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Assessment of Impurities in Neptunium Metal Using Double-Focusing SF-ICP-MS

In the transmutation process, minor actinides such as neptunium, americium and curium obtained from spent nuclear fuel are incorporated into new fuel that can be placed into a fast reactor, where these elements fission into products with shorter half-lives which reduces the health and safety hazards. In order to better understand the all the involved processes, fundamental physical properties of actinides should be investigated, and for that reason, high-purity materials need to be produced. One of the main challenges in characterizing these materials is the lack of pure metal available for study, and lack of analytical methods to determine the purity. Trans-uranic elements are challenging to study because of the need to be handled in specialized facilities, safeguards concerns and they are not easily purchased and/or produced. High-purity Np metal is being produced at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) of Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in a process of direct oxide reduction developed by Squires and Lessing, with a target purity of 99.999%. The goal of this research is to develop methods to determine the impurities in the Np metal, with detection limits low enough to achieve this purity level. In this work, we have used several ICP-MS and ICP OES techniques, but the focus was the method development using a recently acquired Double-Focusing Sector Field Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometer (SF-ICP-MS). To produce the Np metal, approximately 20 g of the neptunium oxide powder was calcined at 800 oC for 6 h in a magnesium oxide crucible, which is placed inside a stainless steel crucible, that goes into the Hot Uniaxial Press (HUP) furnace insert. After the calcining step, the Np oxide was mixed with approximately 9 g of calcium metal and 100 g of ultra-dry calcium chloride. The HUP furnace was heated in a ramp rate of 50 oC min -1 up to 1000 oC. When the reaction mixture reached 850 oC, a tantalum stirrer was activated at 100 rpm. After the tantalum stirrer was removed and the mixture cooled overnight, the MgO crucible was opened with a hammer and chisel to retrieve the Np metal button at the bottom of the reaction mixture. Prior to the dissolution process, the surface contaminants of the sample were removed. The Np button was washed in 10 mL of ultra-pure water for 1 min, with a faint reaction observed on the surface, indicating the presence of Ca metal. The water-washed sample was placed in a tube with 2 M HCl for only 3 s, as a vigorous reaction in the button surface was observed. The leachates were saved for further analysis. The sample was then rinsed with ultra-pure water and air-dried prior to dissolution. The cleaned sample was placed in a PTFE beaker and 25 mL of 6 M HCl and 150 µL of 24 M HF were added. After 10 minutes of reaction, the beaker was placed on a hot plate for 1 h and 30 min, followed by the addition of 1 mL of 16 M HNO3 and allowed to react for a further 1 h and 20 min. The sample was removed from heat and 10 mL of HNO3 16 M was added to react with the HCl. The beaker was covered and left for overnight reaction, producing a solution with approximately 20 mL of final volume. A Quadrupole Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometer (Q-ICP-MS, Perkin Elmer ELAN DRC II Q-ICP-MS) was used to obtain qualitative mass spectra for the dissolution blank, each of the leachates and the dissolved sample. In the water leachate spectrum mainly Ca and Mg were observed, while the acid wash had a similar peak pattern to the one observed for the Np metal sample, indicating that the process not only removed surface contamination, but also reacted with the sample itself. In the Np material spectrum, Ta and actinides were identified as candidates for major contaminants, as the most intense peaks corresponded to the mass-to-charge ratios of these elements. Minor contaminants included Al, Au, Ca, Cr, Fe, I, Na, Nb, Pb, Sn, Ti, Tl, V, Y. The presence of impurities in the material could have originated from several sources, such as the materials used for the casting process, the use of impure NpO2 or contamination of reagents and materials used for the analysis. Some of the isotopes listed as potential contaminants are susceptible to spectral interferences, so Double-Focusing SF-ICP-MS (Nu Instruments Attom ES HR-ICP-MS) was used for the quantitative analysis. For each isotope determined, several items were evaluated: raw signal of a blank solution, sensitivity and determination coefficient of calibration curves, possibility of interferences and comparison of results obtained for at least two resolving powers (RP): 300 and 4000. The evaluation of the signal in a blank solution can indicate if a spectral interference from the plasma gas and/or the solvent was successfully resolved (commonly observed for 52Cr+/40Ar12C+, for example). It is important to highlight that a signal reduction is expected when a higher RP is used, as the ion beam transmission is decreased by the use of narrower slits

