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At least 73 records · Page 4

Physics and technology considerations for the deuterium–tritium fuel cycle and conditions for tritium fuel self sufficiency

The tritium aspects of the DT fuel cycle embody some of the most challenging feasibility and attractiveness issues in the development of fusion systems. The review and analyses in this paper provide important information to understand and quantify these challenges and to define the phase space of plasma physics and fusion technology parameters and features that must guide a serious R&D in the world fusion program. We focus in particular on components, issues and R&D necessary to satisfy three 'principal requirements': (1) achieving tritium self-sufficiency within the fusion system, (2) providing a tritium inventory for the initial start-up of a fusion facility, and (3) managing the safety and biological hazards of tritium. A primary conclusion is that the physics and technology state-of-the-art will not enable DEMO and future power plants to satisfy these principal requirements. We quantify goals and define specific areas and ideas for physics and technology R&D to meet these requirements. A powerful fuel cycle dynamics model was developed to calculate time-dependent tritium inventories and flow rates in all parts and components of the fuel cycle for different ranges of parameters and physics and technology conditions. Dynamics modeling analyses show that the key parameters affecting tritium inventories, tritium start-up inventory, and tritium self-sufficiency are the tritium burn fraction in the plasma (f b ), fueling efficiency (η f ), processing time of plasma exhaust in the inner fuel cycle (t p ), reactor availability factor (AF), reserve time (tr) which determines the reserve tritium inventory needed in the storage system in order to keep the plant operational for time t r in case of any malfunction of any part of the tritium processing system, and the doubling time (t d ). Results show that η f f b > 2% and processing time of 1–4 h are required to achieve tritium self-sufficiency with reasonable confidence. For η f f b = 2% and processing time of 4 h, the tritium start-up inventory required for a 3 GW fusion reactor is ~11 kg, while it is <5 kg if η f f b = 5% and the processing time is 1 h. To achieve these stringent requirements, a serious R&D program in physics and technology is necessary. The EU-DEMO direct internal recycling concept that carries fuel directly from the plasma exhaust gas to the fueling systems without going through the isotope separation system reduces the overall processing time and tritium inventories and has positive effects on the required tritium breeding ratio (TBR R ). A significant finding is the strong dependence of tritium self-sufficiency on the reactor availability factor. Simulations show that tritium self-sufficiency is: impossible if AF < 10% for any η f f b , possible if AF > 30% and 1% ≤ η f f b ≤ 2%, and achievable with reasonable confidence if AF > 50% and η f f b > 2%. These results are of particular concern in light of the low availability factor predicted for the near-term plasma-based experimental facilities (e.g. FNSF, VNS, CTF), and can have repercussions on tritium economy in DEMO reactors as well, unless significant advancements in RAMI are made. There is a linear dependency between the tritium start-up inventory and the fusion power. The required tritium start-up inventory for a fusion facility of 100 MW fusion power is as small as 1 kg. Since fusion power plants will have large powers for better economics, it is important to maintain a 'reserve' tritium inventory in the tritium storage system to continue to fuel the plasma and avoid plant shutdown in case of malfunctions of some parts of the tritium processing lines. But our results show that a reserve time as short as 24 h leads to unacceptable reserve and start-up inventory requirements. Therefore, high reliability and fast maintainability of all components in the fuel cycle are necessary in order to avoid the need for storing reserve tritium inventory sufficient for continued fusion facility operation for more than a few hours. The physics aspects of plasma fueling, tritium burn fraction, and particle and power exhaust are highly interrelated and complex, and predictions for DEMO and power reactors are highly uncertain because of lack of experiments with burning plasma. Fueling by pellet injection on the high field side of tokamak has evolved to be the preferred method to fuel a burning plasma. Extrapolation from the DIII-D penetration scaling shows fueling efficiency expected in DEMO to be <25%, but such extrapolations are highly uncertain. The fueling efficiency of gas in a reactor relevant regime is expected to be extremely poor and not very useful for getting tritium into the core plasma efficiently. Gas fueling will nonetheless be useful for feedback control of the divertor operating parameters. Extensive modeling has been carried out to predict burn fraction, fueling requirements, and fueling efficiency for ITER, DEMO, and beyond. The fueling rate required to operate Q = 10 ITER plasmas in order to provide the required core fueling, helium exhaust and radiative divertor plasma conditions for acceptable divertor power loads was calculated. If this fueling is performed with a 50–50 DT mix, the tritium burn fraction in ITER would be ~0.36%, which is too low to satisfy the self-sufficiency conditions derived from the dynamics modeling for fusion reactors. Extrapolation to DEMO using this approach would also yield similarly low burn fraction. Extensive analysis presented shows that specific features of edge neutral dynamics in ITER and fusion reactors, which are different from present experiments, open possibilities for optimization of tritium fueling and thus to improve the burn fraction. Using only tritium in pellet fueling of the plasma core, and only deuterium for edge density, divertor power load and ELM control results in significant increase of the burn fraction to 1.8–3.6%. These estimates are performed with physics models whose results cannot be fully validated for ITER and DEMO plasma conditions since these cannot be achieved in present tokamak experiments. Thus, several uncertainties remain regarding particle transport and scenario requirements in ITER and DEMO. The safety standard requirements for protection of the public and release guidelines for tritium have been reviewed. General safety approaches including minimizing tritium inventories, reducing tritium permeation through materials, and decontaminating material for waste disposal have been suggested.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Comparative Analysis of Confidence Metrics for Nuclear Criticality Safety

