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NASA NTRS1999

The Isothermal Dendritic Growth Experiment (IDGE): USMP-4 One-Year-Report

Dendrites describe the tree-like crystal morphology commonly assumed in many material systems--particularly in metals and alloys that freeze from supercooled or supersaturated melts. There remains a high level of engineering interest in dendritic solidification because of the role of dendrites in the determination of cast alloy microstructures. Microstructure plays a key role in determining the physical properties of cast or welded products. In addition, dendritic solidification provides an example of non-equilibrium physics and is one of the simplest non-trivial examples of dynamic pattern formation, where an amorphous melt, under simple starting conditions, evolves into a complex ramified microstructure. Although it is well-known that dendritic growth is controlled by the transport of latent heat from the moving solid-melt interface as the dendrite advances into a supercooled melt, an accurate, and predictive model has not been developed. Current theories consider: 1) the transfer of heat or solute from the solid-liquid interface into the melt, and 2) the interfacial crystal growth and growth selection physics for the interface. However, the effects of gravity-induced convection on the transfer of heat from the interface prevent either element from being adequately tested solely under terrestrial conditions. The Isothermal Dendritic Growth Experiment (IDGE) constituted a series of three NASA-supported microgravity experiments, all of which flew aboard the space shuttle, Columbia. This experimental space flight series was designed and operated to grow and record dendrite solidification in the absence of gravity-induced convective heat transfer, and thereby produce a wealth of benchmark-quality data for testing solidification scaling laws. The data collection from the on-orbit phase of the IDGE flight series is now complete. We are currently completing analyses and moving towards final data archiving.

Glicksman, M. E.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Four

This is Volume Four of a set of six reports produced by NASA and other organizations which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The Technical Documents included in this volume are: Appendix F.1 Water Absorption by Foam; Appendix F.2 Follow the TPS; Appendix F.3 MADS Sensor Data; Appendix F.4 ET Cryoinsulation; Appendix F.5 Space Shuttle STS-107 Columbia Accident Investigation, and External Tank Working Group Final Report - Volume 1.

CRYOINSULATION↗
NASA NTRS2005

The Logistic Path from the International Space Station to the Moon and Beyond

The period from the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003 to resumption of Space Shuttle flights, planned for May 2005, has presented significant challenges to International Space Station (ISS) maintenance operations. Sharply curtailed upmass capability has forced NASA to revise its support strategy and to undertake maintenance activities that have significantly expanded the envelope of the ISS maintenance concept. This experience has enhanced confidence in the ability to continue to support ISS in the period following the permanent retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet in 2010. Even greater challenges face NASA with the implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration that will introduce extended missions to the Moon beginning in the period of 2015 - 2020 and ultimately see human missions to more distant destinations such as Mars. The experience and capabilities acquired through meeting the maintenance challenges of ISS will serve as the foundation for the maintenance strategy that will be employed in support of these future missions.

Watson, J. K.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Five

Volume V of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in VolumeI. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia The contents include:. Appendix G.1 Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness; Appendix G.2 Appendix R, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan; Appendix G.3 CAIB Charter, with Revisions; Appendix G.4 Group 1 Matrix Brief on Maintenance, Material, and Management; Appendix G.5 Vehicle Data Mapping(VDM) Team Final Report, Jun 13, 2003; Appendix G.6 SRB Working Group Presentation to CAIB; Appendix G. 7 Starfire Team Final Report, Jun 3, 2003; Appendix G.8 Using the Data and Observations from Flight STS-107, Executive Summary; Appendix G.9 Contracts, Incentives, and Safety/Technical Excellence; Appendix G.10 Detailed Summaries: Rogers Commission Report, ASAP Report, SIAT Report; Appendix G.11 Foam Application and Production Chart; Appendix G.12 Crew Survivability Report; and Appendix G.12 Aero/Aerothermal/ Thermal/Structures Team FinalReport, August 6, 2003.

CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗
NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Crew Interviews 1. Andy Thomas 2. Steve Robinson

STS-114 Mission Specialists, Andy Thomas and Steve Robinson, are seen in this pre-flight interview. Andy Thomas begins by talking about his interest in spaceflight as a young boy growing up in Australia. He expresses that the chances of an Australian boy studying to eventually become an astronaut was very remote. His Mechanical Engineering Degree in Australia and a Doctorate enabled him to acquire unique skills to come to the United States to work for Lockheed Martin. On the topic of return to flight, he reflects on experiences that he had working with the Michael Anderson and Kalpana Chawla of the ill-fated Space Shuttle Columbia. He also talks about the safety of the Space Shuttle Discovery and repairs to its Thermal Protection system. He explains in detail the Logistics Flight (LF) 1, spacewalks, Multipurpose Logistics Module (MPLM) and the External Stowage Platform (ESP)-2. Steve Robinson expresses that he had many interests as a child and becoming an astronaut was one of them. He was fascinated with things that fly and wanted to find out how they flew. He also designed hang gliders as a teenager. He expresses how his family feels about the risky business of spaceflight. He talks about how the space shuttle discovery crew will remember the Columbia crew by including seven stars on their patch so that they can bring them into orbit and then back home. Robinson also talks about his primary job, and the spacewalks that he and Soichi Noguchi will be performing.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Two

Volume II of the Report contains appendices that were cited in Volume I. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board produced many of these appendices as working papers during the investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Other appendices were produced by other organizations (mainly NASA) in support of the Board investigation. In the case of documents that have been published by others, they are included here in the interest of establishing a complete record, but often at less than full page size. Contents include: CAIB Technical Documents Cited in the Report: Reader's Guide to Volume II; Appendix D. a Supplement to the Report; Appendix D.b Corrections to Volume I of the Report; Appendix D.1 STS-107 Training Investigation; Appendix D.2 Payload Operations Checklist 3; Appendix D.3 Fault Tree Closure Summary; Appendix D.4 Fault Tree Elements - Not Closed; Appendix D.5 Space Weather Conditions; Appendix D.6 Payload and Payload Integration; Appendix D.7 Working Scenario; Appendix D.8 Debris Transport Analysis; Appendix D.9 Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.10 Debris Recovery; Appendix D.11 STS-107 Columbia Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.12 Impact Modeling; Appendix D.13 STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment; Appendix D.14 Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) Review; Appendix D.15 Maintenance, Material, and Management Inputs; Appendix D.16 Public Safety Analysis; Appendix D.17 MER Manager's Tiger Team Checklist; Appendix D.18 Past Reports Review; Appendix D.19 Qualification and Interpretation of Sensor Data from STS-107; Appendix D.20 Bolt Catcher Debris Analysis.

CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗
NASA NTRS1982

From Lindbergh to Columbia - The Space Shuttle

An effort to gage the level of maturation of space transportation development signalled by the advent of the Shuttle is attempted. Analogy is drawn to the successful crossing of the Atlantic Ocean by Charles Lindbergh, an event which established the feasibility of routine air transport over long distances. A positive shift in public confidence is expected to arrive by recalling the favorable news coverage which resulted after two or three flights by the Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk in 1908. The evolution of modern airports is taken as an indication of the kind of growth in facilities which may shortly be required due to operational space transportation systems. The arrival of normal operations of humans-to-space and return in reuseable vehicles is seen as a benchmark for a time when certain global assessments of social and technical requirements for the continued existence and progress of human civilization on earth and into space must be made.

