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71 records · Page 4

Experiments for Securing Air Traffic Against Cyber-Physical System Attacks

This presentation describes experiments conducted with single board computers to investigate methods for creating trust for enabling the development of cyber-resilient air transportation systems. Methods included secure communication to prevent unauthorized access to data, consistency of data obtained via sensors and by processing, and built-in safeguards to prevent mission failure. The motivation for this work are the following. The future air transportation system needs to ensure availability, integrity, confidentiality and safety of operations. Safety of vehicles and operations is paramount for successful integration of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), supersonic aircraft and launch vehicles with conventional aviation operations in the National Airspace System. Security is becoming critical because the sensors, networks and computers are far more vulnerable to bad actors than their mechanical or human predecessors. The goal therefore is to design and develop cyber-resilient systems that continue to function even in degraded states. The main findings are (1) off-the-shelf hardware can support development of cyber-resilient onboard flight computers and (2) trust in system design and implementation can be accomplished by integrating layers in depth (detail) and in breadth (scope).

cyber-resilient autonomy, trust, secure communicat↗

Microbial Anomalies Encountered on the International Space Station

Microorganisms in our living environments are unavoidable. A community of microbes arrived in space with the delivery of the first element of the International Space Station (ISS), attached to hardware and on the bodies of the humans tasked with the initial assembly missions. The risk that microorganisms could cause adverse effects in the health of both the human occupants of the ISS as well as the physical integrity of the station environment and life support systems has been both a driver and a function of engineering and operational controls. Scientists and engineers at NASA have gone to extensive measures to control microbial growth at levels safe for the crewmembers and the spacecraft environment. Many of these measures were initiated with the design of the spacecraft and its systems. Materials used in the ISS were tested for resistance to fungi, such as mold and a paint with a fungus-killing chemical was also used. Controlling the humidity of the air in the Station is also an effective way of discouraging microbe growth. The breathing air is reconditioned by the Environmental Control Life Support System (ECLSS) prior to distribution, utilizing High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration. Requirements restricting the accumulation of water condensate in the air handlers and habitable volume of the ISS were other safeguards added. Water for drinking and food rehydration is disinfected or filtered. A robust in-flight housekeeping regimen for the ISS significantly reduces inappropriate growth of microorganisms and includes a regular cleaning of accessible surfaces with disinfectant wipes. Most of these requirements were suggested by microbiologists to mitigate and possibly prevent many microbiological risks. In addition to these controls, before flight monitoring and analyses of the cabin air, exposed surfaces, water and food, consumables, and crew members are conducted to mitigate microbial risk to the crew and spacecraft. Many microbial risks are much easier to identify and resolve before launch than during space flight. Although the focus has been on prevention of microbiologically related, not all problems can be anticipated. A number of microbial anomalies have occurred on ISS. This paper will discuss the occurrences, root-cause investigations, and mitigation steps taken to remediate the contamination.

Bruce, Rebekah J.↗

Nuclear safety policy working group recommendations on nuclear propulsion safety for the space exploration initiative

An interagency Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program. These recommendations, which are contained in this report, should facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG has recommended a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the SEI nuclear propulsion safety program. In addition, the NSPWG has reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. These recommendations should be useful for the development of the program's top-level requirements for safety functions (referred to as Safety Functional Requirements). The safety requirements and guidelines address the following topics: reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations.

Marshall, Albert C.↗

Trial by Fire

The NASa/ATK Thiokol space shuttle solid rocket motor program has doubled ground test firings and enhanced manufacturing quality and process control to increase safety for Discovery's return to flight. There are a number of places where we've strengthened our engineering and our processes, says Mike Kahn, ATK Thiokol vice president of space launch systems. Protecting the booster against corrosion in the humid Florida environment is one area that has been addressed. Since the loss of Columbia, ATK Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Center have completely reevaluated the shuttle solid rocket motor's design certification and found no major problems, Kahn said. The Thiokol solid motors did not play a role in the 2003 Columbia accident, but the motor's older field joint design (since replaced) was the primary cause of the 1986 Challenger accident that killed seven astronauts. The 129 X 12-ft. ATK Thiokol reusable solid rocket motor forms the core of the shuttle's two solid rocket boosters (SRBs). United Space Alliance (USA) has overall responsibility for the booster's nose-mounted systems such as recovery parachutes and aft-mounted thrust vector control systems that increase the length to 149 ft. USA and its subcontractors have also reaffirmed quality control on systems such as the booster's Hamilton Sundstrand hydraulic power units for critical thrust vector control. And to ensure greater safeguards against booster debris jeopardizing the orbiter, a bolt-catcher system to restrain the large bolts, severed at booster separation, was also redesigned.

