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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4

Transient Approximation of SAFE-100 Heat Pipe Operation

Engineers at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have designed several heat pipe cooled reactor concepts, ranging in power from 15 kWt to 800 kWt, for both surface power systems and nuclear electric propulsion systems. The Safe, Affordable Fission Engine (SAFE) is now being developed in a collaborative effort between LANL and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA/MSFC). NASA is responsible for fabrication and testing of non-nuclear, electrically heated modules in the Early Flight Fission Test Facility (EFF-TF) at MSFC. In-core heat pipes must be properly thawed as the reactor power starts. Computational models have been developed to assess the expected operation of a specific heat pipe design during start-up, steady state operation, and shutdown. While computationally intensive codes provide complete, detailed analyses of heat pipe thaw, a relatively simple. concise routine can also be applied to approximate the response of a heat pipe to changes in the evaporator heat transfer rate during start-up and power transients (e.g., modification of reactor power level) with reasonably accurate results. This paper describes a simplified model of heat pipe start-up that extends previous work and compares the results to experimental measurements for a SAFE-100 type heat pipe design.

Bragg-Sitton, Shannon M.↗

Heat Pipe Reactor Dynamic Response Tests: SAFE-100 Reactor Core Prototype

The SAFE-I00a test article at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center was used to simulate a variety of potential reactor transients; the SAFEl00a is a resistively heated, stainless-steel heat-pipe (HP)-reactor core segment, coupled to a gas-flow heat exchanger (HX). For these transients the core power was controlled by a point kinetics model with reactivity feedback based on core average temperature; the neutron generation time and the temperature feedback coefficient are provided as model inputs. This type of non-nuclear test is expected to provide reasonable approximation of reactor transient behavior because reactivity feedback is very simple in a compact fast reactor (simple, negative, and relatively monotonic temperature feedback, caused mostly by thermal expansion) and calculations show there are no significant reactivity effects associated with fluid in the HP (the worth of the entire inventory of Na in the core is .<el, so fluid movement and temperature changes will cause very minor effects). In previous SAFE-100 tests, the point kinetics model was based on core thermal expansion via deflection measurements. It was found that core deflection was a strung function of how the SAFE-100 modules were fabricated and assembled (in terms of straightness, gaps, and other tolerances). To remove the added variable of how this particular core expands as compared to a different concept, it was decided to use a temperature based feedback model (based on several thermocouples placed throughout the core).

Bragg-Sitton, Shannon M.↗

Safe Use of Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems

This is a viewgraph presentation that is a course for teaching the safe use of hydrogen. The objectives of the course are 1. To familiarize the student with H2 safety properties 2. To enable the identification, evaluations and addressing of H2 system hazards 3. To teach: a. Safe practices for, b. Design, c. Materials selection, d. H2 system operation, e. Physical principles and empirical observations on which these safe practices are based, f. How to respond to emergency situations involving H2, g How to visualize safety concepts through in-class exercises, h. Identify numerous parameters important to H2 safety.

Maes, Miguel↗

Reactive, Safe Navigation for Lunar and Planetary Robots

When humans return to the moon, Astronauts will be accompanied by robotic helpers. Enabling robots to safely operate near astronauts on the lunar surface has the potential to significantly improve the efficiency of crew surface operations. Safely operating robots in close proximity to astronauts on the lunar surface requires reactive obstacle avoidance capabilities not available on existing planetary robots. In this paper we present work on safe, reactive navigation using a stereo based high-speed terrain analysis and obstacle avoidance system. Advances in the design of the algorithms allow it to run terrain analysis and obstacle avoidance algorithms at full frame rate (30Hz) on off the shelf hardware. The results of this analysis are fed into a fast, reactive path selection module, enforcing the safety of the chosen actions. The key components of the system are discussed and test results are presented.

