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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Update on the United States Advanced Ultra-Supercritical Program with Full Scale Component Fabrication to Develop Utility Scale Power Plants with 760°C Steam Temperature

Following the successful completion of a 15-year effort to develop and test materials that would allow coal-fired power plants to be operated at advanced ultra-supercritical (A-USC) steam conditions, a United States-based consortium is presently engaged in Phase 2 of a project which includes an advanced manufacturing effort to complete US-based supply chain development for full commercial scale (800-850 MWe) A-USC components made of nickel-based alloys, components operating at up to 760°C. The project, funded under U.S. Department of Energy Award No. DE-FE0025064, falls under the US DOE overall goal to Develop cost-effective, reliable technologies to improve the efficiency of new and existing coal-fired power plants. A-USC steam cycles have the potential to improve cycle efficiency, reduce fuel costs, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Current development and demonstration efforts are focused on enabling the construction of A-USC plants, operating with steam temperatures as high as 1400°F (760°C) and steam pressures up to 5000 psi (35 MPa), which can potentially increase cycle efficiencies to 47% HHV (higher heating value), or approximately 50% LHV (lower heating value), and reduce CO 2 emissions by roughly 25%, compared to today’s U.S. fleet. A-USC technology provides a lower-cost method to reduce CO 2 emissions, compared to CO 2 capture technologies, while retaining a viable coal option for owners of coal generation assets. Among the specific goals of Phase 2 of the ComTest Project are to: validate that components made from advanced nickel-based alloys can operate and perform under A-USC conditions accelerate the development of a U.S.-based supply chain for the full complement of A-USC components close the remaining gaps and reduce the risks for manufacturing components from advanced materials for commercial demonstration fabricate full-scale versions of selected key components made of nickel-based alloys validate a qualified U.S. supply chain, to provide greater cost certainty for components obtain American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code approval for new materials, components and processes Additional benefit: Manufacturing technology will be applicable to other advanced fossil energy high temperature cycles, and can support increased flexibility of existing power plants The ComTest project is managed by Energy Industries of Ohio, and technically directed by the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc., with General Electric designing the A-USC components. As stated earlier, the current phase of the effort is primarily funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, through the National Energy Technology Laboratory. This presentation outlines the motivation for the project, explains the project’s structure and schedule, and provides some of the technical details on the design of the ComTest components.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2023

Potential impacts of Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge on nutrient supply and greenhouse gas emissions of food systems

Seafood plays a critical role in promoting a nutritious and climate-friendly food system but faces challenges from marine contamination that pose food safety risks. Here, to address these challenges, we developed a Marine Pollution-induced Food System Risk Assessment and Response (MP-FSRAR) model to assess the impact of consumer perceptions of marine pollution risk events on nutrient supply and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Applying this model to the proposed Fukushima Nuclear Wastewater Discharge (FNWD) into the Pacific Ocean, we identified the potential variation in nutrient supply and GHG emissions resulting from changes in Chinese consumers' willingness to consume seafood under 12 scenarios. Our analysis revealed nutrient supply gaps in daily protein, minerals, vitamins, and fatty acids, ranging from 1.5 to 2.7 g/person, 2.5–4.5 mg/person, 5.6–10.3 mcg/person, and 0.08–0.14 g/person, respectively. Closing the protein gap in China would require an additional 3.2–15.8 billion kg yr -1 protein-rich foods, including aquatic, livestock, dairy, and pulses. Additional food supply would increase extra GHG emissions by 1–79 billion kg CO 2 e yr -1 , resulting in potential GHG emissions being transmitted to other countries through the trade chain. Furthermore, we found that the livestock-based food substitution pathway had 40 times higher GHG emissions than the plant-based one. Our MP-FSRAR model provides global stakeholders with new perspectives on the potential consequences of consumer perceptions of marine pollution risks and offers valuable insights for developing countermeasures to build a more resilient and low-carbon food system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Bioenergy for climate change mitigation: Scale and sustainability

