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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

Evaluation of Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity

The Department of Energy/Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE/OE) Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program is currently evaluating the Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity document that sets a vision and outlines a set of milestones. The milestones are divided into five strategic focus areas that include: 1. Build a Culture of Security; 2. Assess and Monitor Risk; 3. Develop and Implement New Protective Measures to Reduce Risk; 4. Manage Incidents; and 5. Sustain Security Improvements. The most current version of the roadmap was last updated in September of 2016. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has been tasked with revisiting the roadmap to update the current state of energy delivery systems cybersecurity protections. SNL is currently working with previous and current partners to provide feedback on which of the roadmap milestones have been met and to identify any preexisting or new gaps that are not addressed by the roadmap. The specific focus areas SNL was asked to evaluate are: 1. Develop and Implement New Protective Measures to Reduce Risk and 2. Sustain Security Improvements. SNL has formed an Industry Advisory Board (IAB) to assist in answering these questions. The IAB consists of previous partners on past CEDS funded efforts as well as new collaborators that have unique insights into the current state of cybersecurity within energy delivery systems. The IAB includes asset owners, utilities and vendors of control systems. SNL will continue to maintain regular communications with the IAB to provide various perspectives on potential future updates to further improve the breadth of cybersecurity coverage of the roadmap.

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DOE OSTI2016

Cybersecurity Intrusion Detection and Monitoring for Field Area Network: Final Report

This report summarizes the key technical accomplishments, industry impact and performance of the I2-CEDS grant entitled “Cybersecurity Intrusion Detection and Monitoring for Field Area Network”. Led by Applied Communication Sciences (ACS/Vencore Labs) in conjunction with its utility partner Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), the project accelerated research on a first-of-its-kind cybersecurity monitoring solution for Advanced Meter Infrastructure and Distribution Automation field networks. It advanced the technology to a validated, full-scale solution that detects anomalies, intrusion events and improves utility situational awareness and visibility. The solution was successfully transitioned and commercialized for production use as SecureSmart™ Continuous Monitoring. Discoveries made with SecureSmart™ Continuous Monitoring led to tangible and demonstrable improvements in the security posture of the US national electric infrastructure.

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DOE OSTI2026

Navigating United States Standards and Regulation for Digital Energy Systems

This report provides an analysis of the U.S. standards and regulatory landscape for digital energy systems, focusing on cybersecurity, safety, and reliability requirements. It examines the interplay between federal mandates, state regulations, voluntary industry standards, and utility-specific policies, highlighting critical gaps between compliance and real-world risk mitigation. While NERC CIP standards enforce cybersecurity for Bulk Electric System assets, distribution-level infrastructure and emerging technologies often fall outside mandatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities. The report identifies systemic challenges such as reliance on self-attestation, uneven state adoption of safety codes, and lagging standards for advanced technologies like battery energy storage and inverter-based resources. Through a detailed gap analysis, it underscores the urgency of proactive risk-based approaches, independent verification, and strategic engagement with state and federal entities. Recommendations include adopting tiered security frameworks, strengthening procurement practices, and addressing emerging technology risks to ensure resilient and secure digital energy infrastructure. This guidance is intended for utilities, regulators, and stakeholders navigating compliance obligations and seeking to enhance cybersecurity and safety beyond minimum standards.

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DOE OSTI2022

Business Continuity, Cybersecurity, and Backup Control Center: Standards, References, and Recommendations (White Paper)

This Whitepaper provides an overview and synopsis of relevant standards for Control Center, Cyber Security and Continuity of Operations for electric power utilities. It also provides suggestions and recommendations for the outline of a cybersecurity plan and a business continuity plan, and suggests training and certification opportunities for both cybersecurity and business continuity.

