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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Space Based Range Demonstration and Certification (SBRDC)

This viewgraph presentation describes the development, utilization and testing of technologies for range safety and range user systems. The contents include: 1) Space Based Range (SBR) Goals and Objectives; 2) Today s United States Range; 3) Future Range; 4) Another Vision for the Future Range; 5) STARS Project Goals; 6) STARS Content; 7) STARS Configuration Flight Demonstrations 1 & 2; 8) Spaceport And Range Technologies STARS Objectives and Results; 9) Spaceport And Range Technologies STARS FD2 Objectives; 10) Range Safety Hardware; 11) Range User Hardware; and 12) Past/Future Flight Demo Plans

Sakahara, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2019

Human Systems Integration (HSI) for Safety- Critical Range Operations at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Human Factors (HF) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) funded a preliminary study in 2017 that was narrowly focused within the Range Data Display System (RDDS) scope of display design requirements based on schedule and resources. Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) personnel involved in the previous study asked for a broader Human Systems Integration (HSI) involvement that would span both the RDDS and Flight Termination System (FTS) projects and assist with identifying HSI best practices, via appropriate standards and guidelines, that if properly implemented should result in a more effective and efficient Range Safety Operations. WFF Range Safety Operations has expressed a need to assess the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the various personnel on console during launches to identify existing and potential efficiencies and incorporate them in the new system design. This assessment addresses that need.

Cynthia H Null↗
NASA NTRS2007

Ground Support for the Space-Based Range Flight Demonstration 2

The primary objective of the NASA Space-Based Range Demonstration and Certification program was to develop and demonstrate space-based range capabilities. The Flight Demonstration 2 flights at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center were conducted to support Range Safety (commanding and position reporting) and high-rate (5 Mbps) Range User (video and data) requirements. Required ground support infrastructure included a flight termination system computer, the ground-data distribution network to send range safety commands and receive range safety and range user telemetry data and video, and the ground processing systems at the Dryden Mission Control Center to process range safety and range user telemetry data and video.

Burkes, Darryl A.↗
NASA NTRS1998

X-33 Telemetry Best Source Selection, Processing, Display, and Simulation Model Comparison

The X-33 program requires the use of multiple telemetry ground stations to cover the launch, ascent, transition, descent, and approach phases for the flights from Edwards AFB to landings at Dugway Proving Grounds, UT and Malmstrom AFB, MT. This paper will discuss the X-33 telemetry requirements and design, including information on fixed and mobile telemetry systems, best source selection, and support for Range Safety Officers. A best source selection system will be utilized to automatically determine the best source based on the frame synchronization status of the incoming telemetry streams. These systems will be used to select the best source at the landing sites and at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center to determine the overall best source between the launch site, intermediate sites, and landing site sources. The best source at the landing sites will be decommutated to display critical flight safety parameters for the Range Safety Officers. The overall best source will be sent to the Lockheed Martin's Operational Control Center at Edwards AFB for performance monitoring by X-33 program personnel and for monitoring of critical flight safety parameters by the primary Range Safety Officer. The real-time telemetry data (received signal strength, etc.) from each of the primary ground stations will also be compared during each nu'ssion with simulation data generated using the Dynamic Ground Station Analysis software program. An overall assessment of the accuracy of the model will occur after each mission. Acknowledgment: The work described in this paper was NASA supported through cooperative agreement NCC8-115 with Lockheed Martin Skunk Works.

Burkes, Darryl A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Range Flight Safety Requirements

The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

Flight↗
NASA NTRS2005

An Error Analysis of the Phased Array Antenna Pointing Algorithm for STARS Flight Demonstration No. 2

STARS is a multicenter NASA project to determine the feasibility of using space-based assets, such as the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and Global Positioning System (GPS), to increase flexibility (e.g. increase the number of possible launch locations and manage simultaneous operations) and to reduce operational costs by decreasing the need for ground-based range assets and infrastructure. The STARS project includes two major systems: the Range Safety and Range User systems. The latter system uses broadband communications (125 kbps to 500 kbps) for voice, video, and vehicle/payload data. Flight Demonstration #1 revealed the need to increase the data rate of the Range User system. During Flight Demo #2, a Ku-band antenna will generate a higher data rate and will be designed with an embedded pointing algorithm to guarantee that the antenna is pointed directly at TDRS. This algorithm will utilize the onboard position and attitude data to point the antenna to TDRS within a 2-degree full-angle beamwidth. This report investigates how errors in aircraft position and attitude, along with errors in satellite position, propagate into the overall pointing vector.