Nuclear criticality safety standards provide guidance on the requirements and recommendations to establish confidence in computerized model results used to support operation with fissionable materials. By design, the guidance is not prescriptive, leaving the analysts free to determine how various sources of uncertainties are to be statistically aggregated. This report compares the analyses and key assumptions behind four notable methodologies documented in the nuclear criticality safety literature: the parametric, nonparametric, Whisper, and TSURFER methodologies. Because of the involved use of statistics entangled with heuristic recipes, the results of these methodologies are often difficult to interpret. Also, they are augmented by additional large administrative margins, eliminating the incentive to understand their differences. With the new resurgent wave of advanced nuclear systems focused on economizing operation—including advanced reactors, fuel cycles, and fuel concepts—there is a strong need to develop a clear understanding of uncertainties and their fusion methodologies to reduce uncertainties in a scientifically defensible manner. This report offers a deep dive into the various assumptions of the four noted methodologies, their adequacy, and their limitations, to provide guidance on developing confidence for the emergent nuclear systems. These systems are expected to be challenged by the scarcity of experimental data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Flight Readiness of Mochii S: Portable Spectroscopic Scanning Electron Microscope Facility on the International Space Station (ISS)

The ISS (International Space Station) currently lacks the capability to image and chemically analyze nano-to-micron scale particles from numerous engineering systems. To identify these particles, we must wait for a re-entry vehicle to return them from low earth orbit for ground-based SEM (Scanning Electron Microscope) / EDS (Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy) analysis. This may take months, potentially delaying the affected system. Having an EDS-equipped SEM (Mochii S) aboard the ISS will accelerate response time thereby enhancing crew and vehicle safety by rapid and accurate identification of microscopic threats, especially in time-critical situations.The Mochii S payload will be stationed in the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) powered by 120 VAC (Volts Alternating Current) inverter and connected to station Ethernet and WiFi (Fig. 1). To date the Mochii S payload has undergone testing for command and data handling, power quality, flight vibration, and radiation testing at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Mochii's high-RPM (Revolutions Per Minute) rotating vacuum pumps and high voltage systems have been reviewed to meet safety standards by JSC (Johnson Space Center) Engineering. Topology of the system in the JEM module has been baselined by ISS Safety and JAXA (Japan Space Exploration Agency). Digital controls to and from ISS over Joint Station LAN (Local Area Network) uplink have been simulated and the latencies and data rates have been found to be sufficient for successful operation of the payload from ground.Transporting sensitive electron optical instruments aboard a rocket that sustains 7G acceleration for 8 minutes and then operating it the unique microgravity (micro-g) environment is no trivial matter. To meet strict safety requirements and increase robustness for mission success, over 500 unique verifications must be completed before the payload is certified for spaceflight. Two of which will be discussed in detail are: vibroacoustic testing and magnetic susceptibility shielding and validation.