Lovelace, A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Debris Assessment

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident revealed a fundamental problem of the Space Shuttle Program regarding debris. Prior to the tragedy, the Space Shuttle requirement stated that no debris should be liberated that would jeopardize the flight crew and/or mission success. When the accident investigation determined that a large piece of foam debris was the primary cause of the loss of the shuttle and crew, it became apparent that the risk and scope of - damage that could be caused by certain types of debris, especially - ice and foam, were not fully understood. There was no clear understanding of the materials that could become debris, the path the debris might take during flight, the structures the debris might impact or the damage the impact might cause. In addition to supporting the primary NASA and USA goal of returning the Space Shuttle to flight by understanding the SRB debris environment and capability to withstand that environment, the SRB debris assessment project was divided into four primary tasks that were required to be completed to support the RTF goal. These tasks were (1) debris environment definition, (2) impact testing, (3) model correlation and (4) hardware evaluation. Additionally, the project aligned with USA's corporate goals of safety, customer satisfaction, professional development and fiscal accountability.

Kendall, Kristin↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Three

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's (CAIB) independent investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia produced a six volume report. This is Volume III of the report. Volume III contains other technical documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the CAIB in support of its inquiry into the tragedy. Technical documents included in the report are: Appendix E.1 CoFR Endorsements; Appendix E.2 STS-107 Image Analysis Team Final Report; Appendix E.3 An Assessment of Potential Material Candidates for the 'Flight Day 2', Radar Object Observed during the NASA Mission STS-107; Appendix E.4 Columbia Early Sighting Assessment Team Final Report.

STS-107↗
NASA NTRS2004

Understanding Columbia's Reentry Problems

Soon after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident occurred last year, a group of CFD analysts from NASA centers and private industry was organized to help determine the cause of the accident. This group was under the direction of the Applied Aeroscience and CFD Branch of the Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division at the Johnson Space Center. For external flow simulations, noncommercial CFD codes that specialize in hypersonic or high Mach number flows were used. These tools were used to determine heating rates, pressures, and temperatures for a large number of vehicle damage scenarios. Lockheed Martin Space Operations was called upon to provide CFD support in the area of internal flows within the shuttle wing cavity, and or these simulations, FLUENT 6.1 was chosen. Two large-scale, simplified models were run to understand the flow patterns once a breach of the internal wing cavity was initiated. The results were primarily used to visualize flow patterns within the wing cavity. The first CFD model included the entire left wing without the wheel. well cavity. The purpose of the first model, which did not include the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) cavity along the wing leading edge, was to visualize the flow field within the wing cavity immediately after the leading edge spar breach, This model assumed that the flow coming into the wing cavity was nom1 to the spar. It included all o f the primary vents that allow for flow between the main cavities of the wing. A six-inch diameter hole was modeled in the spar at the approximate location where the spar breach was judged to have occurred, which was between RCC panels 8 and 9. The results of the modeling showed that at this location, the high temperature, high velocity gas stream entering the wing cavity impinged on the outboard wheel well cavity. Instrumentation in the Shuttle wheel well cavity registered abnormal temperatures during reentry, so the FLUENT results helped support the conclusion of the accident investigation team that the spar breach was in the RCC panel 8-9 area, and that the initial spar breach was likely entering the wing cavity normal to the spar. This model also showed that the flow entering the wing cavity tended to swirl within the cavity just outboard of the wheel well, and did not initially penetrate further into the rear cavities of the wing. The second CFD model was a 2-D simulation of the left wing cavity and the RCC cavity. It was used to visualize the flow through the RCC breach, through the wing spar breach, and into the wing cavity directly outboard of the wheel well. The purpose of this model was to verify whether or not it was possible for the flow to come into the wing cavity normal to the leading edge spar. The results from this 2-D model showed that the internal structure behind the RCC panels probably deflected the flow entering the RCC cavity so that it impinged normal to the spar. As in the 3-D model, this deflected flow stream was found to impinge on the wheel well outer wall. This model again supported the conclusions regarding the location of the spar breach and how the flow behaved inside the wing cavity.