Carney, Michael P.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Overview of the X-33 Extended Flight Test Range

On July 1, 1996, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration signed a Cooperative Agreement No. NCC8-115 with Lockheed Martin Skunk Works to develop and flight test the X-33, a scaled version of a reusable launch vehicle. The development of an Extended Test Range, with range instrumentation providing continuous vehicle communications from Edwards Air Force Base Ca. to landing at Malmstrom Air Force Base Montana, was required to flight test the mach 15 vehicle over 950 nautical miles. The cooperative agreement approach makes Lockheed Martin Skunk Works responsible for the X-33 program. When additional Government help was required, Lockheed "subcontracted" to NASA Field Centers for certain work. It was through this mechanism that Dryden Flight Research Center became responsible for the Extended Test Range. The Extended Test Range Requirements come from two main sources: 1) Range Safety and 2) Lockheed Martin Skunk Works. The range safety requirements were the most challenging to define and meet. The X-33 represents a vehicle that launches like a rocket, reenters the atmosphere and lands autonomously like an aircraft. Historically, rockets have been launched over the oceans to allow failed rockets to be destroyed using explosive devices. Such approaches had to be reconsidered for the X-33 flying over land. Numerous range requirements come from Lockheed Martin Skunk Works for interface definitions with the vehicle communication subsystems and the primary ground operations center, defined the Operations Control Center. Another area of considerable interest was the reentry plasma shield that causes "blackout" of the radio frequency signals, such as the range safety commands. Significant work was spent to analyze and model the blackout problem using a cooperative team of experts from across the country. The paper describes the Extended Test Range a, an unique Government/industry team of personnel and range assets was established to resolve design issues and accomplish the X-33 requirements. The paper will also provide an overview of the technical approaches used to meet program requirements. The advances used to develop the extended test range will be discussed to show how other hypersonic and Access to Space programs can benefit from the development of the extended test range. Acknowledgment: The work described in this paper was NASA supported through cooperative agreement NCC8-115 with Lockheed Martin Skunk Works.

Mackall, D.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Space-Based Range

Space-Based Range (SBR), previously known as Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS), is a multicenter NASA proof-of-concept project to determine if space-based communications using NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) can support the Range Safety functions of acquiring tracking data and generating flight termination signals, while also providing broadband Range User data such as voice, video, and vehicle/payload data. There was a successful test of the Range Safety system at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) on December 20, 2005, on a two-stage Terrier-Orion spin-stabilized sounding rocket. SBR transmitted GPS tracking data and maintained links with two TDRSS satellites simultaneously during the 10-min flight. The payload section deployed a parachute, landed in the Atlantic Ocean about 90 miles downrange from the launch site, and was successfully recovered. During the Terrier-Orion tests flights, more than 99 percent of all forward commands and more than 95 percent of all return frames were successfully received and processed. The time latency necessary for a command to travel from WFF over landlines to White Sands Complex and then to the vehicle via TDRSS, be processed onboard, and then be sent back to WFF was between 1.0 s and 1.1 s. The forward-link margins for TDRS-10 (TDRS East [TDE]) were 11 dB to 12 dB plus or minus 2 dB, and for TDRS-4 (TDRS Spare [TDS]) were 9 dB to 10 dB plus or minus 1.5 dB. The return-link margins for both TDE and TDS were 6 dB to 8 dB plus or minus 3 dB. There were 11 flights on an F-15B at Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) between November 2006 and February 2007. The Range User system tested a 184-element TDRSS Ku-band (15 GHz) phased-array antenna with data rates of 5 Mbps and 10 Mbps. This data was a combination of black-and-white cockpit video, Range Safety tracking and transceiver data, and aircraft and antenna controller data streams. IP data formatting was used.