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Lithium Metal Electrode — Understanding Its Unique Characteristics and Functions

Lithium metal electrode (LME) is attractive for the next generation of commercial high-energy rechargeable lithium battery (RLB) design and development. As a light element with a very reducing electrochemical potential, Li metal certainly has the unique characteristics that also present challenges for its application in RLBs. To overcome technical barriers with LME such as the dendrite formation that causes uneven current distributions, excessive SEI formation that consumes Li inventory, and formation of inactive Li metal in granular forms that induces safety hazards, more fundamental understanding of the unique characteristics of LME and its impact on functions in performance in RLBs is critical. Here, we present some recent work based on temporally-correlated reactive molecular dynamics simulations to understand the Li deposition and the associated nucleation and growth process on the LME or graphitic electrode surfaces. Such a study provides some intriguing perspectives on how Li reacts with electrolytes on LME and conventional graphitic electrodes in the RLB operation. Such an insight could help improving our strategy to deal with LME problems and provide functional improvements for LME’s application in RLBs. This presentation is dedicated to Professor Robert Huggins for his life-long teaching of the fundamentals on solid state ionics and its implications in understanding the electrochemical behavior of Li in RLB applications.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Method to control the etching rate of materials

A method for etching materials in which organic solvents are added to the etching mixture and combined in a mixing arrangement. When agitated organic materials mix with the etching agent and interact with the underlying material to form a shield around the etched areas that prevents the additional interaction of water with the newly etched areas and enables the etching of silicon oxides (SiOx) but does not oxidize Si. This method leads to milder reactions with less heat generation and avoids the safety hazards associated with conventional etching methods.

Yi, Ran↗

Hydrogen Internal Combustion Engine - Franco Ocampo

This intern poster is personal research on a Hydrogen Internal Combustion Engine. The poster oversees the core problems with the idea of a HICE. The main problem addressed is abnormal combustion which can be a safety hazard firstly, but also mitigate the performance of the engine severely. Solutions include direct fuel injection, alternative cooling systems, and closer attention to valve timing and calibration in relation to fuel delivery.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities

While probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear facilities is expected to include internal and external hazards for a risk-informed and performance-based design, the current state of practice treats each hazard independently. However, such an independent treatment of hazards may not account for the correlations between different hazards and their response of and damage to the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in a plant resulting in underestimating the overall risk. This project proposes to advance the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities to more adequately evaluate concurrent hazards and contribute to an increased safety of nuclear plants. A framework for multi-hazard PRA will be developed by identifying concurrent hazard events (both internal and external) and event sequences that include interdependencies through the response of SSCs. An example application of the multi-hazard PRA framework will be demonstrated by considering a generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) subjected to seismic and internal flooding hazards. Computational models for the response of components will be developed to generated multi-hazard fragility surfaces under seismic and flooding loads. A PRA model consisting of event and fault trees will also be developed to quantify the multi-hazard risk profile and compare it with the independent hazard risk profile. Overall, by advancing the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities, this project enhances nuclear safety and reduces costs by mitigating unforeseen consequences caused by correlations between concurrent hazards.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities (Revision 1)

