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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4

A Statistical Model for Generating a Population of Unclassified Objects and Radiation Signatures Spanning Nuclear Threats

This report describes an approach for generating a simulated population of plausible nuclear threat radiation signatures spanning a range of variability that could be encountered by radiation detection systems. In this approach, we develop a statistical model for generating random instances of smuggled nuclear material. The model is based on physics principles and bounding cases rather than on intelligence information or actual threat device designs. For this initial stage of work, we focus on random models using fissile material and do not address scenarios using non-fissile materials. The model has several uses. It may be used as a component in a radiation detection system performance simulation to generate threat samples for injection studies. It may also be used to generate a threat population to be used for training classification algorithms. In addition, we intend to use this model to generate an unclassified 'benchmark' threat population that can be openly shared with other organizations, including vendors, for use in radiation detection systems performance studies and algorithm development and evaluation activities. We assume that a quantity of fissile material is being smuggled into the country for final assembly and that shielding may have been placed around the fissile material. In terms of radiation signature, a nuclear weapon is basically a quantity of fissile material surrounded by various layers of shielding. Thus, our model of smuggled material is expected to span the space of potential nuclear weapon signatures as well. For computational efficiency, we use a generic 1-dimensional spherical model consisting of a fissile material core surrounded by various layers of shielding. The shielding layers and their configuration are defined such that the model can represent the potential range of attenuation and scattering that might occur. The materials in each layer and the associated parameters are selected from probability distributions that span the range of possibilities. Once an object is generated, its radiation signature is calculated using a 1-dimensional deterministic transport code. Objects that do not make sense based on physics principles or other constraints are rejected. Thus, the model can be used to generate a population of spectral signatures that spans a large space, including smuggled nuclear material and nuclear weapons.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Threat expert system technology advisor

A prototype expert system was developed to determine the feasibility of using expert system technology to enhance the performance and survivability of helicopter pilots in a combat threat environment while flying NOE (Nap of the Earth) missions. The basis for the concept is the potential of using an Expert System Advisor to reduce the extreme overloading of the pilot who flies NOE mission below treetop level at approximately 40 knots while performing several other functions. The ultimate goal is to develop a Threat Expert System Advisor which provides threat information and advice that are better than even a highly experienced copilot. The results clearly show that the NOE pilot needs all the help in decision aiding and threat situation awareness that he can get. It clearly shows that heuristics are important and that an expert system for combat NOE helicopter missions can be of great help to the pilot in complex threat situations and in making decisions.

Kurrasch, E. R.↗

Forecasting Lightning Threat using Cloud-resolving Model Simulations

As numerical forecasts capable of resolving individual convective clouds become more common, it is of interest to see if quantitative forecasts of lightning flash rate density are possible, based on fields computed by the numerical model. Previous observational research has shown robust relationships between observed lightning flash rates and inferred updraft and large precipitation ice fields in the mixed phase regions of storms, and that these relationships might allow simulated fields to serve as proxies for lightning flash rate density. It is shown in this paper that two simple proxy fields do indeed provide reasonable and cost-effective bases for creating time-evolving maps of predicted lightning flash rate density, judging from a series of diverse simulation case study events in North Alabama for which Lightning Mapping Array data provide ground truth. One method is based on the product of upward velocity and the mixing ratio of precipitating ice hydrometeors, modeled as graupel only, in the mixed phase region of storms at the -15\dgc\ level, while the second method is based on the vertically integrated amounts of ice hydrometeors in each model grid column. Each method can be calibrated by comparing domainwide statistics of the peak values of simulated flash rate proxy fields against domainwide peak total lightning flash rate density data from observations. Tests show that the first method is able to capture much of the temporal variability of the lightning threat, while the second method does a better job of depicting the areal coverage of the threat. A blended solution is designed to retain most of the temporal sensitivity of the first method, while adding the improved spatial coverage of the second. Weather Research and Forecast Model simulations of selected North Alabama cases show that this model can distinguish the general character and intensity of most convective events, and that the proposed methods show promise as a means of generating quantitatively realistic fields of lightning threat. However, because models tend to have more difficulty in correctly predicting the instantaneous placement of storms, forecasts of the detailed location of the lightning threat based on single simulations can be in error. Although these model shortcomings presently limit the precision of lightning threat forecasts from individual runs of current generation models, the techniques proposed herein should continue to be applicable as newer and more accurate physically-based model versions, physical parameterizations, initialization techniques and ensembles of cloud-allowing forecasts become available.