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NASA NTRS2003

Analysis of Return and Forward Links from STARS' Flight Demonstration 1

Space-based Telemetry And Range Safety (STARS) is a Kennedy Space Center (KSC) led proof-of-concept demonstration, which utilizes NASA's space network of Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS) as a pathway for launch and mission related information streams. Flight Demonstration 1 concluded on July 15,2003 with the seventh flight of a Low Power Transmitter (LPT) a Command and Data Handler (C&DH), a twelve channel GPS receiver and associated power supplies and amplifiers. The equipment flew on NASA's F-I5 aircraft at the Dryden Flight Research Center located at Edwards Air Force Base in California. During this NASA-ASEE Faculty Fellowship, the author participated in the collection and analysis of data from the seven flights comprising Flight Demonstration 1. Specifically, the author examined the forward and return links bit energy E(sub B) (in Watt-seconds) divided by the ambient radio frequency noise N(sub 0) (in Watts / Hertz). E(sub b)/N(sub 0) is commonly thought of as a signal-to-noise parameter, which characterizes a particular received radio frequency (RF) link. Outputs from the data analysis include the construction of time lines for all flights, production of graphs of range safety values for all seven flights, histograms of range safety E(sub b)/N(sub 0) values in five dB increments, calculation of associated averages and standard deviations, production of graphs of range user E(sub b)/N(sub 0) values for the all flights, production of graphs of AGC's and E(sub b)/N(sub 0) estimates for flight 1, recorded onboard, transmitted directly to the launch head and transmitted through TDRS. The data and graphs are being used to draw conclusions related to a lower than expected signal strength seen in the range safety return link.

Gering, James A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Superheavyweight missions SI versus DI: Ascent flight design options and recommendations

AFD has completed the trade study on Standard Insertion (SI) vs Direct Insertion (DI) for STS-50. RSOC Range Safety has developed acceptable DI targets from 130 n.mi. to 150 n.mi. and the corresponding performance assessment for these targets using STS-50 data has been completed. This mission has sufficient performance capability to perform this mission as a DI to 160 n.mi. A reduced OMS load corresponding to a DI mission is required for this option. The increase in altitude over the AFP baseline (SI to 145 n.mi.) is highly desirable for this mission. The orientation on orbit for the orbiter/USML-1 payload is such that orbital decay is maximized (maximum frontal cross-sectional area with vehicle normal to velocity vector). Increasing the operational altitude reduces the amount of vernier thruster firings necessary to maintain a constant gravity gradient. The results of this trade study can also be applied to other superheavyweight missions (EDO flights) and will allow for use of the DI technique for lower orbital altitudes, thereby eliminating the SI option for due east, low altitude missions. STSOC transmittal form no. 330-330-130, which documents the technical issues and assumptions used for this trade study effort in detail, should be referenced for further information. The main reason that a DI is desired for STS-50 and other superheavyweight flights (low altitude) is that ESMC range safety has expressed reservations about SI missions in general. The concern is that the current SI design underspeed exposes Africa and Madagascar to potential ET debris impact. In the past range safety has waived the requirement that these areas be protected in the event of an engine failure. With the advent of the pre-MECO OMS dump, the viability of DI and the high casualty expectations from the ACTA press to MECO hazard study, range safety has become more reluctant to approve SI flights. It is felt that to perform an SI mission there would have to be a large decrease in design underspeed to protect these landmasses, which would result in possible gaps between a late TAL and PTA. The assumed limit on a DI has been to altitudes greater than 160 n.mi. It was assumed that for altitudes less than 160 n.mi. the nominal ET impact envelope would overlap the Gilbert Islands.