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DOE OSTI2026

Oakland University Cybersecurity Center (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the outcomes of Award DE-CR0000023, “Oakland University Cybersecurity Center,” a 31-month project funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). The project addressed cybersecurity risks facing small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) transitioning to Industry 4.0. The project integrated customer discovery, applied research, and cybersecurity training development. A total of 51 cybersecurity assessments identified significant gaps in baseline practices, incident response, and workforce capability. Research efforts produced a scalable mitigation framework tailored to SMM environments, and workforce analysis identified persistent talent gaps. Eight cybersecurity training modules were developed and deployed via Oakland University’s Professional and Continuing Education (PACE) platform. All objectives were completed, with 98.93% federal budget utilization and cost share exceeding requirements. The project establishes a scalable model for strengthening cybersecurity resilience and workforce capacity across U.S. manufacturing supply chains.

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DOE OSTI2026

Data Center Cybersecurity, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Cohort Summary: Takeaways and Action Plans

This report summarizes the outcomes of the Data Center Cohort under the Department of Energy’s Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, aimed at enhancing grid resilience through cybersecurity, supply chain risk management (SCRM), and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). The cohort engaged 17 organizations across utilities, data center operators, vendors, and technology providers in three sessions combining presentations, discussions, and exercises. Key topics included AI-driven load behavior, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in UPS/BESS and cooling systems, governance gaps at utility–data center boundaries, and supply chain integrity. Five cross-cutting themes emerged: interconnection architecture vulnerabilities, fragmented governance, AI-driven stability risks, lack of regulatory frameworks, and long-term supply chain concerns. Actionable recommendations were developed, including implementing DMZ segmentation, formalizing vendor access agreements, designing AI workload limits, and advancing standards through NERC and state-level programs. These strategies aim to strengthen resilience, clarify responsibilities, and ensure secure integration of data centers into the grid.

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DOE OSTI2026

DER Cybersecurity Standards: Assessment and Gap Analysis

The purpose of this report is to share the comprehensive gap analysis of existing cybersecurity standards applicable to Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within the electric power sector. This analysis aims to identify critical deficiencies in current standards, assess their alignment with industry needs, and provide actionable recommendations for enhancing cybersecurity measures. The scope encompasses various DER technologies, including solar, wind, energy storage, and hydrogen fuel cells, and emphasizes the significance of establishing robust cybersecurity frameworks and standards to safeguard these increasingly integrated systems. The report provides valuable insights for stakeholders in the DER ecosystem, including manufacturers, utilities, and regulators. It underscores the importance of continued development and refinement of cybersecurity standards to keep up with the technical advances in DERs and associated cybersecurity challenges. The analysis evaluated IEC, IEEE, ISA, ISO, and UL standards relevant to DER cybersecurity. Standards were assessed on their coverage of key requirements including data availability, integrity, confidentiality, access control, authentication, encryption, and system hardening. For each standard, the analysis assessed its alignment with current industry practices, regulatory compliance, effectiveness in addressing known risks, coverage of emerging risks, and how it promotes interoperability. The evaluation also considered potential integration challenges and barriers to adoption.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Linking Threat Agents to Targeted Organizations: A Pipeline for Enhanced Cybersecurity Risk Metrics

In this study, we present a methodology leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence (CTI) narratives into actionable insights for individual organizations. Our approach automates the extraction of machine-readable adversary SKRAM (Skills, Knowledge, Resources, Authorities, and Motivation) attributes from open-source reports, extending LLM utility beyond typical interactions. This innovation enables precise, automated assessments of cybersecurity risks posed by various adversaries. Using a chain-of-thought and multi-shot prompting strategy, our methodology advances the automation of cybersecurity feature extraction for new machine-learning models that predict the risk of adversary targeting. This approach is refined using a substantial dataset of over 150 analyst-validated threat reports and synthetic organizational data from 900 companies. Here, by bootstrapping the training data with a rule-based heuristic over synthetic data, we have developed a high-accuracy machine-learning model that allows entities to dynamically prioritize threats and defensive actions.