Paul, Thomas H.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Understanding Columbia's Reentry Problems

Soon after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident occurred last year, a group of CFD analysts from NASA centers and private industry was organized to help determine the cause of the accident. This group was under the direction of the Applied Aeroscience and CFD Branch of the Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics Division at the Johnson Space Center. For external flow simulations, noncommercia2 CFD codes that specialize in hypersonic or high Mach number flows were used. These tools were used to determine heating rates, pressures, and temperatures for a large number of vehicle damage scenarios. Lockheed Martin Space Operations was called upon to provide CFD support in the area of internal flows within the shuttle wing cavity, and for these simulations, FLUENT 6.1 was chosen. Two large-scale, simplified models were m to understand the flow patterns once a breach of the internal wing cavity was initiated. The results were primarily used to visualize flow patterns within the wing cavity. The first CFD model included the entire lee wing without the wheel well cavity. The purpose of the first model, which did not include the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) cavity along the wing leading edge, was to visualize the flow field within the wing cavity immediately after the leading edge spar breach, This model assumed that the flow coming into the wing cavity was normal to the spar. It included all of the primary vents that allow for flow between the main cavities of the wing. A six-inch diameter hole was modeled in the spar at the approximate location where the spar breach was judged to have occurred, which was between RCC panels 8 and 9. The results of the modeling showed that at this location, the high temperature, high velocity gas stream entering the wing cavity impinged on the outboard wheel well cavity. Instrumentation in the Shuttle wheel well cavity registered abnormal temperatures during reentry, so the FLUENT results helped support the conclusion of the accident investigation team that the spar breach was in the RCC panel 8-9 area, and that the initial spar breach was likely entering the wing cavity normal to the spar. This model also showed that the flow entering the wing cavity tended to swirl within the cavity just outboard of the wheel well, and did not initially penetrate further into the rear cavities of the wing. The second CFD model was a 2-D simulation of the left wing cavity and the RCC cavity. It was used to visualize the flow through the RCC breach, through the wing spar breach, and into the wing cavity directly outboard of the wheel well. The purpose of this model was to verify whether or not it was possible for the flow to come into the wing cavity normal to the leading edge spar. The results from this 2-D model showed that the internal structure behind the RCC panels probably deflected the flow entering the RCC cavity so that it impinged normal to the spar. As in the 3-D model, this deflected flow stream was Found to impinge on the wheel well outer wall. This model again supported the conclusions regarding the location of the spar breach and how the flow behaved inside the wing cavity.

Paul, Thomas↗
NASA NTRS1979

Planning Space Shuttle's maiden voyage

NASA's first Space Shuttle, Columbia, whose technological advances include a space laboratory, navigational and communication satellites, and planetary explorers, is examined, and the first few flights, scheduled for 1980, are described. The Shuttle employs an all-digital, all-electronic, computer-operated avionics system. The onboard data processing and software subsystem, encompassing five computers (four online and one backup), a data-bus network, bus terminals, and software, is analyzed in detail. Attention is given to the basic structure of the Orbiter (37.19 m in length and 23.77 m wingspan), its main engines, and the payload and cargo capacities (29,500 kg). A two-step program that could increase the power and duration of spaceflights is presented. The first step is the creation of a power extension package, using solar arrays, generating electricity to extend the basic five-day flight to 20 days, while the second step uses the same design to create a 25-kW power model capable of providing energy for a 50-day flight. Plans for construction of a manned space construction base and a larger power platform of 250 kW are also presented.