Many global climate change mitigation pathways presented in IPCC assessment reports rely heavily on the deployment of biomass for bioenergy, often used in conjunction with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). We review the literature on bioenergy, including the modelling of bioenergy in integrated assessment models (IAMs) and bottom-up modelling and non-modelling studies on the implications of bioenergy use. We summarise the limitations of existing modelling studies and what is known about the potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects of bioenergy systems. We find that the implications of bioenergy supply on mitigation and other sustainability criteria are context dependent and influenced by feedstock, management regime, climatic region, scale of deployment and the counterfactual land use and energy system. However, due to limitations of the existing models, and uncertainty over the future context with respect to the many variables that influence availability of biomass and land resources, it is not possible to precisely quantify the sustainability implications for different scales of bioenergy implementation. Given these uncertainties, the dependence on large-scale deployment of bioenergy in mitigation scenarios carries risks. The deployment of bioenergy technologies and the evolution of biomass supply chains at a scale that achieves significant mitigation and carbon sequestration requires integrative policies, coordinated institutions and improved governance mechanisms. As a result, bioenergy, and the use of land to produce biomass, is an essential part of many climate mitigation strategies but there are limits to its use due to trade-offs with sustainability.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2024

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

Mental Models for Managing Grid Cybersecurity Risk - ARC Industry Forum, Cybersecurity and Energy Transition

A proper mental model of the concepts of cyber risk and its components of threat and exploitability and consequence is necessary to allocate limited resources to different security activities, especially when considered alongside reliability and regulatory and economic risks. Understanding the consequence and frequency different risks are realized also helps align the right mitigations to the right risks. Cyber-informed engineering (CIE) is an emerging method to “engineer out” cyber risk across product and system lifecycles, and INL has a portfolio of programs operationalizing CIE’s principles for the energy sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Generating multiple benefits from forests by producing value-added products: Lessons from the Pacific Northwestern US

This paper asks what conditions are needed to counteract a declining forest industry. The mobilization of supply chains for new value-added forest products and services can be supported by programs designed to simultaneously achieve multiple goals related to health, climate, and rural economic development. But several challenges are identified that underscore the need to stack benefits and incentives to achieve muti-sectoral goals. Based on a case study in Washington state, we find opportunities and constraints for sourcing forest products are determined by the local and regional conditions such as availability of working forests and their residues, socioeconomic conditions, workforce availability, transportation options, and perceptions about social license of the new industry. Key recommendations are the need for (1) a consistent demand and resilient supply chain for the new product; (2) a stable, supportive policy and assessment framework; (3) timely, transparent, and trusted monitoring and reporting of benefits and costs; (4) fostering engagement and buy-in from stakeholders; (5) a context-specific evaluation of opportunities and constraints; and (6) agreement on the goals of sustainable forestry. A diversity of products and markets builds a more resilient forest-based economy by mitigating impacts of disruptions in any individual market, adding value to biomass, increasing employment, and reducing forest risks to fire, insects, and disease.

Bioenergy↗
DOE OSTI2022

Integrating Cybersecurity with System Operations and Restoration

This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the discipline of cybersecurity. First, a common mental model for risk - both cybersecurity and all-hazards - is presented, followed by a discussion of high-level management strategies for different kinds of cyber harm facing system operators, based on the consequences and frequencies of the harm. The next section covers the importance of cybersecurity for a system operator organization and explains some general concepts to understand the relationships. Finally the role of system operators in the security of the grid as a larger system of systems is discussed over the framework of a resilience event.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Oakland University Cybersecurity Center (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the outcomes of Award DE-CR0000023, “Oakland University Cybersecurity Center,” a 31-month project funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). The project addressed cybersecurity risks facing small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) transitioning to Industry 4.0. The project integrated customer discovery, applied research, and cybersecurity training development. A total of 51 cybersecurity assessments identified significant gaps in baseline practices, incident response, and workforce capability. Research efforts produced a scalable mitigation framework tailored to SMM environments, and workforce analysis identified persistent talent gaps. Eight cybersecurity training modules were developed and deployed via Oakland University’s Professional and Continuing Education (PACE) platform. All objectives were completed, with 98.93% federal budget utilization and cost share exceeding requirements. The project establishes a scalable model for strengthening cybersecurity resilience and workforce capacity across U.S. manufacturing supply chains.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Mapping Support for Targeted Critical Minerals Exploration and Extraction