Cyber Threat Intelligence↗
DOE OSTI2024

PLC Vulnerabilities and Mitigations

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are used extensively in many high-importance industrial and nonindustrial settings including controlling elevators, manufacturing machines, and utility facilities such as power and natural gas, however cybersecurity protection for them has been neglected. Within recent years, PLCs have been put under more security scrutiny and experts have advocated for changes from the addition of protocol encryption and network segmentation to intrusion detection systems on the PLCs themselves. While PLC security is critical, a large portion of the PLCs available today will never receive these changes due to being legacy or the difficulty of overhauling the security on existing systems. Due to the infeasibility of applying many recommended security measures towards currently available machines, we aim to provide realistic and affordable best practices for hardening PLCs. We will first conduct security analysis and consider attack vectors within our target PLC. Once we’ve analyzed the device’s security, we will evaluate a variety of mitigation methods and create guidelines to effectively reduce the threat posed by PLC attacks with minimal disruption to operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Data Management for the Wastewater Industry

This information sheet discusses the technology pillar Advanced Data Management as a pathway toward improving wastewater infrastructure sustainability and resiliency. To supplement existing literature on current technologies and policies for improving resiliency at wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), this document aims to accomplish the following: • Summarize key technologies such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), digital twins, and smart sensors • Summarize relevant cybersecurity measures and data management tools available for WW utilities • Summarize advances in sensing and monitoring technologies • Serve as a comprehensive (though not exhaustive) repository for data management for wastewater utilities The Advanced Management Technical Information Sheet should be viewed as a general guide to established best practices for the water and wastewater sector when considering implementing energy capture and energy- or process-efficient technologies. Further details are presented in the SWIFt Technology Information Sheet Series for accompanying Technology Pillars.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Assessment in DER-rich Distribution Operations: Criticality Levels and Impact Analysis

The integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution networks has become a pivotal strategy for achieving decarbonization, enhancing grid resilience, and optimizing grid efficiency. Remote monitoring and control op- erations of such resources rely on a network of sensors and communication infrastructure, exposing the system to potential cyber threats. Therefore, as the deployment of DERs increases, ensuring secure monitoring and control becomes an imperative challenge. This paper utilizes real-time feeder models, which are instrumental in developing cybersecurity testbeds tailored for hardware-in-loop (HIL) systems. These models enable users to simulate cyber attacks in a real-world environment and analyze the power distribution operations during vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we discuss several practical sets of grid parameters to identify critical levels of DERs and evaluate various scenarios that simulate cyber threats on sensitive DERs. The modified IEEE 123-bus model is used as the test case for demonstrating the proposed scenarios. The findings from this study provide valuable insights into the vulnerabilities and potential consequences of cyber attacks on DERs, allowing for better mitigation strategies and improved cyber resilience in future distribution networks.

Maharjan, Manisha↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Assessment Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

This growing number of smart devices that support DERs can increase the number of access points outside a utility’s administrative domain, which can increase the potential for cyberattack. With the integration of DERs at federal sites, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of DER systems must be understood and addressed. This presentation covers two NREL tools available. The Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) is a web-based holistic tool for evaluating cybersecurity posture including governance, physical security and technical management. The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) extends the DER-CF by applying it to the NIST risk management framework process. It will be downloadable application that runs locally and documents all the major requirements for achieving Authority to Operate the DER.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2024

Does practice make perfect? Lessons learned from full-scale power system incident response exercise

While threats to the energy sector occur daily, few utilities get the opportunity to fully test out their detection and response mechanisms to advanced threats in the real world. With the high demand for reliability, few grid operators would allow execution of simulated cyber-attacks on their live systems. The DOE-funded Liberty Eclipse project offers a unique opportunity for small and large utilities and coops to practice their combined IT/OT responses to a live red team executing attacks against an isolated power system on an island in New York. Both cyber teams and power operations teams must work together to detect and respond to attacks, even restoring the power system against extreme impacts. Lessons learned from these exercises reveal key takeaways for understanding what a real attack against the electric sector will look like, gaps in execution of the best-laid plans when the pressure of a real event is bearing down, and how organizations can better prepare for advanced attacks by optimizing participation in exercises. This presentation will discuss successes and opportunities for improvement both in how utilities can prepare for and respond to events, as well as how full-scale IT/OT exercises can be coordinated.

