Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Risk acceptability”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

57 records · Page 4

The Maintainable Fusion Pilot Plant

The US fusion community has coalesced around the goal of building an FPP as described by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM). In addition to demonstrating the viability of the technologies necessary to operate such a plant, including demonstration of net energy and electricity production, NASEM found that a “fusion pilot plant will need to demonstrate the ability to efficiently perform remote maintenance and replacement in support of the design of a power plant, taking into account details of the consequences of the fusion environment, such as material activation and tritium retention in components.” Current designs of fusion demonstration reactors do usually foresee a regular exchange of their first wall modules, including the tritium breeding blankets. In the European Power Plant Conceptual Studies, it is assumed that a fusion reactor will need to change its divertor every 2 years and its first wall blanket module every 5 to 6 years to reach acceptable availability. Underlying this capability are remote-handling technologies to keep the outage for the exchange of these components short. There are many uncertainties in the remote-handling schemes, and most schemes are at a preconceptual level at best. In addition, the exchange of these components would either produce an enormous rad-waste stream or would require an enormous refurbishment activity with huge cost-prohibitive hot-cells. Past Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) preconceptual studies have led to hot cell dimensions of an unbelievable size, likely costing tens of billions of dollars. Already at The Way (previously International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, ITER), hot-cells have become cost-prohibitive, demanding redesigns of the ITER first wall to reduce the toxic rad-waste/inventory. In this in-situ PFC repair project, a concept for a long-life, maintainable first wall module concept is developed and tested. This first wall concept relies on innovative remote handling to repair the first wall modules in-situ, avoiding costly refurbishments outside of the tokamak vessel. This approach was highlighted in the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC) report on Transformative Enabling Capabilities for Efficient Advance Toward Fusion Energy. In general, the damage of the first wall armor is due to particle and radiation exposures. Load conditions vary from one fusion reactor design to another. In tokamaks, first wall Plasma Facing Components (PFCs) are exposed to far-Scrape-Off-Layer plasma fluxes, electromagnetic radiation, energetic CX neutrals, and potentially runaway electron beams. Protecting the first wall to the worst-case load conditions would require the design of a very thick first wall armor. Transient heat and particle fluxes due to disruptions or edge localized modes can lead to excessive heat loads resulting potentially in melting PFCs down to the cooling channel. Catastrophic events like these need to be avoided by appropriate disruption mitigation systems. However, failure of these systems will still put a first wall at an unacceptable risk. Hence, a first wall design needs to accommodate the occasional transient heat loads by introducing sacrificial limiters, which will absorb these transients.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Hot Springs and Geysers: Exploring Historical and Modern Impacts of Geothermal Energy Production on Associated Natural Surface Systems and Standardizing Management Practices

Surface thermal features, most notably hot springs and geysers are increasingly being recognized for their importance to ecosystems, indigenous cultures, and in some cases agriculture, recreation, and tourism. Geothermal project development poses a potential risk to these natural features but current regulatory requirements for assessing and managing these risks during exploration, permitting and monitoring are somewhat inconsistent and unpredictable across different geothermal fields. This has resulted in uncertainty and increases in exploration risk for geothermal energy developers that have led to costly project delays, cancellations, or hesitation to commit. Varying regulatory requirements may also influence public perception, fostering confusion, distrust and ultimately opposition to geothermal projects, further contributing to project delays or cancellations. At a time when there is an increasing urgency for reliable baseload clean energy, geothermal is a net-zero, renewable solution that additionally provides access to more equitable and environmentally just clean power. Continued integration of geothermal energy into the national energy roadmap can be facilitated through consistent and predictable permitting, providing regulators the framework they need, developers a clear path forward, and transparency that the public deserves. This project, currently in its beginning phases, seeks to address this important issue by providing a technical basis from which to build a preliminary protocol for assessing and managing potential impacts from new or existing geothermal energy projects to surface thermal features and their associated ecosystems. Development of this preliminary protocol will be informed by (1) a literature review of well-documented case studies in the western U.S. and New Zealand to understand the range of conditions that exemplify geothermal-surface thermal systems; (2) development of generic illustrative conceptual-numerical models to quantify, understand, and predict the first-order controls (e.g., pressure and permeability) on surface flows; and (3) additional independent and scientifically rigorous evaluations of geothermal-surface thermal system case studies from the Basin and Range Province that incorporate publicly available data as well as data provided by industry through data-sharing agreements. Learning from the successes of the process used to develop the Induced Seismicity Management Protocol (ISMP), we ultimately aim to use these initial efforts as a springboard for establishing a surface thermal feature management working group that will work collaboratively to finalize the protocol as well as co-create recommended best practices for implementation. We envision that the working group will primarily be composed of representatives from regulatory entities, government agencies, Tribes, academia, national laboratories, and industry, and will include early and regular engagement with community organizations and environmental groups. This will help ensure broad acceptance and implementation of the protocol, which will facilitate a more consistent, predictable, and standardized regulatory process, and help to ensure that geothermal energy continues to provide a reliable source of clean energy, and a pathway to achieving greater energy equity in the U.S.