Mochii↗

Gap Analysis of UAS Manuals and Hazards

Emerging aviation includes the use of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in novel operations. The manufacture and operation of these small UAS are not as regulated as today’s commercial operation, and their widespread use introduces new risks and hazards to the general public. Today, there are case-by-case approvals for sUAS operations, particularly for emergency response operations in which the potential benefits to use of sUAS is perceived to outweigh potential risks. We analyze operational approvals, procedures, and concepts of operation to identify and categorize the risks and hazards that applicants and approvers are already considering, and also identify barriers and mitigations that the operators have already put in place. This analysis may help lead to routine checklists that standardize safety analysis and lead to more routine operations.

grounded theory↗

Reinforcement Learning-Based Oscillation Dampening: Scaling Up Single-Agent Reinforcement Learning Algorithms to a 100-Autonomous-Vehicle Highway Field Operational Test

In this article, we explore the technical details of the reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms that were deployed in the largest field test of automated vehicles designed to smooth traffic flow in history as of 2023, uncovering the challenges and breakthroughs that come with developing RL controllers for automated vehicles. We delve into the fundamental concepts behind RL algorithms and their application in the context of self-driving cars, discussing the developmental process from simulation to deployment in detail, from designing simulators to reward function shaping. We present the results in both simulation and deployment, discussing the flow-smoothing benefits of the RL controller. From understanding the basics of Markov decision processes to exploring advanced techniques such as deep RL, our article offers a comprehensive overview and deep dive of the theoretical foundations and practical implementations driving this rapidly evolving field. We also showcase real-world case studies and alternative research projects that highlight the impact of RL controllers in revolutionizing autonomous driving. From tackling complex urban environments to dealing with unpredictable traffic scenarios, these intelligent controllers are pushing the boundaries of what automated vehicles can achieve. Furthermore, we examine the safety considerations and hardware-focused technical details surrounding deployment of RL controllers into automated vehicles. As these algorithms learn and evolve through interactions with the environment, ensuring their behavior aligns with safety standards becomes crucial. Here, we explore the methodologies and frameworks being developed to address these challenges, emphasizing the importance of building reliable control systems for automated vehicles.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗

Survey of Methods for Assessing Safety Compliance of sUAS BVLOS Operations

To ensure the safety of small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Beyond Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS), the FAA offers a guideline on how sUAS operators can demonstrate compliance with FAA rules, including regulations, advisory circulars, policy statements, and acceptable means of compliance (AMOC), using a formal and top-down approach. According to FAA Advisory Circular 23.2010-1, the AMOC refers to “one method, but not the only method, to show compliance with a regulatory requirement.” It is common for regulations to include a performance and safety standard rather than a detailed design or operation requirement, which allows for flexibility in fulfilling the regulatory requirements while still achieving a predetermined level of safety. This technical report explores existing frameworks for sUAS BVLOS safety analysis. It begins by discussing how sUAS BVLOS operations can be strategically deconflicted and then discusses their hazards. The next step is to establish safety assessment methods commonly used by the aviation industry and the FAA, illustrate how these methods can be applied to several safety-critical air traffic systems, and list collision models that the FAA and industry use. This investigation documents the processes for assessing safety risks in sUAS BVLOS operations and will allow sUAS BVLOS operations to be assessed for safety compliance more efficiently.

sUAS BVLOS Operations↗

A matrix safety frame approach to robot safety for space applications

The planned use of autonomous robots in space applications has generated many new safety problems. This thesis assesses safety of autonomous robot systems through the structure of a proposed three-dimensional matrix safety frame. By identifying the common points of accidents and fatalities involving terrestrial robots, reviewing terrestrial robot safety standards, and modifying and extending these results to space applications, hazards are identified and their associated risks assessed. Three components of the safeguarding dimension of the matrix safety frame, safeguarding through design and operation for intrinsic safety, and incorporation of add-on safety systems are explained through examples for both terrestrial and space robots. A space robot hazard identification checklist, a qualitative tool for robot systems designers, is developed using the structure imparted by the matrix safety frame. The development of an expert system from the contents of the checklist is discussed.

Montgomery, T. D.↗

A Software Safety Risk Taxonomy for Use in Retrospective Safety Cases

Safety standards contain technical and process-oriented safely requirements. The best time to include these requirements is early in the development lifecycle of the system. When software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, a retrospective safety case will need to be constructed for the software in the system. This can be a difficult task because there may be few to no art facts available to show compliance to the software safely requirements. The risks associated with not meeting safely requirements in a legacy safely-critical computer system must be addressed to give confidence for reuse. This paper introduces a proposal for a software safely risk taxonomy for legacy safely-critical computer systems, by specializing the Software Engineering Institute's 'Software Development Risk Taxonomy' with safely elements and attributes.