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NASA NTRS1997

An Impact-Location Estimation Algorithm for Subsonic Uninhabited Aircraft

An impact-location estimation algorithm is being used at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center to support range safety for uninhabited aerial vehicle flight tests. The algorithm computes an impact location based on the descent rate, mass, and altitude of the vehicle and current wind information. The predicted impact location is continuously displayed on the range safety officer's moving map display so that the flightpath of the vehicle can be routed to avoid ground assets if the flight must be terminated. The algorithm easily adapts to different vehicle termination techniques and has been shown to be accurate to the extent required to support range safety for subsonic uninhabited aerial vehicles. This paper describes how the algorithm functions, how the algorithm is used at NASA Dryden, and how various termination techniques are handled by the algorithm. Other approaches to predicting the impact location and the reasons why they were not selected for real-time implementation are also discussed.

Bauer, Jeffrey E.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Autonomous Flight Safety System

Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is an independent flight safety system designed for small to medium sized expendable launch vehicles launching from or needing range safety protection while overlying relatively remote locations. AFSS replaces the need for a man-in-the-loop to make decisions for flight termination. AFSS could also serve as the prototype for an autonomous manned flight crew escape advisory system. AFSS utilizes onboard sensors and processors to emulate the human decision-making process using rule-based software logic and can dramatically reduce safety response time during critical launch phases. The Range Safety flight path nominal trajectory, its deviation allowances, limit zones and other flight safety rules are stored in the onboard computers. Position, velocity and attitude data obtained from onboard global positioning system (GPS) and inertial navigation system (INS) sensors are compared with these rules to determine the appropriate action to ensure that people and property are not jeopardized. The final system will be fully redundant and independent with multiple processors, sensors, and dead man switches to prevent inadvertent flight termination. AFSS is currently in Phase III which includes updated algorithms, integrated GPS/INS sensors, large scale simulation testing and initial aircraft flight testing.

Ferrell, Bob↗
NASA NTRS2008

Automating Range Surveillance Through Radio Interferometry and Field Strength Mapping Techniques

Space vehicle launches are often delayed because of the challenge of verifying that the range is clear, and such delays are likely to become more prevalent as more and more new spaceports are built. Range surveillance is one of the primary focuses of Range Safety for launches and often drives costs and schedules. As NASA's primary launch operation center, Kennedy Space Center is very interested in new technologies that increase the responsiveness of radio frequency (RF) surveillance systems. These systems help Range Safety personnel clear the range by identifying, pinpointing, and resolving any unknown sources of RF emissions prior to each launch.

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NASA NTRS1982

Magellan Post Launch Mission Operation Report

Magellan was successfully launched by the Space Shuttle Atlantis from the Kennedy Space Center at 2:47 p.m. EDT on May 4, 1989. The Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) booster and attached Magellan Spacecraft were successfully deployed from Atlantis on Rev. 5 as planned, at 06:14 hrs Mission Elapsed Time (MET). The two IUS propulsion burns which began at 07:14 hrs MET and were completed at 07:22 hrs MET, placed the Magellan Spacecraft almost perfectly on its preplanned trajectory to Venus. The IUS was jettisoned at 07:40 hrs MET and Magellan telemetry was immediately acquired by the Deep Space Network (DSN). A spacecraft trajectory correction maneuver was performed on May 21 and the spacecraft is in the planned standard cruise configuration with all systems operating nominally. An initial attempt was made to launch Atlantis on April 28, 1989, but the launch was scrubbed at T-31 sec due to a failure of the liquid hydrogen recirculation pump on Space Shuttle Main Engine #1. The countdown had proceeded smoothly until T-20 min when the Magellan radio receiver "locked-on" the MIL 71 Unified S-Band (USB) transmission as the transmitter power was increased fro 2 kw to 10 kw in support of the orbiter launch. During the planned hold at T-9 min, the USB was confirmed as the source of the receiver "lock" and Magellan's launch readiness was reaffirmed. In addition a five-minute extension of the T-9 hold occurred when a range safety computer went off-line, creating a loss of redundancy in the range safety computer network. Following resumption of the countdown, both the orbiter and Magellan flows proceeded smoothly until the launch was scrubbed at T-31 sec.