This project will demonstrate a multi-hazard time-dependent probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach for nuclear facilities considering aging-related deterioration of structures. A generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) reactor subjected to seismic mainshock-aftershock sequences considering the aging of the containment structure will be used as a case study to demonstrate the multi-hazard PRA approach. Using advanced modeling and simulation, seismic mainshock-aftershock fragility functions will be simulated for the containment structure considering aging effects. A multi-hazard PRA model for a generic PWR reactor will be built to quantify the multi-hazard core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) with explicit time-dependent modeling of event sequences. To date, the cascading impacts of multi-hazards are not adequately accounted for in the PRA models for nuclear facilities. In addition, for both initial and periodic evaluation of facilities to withstand natural phenomena hazards (NPH), deterioration of the SSCs due to aging and other effects is not adequately considered. By advancing multi-hazard considerations accounting for aging effects, this project will contribute to improved understanding of the safety of aging nuclear facilities. Project outcomes such as the multi-hazard CDF and LERF will also allow facility owners to optimize upgrade and retrofit protocols. This project is divided into two components: (1) advanced modeling and simulations; and (2) multi-hazard PRA. For the first component, Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) and BlackBear codes will be used to simulate the seismic response and damage of a containment structure under cascading mainshock-aftershock sequences with aging effects. Uncertainties related to the seismic inputs, material parameters, and environmental factors such as temperature and humidity will be identified and propagated to the fragility functions. These fragility functions, which consider aging effects, will be time dependent. The second component will take the fragility information from the first component to build a multi-hazard time-dependent PRA model starting from a generic PWR model to evaluate the multi-hazard CDF and LERF and characterize the associated consequences. For this component, OpenPRA Web Application and SAPHIRE code will be used. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of considering the cascading impacts of multi-hazards for PRA. Moreover, many of the reactors in the current nuclear fleet in the United States (US) are already operating well beyond their initially planned design life, and applications for further extensions to operating licenses are being considered. Therefore, considering multi-hazard effects and aging deterioration in the NPH risk assessment process will contribute to the safety of both existing and future nuclear facilities. Outcomes of this project will thus directly benefit the standards DOE-STD-1020-16 and DOE-HDBK-1224-18.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

HAZARD ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS USING A REDUNDANCY-GUIDED APPROACH

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. This paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the triggers of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Adaptive Anomaly Detection for Dynamic Clinical Event Sequences

Over the past decade, health information technology (IT) has enabled the amount of digital information stored in electronic health records (EHRs) to expand greatly. However, according to some studies, hazards in health IT can lead to changes in clinical decisions, care processes, and care outcomes, as well as other issues. Thus, the effects of health IT hazards on patient safety have been at the forefront of recent patient safety research. Nonetheless, hazard detection in health IT remains a challenge. In this paper, the authors assume that safety-related issues in health IT would exhibit anomalous characteristics in EHR data. Although all hazards will exhibit some anomalous characteristics, not all anomalies can be regarded as hazards. The authors hypothesize that errors in health IT could lead to interruptions in the sequence of clinical actions. To this end, the problem of detecting anomalous sequences in big EHR data is considered. This paper focuses on dynamic event sequences, which are a series of clinical actions in motion. The authors propose an adaptive anomaly detection approach that uses higher-order network representation to detect anomalous sequences. Furthermore, the authors propose a contiguous subsequence anomaly detection approach that identifies abnormal subsequences in the detected anomalous sequences. The proposed approaches are tested by using synthetic and real-world EHR data. The proposed methods outperform existing state of the art anomaly detection techniques. To reduce the computational complexity associated with the operational implementation of the proposed approaches, the Apache Spark environment was leveraged, and a much shorter run time together with improved performance were achieved, especially for data with more than 60,000 sequences.

Niu, Haoran↗

CO 2 Pipeline risk assessment and comparison for the midcontinent United States

For this work, a comprehensive quantitative risk assessment for the construction and operation of CO 2 transportation networks considered for the Midcontinent United States was conducted. The results showed risks associated with CO 2 pipelines were significantly less than those of other pipeline types. The assessment used four conceptual pipelines of different lengths to discuss risks operators may see. The assessment evaluated the risk associated with construction and operation using data from the US Occupational Safety Health Administration to determine the risk of injury or death for pipeline workers and data from the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration for CO 2 , natural gas distribution, natural gas transmission/gathering, and non-CO 2 hazardous liquid pipelines to develop quantitative likelihood and severity values leading to risk values. The data for the assessment covered incidents from 2010 to 2017 for CO 2 pipelines. The average risk for construction and 30 years of operation for four CO 2 pipeline configurations ranging between 79 and 1,546 miles in length was found. The construction and operational risk averaged between $\$1,400,521$ (approximately $\$0.02$/tonne of CO 2 ) for the shorter pipeline (79 miles) and $\$27,481,939$ (approximately $\$0.10$/tonne of CO 2 ) for a longer pipeline (1,546 miles). The largest risks of fatality for CO 2 pipelines comes from vehicle transport. The largest operational risk to the pipeline was due to leakage. Public pipeline opposition is also a significant risk; it was not quantified but is addressed.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ORNL Package Testing Program Overview