Malkin, M. S.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A History of High-Performance Computing

Faster than most speedy computers. More powerful than its NASA data-processing predecessors. Able to leap large, mission-related computational problems in a single bound. Clearly, it s neither a bird nor a plane, nor does it need to don a red cape, because it s super in its own way. It's Columbia, NASA s newest supercomputer and one of the world s most powerful production/processing units. Named Columbia to honor the STS-107 Space Shuttle Columbia crewmembers, the new supercomputer is making it possible for NASA to achieve breakthroughs in science and engineering, fulfilling the Agency s missions, and, ultimately, the Vision for Space Exploration. Shortly after being built in 2004, Columbia achieved a benchmark rating of 51.9 teraflop/s on 10,240 processors, making it the world s fastest operational computer at the time of completion. Putting this speed into perspective, 20 years ago, the most powerful computer at NASA s Ames Research Center, home of the NASA Advanced Supercomputing Division (NAS), ran at a speed of about 1 gigaflop (one billion calculations per second). The Columbia supercomputer is 50,000 times faster than this computer and offers a tenfold increase in capacity over the prior system housed at Ames. What s more, Columbia is considered the world s largest Linux-based, shared-memory system. The system is offering immeasurable benefits to society and is the zenith of years of NASA/private industry collaboration that has spawned new generations of commercial, high-speed computing systems.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1998

Application of a Modified Gas Chromatograph to Analyze Space Experiment Combustion Gases on Space Shuttle Mission STS-94

A space experiment designed to study the behavior of combustion without the gravitational effects of buoyancy was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Columbia on July 1, 1997. The space experiment, designated as Combustion Module-1 (CM-1), was one of several manifested on the Microgravity Sciences Laboratory - 1 (MSL-1) mission. The launch, designated STS-94, had the Spacelab Module as the payload, in which the MSL-1 experiments were conducted by the Shuttle crewmembers. CM-1 was designed to accommodate two different combustion experiments during MSL-1. One experiment, the Structure of Flame Balls at Low Lewis-number experiment (SOFBALL), required gas chromatography analysis to verify the composition of the known, premixed gases prior to combustion, and to determine the remaining reactant and the products resulting from the combustion process in microgravity. A commercial, off-the-shelf, dual-channel micro gas chromatograph was procured and modified to interface with the CM-1 Fluids Supply Package and the CM-1 Combustion Chamber, to accommodate two different carrier gases, each flowing through its own independent column module, to withstand the launch environment of the Space Shuttle, to accept Spacelab electrical power, and to meet the Spacelab flight requirements for electromagnetic interference (EMI) and offgassing. The GC data was down linked to the Marshall Space Flight Center for near-real time analysis, and stored on-orbit for post-flight analysis. The gas chromatograph operated successfully during the entire SOFBALL experiment and collected 309 runs. Because of the constraints imposed upon the gas chromatograph by the CM-1 hardware, system and operations, it was unable to measure the gases to the required accuracy. Future improvements to the system for a re-flight of the SOFBALL experiment are expected to enable the gas chromatograph to meet all the requirements.

Coho, William K.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Understanding Workforce Agility at NASA Kennedy Space Center

NASA leads the world in space research and provides other government agencies, educational institutions, and companies opportunities to explore, launch, and conduct research in and around space. NASA has 11 formal locations based around the United States, and each has different goals and objectives to help NASA meet its overall mission. 2004, President George Bush announced a new vision for the Space Exploration program. During his grand announcement, he discussed that the Space Shuttles would retire due to the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia accident, where the crew and the space vehicle were lost. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) would no longer manage the day-to-day operations of maintaining the US Space Shuttle fleet. Our NASA teams would continue working to finish the Space Shuttle program's mission to build the International Space Station. Afterward, NASA would transition to develop and test a new spacecraft, the Crew Exploration Vehicle. The third goal was to return to the moon by 2020 as the launching point for missions beyond, to get humans from lower Earth orbit to the moon and Mars. (Secretary, 2004) The KSC engineering workforce had to prepare to transition from Operational support of the Space Shuttle program to the design and development of over 50 subsystems for the future SLS and Orion Launch Systems at the Kennedy Space Center. These subsystems developed at the Kennedy Space Center Engineering Directorate followed a comprehensive design process that required several different product deliverables during various phases for each subsystem. (Schafer et al., 2013) What allowed these systems to be successful? What enabled NASA KSC to complete over 130 Artemis 1 Design Certification and System Acceptance Reviews, closing over 21,656 Requirements to deem the Artemis 1 rocket ready for launch? Little is known about the NASA engineering workforce agility characteristics that enabled the organization to transition from the Space Shuttle program that ended in 2011 and launch the Artemis Program's SLS rocket on November 16, 2022.