McCaul, E. W., Jr.↗

Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation

The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with compensating mitigation can decrease the risk of an insider performing a malicious act without detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Deep Learning for Unsupervised Insider Threat Detection in Structured Cybersecurity Data Streams

Analysis of an organization’s computer network activity is a key component of early detection and mitigation of insider threat, a growing concern for many organizations. Raw system logs are a prototypical example of streaming data that can quickly scale beyond the cognitive power of a human analyst. As a prospective filter for the human analyst, we present an online unsupervised deep learning approach to detect anomalous network activity from system logs in real time. Our models decompose anomaly scores into the contributions of individual user behavior features for increased interpretability to aid analysts reviewing potential cases of insider threat. Using the CERT Insider Threat Dataset v6.2 and threat detection recall as our performance metric, our novel deep and recurrent neural network models outperform Principal Component Analysis, Support Vector Machine and Isolation Forest based anomaly detection baselines. For our best model, the events labeled as insider threat activity in our dataset had an average anomaly score in the 95.53 percentile, demonstrating our approach’s potential to greatly reduce analyst workloads.

Tuor, Aaron R.↗

Consumer Choice and Dempster-Shafer Models of Threat Prioritization for Emerging Dual-Use Technologies: Their Application to Synthetic Biology

Identification and prioritization of risks to international security associated with emerging dual-use technologies presents numerous challenges. First, it demands prediction of the evolving states-of-the-art in various technological fields and, second, it requires a comprehension of the motivations and prospective selection criteria that illicit users might adopt in choosing among new technologies and their means of deployment. Nevertheless, the identification and prioritization of such threats is critical in establishing the appropriate focal points for proactive, nonproliferation policy-making. This paper addresses the question of how the threats associated with alternative means of deploying an emerging technology might be prioritized. The method revolves around systematic identification of the technological barriers to an illicit user in deploying a new technology. Evaluation of the resources necessary to overcome the barriers - such acquisition of the necessary intellectual capital and laboratory assets - then provides the basis for assessing the relative likelihoods or plausibilities of various deployment scenarios. Two optional bases are outlined for quantification of the model. One is a choice model that has found application in the analysis of consumer behavior, where the illicit user is modeled essentially as a consumer of new technology. The other employs a Dempster-Shafer framework for priority characterization. The paper describes application of the methodology to emerging life science technologies; in particular, to synthetic biology - the means of engineering biological systems. The prospect of a terrorist being able to synthesize natural pathogens or, perhaps worse still, to engineer pathogens not present in nature, creates an unprecedented threat to international security. Use of the proposed methodology to identify and prioritize threats associated with the engineering of pathogens is described.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Ransomware Security Threat Modeling for Photovoltaic Systems

Ransomware attacks are one of the most dangerous cyber-attacks which can disrupt the operation of photovoltaic (PV) systems and incur an enormous economic loss. This paper introduces a ransomware security threat modeling method that identifies potential vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts of ransomware attacks targeting a PV system. Here, the security threat modeling consists of three steps: 1) system identification, 2) threat modeling that finds existing vulnerabilities, 3) attack modeling that designs attack profiles to succeed ransomware attacks, and 4) penetration testing that performs authorized cyber-attacks and analyzes impacts of the ransomware attack profiles using a real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) PV system security testbed.

attack modeling↗

The Threat Among Us: Insiders Intensify Aviation Terrorism

Aviation terrorism is powerful and symbolic, and will likely remain a staple target for terrorists aiming to inflict chaos and cause mass casualties similar to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The majority of international and domestic aviation terrorist attacks involves outsiders, or people who do not have direct access to or affiliation with a target through employment. However, several significant attacks and plots against the industry involved malicious employees motivated by suicide or devotion to a terrorist organization. Malicious insiders’ access and knowledge of aviation security, systems, networks, and infrastructure is valuable to terrorists, providing a different pathway for attacking the industry through the insider threat. Indicators and warnings of insider threats in these cases exist, providing insight into how security agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration, can better predict and identify insider involvement. Understanding previous aviation insider threat events will likely aid in stimulating proactive security measures, rather than reactive responses. However, similar to traditional airport security measures, there are social, political, and economic challenges in protecting against the insider threat, including privacy concerns and cost-benefit analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Insider Threat to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities

After completing this session, you should be able to: Describe the Insider Threat; Characterize the cyber insider threat; Describe preventive measures against the insider threat; Describe protective measures against the insider threat.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Threat Reduction Research Networks: Fostering Sustainable Collaborations Through Trainings for Genomics for Biosurveillance