When transporting radioactive or hazardous materials, safety and security are top priorities. Packaging and transportation regulations require reliable evidence that containers have passed rigorous performance tests to ensure that the public and the environment are protected from the hazardous nature of the cargo. Because of its long history in energy and security research, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has needed to ship hazardous packages for the past 65 years. Since the 1940s, ORNL has made significant contributions to transportation regulations and has been at the forefront of regulatory testing development. Today, ORNL is a leader in standards development and testing of designs of radioactive material packages. ORNL plays a critical role in ensuring the safe transportation of radioactive materials across the United States by executing rigorous testing campaigns of packages that contain radioactive materials. Early testing activities focused on supporting the development of transportation regulations established by both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Currently, all package testing activities are performed under the Package Testing Program (PTP) at the Package Evaluation Facility (PEF) located at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC), which is about 10 miles from the main ORNL campus. The PTP develops and evaluates testing solutions, ensuring that they are safe efficient, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. The vision for the PTP is to be a world-class leader in the evaluation and testing of radioactive and hazardous material packages. The key elements necessary to fulfill this mission are an experienced and professional staff; state-of-the-art facilities, equipment, and instrumentation; and completion of challenging programs and projects important to package transportation. Collaborations with other internal and external organizations play a significant role in building stronger teams and achieving this vision. By adhering to and advancing regulatory standards, ORNL’s PTP supports development of safe and compliant packaging, safeguarding the transportation process from potential risks associated with radioactive material logistics.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Grid-scale Energy Storage Hazard Analysis & Design Objectives for System Safety

Battery based energy storage systems are becoming a critical part of a modernized, resilient power system. However, batteries have a unique combination of hazards that can make design and engineering of battery systems difficult. This report presents a systematic hazard analysis of a hypothetical, grid scale lithium-ion battery powerplant to produce sociotechnical "design objectives" for system safety. We applied system's theoretic process analysis (STPA) for the hazard analysis which is broken into four steps: purpose definition, modeling the safety control structure, identifying unsafe control actions, and identifying loss scenarios. The purpose of the analysis was defined as to prevent event outcomes that can result in loss of battery assets due to fires and explosions, loss of health or life due to battery fires and explosions, and loss of energy storage services due to non- operational battery assets. The STPA analysis resulted in identification of six loss scenarios, and their constituent unsafe control actions, which were used to define a series of design objectives that can be applied to reduce the likelihood and severity of thermal events in battery systems. These design objectives, in all or any subset, can be utilized by utilities and other industry stakeholders as "design requirements" in their storage request for proposals (RFPs) and for evaluation of proposals. Further, these design objectives can help to protect firefighters and bring a system back to full functionality after a thermal event. We also comment on the hazards of flow battery technologies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

HyRAM+ (Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models) v.6.1

SAND2025-11565O HyRAM+ (Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models) is a tool for conducting quantitative risk assessment (QRA) in transportation systems. HyRAM+ contains validated, simplified release behavior models, engineering models, and generic data relevant to hydrogen installations. HyRAM+’s platform integrates models and data to conduct QRA on user-defined hydrogen or other alternative fuel systems. The software will enable the international safety research community to add validated models to the HyRAM+ platform for use in QRAs. HyRAM (hydrogen-only) versions 1.0 to 3.1 were developed by Sandia for the Department of Energy (DOE) Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies Office. The following agencies contributed to the development of HyRAM+ version 4.0 regarding the addition of methane (natural gas) and propane models: the DOE Vehicle Technologies Office and the Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Groth, Katrina [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Alb↗

Evaluation of Safety Standards for Fuel System and Fuel Container Integrity of Alternative Fuel Vehicles

There are two Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) in place that specify requirements for integrity of the fuel system and fuel container on compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel vehicles. These are FMVSS Nos. 303, “Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles,” and FMVSS No. 304, “CNG fuel container integrity.” At this time, no FMVSS are defined for the fuel system and fuel container integrity of propane and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vehicles or fuel system integrity requirements for heavy-duty CNG vehicles on the road. However, there are voluntary industry design standards and best practices, as well as regulations defined in other countries. FMVSS No. 303 specifies requirements for the integrity of the CNG fuel system of light-duty vehicles and school buses, and FMVSS No. 304 specifies requirements for fuel container integrity on all CNG vehicles. FMVSS No. 304 applies to containers used for vehicle propulsion, whereas containers used to transport CNG and transportation of CNG containers are regulated by the DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304 are performance-based standards to consistently test and validate equipment and are not design restrictive. Despite the increasing number of natural gas and propane medium- and heavy-duty vehicles on the road, there are no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements beyond light-duty and school buses for CNG vehicles and no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements for propane vehicles. NHTSA is researching fuel system safety for medium- and heavy-duty natural gas and propane vehicles to update FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304. NHTSA is also researching current best practices and standards for high pressure fuel tanks in motor vehicles as they may apply to FMVSS No. 304.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗

Assessment of Technical Information Needs and Considerations for Front-End Activities for Molten Salt Fuel Types

This report details an assessment of the hazards and safety impacts related to front-end operations of molten salt reactors (MSR) as well as an assessment of existing safety guidance. Publicly available information was evaluated to make recommendations to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for guidance development and information gathering needs. Five different MSR technologies were evaluated along with information from 1960’s about the Atomic Energy Commission programs for the Aircraft Reactor Experiment and Molten Salt Reactor Experiment. Primary areas of evaluation include fuel cycle facilities, transportation and at reactor fuel mixing operations up to reactor startup. In general, there was difficulty synthesizing publicly available information due to the early stage of the MSR development and proprietary information associated with the reactor technology companies analyzed. There are a few specific recommendations from this report. One overarching paradigm shift that the NRC needs to evaluate is the possibility of collocating fuel cycle facilities with operating MSRs. Although there is no specific prohibition to this in the NRC regulations, the collocation of the fuel cycle facilities with the operating MSR presents a novel approach compared to the light water reactor baseline. More guidance and research into thorium operations and regulation is needed. The hazards associated with the stability of stored fuel constituents need to be evaluated. Some reactor fuel cycles use beryllium, and its use and the associated hazards need further analysis. NRC-approved designs for transportation packages for shipping molten salt fuels and factory-built and fueled reactors are not available.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk Model for EM Decision Support Toolsets

The Government Office of Accountability (GAO) has published several reports identifying the need for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) to address mounting costs for DoE's cleanup program. DOEEM could greatly benefit from independent decision tool-sets/models that would allow them to evaluate options and inform business decision at the enterprise level considering site-specific life cycle costs and system plans. Program goals: Develop a tool-set that enables EM to independently evaluate alternatives, assess outcomes from different contracting strategies, and inform critical decisions for the enterprise. Project goals: Adaption of a Risk Model for integration with complimentary tool-sets for project level decision making. Operational Events: Discrete event model that evaluates operational variables (e.g. capacity, throughput, maintenance constraints) and identify bottlenecks. Identifying and Bounding Project Risk: Identify risks that impact confidence in meeting goals (e.g. production). Life cycle Cost: Evaluate impacts of staffing levels, inventory, and capital investments on life cycle costs. Methods and approach: Monte Carlo Analysis is being executed to generate results: Input derives from Risk Register Data; Tied to Projected and Target Schedules; Incorporates float duration within the model. Assumes associated risk mitigation actions being completed within a timeline of five fiscal years. Metrics include: Confidence in Meeting Production Goal; Confidence in Safety Standards; Confidence in Continuous Operation; Other Metrics can be added as appropriate regarding specific site needs. The adapted risk model can be used as a stand alone decision tool or can be integrated complementary tool-sets (i.e. process and cost models) for project-specific decisions. These support tool-sets can then be integrated with others for site- and complex- level evaluations. Future work includes designing an adaptable and modular framework that would allow integration of multiple tool-sets for holistic and/or targeted evaluation of alternative strategies for decision making that could lead to risk and cost reduction across the enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

HyRAM+ (Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models) v.4.0

HyRAM+ is a software toolkit for conducting quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and consequence modeling for hydrogen and other alternative fuels infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM+ contains validated, simplified release behavior models, a standardized QRA approach, and engineering models and generic data relevant to hydrogen installations. HyRAM (hydrogen-only) versions 1.0 to 3.1 were developed by Sandia for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies Office (HFTO). The U.S. DOE Vehicle Technologies Office (VTO) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) contributed to the development of HyRAM+ version 4.0 regarding the addition of methane (natural gas) and propane models. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-10862 O

Groth, Katrina↗