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NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Flight Safety System September 27, 2005, Aircraft Test

This report describes the first aircraft test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS). The test was conducted on September 27, 2005, near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a privately-owned single-engine plane and evaluated the performance of several basic flight safety rules using real-time data onboard a moving aerial vehicle. This test follows the first road test of AFSS conducted in February 2005 at KSC. AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility (WEF) project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations. The mission rules are configured for each operation by the responsible Range Safety authorities and can be loosely categorized in four major categories: Parameter Threshold Violations, Physical Boundary Violations present position and instantaneous impact point (TIP), Gate Rules static and dynamic, and a Green-Time Rule. Examples of each of these rules were evaluated during this aircraft test.

Simpson, James C.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Extended Range Communications Support for the X-33

Communications support for the X-33 requires addressing several interesting challenges to meet program and range safety requirements. In addition, the heavily cost driven program has provided concessions to the communications support to reduce the cost of networking the extended range. Cost trade-offs showed that by lowering the telemetry data rate from 2 Megabits per second to 1440 Megabits per second that significant cost avoidance could be realized. Also, by adopting standard telecommunications data rate for the uplink data stream, an efficient and integrated solution for the extended range communications could be supported. Meeting the program requirements as well as range safety requirements for this effort are critical to the success of the program. This paper describes some of the important requirements driving the design of the extended range communications support and the design of the system to meet those requirements.

Eslinger, Brian↗
NASA NTRS2008

GPS Metric Tracking Unit

As Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) applications become more prevalent for land- and air-based vehicles, GPS applications for space vehicles will also increase. The Applied Technology Directorate of Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has developed a lightweight, low-cost GPS Metric Tracking Unit (GMTU), the first of two steps in developing a lightweight, low-cost Space-Based Tracking and Command Subsystem (STACS) designed to meet Range Safety's link margin and latency requirements for vehicle command and telemetry data. The goals of STACS are to improve Range Safety operations and expand tracking capabilities for space vehicles. STACS will track the vehicle, receive commands, and send telemetry data through the space-based asset, which will dramatically reduce dependence on ground-based assets. The other step was the Low-Cost Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Transceiver (LCT2), developed by the Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), which allows the vehicle to communicate with a geosynchronous relay satellite. Although the GMTU and LCT2 were independently implemented and tested, the design collaboration of KSC and WFF engineers allowed GMTU and LCT2 to be integrated into one enclosure, leading to the final STACS. In operation, GMTU needs only a radio frequency (RF) input from a GPS antenna and outputs position and velocity data to the vehicle through a serial or pulse code modulation (PCM) interface. GMTU includes one commercial GPS receiver board and a custom board, the Command and Telemetry Processor (CTP) developed by KSC. The CTP design is based on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) with embedded processors to support GPS functions.

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NASA NTRS2012

SureTrak Probability of Impact Display

The SureTrak Probability of Impact Display software was developed for use during rocket launch operations. The software displays probability of impact information for each ship near the hazardous area during the time immediately preceding the launch of an unguided vehicle. Wallops range safety officers need to be sure that the risk to humans is below a certain threshold during each use of the Wallops Flight Facility Launch Range. Under the variable conditions that can exist at launch time, the decision to launch must be made in a timely manner to ensure a successful mission while not exceeding those risk criteria. Range safety officers need a tool that can give them the needed probability of impact information quickly, and in a format that is clearly understandable. This application is meant to fill that need. The software is a reuse of part of software developed for an earlier project: Ship Surveillance Software System (S4). The S4 project was written in C++ using Microsoft Visual Studio 6. The data structures and dialog templates from it were copied into a new application that calls the implementation of the algorithms from S4 and displays the results as needed. In the S4 software, the list of ships in the area was received from one local radar interface and from operators who entered the ship information manually. The SureTrak Probability of Impact Display application receives ship data from two local radars as well as the SureTrak system, eliminating the need for manual data entry.

Elliott, John↗