Covault, Craig↗

Flight Performance Evaluation of Three GPS Receivers for Sounding Rocket Tracking

In preparation for the European Space Agency Maxus-4 mission, a sounding rocket test flight was carried out at Esrange, near Kiruna, Sweden on February 19, 2001 to validate existing ground facilities and range safety installations. Due to the absence of a dedicated scientific payload, the flight offered the opportunity to test multiple GPS receivers and assess their performance for the tracking of sounding rockets. The receivers included an Ashtech G12 HDMA receiver, a BAE (Canadian Marconi) Allstar receiver and a Mitel Orion receiver. All of them provide C/A code tracking on the L1 frequency to determine the user position and make use of Doppler measurements to derive the instantaneous velocity. Among the receivers, the G12 has been optimized for use under highly dynamic conditions and has earlier been flown successfully on NASA sounding rockets. The Allstar is representative of common single frequency receivers for terrestrial applications and received no particular modification, except for the disabling of the common altitude and velocity constraints that would otherwise inhibit its use for space application. The Orion receiver, finally, employs the same Mitel chipset as the Allstar, but has received various firmware modifications by DLR to safeguard it against signal losses and improve its tracking performance. While the two NASA receivers were driven by a common wrap-around antenna, the DLR experiment made use of a switchable antenna system comprising a helical antenna in the tip of the rocket and two blade antennas attached to the body of the vehicle. During the boost a peak acceleration of roughly l7g's was achieved which resulted in a velocity of about 1100 m/s at the end of the burn. At apogee, the rocket reached an altitude of over 80 km. A detailed analysis of the attained flight data is given together with a evaluation of different receiver designs and antenna concepts.

Bull, Barton↗

Morpheus: Advancing Technologies for Human Exploration

NASA's Morpheus Project has developed and tested a prototype planetary lander capable of vertical takeoff and landing. Designed to serve as a vertical testbed (VTB) for advanced spacecraft technologies, the vehicle provides a platform for bringing technologies from the laboratory into an integrated flight system at relatively low cost. This allows individual technologies to mature into capabilities that can be incorporated into human exploration missions. The Morpheus vehicle is propelled by a LOX/Methane engine and sized to carry a payload of 1100 lb to the lunar surface. In addition to VTB vehicles, the Project s major elements include ground support systems and an operations facility. Initial testing will demonstrate technologies used to perform autonomous hazard avoidance and precision landing on a lunar or other planetary surface. The Morpheus vehicle successfully performed a set of integrated vehicle test flights including hot-fire and tethered hover tests, leading up to un-tethered free-flights. The initial phase of this development and testing campaign is being conducted on-site at the Johnson Space Center (JSC), with the first fully integrated vehicle firing its engine less than one year after project initiation. Designed, developed, manufactured and operated in-house by engineers at JSC, the Morpheus Project represents an unprecedented departure from recent NASA programs that traditionally require longer, more expensive development lifecycles and testing at remote, dedicated testing facilities. Morpheus testing includes three major types of integrated tests. A hot-fire (HF) is a static vehicle test of the LOX/Methane propulsion system. Tether tests (TT) have the vehicle suspended above the ground using a crane, which allows testing of the propulsion and integrated Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) in hovering flight without the risk of a vehicle departure or crash. Morpheus free-flights (FF) test the complete Morpheus system without the additional safeguards provided during tether. A variety of free-flight trajectories are planned to incrementally build up to a fully functional Morpheus lander capable of flying planetary landing trajectories. In FY12, these tests will culminate with autonomous flights simulating a 1 km lunar approach trajectory, hazard avoidance maneuvers and precision landing in a prepared hazard field at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). This paper describes Morpheus integrated testing campaign, infrastructure, and facilities, and the payloads being incorporated on the vehicle. The Project s fast pace, rapid prototyping, frequent testing, and lessons learned depart from traditional engineering development at JSC. The Morpheus team employs lean, agile development with a guiding belief that technologies offer promise, but capabilities offer solutions, achievable without astronomical costs and timelines.