Utz, Hans↗

Compliant Task Execution and Learning for Safe Mixed-Initiative Human-Robot Operations

We introduce a novel task execution capability that enhances the ability of in-situ crew members to function independently from Earth by enabling safe and efficient interaction with automated systems. This task execution capability provides the ability to (1) map goal-directed commands from humans into safe, compliant, automated actions, (2) quickly and safely respond to human commands and actions during task execution, and (3) specify complex motions through teaching by demonstration. Our results are applicable to future surface robotic systems, and we have demonstrated these capabilities on JPL's All-Terrain Hex-Limbed Extra-Terrestrial Explorer (ATHLETE) robot.

multi-agent collaboration↗

An Automated Safe-to-Mate (ASTM) Tester

Safe-to-mate testing is a common hardware safety practice where impedance measurements are made on unpowered hardware to verify isolation, continuity, or impedance between pins of an interface connector. A computer-based instrumentation solution has been developed to resolve issues. The ASTM is connected to the circuit under test, and can then quickly, safely, and reliably safe-to-mate the entire connector, or even multiple connectors, at the same time.

Nguyen, Phuc↗

New Developments in FPGA: SEUs and Fail-Safe Strategies from the NASA Goddard Perspective

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

hardware description language (HDL)↗

New Developments in FPGA Devices: SEUs and Fail-Safe Strategies from the NASA Goddard Perspective

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)↗

New Developments in FPGA: SEUs and Fail-Safe Strategies from the NASA Goddard Perspective

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

Error Correction and Detection (EDAC)↗

Unmanned Aerial Systems Traffic Management (UTM): Safely Enabling UAS Operations in Low-Altitude Airspace

Currently, there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS flight operations. Given this, and understanding that the FAA faces a mandate to modernize the present air traffic management system through computer automation and significantly reduce the number of air traffic controllers by FY 2020, the FAA maintains that a comprehensive, yet fully automated UAS traffic management (UTM) system for low-altitude airspace is needed. The concept of UTM is to begin by leveraging concepts from the system of roads, lanes, stop signs, rules and lights that govern vehicles on the ground today. Building on its legacy of work in air traffic management (ATM), NASA is working with industry to develop prototype technologies for a UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system that would evolve airspace integration procedures for enabling safe, efficient low-altitude flight operations that autonomously manage UAS operating in an approved low-altitude airspace environment. UTM is a cloud-based system that will autonomously manage all traffic at low altitudes to include UASs being operated beyond visual line of sight of an operator. UTM would thus enable safe and efficient flight operations by providing fully integrated traffic management services such as airspace design, corridors, dynamic geofencing, severe weather and wind avoidance, congestion management, terrain avoidance, route planning re-routing, separation management, sequencing spacing, and contingency management. UTM removes the need for human operators to continuously monitor aircraft operating in approved areas. NASA envisions concepts for two types of UTM systems. The first would be a small portable system, which could be moved between geographical areas in support of operations such as precision agriculture and public safety. The second would be a Persistent system, which would support low-altitude operations in an approved area by providing continuous automated coverage. Both would require persistent communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) coverage to track, ensure, and monitor conformance. UTM is creating an airspace management tool that allows the ATM system to accommodate the number of UAS that will operate in the low altitude airspace. The analogy is just because we have a car, whether its autonomous or someone is driving, does not diminish the need for a road or road signs or rules of the road.

traffic management↗

Safe, High Power/Voltage Battery Module Design Challenges

NASA seeks to demonstrate a path for achieving safe, high power, and high performing Li-ion battery designs for the purpose of establishing design guidelines for our aeronautic and spacecraft applications. Safe means passively resistant to thermal runaway propagation of any single cell catastrophic thermal runaway. High power means capable of 3C continuous discharge without overheating. High performing means achieving > 160 Wh/kg, 200 Wh/L. The biggest challenge has been balancing a high flux light weight path for cell heat dissipation during the high rate discharge that minimizes thermal gradients between cells and also protects adjacent cells from the heat load of thermal runaway cell. Our solution includes an oscillating heat pipe spine that contacts every 18650 cell in the pack and careful cell design selection to maximize the range of initial temperatures conditions where the battery can safely complete the 3C discharge.