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DOE OSTI2018

Final Report: TIP-337 Home Battery System for Cybersecure Energy Efficiency and Demand Response

Many challenges related to energy use and grid participation face the residential building sector and utilities that serve our homes today. To reduce energy consumption, increase grid service participation, and improve homeowner benefits, a solution is needed that can adapt itself to each home and homeowner/occupant, that can deliver both building and grid services with reliability and high availability, that can automate these operations to minimize cost and complexity of deployment, and that can provide both home data privacy and grid cybersecurity. We hypothesize that customer-oriented home automation can mutually satisfy home occupant/owner needs, reduce energy consumption, and deliver reliable grid services. This project seeks to develop innovative technology solutions that prove this hypothesis. The Home Battery System (HBS) is a technology package comprised of connected 'smart' appliances, rooftop solar photovoltaics, a home battery, and a coordinating smart controller. This system is envisioned, developed and demonstrated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Bosch, ESCRYPT and Colorado State University (CSU). It is the result of three years of research by our diverse team. NREL developed the home automation controller, and performed simulation and laboratory evaluations of the HBS. Bosch developed and delivered most of the connected appliances used in the project, and provided technical and commercialization guidance. ESCRYPT led cybersecurity analysis and developed the cybersecurity layer. CSU provided leadership on preference elicitation methodologies.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2024

CARILEC Resilient Energy Community CoP for Cybersecurity Workshop Series: Cybersecurity Assessment Tools [Slides]

For the last several years and in collaboration with CARILEC, USAID and NREL have been working to support cyber resilience at power sector utilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Direct technical assistance with regional utilities has been a key component of USAID-NREL Partnership activities, and technical assistance has typically included a foundational cybersecurity assessment using NREL's Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) tool. The DER-CF allows organizations to benchmark and evaluate their cybersecurity posture across the areas of Governance, Technical Management, and Physical Security. To complement the activities of the newly created CAREC IT/OT and Cybersecurity Team, this webinar on cybersecurity assessment tools includes an overview of the DER-CF tool and a discussion with regional stakeholders and NREL experts on the DER-CF assessment process and other resources for cybersecurity assessments.

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DOE OSTI2018

Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber‐physical threats

Abstract Recent events have highlighted the need to address cybersecurity threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal information systems which are evolving and growing. These threats have become ubiquitous in the United States, and throughout the world. Many information and communications technology (ICT) devices and other components are interdependent so that disruption of one component may have a negative, cascading effect on others. In the United States, the Federal role in cyber‐security has been debated for more than a decade but creating a policy is complicated because in the United States, State and local governments are the major institutions responsible for providing services to their populations. It is important that critical infrastructure such as Publically Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) and Public Water Systems (PWSs) adopt suitable countermeasures to prevent or minimise the consequences of cyber‐attacks. This paper discusses both technological and procedural techniques that can be used to protect against cyber‐threats.

Clark, Robert M.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Using Structured Intelligence Graph (STIG) to protect our critical infrastructure against cyber attacks [Poster]

STIG is a revolutionary cybersecurity tool developed by researchers at the U. S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory and it is a software that allows utility owners and operators to easily visualize, create, and edit cyberthreat intelligence information. STIG uses Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) and converts complex data on cybersecurity vulnerabilities into a visualization that is easy to understand and act on. With STIG, utility owners and operators have a common system for sharing threat intelligence information, thus increasing the chances of detecting and mitigating cyber exploits before they lead to a cyberattack.

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