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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2024

Select Proliferation Studies on TRISO-fueled, Heat-Pipe-cooled Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors carry the potential to open up new markets for the nuclear industry, as their expected cost competitiveness in non-traditional market segments (e.g., mines, military bases, extraterrestrial surfaces, and remote areas), and their inherent safety features make them deployable when other power sources are unavailable or difficult to exploit. For countries that have not traditionally participated in nuclear power, microreactors represent a clean energy solution [1]. However, their use, especially in non-weapons states, may entail challenges in terms of maintaining international nuclear safeguards [2]. Furthermore, the deployment locations where microreactors may prove most cost competitive would be difficult to access by state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [3]. In addition to the isolated nature of potential deployment sites, the low-power characteristic of microreactors suggests that numerous microreactors would need to be deployed to meet energy demands. That, coupled with the unique physics of many current microreactor designs, opens up a new area of research with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards concerns [2]. Whereas traditional facilities are inspected as isolated cases when looking for signs of diversion or misuse; microreactors may need to be assessed in the context of the entire fleet to which they belong. International safeguards necessitate timely detection of any significant quantities (SQs) of material that are being diverted (e.g., 1 SQ of special nuclear material diverted over the course of a 1-year period) [4]. For low-enriched uranium, the IAEA defines 1 SQ as corresponding to 75 kg of 235U. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the detectability threshold for material diversion in microreactors by relying on critical control drum angles, excess reactivity, and the reactor lifetime as the selected operational parameters. For this assessment, a heat-pipe-cooled microreactor was regarded as the base design. While the conclusions reached in this paper are not readily extendable to the design of actual microreactors, the analysis herein enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the level of accuracy needed for reference calculations in order to detect diversion scenarios by utilizing the selected operational parameters (i.e., mainly control drum angles, critical insertion angle, and the reactor lifetime).

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Enhanced Mechanical Properties and Wear Resistance of FeCrAl Alloys at ~ 300°C and Higher Temperatures

Abstract Worldwide, light water reactors (LWRs) have been using zirconium (Zr)-based alloys for the cladding of the uranium dioxide fuel for more than 6 decades. Zr alloys oxidize rapidly in the presence of water and steam at temperatures > 450°C; therefore, they do not respond well to scenarios of loss of coolant accidents. There is a global effort by nuclear materials technologists to find more robust or stronger cladding materials for LWRs. One option is to use an iron-chromium-aluminum (FeCrAl) alloy since they have excellent resistance to high temperature oxidation and superior mechanical properties at LWR operation temperatures. Results show that (1) FeCrAl alloys have better mechanical properties than Zr alloy and are orders of magnitude more resistant to creep at temperatures higher than LWR normal operation conditions. (2) FeCrAl alloys have better resistance to fretting wear than Zr alloys at the normal operation conditions of LWRs.