Olansen, Jon B.↗

Electrical safety requirements: Implications for the module designer

Commercial photovoltaic array installations, which include residential and intermediate applications, are subject to building and electrical codes and to product safety standards. The National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 690, titled Solar Photovoltaic Systems, contains provisions defining acceptable levels of system safety and emphasizes the system design and its installation. The Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), document titled: Proposed First Edition of the Standard for Flat Plate Photovoltaic Modules and Panels, UL-1703, identifies module and panel construction requirements that ensure product safety. Together these documents describe requirements intended to minimize hazards such as shock and fire. Although initial focus of these requirements is on single crystal silicon modules, they are generic in nature, and are equally applicable to high voltage ( 30 Vdc), multikilowatt, thin film systems. A major safety concern is insulation breakdown within the module or array wiring system, or discontinuities within the electrical conductors. These failures can result in ground faults, in circuit arcs, or exposure to hazardous electrical parts. Safeguards are discussed.

Sugimura, R. S.↗

Flight Performance Evaluation of Three GPS Receivers for Sounding Rocket Tracking

In preparation for the European Space Agency Maxus-4 mission, a sounding rocket test flight was carried out at Esrange,, near Kiruna, Sweden on February 19, 2001 to validate existing ground facilities and range safety installations. Due to the absence of a dedicated scientific payload, the flight offered the opportunity to test multiple GPS receivers and assess their performance for the tracking of sounding rockets. The receivers included an Ashtech G12 HDMA receiver, a BAE (Canadian Marconi) Allstar receiver and a Mitel Orion receiver. All of them provide CIA code tracking on the L1 frequency to determine the user position and make use of Doppler measurements to derive the instantaneous velocity. Among the receivers, the G12 has been optimized for use under highly dynamic conditions and has earlier been flown successfully on NASA sounding rockets [Bull, ION-GPS-2000]. The Allstar is representative of common single frequency receivers for terrestrial applications and received no particular modification, except for the disabling of the common altitude and velocity constraints that would otherwise inhibit its use for space application. The Orion receiver, finally, employs the same Mitel chipset as the Allstar, but has received various firmware modifications by DLR to safeguard it against signal losses and improve its tracking performance [Montenbruck et al., ION-GPS-2000]. While the two NASA receivers were driven by a common wrap-around antenna, the DLR experiment made use of a switchable antenna system comprising a helical antenna in the tip of the rocket and two blade antennas attached to the body of the vehicle. During the boost a peak acceleration of roughly 17g's was achieved which resulted in a velocity of about 1100 m/s at the end of the burn. At apogee, the rocket reached a maximum altitude of over 80 km. A detailed analysis of the attained flight data will be given in the paper together with a evaluation of different receiver designs and antenna concepts.

Bull, Barton↗

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in urban air mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex infrastructures has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens’ safety and the efficiency of transportation networks. In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on implementing a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) tailored explicitly to urban mobility environments’ unique demands. This study explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the urban mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organization’s overall cybersecurity posture. In conclusion, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in urban mobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

Project Ares 3

The mission of Project Ares is to design and fabricate an Earth prototype, autonomous flying rover capable of flying on the Martian surface. The project was awarded to California State University, Northridge (CSUN) in 1989 where an in-depth paper study was completed. The second year's group, Project Ares 2, designed and fabricated a full-scale flight demonstration aircraft. Project Ares 3, the third and final group, is responsible for propulsion system design and installation, controls and instrumentation, and high altitude testing. The propulsion system consists of a motor and its power supply, geartrain, and propeller. The motor is a four-brush DC motor powered by a 50-V NiCd battery supply. A pulley and belt arrangement is used for the geartrain and includes light weight, low temperature materials. The propeller is constructed from composite materials which ensures high strength and light weight, and is specifically developed to provide thrust at extremely high altitudes. The aircraft is controlled with a ground-based radio control system and an autopilot which will activate in the event that the control signal is lost. A transponder is used to maintain radar contact for ground tracking purposes. The aircraft possesses a small, onboard computer for collecting and storing flight data. To safeguard the possibility of computer failure, all flight data is transmitted to a ground station via a telemetry system. An initial, unpowered, low-level test flight was completed in August of 1991. Testing of systems integration in the second low-level test flight resulted in loss of elevator control which caused considerable damage on landing. Complete failure analysis and repairs are scheduled for September of 1992.