Hill, Janice L.↗

MELCOR-TMAP: The integration of MELCOR for fusion and TMAP4 for fusion reactor systems safety analysis and tritium inventory tracking

The design of fusion reactors requires the prediction of radioactive tritium migration during normal operating conditions and accident scenarios. Safety standards such as those from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) require that fusion reactor designs limit the release of hazardous material to the environment. In addition to safety requirements, the rarity of tritium supplies for burning D-T fusion plasma requires tritium breeding blankets. Computational modeling of migration of tritium and various reaction products throughout the fusion reactor serves to create designs that fulfill these requirements. MELCOR-TMAP, owned and developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is an integrated system-level engineering code adapted for the analysis of fusion reactor systems. The history of the conception and evolution of the MELCOR-TMAP code, as well as its current capabilities, recent updates including a corrected composite material wall nodalization scheme, and plans for future development, are discussed here.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

A New Market for Terrestrial Single-Event Effects: Autonomous Vehicles

ISO-26262, the road vehicle functional safety standard, underwent a major overhaul that was released in December 2018. Radiation effects, and single-event effect (SEE) hazards in particular, play an important role in autonomous vehicle safety. This connection will only increase as the level of driving automation goes from "hands off," to "eyes off," to "mind off." This translates to increased coupling with space climate and weather in addition to other traditional terrestrial radiation sources like thorium and uranium contamination in process and packaging materials. We will focus on autonomous vehicle radiation effects and present both benefits and challenges to the space weather and radiation engineering communities.

Autonomous Vehicles↗

Blast Effects on Buildings (Final Report)

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has conservatively reduced the explosive safety standards suggested by the Small Quantities in Research Laboratories (SQRL) program testing by 60%. For this reason, further research into the detailed effects of small amounts of explosives in typically constructed rooms is needed in order to improve their factor of safety. The team was tasked with designing an experiment to investigate the effect of different variables on drywall under explosive blasts. In order to meet this objective, the team conducted a comprehensive literature review to gain an understanding of industry-standard construction practices and review previous tests conducted by the Army corp of engineers. Since the team used PBXN-5 rather than C4, as in SQRL, an initial shot was conducted to compare damage levels. From those results and the physical constraints of the testing chamber, the team redesigned multiple single-panel drywall frames to capture the entirety of the incurred damage. Proposed designs were narrowed down using a decision matrix. From the study of previous tests and literature review, variables were chosen that the team hypothesized to have an impact on drywall strength. The variables that were tested were chosen from the results of that work and specific variables the sponsor was interested in, and they were paint, humidity/moisture content, and explosive positioning relative to the studs. Detailed plans were made for each variable according to what conditions the team wanted to investigate. For humidity, this involved testing low, ambient, and high conditions by treating the panels in a chamber. Preliminary shots were performed to test the structural integrity of the frame and streamline the test diagnostics which involved a high-speed camera placed behind the drywall, outside of the chamber, and a pressure probe placed behind the drywall, inside the chamber. Once the instrumentation, diagnostics, and frame design were finalized, a quantitative damage criteria matrix was created to categorize the results of the main shot series. In conjunction with evidence from the high-speed video, the achieved damage levels indicate that high moisture content drywall is better able to withstand explosive blasts. Larger stud damage and lower drywall damage occurred when the explosive was located directly in front of a stud. Paint had no noticeable impact on strength. Ultimately, the team conducted a total of 17 tests, leaving the door open for future in-depth research into the impact of humidity.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Mitigation of safety and environmental challenges posed by refrigerants

The abatement of safety and environmental burden associated with low and ultra-low Global Warming Potential (GWP) refrigerants is a critical undertaking. As the industry shifts towards more environmentally friendly alternatives, mitigating the potential risks and ensuring safety standards becomes paramount. The adoption of mildly and highly flammable refrigerants contributes significantly to minimizing the greenhouse gas impact on the environment, aligning with global climate and sustainability goals. However, it is essential to address safety concerns and potential environmental implications associated with the end use of these refrigerants. A method to mitigate the safety risk in a flammable refrigerant based heating, ventilation, air-conditioning, and refrigeration (HVACR) system is the primary focus of this paper. Advent of A2L and A3 refrigerants as replacements to high GWP refrigerants requires careful handling of leak episodes to lower or eliminate the risk associated with creating flammable mixtures capable of fire/explosion hazard. Solid materials tailored to target the molecule of interest (i.e., refrigerant.) by engineering the microporous structure as well as chemically functionalizing the surface to attract and hold on to the chemical compound being removed from the gas stream was realized. Quantitative analysis reveals the adsorbent's effectiveness in reducing leak potential in the range of 40 %–100 % for various refrigerants. Strategic placement and active leak management with negative pressure offer promising avenues for capturing leaked refrigerants, enhancing overall safety.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Software Safety Progress in NASA

