the SPAR models is being developed. The prioritization process focuses on those findings that will enhance the accuracy, completeness and usability of the SPAR models.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Addressing fission product validation in MCNP burnup credit criticality calculations - 14508

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation issued Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 8, Revision 3 in September 2012. This ISG provides guidance for NRC staff members' review of burnup credit (BUC) analyses supporting transport and dry storage of pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in casks. The ISG includes guidance for addressing validation of criticality (k{sub eff}) calculations crediting the presence of a limited set of fission products and minor actinides (FP and MAs). Based on previous work documented in NRC Regulatory Guide (NUREG) Contractor Report (CR)-7109, the ISG recommends that NRC staff members accept the use of either 1.5 or 3% of the FP and MA worth - in addition to bias and bias uncertainty resulting from validation of k{sub eff} calculations for the major actinides in SNF - to conservatively account for the bias and bias uncertainty associated with the specified unvalidated FP and MAs. The ISG recommends (1) use of 1.5% of the FP and MA worth if a modern version of SCALE and its nuclear data are used and (2) 3% of the FP and MA worth for well qualified, industry standard code systems other than SCALE with the Evaluated Nuclear Data Files, Part B (ENDF/B),-V, ENDF/B-VI, or ENDF/B-VII cross sections libraries. The work presented in this paper provides a basis for extending the use of the 1.5% of the FP and MA worth bias to BUC criticality calculations performed using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code. The extended use of the 1.5% FP and MA worth bias is shown to be acceptable by comparison of FP and MA worths calculated using SCALE and MCNP with ENDF/B-V, -VI, and -VII-based nuclear data. The comparison supports use of the 1.5% FP and MA worth bias when the MCNP code is used for criticality calculations, provided that the cask design is similar to the hypothetical generic BUC-32 cask model and that the credited FP and MA worth is no more than 0.1 Δk{sub eff} (ISG-8, Rev. 3, Recommendation 4). (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Personnel Qualification and Certification Program in Pressure Decay Leak Testing on the RT-100 Type (B) Cask - 17229

The requirements for qualifications and certification of leak test personnel on Type (B) shipping casks have been more clearly defined with the recent release of ANSI N14.5-2014, Leak Tests on Radioactive Packages for Shipment. The latest version creates a standardized approach for qualifying and certifying personnel to conduct pre-shipment leakage tests on Type (B) packages. The U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is currently updating the Regulatory Guide R.G 7.4, Leakage Tests on Packages for shipment of Radioactive Material, to endorse ANSI N14.5-2014. According to ANSI N14.5-2014, leakage testing shall be performed in accordance with written procedures by qualified and certified personnel in accordance with the requirements of ASNT SNT-TC-1A-2006, Recommended Practice for Personnel Qualification and Certification in Nondestructive Testing. This is a significant modification to the old standard, ANSI N14.5-1997, which simply states that pressure leak testing shall be conducted by trained and certified personnel without reference to any specific certification standards or regulations. SNT-TC-1A published by the American Society for Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) has several advantages to employers; namely, it allows for a Limited NDT Level II certification program. Limited certifications are especially valuable for personnel who possess limited experience and wish to become a certified Limited NDT Level II in a specific technique on a specific cask using a specific procedure and equipment. Robatel Technologies recently developed a comprehensive qualification and training program based on the recommendations of SNT-TC-1A for Exelon Corporation to certify their employees to a Limited NDT Level II in Pressure Decay Leak Testing on the RT-100 Cask. The project scope included the development of a training and qualification program (Written practice), writing a pressure decay leak test procedure, the design of a pressure decay leak test manifold, and the delivery of classroom training. The written practice outlines the requirements to ensure that personnel participating in the program have the necessary qualification, experience, and training to become certified in the leak test method. The program will give Exelon the liberty to conduct their own leak testing on the RT- 100 without the need to rely on outside resources for leak testing. When fully implemented, the program is expected to improve productivity and eliminate schedule delays, along with substantial economic benefits. Following the appropriate standards and industry best practices, the project was successfully completed and scheduled to be fully implemented by Exelon's Nuclear Stations by the end of 2016. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Engineered Solutions Group's SMR Containment Cable and Electrical Penetration Assembly System