Raymer, Dan↗

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in Urban Air Mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex components has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens safety and the efficiency of transportation networks.In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on the need for cyber resilient techniques within future air traffic environments. It will pay specific attention to the implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) utilizing Atomic OSSEC software, tailored specifically to a NASA simulation of an UrbanAirMobility environments’ unique demands. Further, this study seeks to outline the rational for NASA’s recommendation for a HIDS in such environments. It explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the Urban Air Mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organizations overall cybersecurity posture. Finally, this study aims to provide recommendations and include learned takeaways that the Urban Air Mobility industry should consider. In brief, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in UrbanAirMobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

Idaho & Oregon Agriculture: Monitoring Vegetation Impacts of Livestock Management Practices Used to Reduce Predator Conflicts on Idaho and Oregon Grazing Allotments

The practice of night penning, which involves corralling livestock into a fenced, secure area overnight, aims to safeguard animals from predators. Although this method has proven successful in minimizing interactions between livestock and wildlife, the extent of its impact on vegetation communities is still being explored. This project examines the feasibility of using Net Primary Productivity (NPP) values from the Rangeland Analysis Platform (RAP) to quantify the impacts of night penning on rangeland vegetation communities. RAP provides spatially distributed values of vegetation composition, cover, and productivity, and is derived from imagery from Landsat 5, Landsat 7 & Landsat 8 at a 30m resolution for rangelands across the United States. Our DEVELOP team partnered with Alderspring Ranch, Krebs Livestock, and the U.S Department of Agriculture Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to analyze the impacts of night penning on vegetation communities. We identified control sites that captured the topographic characteristics of night pen sites used by our partners. We then quantified and compared changes in annual NPP between night pen and control sites. Our analysis of RAP NPP data, using a control-treatment design did not find impacts of night penning on vegetation. However, this was a preliminary analysis, and does not conclusively quantify the impacts of night penning on rangeland vegetation. Our analysis indicated that RAP may be a feasible tool to study livestock management impacts on rangeland vegetation; however, future studies could further validate these findings through ground observations.

Rangeland Analysis Platform (RAP)↗

Verification of fault-tolerant clock synchronization systems

A critical function in a fault-tolerant computer architecture is the synchronization of the redundant computing elements. The synchronization algorithm must include safeguards to ensure that failed components do not corrupt the behavior of good clocks. Reasoning about fault-tolerant clock synchronization is difficult because of the possibility of subtle interactions involving failed components. Therefore, mechanical proof systems are used to ensure that the verification of the synchronization system is correct. In 1987, Schneider presented a general proof of correctness for several fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithms. Subsequently, Shankar verified Schneider's proof by using the mechanical proof system EHDM. This proof ensures that any system satisfying its underlying assumptions will provide Byzantine fault-tolerant clock synchronization. The utility of Shankar's mechanization of Schneider's theory for the verification of clock synchronization systems is explored. Some limitations of Shankar's mechanically verified theory were encountered. With minor modifications to the theory, a mechanically checked proof is provided that removes these limitations. The revised theory also allows for proven recovery from transient faults. Use of the revised theory is illustrated with the verification of an abstract design of a clock synchronization system.