NASA has developed guidelines for development and analysis of safety-critical software. These guidelines have been documented in a Guidebook for Safety Critical Software Development and Analysis. The guidelines represent a practical 'how to' approach, to assist software developers and safety analysts in cost effective methods for software safety. They provide guidance in the implementation of the recent NASA Software Safety Standard NSS-1740.13 which was released as 'Interim' version in June 1994, scheduled for formal adoption late 1995. This paper is a survey of the methods in general use, resulting in the NASA guidelines for safety critical software development and analysis.

Radley, Charles F.↗

Research on ignition and flame spread of solid materials in Japan

Fire safety is one of the main concerns for crewed missions such as the space station. Materials used in spacecraft may burn even if metalic. There are severe restrictions on the materials used in spacecraft from the view of fire safety. However, such restrictions or safety standards are usually determined based on experimental results under normal gravity, despite large differences between the phenomena under normal and microgravity. To evaluate the appropriateness of materials for use in space, large amount of microgravity fire-safety combustion data is urgently needed. Solid material combustion under microgravity, such as ignition and flame spread, is a relatively new research field in Japan. As the other reports in this workshop describe, most of microgravity combustion research in Japan is droplet combustion as well as some research on gas phase combustion. Since JAMIC, the Japan Microgravity Center, (which offers 10 seconds microgravity time) opened in 1992, microgravity combustion research is robust, and many drop tests relating to solid combustion (paper combustion, cotton string combustion, metal combustion with Aluminium or Magnesium) have been performed. These tests proved that the 10 seconds of microgravity time at JAMIC is useful for solid combustion research. Some experiments were performed before JAMIC opened. For example, latticed paper was burned under microgravity by using a 50 m drop tower to simulate porous material combustion under microgravity. A 50 m tower provides only 2 seconds microgravity time however, and it was not long enough to investigate the solid combustion phenomena.

Ito, Kenichi↗

Mitigation of Safety and Environmental Challenges Posed by Low and Ultra-low GWP Refrigerants

The abatement of safety and environmental burden associated with low and ultra-low Global Warming Potential (GWP) refrigerants is a critical undertaking. As the industry shifts towards more environmentally friendly alternatives, mitigating the potential risks and ensuring safety standards becomes paramount. The adoption of low GWP and ultra-low GWP refrigerants contributes significantly to minimizing the greenhouse gas impact on the environment, aligning with global climate and sustainability goals. However, it is essential to address safety concerns and potential environmental implications associated with the end use of these refrigerants.A method to mitigate the safety risk in a flammable refrigerant based HVACR system is the primary focus of this paper. Advent of A2L and A3 refrigerants as replacements to high GWP refrigerants requires careful handling of leak episodes to lower or eliminate the risk associated with creating flammable mixtures capable of fire/explosion hazard. Solid materials tailored to target the molecule of interest (i.e., refrigerant.) by engineering the microporous structure as well as chemically functionalizing the surface to attract and hold on to the chemical compound being removed from the gas stream was realized. Additionally, a chromatic transformation technique is investigated for rapid on-site analysis of refrigerant blends. Preliminary results demonstrating the feasibility of both of these methods for successful deployment of low-GWP refrigerants are presented.

Cheekatamarla, Praveen↗

Equivalent Safety Evaluation of the 2021 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to Editions Incorporated by Reference in 49 CFR 192, 193, and 195

Federal safety standards for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and liquid natural gas facilities incorporate rules and requirements for boiler and pressure vessel design and fabrication into 49 CFR Parts 192, 193, and 195 through the IBR process. The equivalent safety evaluations documented in this report demonstrate that boilers and pressure vessels in pipeline facilities that are designed and fabricated in accordance with rules and requirements specified in the 2021 edition do not violate the fundamental safety assumptions stated or implied in the 2007 edition of the ASME BPVC and therefore provide equivalent safety.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