The United States’ dependency on imported minerals poses significant risks to economic stability and national security due to potential supply disruptions. Recognizing the strategic importance of critical minerals, the Department of Energy (DOE) emphasizes the need for a secure and resilient supply chain to support emissions reduction, technology development, and capitalization on clean energy opportunities. The DOE’s Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC), in collaboration with the Office of Policy (OP), addresses these vulnerabilities by focusing on upstream domestic critical minerals production, balancing extraction with social and environmental goals, including conservation, environmental justice, and respect for Tribal sovereignty. This report showcases a collaborative effort involving Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to map mineral development potential along with key social and environmental datasets. A geographical information system (GIS)-based web map application was developed as a preliminary tool for environmental analysis, integrating 158 geospatial data layers such as critical habitat, land ownership, economic indicators, and environmental concerns. Data were sourced from agencies like the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and USGS and processed using GIS technology to enhance visualization and analysis. The proposed analysis framework categorizes areas into high, mid, and low concern based on withdrawn lands, special status species, the Economic Development Capacity Index (EDCI) Mining Composite Index, and the Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool (CEJST). While the application provides broad visualizations, it is not a substitute for detailed environmental reviews required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Users must conduct further analyses and engage with tribal entities and other stakeholders for comprehensive planning. A case study of the Idaho Cobalt Belt (ICB) in Lemhi County, Idaho, has been provided in the report to illustrate the tool's practical use. This report introduces a GIS application and framework to support stakeholders in identifying and prioritizing areas for critical mineral exploration, promoting secure supply chains, and advancing the nation's energy independence through responsible resource stewardship.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Survey of Cyber Risk Analysis Techniques for Use in the Nuclear Industry

Using traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods for severe accident safety risk management on non-digital systems, structures, and components at nuclear power plants is well-established. In contrast, cyber risk analysis of digital assets is still an immature field with unproven techniques due, in part, to the continuously changing threat environment and the challenge of digital assets failing in unexpected ways. As the nuclear fleet continues to adopt digital instrumentation and control systems, it is increasingly important to have effective and efficient cyber risk analysis techniques to support risk management decisions, such as risk elimination by system redesign or risk mitigation by implementation of prioritized security controls. To understand the state of the art in cyber risk analysis for future research, we surveyed 36 publications across ten application domains. We describe our survey methodology and rate each technique based upon scope, adoptability, and repeatability. In this work, we examine the unique constraints of the nuclear industry and outline the strengths and weaknesses of using the cyber risk analysis techniques in the industry, highlighting gaps with current techniques. We also discuss challenges and potential research directions for advancing the science for both existing and new advanced reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind

Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for the consideration of cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and how they are interconnected to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a risk assessment process that uses the cyber-resilience framework to address challenges specific to distributed wind.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2021

Integrated Energy Systems Program Management Plan

In 2012, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) initiated the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technology Program, which includes the Crosscutting Technology Development (CTD) portfolio of subprograms, to conduct research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) to support existing, new and advanced reactor designs and fuel cycle technologies. This program plan describes the Integrated Energy Systems (IES) Program, an element of the CTD portfolio since 2016 that seeks to improve the economic competitiveness, efficiency and environmental performance of nuclear energy systems by expanding their potential application space beyond electricity and optimizing their utilization in the context of the larger U.S. electric and non-electric energy system.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Geologic hydrogen: From natural occurrences to anthropogenic generation – A review of fundamentals, potential, challenges and prospects