Scientific research communities can be represented as heterogeneous or multidimensional networks encompassing multiple types of entities and relationships. These networks might include researchers, institutions, meetings, and publications, connected by relationships like authorship, employment, and attendance. We describe a method for efficiently and flexibly capturing, storing, and extracting information from multidimensional scientific networks using a graph database. The database structure is based on an ontology that captures allowable types of entities and relationships. This allows us to construct a variety of projections of the underlying multidimensional graph through database queries to answer specific research questions. We demonstrate this process through a study of the U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), which seeks to develop Threat Reduction Networks to build and strengthen a sustainable international community of biosecurity, biosafety, and biosurveillance experts to address shared biological threat reduction challenges. Networks like these create connectional intelligence among researchers and institutions around the world, and are central to the concept of cooperative threat reduction. Our analysis focuses on a series of seven BTRP genome sequencing training workshops, showing how they created a growing network of participants and countries over time, which is also reflected in coauthorship relationships among attendees. By capturing concept and relationship hierarchies, our ontology-based approach allows us to pose general or specific questions about networks within the same framework. This approach can be applied to other research communities or multidimensional social networks to capture, analyze, and visualize different types of interactions and how they change over time.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Domestic Extremism: How to Counter Threats Posed to Critical Assets

Although facilities with sensitive information, hazardous materials, critical infrastructure, or other sensitive items have security measures in place to protect those critical assets, the threat of domestic extremism (DE) has challenged those security measures in new ways. The project described in this brief report used focus groups to identify best practices, tools, or techniques relevant to preventing or countering DE and sought to identify gaps in security measures. Five focus groups with twenty-two subject matter experts from government, healthcare, and other stakeholder groups were conducted to understand how organizations protect critical assets against the DE threat. The results of the focus groups underscore the importance of organizational culture, codes of conduct, and behavior observation programs in prevention of DE events. In addition, results emphasized the value of multidisciplinary teams, employee assistance programs, and regular threat assessment as resources when responding to DE incidents. However, monitoring of social media and lack of adequate resources remain challenges when attempting to prevent or counter the DE threat.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Environmental and health impacts of fine and ultrafine metallic particles: Assessment of threat scores

This study proposes global threat scores to prioritize the harmfulness of anthropogenic fine and ultrafine metallic particles (FMP) emitted into the atmosphere at the global scale. (Eco)toxicity of physicochemically characterized FMP oxides for metals currently observed in the atmosphere (CdO, CuO, PbO, PbSO{sub 4}, Sb{sub 2}O{sub 3}, and ZnO) was assessed by performing complementary in vitro tests: ecotoxicity, human bioaccessibility, cytotoxicity, and oxidative potential. Using an innovative methodology based on the combination of (eco)toxicity and physicochemical results, the following hazard classification of the particles is proposed: CdCl{sub 2}∼CdO>CuO>PbO>ZnO>PbSO{sub 4}>Sb{sub 2}O{sub 3}. Both cadmium compounds exhibited the highest threat score due to their high cytotoxicity and bioaccessible dose, whatever their solubility and speciation, suggesting that cadmium toxicity is due to its chemical form rather than its physical form. In contrast, the Sb{sub 2}O{sub 3} threat score was the lowest due to particles with low specific area and solubility, with no effects except a slight oxidative stress. As FMP physicochemical properties reveal differences in specific area, crystallization systems, dissolution process, and speciation, various mechanisms may influence their biological impact. Finally, this newly developed and global approach could be widely used in various contexts of pollution by complex metal particles and may improve risk management. - Highlights: • Seven micro- and nano- monometallic characterized particles were studied as references. • Bioaccessibility, eco and cytotoxicity, and oxidative potential assays were performed. • According to calculated threat scores: CdCl{sub 2}∼CdO>CuO>PbO>ZnO>PbSO{sub 4}>Sb{sub 2}O{sub 3}.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Analyzing the threat of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to nuclear facilities

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are among the major growing technologies that have many beneficial applications, yet they can also pose a significant threat. Recently, several incidents occurred with UAVs violating privacy of the public and security of sensitive facilities, including several nuclear power plants in France. The threat of UAVs to the security of nuclear facilities is of great importance and is the focus of this work. This paper presents an overview of UAV technology and classification, as well as its applications and potential threats. We show several examples of recent security incidents involving UAVs in France, USA, and United Arab Emirates. Further, the potential threats to nuclear facilities and measures to prevent them are evaluated. The importance of measures for detection, delay, and response (neutralization) of UAVs at nuclear facilities are discussed. An overview of existing technologies along with their strength and weaknesses are shown. Finally, the results of a gap analysis in existing approaches and technologies is presented in the form of potential technological and procedural areas for research and development. Furthermore based on this analysis, directions for future work in the field can be devised and prioritized.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Matrix Characterization in Threat Material Detection Processes