Workforce Agility↗
NASA NTRS2004

Application of Non-Deterministic Methods to Assess Modeling Uncertainties for Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Debris Impacts

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) made several recommendations for improving the NASA Space Shuttle Program. An extensive experimental and analytical program has been developed to address two recommendations related to structural impact analysis. The objective of the present work is to demonstrate the application of probabilistic analysis to assess the effect of uncertainties on debris impacts on Space Shuttle Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels. The probabilistic analysis is used to identify the material modeling parameters controlling the uncertainty. A comparison of the finite element results with limited experimental data provided confidence that the simulations were adequately representing the global response of the material. Five input parameters were identified as significantly controlling the response.

Lyle, Karen H.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle Main Engine Debris Testing Methodology and Impact Tolerances

In the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster every effort is being made to determine the susceptibility of Space Shuttle elements to debris impacts. Ice and frost debris is formed around the aft heat shield closure of the orbiter and liquid hydrogen feedlines. This debris has been observed to liberate upon lift-off of the shuttle and presents potentially dangerous conditions to the Space Shuttle Main Engine. This paper describes the testing done to determine the impact tolerance of the Space Shuttle Main Engine nozzle coolant tubes to ice strikes originating from the launch pad or other parts of the shuttle.

Gradl, Paul R.↗
NASA NTRS2002

STS 107 Shuttle Press Kit: Providing 24/7 Space Science Research

Space shuttle mission STS-107, the 28th flight of the space shuttle Columbia and the 113th shuttle mission to date, will give more than 70 international scientists access to both the microgravity environment of space and a set of seven human researchers for 16 uninterrupted days. Columbia's 16-day mission is dedicated to a mixed complement of competitively selected and commercially sponsored research in the space, life and physical sciences. An international crew of seven, including the first Israeli astronaut, will work 24 hours a day in two alternating shifts to carry out experiments in the areas of astronaut health and safety; advanced technology development; and Earth and space sciences. When Columbia is launched from Kennedy Space Center's Launch Pad 39A it will carry a SPACEHAB Research Double Module (RDM) in its payload bay. The RDM is a pressurized environment that is accessible to the crew while in orbit via a tunnel from the shuttle's middeck. Together, the RDM and the middeck will accommodate the majority of the mission's payloads/experiments. STS-107 marks the first flight of the RDM, though SPACEHAB Modules and Cargo Carriers have flown on 17 previous space shuttle missions. Astronaut Rick Husband (Colonel, USAF) will command STS-107 and will be joined on Columbia's flight deck by pilot William 'Willie' McCool (Commander, USN). Columbia will be crewed by Mission Specialist 2 (Flight Engineer) Kalpana Chawla (Ph.D.), Mission Specialist 3 (Payload Commander) Michael Anderson (Lieutenant Colonel, USAF), Mission Specialist 1 David Brown (Captain, USN), Mission Specialist 4 Laurel Clark (Commander, USN) and Payload Specialist 1 Ilan Ramon (Colonel, Israeli Air Force), the first Israeli astronaut. STS-107 marks Husband's second flight into space - he served as pilot during STS-96, a 10-day mission that saw the first shuttle docking with the International Space Station. Husband served as Chief of Safety for the Astronaut Office until his selection to command the STS-107 crew. Anderson and Chawla will also be making their second spaceflights. Anderson first flew on STS-89 in January 1998 (the eighth Shuttle-Mir docking mission) while Chawla flew on STS-87 in November 1997 (the fourth U.S. Microgravity Payload flight). McCool, Brown, Clark and Ramon will be making their first flights into space.

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