Growing demand for hydrogen is exposing the environmental and economic limits of reforming-based and carbon-managed supply chains, while the scale-up of electrolytic capacity remains capital-constrained. Geologic hydrogen, defined as molecular H₂ generated and stored within the Earth's crust offers a complementary, potentially lower-cost resource, yet exploration is still ad hoc. This review (1) revisits a global inventory of confirmed hydrogen seeps and subsurface occurrences; (2) analyzes the controlling reactions, migration pathways, and trapping conditions governing these occurrences; (3) proposes a process-based geologic hydrogen system concept analogous to, yet distinct from, the petroleum system; and (4) evaluates potential geologic hydrogen systems within the United States as a representative case study. Here, we contrast natural systems powered by serpentinization, mantle degassing or radiolysis with anthropogenic systems that stimulate the same reactions or convert in-situ hydrocarbons. Stable hydrogen accumulations require generation rates that outpace combined physical, chemical and microbial losses; the Bourakébougou field (Mali) exemplifies a self-recharging, free-gas reservoir sustained by meteoric-water serpentinization beneath an efficient caprock. Prospective geologic hydrogen resources are likely to occur in regions where iron-rich lithologies, deep-seated faults, and low-permeability sealing formations coexist. Applying this principle, we highlight three promising hydrogen play types in U.S. geological terrains: ophiolite belts (Appalachian and Californian regions), the Midcontinent Rift and the Lake Superior banded‑iron formations. Multiphysics numerical models and positive-unlabeled machine-learning workflows help to accelerate play screening and de-risk future production; yet, reaction kinetics, stimulation strategies, and full techno-economic and life-cycle assessments remain pivotal knowledge gaps.

Anthropogenic hydrogen generation↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Certification Recommendations for Interconnected Grid Edge Devices and Inverter Based Resources

Escalating deployment of PV and grid-edge devices on the distribution grid has increased the sustainability and efficiency of the electric grid. However, the increasing number of distributed energy resources (DERs) deployed creates a heightened cyber-physical interdependency on the distribution grid and thus creates more vectors for cyber-attacks to exploit through information and communication technology (ICT) systems and networks. For example, control signal packets can be modified, intercepted, or corrupted due to vulnerabilities in communication protocols used by microgrid controllers and grid edge devices for power control. Therefore, to mitigate and prevent cyber-attacks on grid edge devices and the inverter-based resources connected to the distribution grid, the U.S. Department of Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO) awarded funding to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) to research, develop, and harmonize cybersecurity standards for Photovoltaic (PV) systems and for other kinds of DERs. To help develop a standard for DER cybersecurity, NREL established certification recommendations and test cases, in consensus with the solar industry and UL, for ensuring intrinsic design security for DERs. These recommendations were developed to bolster the cybersecure functionalities such as TLS, MAC, CRL, session resumption/renegotiation, and password, system, and service security management within the DER devices. The proposed test cases verify authentication, authorization, confidentiality, and data integrity for data and communications of DERs that use Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). They were also developed to protect DER communications from eavesdropping, replay, man-in-the-middle, denial of service (DoS), spoofing through security certificates, least-privilege violation, and brute-force credentials. This report, which has been validated and reviewed by UL, expands upon those test cases to provide DER cybersecurity certification recommendations which increase DER resiliency and help to mitigate cyber-attacks. UL's collaboration with NREL and approval of this document will accelerate the adoption of a UL standard for DER cybersecurity.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Model for Lean Corporate/ Startup Interfaces: Unlocking Resources of Midcap Corporations Providing a Pathway to Advanced Energy Technologies