Materials Science↗
DOE OSTI2023

2023 Critical Materials Strategy

The global effort to curb carbon emissions is accelerating demand for clean energy technologies and the materials they rely on. Demand for these materials will only continue to grow, especially as some nations aim to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. While some major materials like steel, copper, and aluminum are already powering the fossil fuel economy, others are more minor materials with potential supply risks. These risks could jeopardize the ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the desirable timeframe to avoid significant climate change. In some cases, it may be necessary to take action to improve the resilience of material supply chains and mitigate supply risks. Understanding the importance of individual materials to clean energy and the supply risks associated with them is necessary to identify which materials may serve as potential roadblocks to a clean energy future. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a series of 13 supply chain deep dive assessment reports on various energy technologies in 2022 in response to President Biden’s Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains (E.O. 14017). These reports emphasized that supply chain bottlenecks can occur at any stage of the value chain from mining and refining to component and even sub-system manufacturing. The bottlenecks are a combination of factors such as material availability, equipment availability, work force availability and quality, logistics, regulatory framework, and market conditions. These bottlenecks were worsened during the global Covid-19 pandemic. Its lingering impacts have hindered capacity expansion for material supply chains and prevented product lead-time recovery. One approach to reduce supply chain risks for the United States is to have a strong domestic manufacturing sector with a diverse set of producers. Boosting responsible domestic production would require leveraging the latest science not only in material extraction but also in developing substitutes, recycling, reuse, and remanufacturing. This report is an updated analysis of previous Critical Materials Strategy (CMS) reports published by the DOE in 2010, 2011, and 2019 based on national and global priorities, technology advancement, and technology adoption trends. Like the CMS reports, this analysis presents the results of a formal material criticality assessment to identify which materials are critical to the continued deployment of clean energy technologies globally. The analysis in this report leveraged the DOE supply chain deep dive assessments to develop the initial list of materials to evaluate. This DOE Critical Materials Assessment (CMA) is conducted independently of criticality assessments performed by other U.S. government agencies, such as that conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). This analysis complements the USGS critical minerals determination in three aspects. First, the DOE assessment is performed from a global perspective, while the USGS analysis focusses on the importance of minerals to the U.S. economy. Second, this report focuses on the importance of materials to clean energy technologies, rather than to the economy in general. Lastly, this study is forward looking to 2035 based on clean energy deployment scenarios, whereas the USGS assessment is retrospective. Materials evaluated in this report that do not appear in the USGS Critical Minerals List include copper, uranium, electrical steel, and SiC. A draft version of this report received ~80 public comments related to supporting data and methodological improvement. Those comments have been incorporated as much as possible where appropriate. Highlights of findings from this 2023 CMA include: Rare earth materials (neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium) used in magnets in electric vehicle (EV) motors and wind turbine generators continue to be critical. While dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) are both heavy rare earth elements that serve the same function in magnets, the criticality of Tb is slightly lower than that for Dy in the short term due to the widespread use of Dy in high-grade magnets and Tb’s present role as a substitute. Similarly, praseodymium (Pr) is critical in the medium term but only near critical in the short term because it is more substitutable in magnets than neodymium (Nd); Materials used in batteries for EVs and stationary storage are now considered to be critical. While cobalt (Co) was found to be critical in this and previous reports, lithium (Li) becomes critical in the medium term due to its broader use in various battery chemistries and the rampant growth of the EV industry. Natural graphite is a new addition in this assessment and is also found to be critical; Platinum group metals used in hydrogen electrolyzers, such as platinum (Pr) and iridium (Ir), are critical due to an increased focus on hydrogen technologies to achieve net zero carbon emissions, while those used in catalytic converters, such as rhodium (Rh) and palladium (Pd), were screened out due to the decreased importance of catalytic converters in the medium term; Gallium (Ga) continues to be critical due to its use in light-emitting diodes (LEDs). In addition, the use of Ga has increased in magnet manufacturing and in semiconductor in forms such as gallium arsenide (GaAs) or gallium nitride (GaN); Major materials like Aluminum (Al), copper (Cu), nickel (Ni), and silicon (Si) move from noncritical in the short term to near critical in the medium term due to their importance in electrification; Electrical steel is near critical due to its use in transformers for the grid and electric motors in EVs.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

FIU Project 2: Environmental Remediation Science & Technology [Slides]

FIU’s research under this project involves conducting basic and applied science to fill knowledge gaps and validate potential remediation technologies for contaminated soil and groundwater and the assessment of the fate and transport of contaminants in the environment. The aim of FIU’s research is to reduce the potential for contaminant mobility or toxicity in the surface and subsurface through the development and application of state-of-the-art scientific and environmental remediation technologies at the Hanford Site, Savannah River Site (SRS), and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which is the Nation’s only mined geologic repository for permanent disposal of transuranic waste. FIU collaborates with scientists from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) in order to plan and execute research that is synergistic with the work being conducted at the sites, and that supports the resolution of critical science and engineering needs which leads to a better understanding of the long-term behavior of subsurface contaminants. The knowledge gained through this research will be used to transform experimental and modeling innovations into practical applications deployed at the sites to support EM’s primary goal of expediting the closure of major contaminated soil and groundwater sites and waste units. Collaborative relationships between FIU and the national laboratories have provided large benefits over the years to FIU, the national laboratories, the DOE complex, and the DOE EM mission. By working closely with the national laboratories, FIU’s research is not only closely aligned with the cleanup mission priorities at the DOE sites, but complements and supports ongoing work at the national laboratories for screening of new remedial technologies. This coordination and leveraging of research efforts results in time- and cost-savings, and will accelerate progress of the DOE EM environmental restoration mission.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