Thermal runaway↗

Define Minimum Safe Operational Volume for Aerial Vehicles in Upper Class E Airspace

This work presents both analytical and simulation studies for defining the minimum safe operational volume needed for aerial vehicles operating in upper Class E airspace. The analytical study is conducted first to investigate factors that affect the minimum safe operational volume, such as position errors, wake/vortex, vehicle maneuverability, communication and surveillance, control/operator response time. A mathematical approach is developed to compute the boundary of the safe operational volume required by the limited aircraft maneuverability and an analytical sensitivity study is then performed with varying parameters. After the analytical study, simulations are then conducted to verify the results from the analytical study. Simulation results will be included in the final paper.

Separation standard, well-clear definition, upper ↗

Mars Sample Receiving Facility Research and Development to Enable Preservation, Safe Containment, and Scientific Research of Martian Samples on Earth

NASA and ESA are working together to plan a joint campaign to potentially bring back the first Martian samples to Earth in the early 2030s. On the surface of Mars, the Mars 2020Perseverance Rover is selecting and packaging samples that could be returned to Earth for careful examination by an international team of scientists. In preparation for this historic sample return, advance planning is underway to design and build a Mars Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in the mid-2020s. In 2022, a Mars Sample Receiving Facility Assessment Study(MSAS) will be conducted to further define construction modality and capability options for a facility in the conterminous United States. Since Mars Sample Return (MSR) is currently categorized as a planetary protection restricted Earth return, this new facility would feature biosafety level 4 (BSL-4)-like high containment to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential hazard. In addition, the facility also requires integration of cleanroom technologies to mitigate against terrestrial contamination and preserve sample integrity for science investigations. The integration of both clean handling and high containment requires significant technology research and development (R&D) by the mid-2020s to support the definition and planning of a SRF before commencing the site specific design phase. The SRF project will need to solidify the inorganic, organic, and biological contamination control (CC) requirements for the facility. This could entail a translation of Mars 2020 mission CC requirements for geologic material to engineering requirements for surfaces and airborne molecular contamination inside isolators and cleanrooms. In tandem, the project will need to determine precision cleaning and sterilization approaches for cleanrooms, isolators, equipment, and tools. Initial material selections for the facility construction materials, cleanrooms, isolators, and BSL-4 suits/garments are an important activity. The recent construction of the OSIRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 curation cleanroom laboratories greatly benefited from early materials testing, before the design phase, to reduced organic outgassing and particulate shedding inside the laboratory. While the early biohazard investigations in the SRF may deem the samples safe to release to laboratories throughout the world, sterilization methods need to be defined to safely release Martian samples. One key aspect of enabling simultaneous sample containment and cleanliness is the concept of a Double-Walled Isolator (DWI) that ESA has been pursuing. Further R&D is needed about DWIs, sample handling, and instrumentation interfaces before beginning the SRF site specific design phase. A working isolator/DWI engineering model should be developed and fabricated. Isolator sizes, connections, pass-through antechambers, and configurations and basic interfaces with instruments and tools as well as the use of robotic, mechanical, and/or human manipulation need to be considered. Inert high purity gas supply (one-pass or recirculation) and other isolator utilities must be determined. Special accommodations for large instruments (e.g., XCT,SEM, etc.) need to be developed. Techniques for opening the sample tubes packaged by M2020and extracting the headspace gas while keeping samples pristine will be challenging, requiring additional R&D, and engagement of the M2020 project. In addition, careful micromanipulation for subdivision and packaging of samples will also need to be included. These combined R&D activities are important before commencing the SRF design phase to ensure safe biohazard containment, sample preservation, and science integrity for the samples that would be studied in the SRF and in laboratories around the world.