Commercializing energy technologies through traditional market pathways is challenging for early-stage energy innovators. Development cycles in energy are long and expensive, and adoption is difficult, making energy technologies of limited interest to venture capital relative to industries with faster growth and shorter product life cycles such as life sciences and software. As such, partnerships with established corporations are one of the most promising, and in some cases only, go-to-market pathways for energy technologies. Startups often seek to work with, large well-known Fortune 500 (and similar) companies. However, the size and risk aversion of those firms often makes partnering challenging. It can take well over 12 months for a large corporation to agree to commercial terms and get internal board / management approval to move forward with a binding agreement with a startup for even a simple starting partnership. This timeline is prohibitive for most early-stage companies who are both time and money constrained, and often working in highly competitive commodity sectors. Mid-cap corporations ($\$ $100M to $\$ $10B) are a promising but untapped resource for partnering with technology developers because they are often nimbler, tend to be fiercely competitive, and are looking for new revenue or cost-saving opportunities. These factors make them both more receptive to disruptive technologies, and more capable of integrating them. However, while Fortune 500 companies often have venturing groups that facilitate the initial connection process, most midcap incumbents do not have the resources to create standalone corporate venture groups. As a result, although they could help each other significantly (startup technologies make midcaps more competitive; midcaps offer a faster commercialization pathway to startups), midcap companies and startups rarely work together. In 2017, ADL Ventures (ADL) received Award #DE-EE0008111 from DOE EERE’s Innovative Pathways program to unlock the domain expertise and material resources of midcap companies. The goal of the award was to support energy technology commercialization via an innovation platform for startups to interface with midcap corporations. During the grant period, we have developed a novel open innovation platform that allows financially conservative incumbents to efficiently engage with energy innovators and startups, thereby unlocking the incumbents’ domain expertise, strategic capital, R&D facilities, supply chain, and pathways to market. We have executed full-scale open innovation challenges for three clients, exceeding the initial proposed goal of two. We also built a diversified opportunity pipeline which resulted in four projects contracted for 2020, meeting the goals of the proposal, with others pending.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Synthesis Roadmap for Actinide Chloride Salts

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are among the main advanced nuclear reactor types at the forefront of development by industry, with the support of the US government, for the next fleet of nuclear reactors to support the demand for energy in the coming decades. MSRs are highly unique because they are cooled and typically also fueled by molten salt. This quality brings about safety benefits such as low-pressure operation and self-stabilization of the neutron flux, operational benefits such as high-temperature operation and the ability for online refueling, and fuel and waste management benefits thanks to the flexibility of post-processing of molten salts and reprocessing options that involve removal of fission products and actinide separation. In fact, domestic deployment of molten salt (or molten salt–cooled) reactors is an approaching reality: a handful of molten salt reactor developers are planning to operate demonstration-scale reactors, as a step toward commercial-scale power reactors, within the decade. For example, Natura Resources received a construction permit in September 2024 for the deployment of MSR-1, which is a graphite-moderated thermal spectrum reactor, at Abilene Christian University. Also, TerraPower, in a collaborative effort with Southern Company and Idaho National Laboratory (INL), received approval from DOE in 2023 to proceed with the construction of the Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE), a homogeneous chloride fast reactor at INL, and has begun assembly of system components. There are several other examples of developers at different stages of development of their own unique MSR designs (Jenet et al., 2025). As developers are in the process of obtaining approvals for their designs, deploying demonstration-scale reactors, and planning for their commercial-scale power reactors, there is a critical supply chain need for the synthesis of fuel for these reactors that must be addressed. The challenge generally is three-fold: (1) the quantity of fueled salt needed for these reactors is extraordinarily high (>100s of kilograms), but demonstrations of scaled-up techniques for fueled salt synthesis are significantly more limited than demonstrations of lab-scale syntheses; (2) each developer has a unique reactor design, which means different actinide halide elements in different carrier salts must be synthesized; and (3) there is a need for particularly high-purity salt so as to ensure the long-term operability of these reactors with minimal degradation to salt-wetted components, which necessitates synthesis techniques with high levels of quality control, repeatability, and well-characterized precursor and reactant materials. It is crucial that this supply chain challenge be addressed by demonstrating synthesis techniques that are scalable, de-risked, and well-documented so that these technologies may be adopted and utilized by industry to support the fueling needs of MSRs that are to come online within the next 10 years. With this supply chain challenge clearly defined for the developing MSR industry, it is important to consider that addressing such a challenge is oftentimes complex and context-dependent. There is not necessarily a single synthesis technique that can be scaled up and adopted to address the needs of all MSR developers; the synthesis approach that may be viable for producing a desired fuel salt will be entirely dependent on the exact salt composition needed, the quantity needed, purity needed, the refueling and waste plans, and the availability of a carrier salt for the fuel. Therefore, it is important to consider more broadly what synthesis techniques are available and have been demonstrated to understand the benefits, challenges, and general nuances that should be considered when evaluating a particular route for efficient production of high-purity fuel salts at scale.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