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NASA NTRS1993

WTEC monograph on instrumentation, control and safety systems of Canadian nuclear facilities

This report updates a 1989-90 survey of advanced instrumentation and controls (I&C) technologies and associated human factors issues in the U.S. and Canadian nuclear industries carried out by a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Carter and Uhrig 1990). The authors found that the most advanced I&C systems are in the Canadian CANDU plants, where the newest plant (Darlington) has digital systems in almost 100 percent of its control systems and in over 70 percent of its plant protection system. Increased emphasis on human factors and cognitive science in modern control rooms has resulted in a reduced workload for the operators and the elimination of many human errors. Automation implemented through digital instrumentation and control is effectively changing the role of the operator to that of a systems manager. The hypothesis that properly introducing digital systems increases safety is supported by the Canadian experience. The performance of these digital systems has been achieved using appropriate quality assurance programs for both hardware and software development. Recent regulatory authority review of the development of safety-critical software has resulted in the creation of isolated software modules with well defined interfaces and more formal structure in the software generation. The ability of digital systems to detect impending failures and initiate a fail-safe action is a significant safety issue that should be of special interest to nuclear utilities and regulatory authorities around the world.

Uhrig, Robert E.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Fault Tree Analysis Application for Safety and Reliability

Many commercial software tools exist for fault tree analysis (FTA), an accepted method for mitigating risk in systems. The method embedded in the tools identifies a root as use in system components, but when software is identified as a root cause, it does not build trees into the software component. No commercial software tools have been built specifically for development and analysis of software fault trees. Research indicates that the methods of FTA could be applied to software, but the method is not practical without automated tool support. With appropriate automated tool support, software fault tree analysis (SFTA) may be a practical technique for identifying the underlying cause of software faults that may lead to critical system failures. We strive to demonstrate that existing commercial tools for FTA can be adapted for use with SFTA, and that applied to a safety-critical system, SFTA can be used to identify serious potential problems long before integrator and system testing.

Wallace, Dolores R.↗

NASA NTRS2005

The Integrated Safety-Critical Advanced Avionics Communication and Control (ISAACC) System Concept: Infrastructure for ISHM

Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) architectures for spacecraft will include hard real-time, critical subsystems and soft real-time monitoring subsystems. Interaction between these subsystems will be necessary and an architecture supporting multiple criticality levels will be required. Demonstration hardware for the Integrated Safety-Critical Advanced Avionics Communication & Control (ISAACC) system has been developed at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. It is a modular system using a commercially available time-triggered protocol, ?Tp/C, that supports hard real-time distributed control systems independent of the data transmission medium. The protocol is implemented in hardware and provides guaranteed low-latency messaging with inherent fault-tolerance and fault-containment. Interoperability between modules and systems of modules using the TTP/C is guaranteed through definition of messages and the precise message schedule implemented by the master-less Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) communications protocol. "Plug-and-play" capability for sensors and actuators provides automatically configurable modules supporting sensor recalibration and control algorithm re-tuning without software modification. Modular components of controlled physical system(s) critical to control algorithm tuning, such as pumps or valve components in an engine, can be replaced or upgraded as "plug and play" components without modification to the ISAACC module hardware or software. ISAACC modules can communicate with other vehicle subsystems through time-triggered protocols or other communications protocols implemented over Ethernet, MIL-STD- 1553 and RS-485/422. Other communication bus physical layers and protocols can be included as required. In this way, the ISAACC modules can be part of a system-of-systems in a vehicle with multi-tier subsystems of varying criticality. The goal of the ISAACC architecture development is control and monitoring of safety critical systems of a manned spacecraft. These systems include spacecraft navigation and attitude control, propulsion, automated docking, vehicle health management and life support. ISAACC can integrate local critical subsystem health management with subsystems performing long term health monitoring. The ISAACC system and its relationship to ISHM will be presented.