Best Practices↗

E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility Inadvertent Human Intruder Limits and Doses in Support of the PA2022

This report documents the inadvertent human intruder (IHI) analysis for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS), near Aiken, South Carolina. This analysis supports the revised ELLWF Performance Assessment (PA), complying with the Department of Energy standard for operation of low-level waste disposal facilities (USDOE, 2017). The ELLWF is an operating waste disposal facility and is scheduled to continue accepting waste to 2065. One task of the revised PA is to establish waste inventory limits for the various disposal units at ELLWF. This is done by modeling future contaminant release and transport through applicable pathways to human receptors, comparing predicted doses per disposed curie with applicable performance measures, to obtain inventory limits which will assure that doses to receptors do not exceed performance measures. This report documents results of modeling future doses to one class of receptor, the inadvertent human intruder. It is assumed that after site closure, public knowledge of the site is lost, and IHIs will engage in activities on the ELLWF that will disrupt the closure cap, causing dose to the IHI. Following USDOE (2017), six different stylized exposure scenarios are considered, simulating activities by an IHI which could result in a radiological dose. The six scenarios are: • Acute – Basement Construction: IHI constructs a basement and encounters waste during excavation which is inadvertently mixed with clean soil and diluted. • Acute – Well Drilling: IHI drills a water well through waste and is exposed to drill cuttings mixed with clean soil that are brought to the surface. • Acute – Discovery: IHI begins constructing a basement but stops when encountering the riprap in the final closure cap and is exposed to photon radiation from unexcavated material residing in the undisturbed waste zone. • Chronic – Agriculture: Resident IHI is exposed to waste that was excavated for basement construction and mixed with native soil in the intruder’s vegetable garden. • Chronic – Post-Drilling: Resident IHI is exposed to waste from drill cuttings mixed with native soil and scattered in the garden area. • Chronic – Residential: Resident IHI is exposed to external radiation while in home located above waste with shielding provided by the concrete basement floor and any soil or engineered material remaining between the basement and waste. Dose calculations are performed using the SRNL Dose Toolkit (Aleman, 2023), following the approach of Smith et al (2019). Calculations are performed separately for 27 of the 33 disposal units (DUs) at ELLWF and are radionuclide specific. The results of the IHI analysis include: • Dose Factors: mrem per disposed curie (acute) and mrem/yr per disposed curie (chronic) for each parent radionuclide, for each DU. • Inventory Limits: in curies, for each parent radionuclide, for each DU. • Estimated Dose to IHI: mrem (acute) and mrem/yr (chronic), for each DU, given its projected closure inventory without inventory biases applied. Most DU-specific IHI inventory limits are in the range of 10 3 to 10 7 curies per nuclide. The lowest inventory limits are associated with gamma-emitters such as Sn-126, Ra-226, Th-232, and Cm-248. Radionuclides with short half-lives such as Pu-241, and nuclides which are pure beta emitters or which decay by electron capture, such as Ni-59 and Ni-63, have the highest limits. For the 27 evaluated DUs, predicted IHI doses are shown in Table ES-1. The maximum acute dose is 1.18 mrem, at ST23, much less than the DOE performance measure of 500 mrem (USDOE, 2017). The highest chronic dose is 37.2 mrem/yr at ST02, below the DOE performance measure of 100 mrem/yr. Also shown are estimated inventory sums of fractions (SOFs) at closure in 2065, for groundwater (GW) and IHI pathways. For each DU, the inventory is constrained by the GW pathway. For most DUs, the IHI SOFs are approximately 1000 times lower than the GW SOF values, and the IHI pathway does not drive risk for any disposal unit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