GAIN Project CRADA Number NFE-21-08839, entitled “SMR Containment Cable and EPA System” was initiated by the partnership of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Engineered Solutions Group (ESG) to test an ESG-designed Electrical Penetration Assembly and Containment Cabling System Qualified for not only legacy LWR designs, but also Small Modular Reactors designs currently being designed by several different suppliers. This project was undertaken to fill the equipment gap of EPA and Cabling Systems that require much more severe environmental requirements than legacy plant applications present due to their smaller containment volumes that result in high energy densities compared to legacy designs. This high energy density results in severe accident environments and more severe normal operating conditions as well. We developed two approaches to qualify Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) and Containment Cabling Systems for SMRs and Advanced Reactors. We take into consideration the more severe environmental parameters found with SMR designs. The system will need to meet a qualification test program addressing wear/cyclic aging, potential radiation exposure, thermal aging, vibration aging, thermal cycling, seismic qualification, electrical fault testing (per IEEE 317) and accident simulation. The equipment must meet the requirements of 10CFR50.49, GDC 50 in 10CFR50 Appendix A, and 10CFR50 Appendix J. NRC Regulatory Guides (RGs) identify an acceptable way of meeting regulatory requirements. RGs frequently endorse a standard for meeting these requirements. Specific to this review, equipment would be qualified in accordance with the following IEEE Standards. • IEEE 317-2013 (Electrical Penetration Assemblies), which is endorsed by RG 1.63, Rev. 3, • IEEE 323-2003 and the more current IEC/IEEE 60780-323 (Environmental Qualification of 1E Equipment) which is endorsed by RG 1.89. IEEE 323-2003 is endorsed by RG 1.209, • IEEE 344-2020 (Seismic Qualification. The 2013 version endorsed by RG 1.100, Rev. 4, with exceptions), • IEEE 383-2015 (Electrical Cables) (which is endorsed by RG 1.189 Rev. 4 and the -2003 version endorsed by RG 1.211 rev. 0), • IEEE 572-2019 (Electrical Connectors and Assemblies), which is endorsed by 1.156 Rev 1, and • [IEEE 1202 (endorsed by RG 1.189) would normally be applicable but the advanced cable designs are impervious to this cable flame test.] The primary goal of such a program is to provide an EPA design that can meet the qualification requirements for all legacy light water reactor plants currently operating as well as new plant designs including light water Small Modular Reactors. Thus, these requirements are applicable to plants licensed under 10CFR50 and 10CFR52. Other reactor designs may be evaluated, and this test system and qualification method applied to those applications if the requirements would satisfy the requirements of the intended plant. A secondary benefit of this work is to document some of the history and background in these requirements as there have been recent delays in an SMR licensing process due to NRC Requests for Additional Information in this subject matter area.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Application of the Licensing Modernization Project Approach to the Authorization of the Versatile Test Reactor

The Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) has created a risk-informed, performance-based process for nonlight water reactor licensing under the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Adoption of the LMP process has been recommended by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) [2] and the NRC has issued a draft regulatory guide [3]. The LMP process utilizes risk information to justify the regulatory treatment of event sequences, the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and to assist with the evaluation of defense-in-depth (DID). The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) seeks to leverage the efforts of the LMP to develop a risk-informed, performance-based approach for reactor authorization under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to differing rules and regulations between the NRC and DOE, modifications to the LMP process are necessary for the VTR authorization approach. However, the goals regarding risk-informed event categorization, SSC classification, and DID evaluation, remain the same.