Matrix characterization in the threat material detection is of utmost importance, it generates the background against which the threat material signal has to be identified. Threat materials (explosive, chemical warfare, ...) are usually contained within small volume inside large volumes of variable matrices. We have studied the influence of matrix materials on the capability of neutron systems to identify hidden threat material. Three specific scenarios are considered in some details: case 1--contraband material in the sea containers, case 2 - explosives in soil (landmines), case 3 - explosives and chemical warfare on the sea bottom. Effects of container cargo material on tagged neutron system are seen in the increase of gamma background and the decrease of neutron beam intensity. Detection of landmines is more complex because of variable soil properties. We have studied in detail space and time variations of soil elemental compositions and in particular hydrogen content (humidity). Of special interest are ammunitions and chemical warfare on the sea bottom, damping sites and leftovers from previous conflicts (WW-I, WW-II and local). In this case sea sediment is background source and its role is similar to the role of the soil in the landmine detection. In addition to geochemical cycling of chemical elements in semi-enclosed sea, like the Adriatic Sea, one has to consider also anthropogenic influence, especially when studying small scale variations in concentration levels. Some preliminary experimental results obtained with tagged neutron sensor inside an underwater vehicle are presented as well as data on sediment characterization by X-Ray Fluorescence.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Anomaly metrics to differentiate threat sources from benign sources in primary vehicle screening.

Discrimination of benign sources from threat sources at Port of Entries (POE) is of a great importance in efficient screening of cargo and vehicles using Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM). Currently RPM's ability to distinguish these radiological sources is seriously hampered by the energy resolution of the deployed RPMs. As naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) are ubiquitous in commerce, false alarms are problematic as they require additional resources in secondary inspection in addition to impacts on commerce. To increase the sensitivity of such detection systems without increasing false alarm rates, alarm metrics need to incorporate the ability to distinguish benign and threat sources. Principal component analysis (PCA) and clustering technique were implemented in the present study. Such techniques were investigated for their potential to lower false alarm rates and/or increase sensitivity to weaker threat sources without loss of specificity. Results of the investigation demonstrated improved sensitivity and specificity in discriminating benign sources from threat sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Advanced Insider Threat Mitigation Workshop Instructional Materials

Insiders represent a formidable threat to nuclear facilities. This set of workshop materials covers methodologies to analyze and approaches to mitigate the threat of an insider attempting abrupt and protracted theft of nuclear materials. This particular set of materials is an update of a January 2008 version to add increased emphasis on Material Control and Accounting and its role with respect to protracted insider nuclear material theft scenarios. This report is a compilation of workshop materials consisting of lectures on technical and administrative measures used in Physical Protection (PP) and Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and methods for analyzing their effectiveness against a postulated insider threat. The postulated threat includes both abrupt and protracted theft scenarios. Presentation is envisioned to be through classroom instruction and discussion. Several practical and group exercises are included for demonstration and application of the analysis approach contained in the lecture/discussion sessions as applied to a hypothetical nuclear facility.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Scalable HPC Insider Threat Monitoring System

Cyber Equations, Inc. is reporting on the results of its DOE SBIR Phase I project for the development of a Scalable HPC Insider Threat Monitoring System. This final report to the Department of Energy for Task DE-FOA-0001618 covers the period from 02/21/2017 to 02/20/2018 and summarizes the larger research accomplishments, which can be divided in theoretical and laboratory experiments. One of the many challenges for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the support of the high-performance computing (HPC) centers while providing quality information services, strategic vision, leadership, technical expertise, and capabilities necessary to enable the DOE to deliver effective, efficient, economical, and secure HPC services. In order to realize a secure DOE laboratory enterprise, DOE facilities operations must counter a wide range of cyber insider threats, from unsophisticated adversaries up to advanced, nation state sponsored actors. The DOE laboratories also presents an enormous insider attack surface of an ever-growing number of computers, networks, and devices all running a myriad of software. In addition, the DOE laboratories are connected to a variety of external organizations which multiplies the possibility of insider threat. During this SBIR project Cyber Equations developed a strategic combination of supervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques to control scale and classify whether entities, such as hosts, actors, or documents, are showing suspicious insider behavior. We conducted experiments using real cyber data to show that changes in observable behavior (e.g., changes in outbound traffic patterns) are indicative of attacks executing (e.g., insiders exfiltrating data, bots calling home, or an attack spreading). The features and methods we use, have been used in the anomaly detection research and development community for a significant amount of time and robust implementations are openly available. K-Means clustering, Decision Trees, and Support Vector Machine based classifiers are readily available through the R language and open source H20 machine learning framework. The Cyber Equations approach is novel in its use of these classifiers combined with Hadoop based parallel processing technology. The five stages of processing used by CyberInsider improve scalability and reduce the high number of false positives normally associated with network anomaly detection. In summary, the Cyber Equations has successfully accomplished all of its Phase I tasks and demonstrated the feasibility of the Insider Threat Monitoring System.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