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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Functionalized Magnetic Nanoparticles for Technetium Sequestration from Groundwater

Technetium 99 (Tc) is among the most common environmental contaminants at DOE sites and one of the most common risk drivers in low- and high-level waste disposal sites. The majority of Tc is generated from anthropogenic sources, such as nuclear power plants, global weapons, nuclear storage facilities and medical applications. Through these sources, Tc contamination has been unintentionally introduced in to the environment. The most common chemical form of Tc is Tc(VII)O{sub 4}{sup -}. Due to its high solubility and mobility, Tc can enter the food chain and cause adverse health effects to humans. Currently, ion exchange resins and reduction processes are the most common approaches for Tc immobilization. Although these techniques have shown to be effective, they also possess major drawbacks, such as high cost, low adsorption capacity, and complex creation and maintenance. Therefore, development of more efficient and simple technologies for the remediation of Tc-contaminated systems are needed. Functionalized magnetic nanoparticles have been used to remove organic and inorganic contaminants from water resources. These nanoparticles have attracted extensive attention as an adsorbent material due to their large surface area, high efficiency, low-cost, easy functionalization and separation with a magnet. This study seek to develop functionalized magnetic iron oxide nanoparticles for the efficient removal of Tc and other heavy metal contaminants from water resources under ambient conditions. Objectives: Synthesize magnetic iron oxide nanoparticles and functionalize their surface with Cetyltrimethylammonium Bromide (CTAB) and tetraethyl-orthosilicate (TEOS). Characterize the synthesized nanoparticles using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) coupled with energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EDS), Dynamic Light Scattering (DLS) and Zeta PALS. Perform adsorption studies to evaluate their adsorption behavior and capacity for (a) Technetium using Rhenium (ReO{sub 4}{sup -}) as a surrogate and (b) heavy metals, e.g. Cu{sup 2+}. Conclusions: Magnetic iron oxide nanoparticles were successfully functionalized with CTAB and TEOS. The functionalization of the iron oxide nanoparticles affects their surface charge and their hydrodynamic diameter. The addition of CTAB or TEOS decreased the hydrodynamic diameter of the nanoparticles due to repulsive and steric forces. The SEM micrographs show spherical nanoparticles of different sizes. The EDX analysis shows the presence of iron and oxygen from the iron oxide crystalline structure, and the different constituents of the CTAB and TEOS molecules. Proof-of-concept shows the successful adsorption of rhenium (ReO{sub 4}{sup -}) and copper Cu{sup 2+}) onto CTAB-Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} and TEOS-Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} respectively.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