Miner, Paul S.↗

A rose by any other name: Certification seen as process rather than content

Green (1990) believes that the two main factors safeguarding flying from human error are both related to certification and regulation. First is the increasingly proceduralized nature of flying whereby as much as possible is reduced to a rule-based activity. Second is the emphasis placed upon training and competency checking of aircrew in simulators and in the air, both generally and for all particular types of aircraft flown. This leaves, believes Green, other human factors that are relatively unaddressed as yet and which can give rise to human reliability problems. These include: hardware factors and especially pilot/co-pilot relationships; and system factors including fatigue and cost/safety trade-offs. He also, importantly, identifies problems with the integration of the 'electronic crew member' following increased automation. Human reliability failures with artificial intelligence and automation, due to over-reliance on the system fail-safe mechanisms, or to operator under- confidence in the integrity or self-regulating capacity of the system, or to out-of-loop effects, are widely accepted as being due to deficiencies in plant design, planning, management and maintenance more than to 'operator error' - Reason's (1990) latent error or organization pathogens argument. Reliability failures in complex systems are well enough documented to give cause for concern and at least promote a debate on the merits of a full certification program. The purpose of this short paper is to seek out and explore what is valuable in certification, at the least to show that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages and at best to identify positive outcomes perhaps not obtainable in other ways. On both sides of the debate on certification there is general agreement on the need for a better human factors perspective and effort in complex aviation systems design. What is at issue is how this is to be promoted. It is incumbent upon opponents of certification to say how else such promotion be enabled. This is an exploratory and philosophical review, not a focused and specific one, and it will draw upon much that is not firmly in the domain of complex aviation systems.

Wilson, John R.↗

LLMs and GenAI Tools to Depict Contributions of Human Systems to Spaceflight Tasks Execution

Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) technologies, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) capable of sophisticated syntax analysis, offer substantial potential in automating complex processes, thereby saving time and human resources. This study explores the development of an LLM-driven model designed to analyze and categorize a diverse set of Mars mission tasks into 18 predefined Human System Task Categories (HSTCs) based on their textual descriptions. As part of developing the Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA projects Performance Risk Model (PRisM) proof-of-concept, we established a framework to project performance scores from small-scale tests onto a preliminary list of Mars tasks. The foundation of our model was a comprehensive spreadsheet populated by NASA experts and clinicians, which detailed each Mars task alongside binary indicators of HSTC involvement. This dataset enabled the initial application of supervised ML, training and testing on existing HSTC labels. The HSTCs were originally defined from a medical system perspective, focusing on task impairments due to deteriorated human health. To expand our model's scope to include categories impacting performance, we face the challenge of generating binary labels (0 or 1) for new categories without pre-existing data. We address this by employing Generative AI (GenAI) software to determine whether a given task involved a new category by asking, "Does task A involve using category B?" We validate our approach by comparing the GenAI's binary classifications with the expert-provided labels for existing HSTCs. Notably, we utilize Ollama [4], a locally hosted GenAI tool that does not require cloud access, thus safeguarding NASA's proprietary data from unauthorized exposure. This study demonstrates the feasibility of leveraging cutting-edge AI tools to advance research, paving the way for automation and rapid decision-making in space exploration.

Mona Matar↗

Managing Fire Risk During Drought: The Influence of Certification and El Nino on Fire-Driven Forest Conversion for Oil Palm in Southeast Asia

Indonesia and Malaysia have emerged as leading producers of palm oil in the past several decades, expanding production through the conversion of tropical forests to industrial plantations. Efforts to produce "sustainable" palm oil, including certification by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), include guidelines designed to reduce the environmental impact of palm oil production. Fire-driven deforestation is prohibited by law in both countries and a stipulation of RSPO certification, yet the degree of environmental compliance isunclear, especially during El Niño events when drought conditions increase fire risk. Here, we used time series of satellite data to estimate the spatial and temporal patterns of fire-driven deforestation on and around oil palm plantations. In Indonesia, fire-driven deforestation accounted for one-quarter of total forest losses on both certified and noncertified plantations. After the first plantations in Indonesia received RSPO certification in 2009,forest loss and fire-driven deforestation declined on certified plantations but did not stop altogether. Oil palm expansion in Malaysia rarely involved fire; only 5 % of forest loss on certified plantations had coincident activefire detections. Interannual variability in fire detections was strongly influenced by El Nino and the timing of certification. Fire activity during the 2002, 2004, and 2006 El Nino events was similar among oil palm plantations in Indonesia that would later become certified, noncertified plantations, and surrounding areas. However, total fire activity was 75% and 66% lower on certified plantations than noncertified plantations during the 2009 and 2015 El Nino events, respectively. The decline in fire activity on certified plantations, including during drought periods, highlights the potential for RSPO certification to safeguard carbon stocks in peatlands and remaining forests in accordance with legislation banning fires. However, aligning certification standards with satellite monitoring capabilities will be critical to realize sustainable palm oil production and meet industry commitments to zero forestation.

Noojipady, Praveen↗

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2

Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.

Rummel, John D.↗