Grabaskas, David↗

Structural Analysis Approach for the Defense Programs Package 3 (DPP-3)

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is the design authority for a new Type B hazardous materials transportation package designated as the Defense Programs Package 3 (DPP-3) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DPP-3 has been developed using similar materials and fabrication methods employed in previous U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE, and NNSA certified packages. The DPP-3 design criteria are derived from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), NNSA guidance and NRC regulatory guides in order to safely and securely transport a variety of payloads. Final regulatory approval by the NNSA will require physical testing to demonstrate that the containment vessel (CV) remains leaktight after enduring the entire regulatory testing sequence prescribed in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (10 CFR 71). In order to gain confidence that the DPP-3 will remain leaktight after testing, the DPP-3 has been structurally analyzed using the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) software LS-DYNA. The FEA analyses serve two general purposes: first, they aid in design and development of the package, and second, they advise as to which drop orientations are expected to cause the most damage during regulatory testing. This paper will discuss how the design criteria are incorporated into analytical techniques needed to evaluate the FEA structural simulation results for 10 CFR 71 conditions to give confidence the DPP-3 testing campaign will be successful.

Sakalaukus Jr., Peter J.↗

COL Application Content Guide for HTGRs: Revision to RG 1.206, Part 1 - Status Report

A combined license (COL) application is required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for all proposed nuclear plants. The information requirements for a COL application are set forth in 10 CFR 52.79, “Contents of Applications; Technical Information in Final Safety Analysis Report.” An applicant for a modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) must develop and submit for NRC review and approval a COL application which conforms to these requirements. The technical information necessary to allow NRC staff to evaluate a COL application and resolve all safety issues related to a proposed nuclear plant is detailed and comprehensive. To this, Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.206, “Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants” (LWR Edition), was developed to assist light water reactor (LWR) applicants in incorporating and effectively formatting required information for COL application review (Ref. 1). However, the guidance prescribed in RG 1.206 presumes a LWR design proposal consistent with the systems and functions associated with large LWR power plants currently operating under NRC license.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A review of cladding failure thresholds in RIA conditions based on transient reactor test data and the need for continued testing

Transient reactor experiments on light water reactor (LWR) fuel pins had been conducted since the beginning of the nuclear era to help determine core coolability and cladding failure thresholds. During one such test in November of 1993 at the CABRI transient test reactor on a test involving a high burnup fuel rod with a corroded Zircaloy-4 cladding it was first observed that cladding failures could occur prior to a departure from nucleate boiling (pre-DNB) at lower-than-expected peak radial average enthalpies. Thirteen additional tests would be performed in the CABRI reactor over the next decade on fuel rods with higher burnups [1]. Additionally, a larger testing program at the NSRR reactor in Japan with high burnup fuel would uncover a similar trend of pre-DNB ruptures in high burnup test rods at lower-than-expected peak enthalpies [2]. Numerous out of pile testing programs involving a variety of innovative mechanical testing techniques have been employed in an attempt to better quantify the failure thresholds of corroded zirconium alloy cladding in these rapid heating and loading conditions [3][4][5]. While previously interim guidance had been issued, in June of 2020 the NRC officially published updated regulatory guidance to account of these pre-DNB failures in Regulatory Guide 1.236 [6]. This paper will present an independent review of the publicly available transient reactor test database on higher burnup LWR pins conducted at the CABRI and NSRR reactors as well as review of a selection of published out of pile mechanical testing methods. The purpose of the review is to determine how well the new regulatory limits are supported by experimental data. The review will identify if additional transient reactor tests could provide additional support for the NRC guidance or identify the need for revisions. The evaluation will consider how far the existing database can be extrapolated when considering low hydrogen zirconium alloy claddings (with and without protective coatings) containing very high burnup (> 70 MWd/kgU) UO2 fuel pellets. Finally, the authors will suggest how out of pile mechanical tests can be used in conjunction with a limited number of transient reactor tests to develop cladding specific failure thresholds in RIA type transients.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Calibration and Validation of NRC Fuel Performance Models