Gwaltney, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Model-Based Safety Analysis

System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from several sources and embedding this information in the safety artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and safety engineers share a common system model created using a model-based development process. By extending the system model with a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making this approach practical.

Joshi, Anjali↗

NASA NTRS2009

Deriving Safety Cases from Automatically Constructed Proofs

Formal proofs provide detailed justification for the validity of claims and are widely used in formal software development methods. However, they are often complex and difficult to understand, because the formalism in which they are constructed and encoded is usually machine-oriented, and they may also be based on assumptions that are not justified. This causes concerns about the trustworthiness of using formal proofs as arguments in safety-critical applications. Here, we present an approach to develop safety cases that correspond to formal proofs found by automated theorem provers and reveal the underlying argumentation structure and top-level assumptions. We concentrate on natural deduction style proofs, which are closer to human reasoning than resolution proofs, and show how to construct the safety cases by covering the natural deduction proof tree with corresponding safety case fragments. We also abstract away logical book-keeping steps, which reduces the size of the constructed safety cases. We show how the approach can be applied to the proofs found by the Muscadet prover.

Basir, Nurlida↗

NASA NTRS2009

Deriving Safety Cases from Machine-Generated Proofs

Proofs provide detailed justification for the validity of claims and are widely used in formal software development methods. However, they are often complex and difficult to understand, because they use machine-oriented formalisms; they may also be based on assumptions that are not justified. This causes concerns about the trustworthiness of using formal proofs as arguments in safety-critical applications. Here, we present an approach to develop safety cases that correspond to formal proofs found by automated theorem provers and reveal the underlying argumentation structure and top-level assumptions. We concentrate on natural deduction proofs and show how to construct the safety cases by covering the proof tree with corresponding safety case fragments.

Basir, Nurlida↗

NASA NTRS2014

Querying Safety Cases

Querying a safety case to show how the various stakeholders' concerns about system safety are addressed has been put forth as one of the benefits of argument-based assurance (in a recent study by the Health Foundation, UK, which reviewed the use of safety cases in safety-critical industries). However, neither the literature nor current practice offer much guidance on querying mechanisms appropriate for, or available within, a safety case paradigm. This paper presents a preliminary approach that uses a formal basis for querying safety cases, specifically Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) argument structures. Our approach semantically enriches GSN arguments with domain-specific metadata that the query language leverages, along with its inherent structure, to produce views. We have implemented the approach in our toolset AdvoCATE, and illustrate it by application to a fragment of the safety argument for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) being developed at NASA Ames. We also discuss the potential practical utility of our query mechanism within the context of the existing framework for UAS safety assurance.

Safety Case↗

NASA NTRS2009

Deriving Safety Cases from Machine-Generated Proofs

Basir, Nurlida↗

NASA NTRS2015

Formal Foundations for Hierarchical Safety Cases

Safety cases are increasingly being required in many safety-critical domains to assure, using structured argumentation and evidence, that a system is acceptably safe. However, comprehensive system-wide safety arguments present appreciable challenges to develop, understand, evaluate, and manage, partly due to the volume of information that they aggregate, such as the results of hazard analysis, requirements analysis, testing, formal verification, and other engineering activities. Previously, we have proposed hierarchical safety cases, hicases, to aid the comprehension of safety case argument structures. In this paper, we build on a formal notion of safety case to formalise the use of hierarchy as a structuring technique, and show that hicases satisfy several desirable properties. Our aim is to provide a formal, theoretical foundation for safety cases. In particular, we believe that tools for high assurance systems should be granted similar assurance to the systems to which they are applied. To this end, we formally specify and prove the correctness of key operations for constructing and managing hicases, which gives the specification for implementing hicases in AdvoCATE, our toolset for safety case automation. We motivate and explain the theory with the help of a simple running example, extracted from a real safety case and developed using AdvoCATE.