mars sample return↗

Lidar-Based Safe Site Relative Navigation

Established Safe and Precise Landing–Integrated Capability Evolution (SPLICE) project precision landing requirements necessitate a navigation filter architecture and underlying models developed specifically with these needs in mind. To date, test flights to characterize SPLICE guidance and navigation (GN) system performance have not provided a means to divert from the a priori selected landing site (LS) due to hazardous conditions. With the inclusion of a new sensor type, the Hazard Detection Lidar (HDL) coupled with safe landing site selection algorithms, GN can divert from the originally planned trajectory and navigate relative to the new targeted landing site. This discussion covers the navigation filter developments necessary to perform this estimation and process the resulting HDL measurements to meet project safe landing goals.

Navigation↗

Hazard Boresight Relative Navigation for Safe Lunar Landing

Hazard Boresight Relative Navigation greatly simplifies Hazard Detection and Avoidance methodologies by providing a common interface between the Hazard DEM, the Safe Site Selection Algorithm, the size of the landing ellipse, the divert distance and the Guidance targeting algorithm. After the Safe Site is selected from the DEM, Hazard Boresight Relative Navigation will replace the original planet target with the boresight target. The location of the safe site relative to the boresight is sent back to GNC for the divert maneuver.

Stephen R. Steffes↗

Mars 2020 Perseverance Edl Gnc Safe Target Selection Reconstruction

On February 18th, 2021, NASA landed Perseverance on the Jezero crater (on Mars) using a new Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN) capability. TRN is com-prised of a new sensor, the Lander Vision System (LVS), and a new GNC algo-rithm, the Safe Target Selection (STS). LVS localized the descent vehicle with respect to a map. STS selected the safe landing target within a reachable region from the on-board Safe Targets Map (STM). The landing target was then handed to the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) heritage powered descent GNC system to execute the landing. This paper describes the design and the as-flown performance of the STS algorithm.

Dutta, Soumyo↗

Design of Solar Sailing Trajectories Resilient to Safe Mode Events

Solar sails are an enabling technology for stand-alone small-satellite deep-space exploration. However, their always-on nature, combined with the time of flight required for deep-space missions, makes them particularly susceptible to safe mode events. Unlike missions using electric propulsion, exclusively solar sail- ing missions cannot carry extra propellant to make up for a safe mode event, and more powerful methods like expected availability cannot be directly applied. This work extends the expected availability and duty cycle approaches to solar sailing. Through an application to NASA’s Solar Cruiser mission, a 46 % increase in tra- jectory resilience is obtained at negligible change in the mission’s time of flight. Additionally, it is shown that when a safe mode event stops the spacecraft from reaching its target orbit, the developed methods reduce the expected final error by approximately an order of magnitude.

Johnson, Les↗

Bayesian Deep Learning for Segmentation for Autonomous Safe Planetary Landing

Hazard detection is critical for enabling autonomous landing on planetary surfaces. Current state-of-the-art methods leverage traditional computer vision approaches to automate the identification of safe terrain from input digital elevation models (DEMs). However, performance for these methods can degrade for input DEMs with increased sensor noise. In the last decade, deep learning techniques have been developed for various applications. Nevertheless, their applicability to safety-critical space missions has often been limited due to concerns regarding their outputs’ reliability. In response to these limitations, this paper proposes an application of the Bayesian deep learning segmentation method for hazard detection. The developed approach enables reliable, safe landing site detection by i) generating simultaneously a safety prediction map and its uncertainty map via Bayesian deep learning and semantic segmentation, and ii) using the uncertainty map to filter out the uncertain pixels in the prediction map so that the safe site identification is performed only based on the certain pixels (i.e., pixels for which the model is certain about its safety prediction). Experiments are presented with simulated data based on a Mars HiRISE digital terrain model by varying uncertainty threshold and noise levels to demonstrate the performance of the proposed approach.

Kento Tomita↗