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory maintains steady-state and transient fuel performance codes for the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC uses these codes in performing confirmatory calculations of licensee fuel performance codes and safety analysis methods during the review and approval of these codes and methods. The NRC also uses these codes to perform calculations to direct regulatory research and to assist in the development of new regulations and regulatory guides. Because of the safety-related uses for these codes, it is critically important that the codes are capable of accurately modeling modern fuel and operations and that the models and code predictions are well validated using data collected from conditions relevant to in-reactor conditions. FRAPCON and FRAPTRAN have an extensive database of separate effects data used to validate individual material property and fuel performance models and an integral effects database used to assess the overall code prediction within the full range of fuel operations. The key code predictions that are of regulatory interest as they relate to various specified acceptable design limits are; fuel and cladding temperature, rod internal pressure, cladding hoop strain, cladding corrosion and hydriding, and fission gas release. To assess the ability of the code to accurately predict these values, the integral assessment database consists of measurements of fuel centerline temperature, fission gas release, void volume, cladding corrosion, and cladding hoop strain. This paper will discuss the activities that are performed to ensure that FRAPCON and FRAPTRAN represent the state of the industry and will describe the separate effect and integral effect databases that are used to validate the models and are continually being expanded to ensure validation over the full range of fuel operations.

Geelhood, Kenneth J.↗

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the UNFSF. The framework for integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF will include 1) identification of applicable regulatory requirements, 2) selection of a common system that share dual safeguard and security functions, 3) development of functional design criteria and design requirements for the selected system, 4) identification and integration of the dual safeguards and security design requirements, and 5) assessment of the integration and potential benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evaluation of ASCE 4-16 and AISC 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems, and Components

This report describes the assessment of ASCE Standards 4-16 and 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based (RIPB) seismic design of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) at nuclear power plants. This work was performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Regulatory Research (RES), to support potential endorsement of these industry standards for the design of nuclear power plants based on the RIPB approach. Currently, the NRC endorses a deterministic design approach for demonstrating the design adequacy of SSCs based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) and NRC Regulatory Guides. In the RIPB approach, the design criteria are developed to achieve a target performance goal, which is defined by the annual frequency of occurrence of the design basis earthquake (i.e., Seismic Design Category) and the acceptable level of structural performance (i.e., Limit State) for the SSCs. ASCE 4-16 provides methods for performing a seismic analysis of structures to obtain the seismic response of these structures (e.g., building displacements, accelerations, in-structure response spectra) which are used in the design of the SSCs. It also provides methods for performing seismic analysis of SSCs to determine the seismic demands (e.g. member forces and displacements) needed to design individual SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provides the criteria for the seismic design of SSCs using the seismic demands developed in ASCE 4-16. The use of ASCE Standard 43-18 (Draft), along with ASCE 4-16, provides the criteria for the seismic design of the SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (DRAFT) relies on other consensus codes and standards such as ACI 349 for reinforced concrete, AISC/N690 for steel structures, ASME Section III for pressure-retaining mechanical components and Containments, and IEEE-344 for Class 1E equipment. The goal of this technical review was to assess the adequacy of the provisions in these standards for use by the NRC in developing regulatory guidance for design of SSCs in nuclear power plants, based on the RIPB approach. The research reported herein describes the basis for acceptance of the new standards and identifies areas where additional staff guidance is needed for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants. This technical review has determined that ASCE 4-16 and ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provide an appropriate framework for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants using a Risk-Informed Performance-Based approach. However, some of the criteria therein warrant exceptions, qualifications, and/or clarifications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Task 4 - EMI/RFI Issues Potentially Impacting Electromagnetic Compatibility of I&C Systems (NRCHQ6014D0015)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations in Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50) state that structures, systems, and components important to safety in a nuclear power plant are to be designed to accommodate the effects of environmental conditions (i.e., remain functional under all postulated service conditions) and that design control measures such as testing are to be used to check the adequacy of design. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180 was developed to provide guidance to licensees and applicants on methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the NRC’s regulations on design, installation, and testing practices for addressing the effects of electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) and power surges on safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. The first revision of RG 1.180 was issued in January 2000 and a second revision was issued in October 2003*. The second revision differed from the first revision in endorsing Military Standard (MIL-STD)-461E and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard (Std) 61000 series of EMI/RFI test methods, extending the guidance to cover signal line testing, incorporating frequency ranges where portable communications devices are experiencing increasing use, and relaxing the operating envelopes (test levels) when experience and confirmatory research warranted. It also offered exemptions from specific test criteria based on technical considerations such as plant conditions and the intended location of the safety-related I&C equipment. Since the last revision, new requirements have been identified, associated RGs have been created and updated, and additional industry guidance has been developed. Additionally, the operational environment has changed with the increase in wireless communication technology for both personal (smartphone) and industrial (remote I&C) purposes. Also, specific concerns and issues with testing methods and methodologies have been identified that must be addressed. Further, most of the standards that serve as the basis for the RG have been revised. Therefore, the NRC’s Office of Regulatory Research has contracted with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to incorporate new information and resolve the identified issues under NRC-HQ-60-14-D-0015, “Update to RG 1.180, Revision 2, Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems.” The ultimate goal of this project is to provide NRC the technical basis for developing and publishing a new revision of the RG. The focus of Task 4 was for ORNL to identify and address any new or additional EMI/RFI issues that could potentially impact the EMC of I&C systems. More specifically, ORNL was to evaluate the impact of any new issue on safety equipment in their local environments and then determine whether the issues should be included and discussed in the revision to RG 1.180 that is currently under way.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The Relationship Between Dose Rate and Decay Heat for Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks

Decay heat and dose rate are two important limits used for determining the allowable contents of spent fuel (SNF) in dry storage systems and transportation packages. While the decay heat limit is used to maintain fuel cladding integrity and ensure retrievability, dose rates are used to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements on radiation protection. Because both dose rate and decay heat result from decay of radioisotopes in SNF, this study is an attempt to examine the relationship between dose rate and decay heat for a given cask design. Dose rates were evaluated for 198 cask configurations, that include various SNF system designs (e.g., storage, transfer, transport), SNF characteristics (e.g., fuel types, burnup, cooling time), and loading maps (e.g., uniform loading, zone loading), while a constant decay heat was maintained. The decay heat was calculated using US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 3.54, Revision 2, and verified using ORIGEN sequence within SCALE code system. The ORIGEN outputs were used as source terms in the dose analysis using 198 different configurations. A computer script was developed to calculate the cooling time necessary to achieve a given decay heat for a given enrichment, assembly average burnup, assembly mass, and in-core history using a rootfinder algorithm. Initially the computer script was developed to provide cooling time and burnup calculations directly to the analysis of dose rates and decay heats, so a comparison between Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) results and RG3.54 data was made; results are included in the appendix to this document. However, an iterative approach was used to compute cooling time, and its accuracy did not depend on the results of the RG3.54r2 algorithm, although the algorithm was still used. The results of the evaluation presented herein clearly demonstrate that a given decay heat does not correspond to a unique dose rate for a variety of cask and package designs. There is no clear pattern to develop a correlation between decay heat and the source terms. Depending on burnup, enrichment, cask type, and loading pattern, dose rates varied for the exact same decay heat—in some cases by 400% for a given cask. For cases in which decay heat was held constant through selection of the appropriate cooling time, dose rates would decrease with increasing burnup, and in other cases, dose rates would increase. The large variation in dose rates for a constant decay heat indicates that casks loaded based on decay heat—that is allowing any burnup, cooling time, and enrichment combinations that yield the qualified decay heat limit(s) —cannot ensure that an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation or a spent fuel transportation package will meet the regulatory limits set forth by the respective regulations, i.e., 10 CFR 72 or 10 CFR 71.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