Hierarchy↗

NASA NTRS2017

Command and Control Software Development Memory Management

This internship was initially meant to cover the implementation of unit test automation for a NASA ground control project. As is often the case with large development projects, the scope and breadth of the internship changed. Instead, the internship focused on finding and correcting memory leaks and errors as reported by a COTS software product meant to track such issues. Memory leaks come in many different flavors and some of them are more benign than others. On the extreme end a program might be dynamically allocating memory and not correctly deallocating it when it is no longer in use. This is called a direct memory leak and in the worst case can use all the available memory and crash the program. If the leaks are small they may simply slow the program down which, in a safety critical system (a system for which a failure or design error can cause a risk to human life), is still unacceptable. The ground control system is managed in smaller sub-teams, referred to as CSCIs. The CSCI that this internship focused on is responsible for monitoring the health and status of the system. This team's software had several methods/modules that were leaking significant amounts of memory. Since most of the code in this system is safety-critical, correcting memory leaks is a necessity.

Programmin↗

NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗

NASA NTRS2022

NASA System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop Report

On March 9-11, 2022, NASA’s System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop engaged the broader wildland firefighting management ecosystem in a safety-oriented discussion via a virtual platform. This enabled a better understanding of how NASA and community expertise can be leveraged in the safe development of current and future firefighting systems and operations. The goals of the workshop were to: (1) identify and prioritize the top safety-oriented risks, gaps in capabilities, and emerging technologies to enhance wildland firefighting for both near-term and far-term concepts, with a specific focus on aviation operations and (2) engage the stakeholder community in defining emergent safety-oriented scope, roles, responsibilities, and procedures for agents undergoing increasingly complex wildland firefighting operations in information-rich, but uncertain environments. Workshop participants were solicited from wildland firefighting stakeholders across government, industry, and academia. All levels of government were engaged, as NASA sought attendees from federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies. Industry participants from traditional wildland firefighting domains such as data visualization and equipment manufacturers were invited, and corporate attendees from novel application domains such as aerial robotics and autonomous systems were present as well. The top three findings were as follows: (1) Enhancing situation awareness is a safety priority, especially in the use of aerial assets; (2) Timely access to information along with data fusion and integrated displays will enhance safety-critical decision-making both inside and outside aviation contexts; and (3) Tailorable standards and common operating pictures in the field will enhance inter-agency cooperation in the wildland firefighting lifecycle and enable the optimal use of limited resources such as aerial assets. The workshop helped inform NASA of the relevant safety-related wildland firefighting concerns and aided the broader ecosystem in understanding the potential safety-oriented role NASA might play in this community. Increased engagement with crucial governmental stakeholders (e.g., U.S. Forest Service, CAL FIRE, etc.) along with industry partners in cutting- edge information -centric domains is a fundamental next step. Additionally, the workshop findings will help define the first of a series of operationally challenging demonstrations, held in concert with strategic ecosystem partners, known as the Safety Demonstrator Series for NASA’s System-Wide Safety project. The first demonstration is set in the wildland firefighting application domain and will: (1) examine high risk operational scenarios to reduce their overall risk via services, functions or capabilities that act as risk mitigators (or transfer that risk to automated systems better able to tolerate it) and (2) explore novel tools and technologies that will enhance safety margins by enabling non-traditional or neoteric operational paradigms.

wildland firefighting↗

NASA NTRS2023

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-01: Including Key Design Features in Safety-Critical Pyrotechnic Firing Circuits

Pyrotechnic systems often fall into a unique category in that inadvertent activation of these systems resulting from a fault and/or lack of safe margins can lead directly to loss of crew. For example, untimely activation of pyrotechnics used for a flight termination system could override an abort capability. Over the years, NASA and the military have learned lessons about safe pyrotechnic circuit design and test, many of which are codified. However, with NASA’s recent efforts to move toward a development model than leans more heavily on Commercial Partners these requirements have not always been directly levied on projects and in some cases been misinterpreted. This bulletin describes key safety features of pyrotechnic firing circuit design and provides rationale for inclusion of each feature.

Pyrotechnic Firing Curcuits↗